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ABSTRACT 
 
 ‘Entirely oblivious to the events unfolding on the “other shore,” Europe tolerated that the 
Mediterranean, her sea, would turn into a graveyard,’ (Cacciari 2016: viii) These words 
from the Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari’s 2016 study on Europe and Empire 
indicate to us how Europe today still suffers from a “historical emphysema.” This thesis 
addresses the question of how these pulmonary difficulties of Europe are related to the 
process of a history in which the name of Europe comes to be related to and even 
identified with what is called “spirit.” As is well known, Europe has been conceived as 
‘no more than a geographical accident, the peninsula that Asia shoves into the Atlantic’ 
(Sartre 1988: 292). However, the thesis argues that another definition of Europe, even if 
intimately bound up with its geography, comes to the fore as the spirit of Europe. In order 
to bring to light the “spiritual geography” of Europe, I focus primarily on two strands of 
the twentieth century philosophical inquiry into the notion of “Europe;” one by the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger and the other by the French poet and thinker Paul 
Valéry. The argument is that what these two thinkers achieve in their thought testifies to 
the history of an ambiguous relation between Europe and spirit. For both thinkers Europe 
appears as such only as it is shaped and reshaped by this spiritual relation, one which 
Europe today retains in its absence, that is, in its spiritlessness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We live in a time when the notion of Europe appears once again to have become a subject 
of intense debate. Moreover, this particular time, a time in which we claim that Europe is 
unified in a European union all the while that Europe and our so-called European cultures 
prove to be dispersed, scattered, and even unidentifiable, presents us with numerous 
challenges as we come face to face with the question of Europe. As such, this time is also 
a crucial yet somewhat inconvenient time to put together a thesis that makes no attempt 
at solving or improving the ambiguous and problematic situation in which Europe finds 
itself, but rather seeks merely to discuss a single historically and philosophically 
significant aspect of Europe, namely the spirit of Europe that appears to have fallen into 
crisis. 
As will become clear in the pages that follow, the title of the present work, “The 
spirit of Europe,” carries within itself a certain duality. That is, it carries the duality of a 
European spirit that is foundational at the same time that it is collapsing. Such a duality, 
moreover, is one that is reflected in the thought of the two prominent European thinkers 
of the twentieth century, namely Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Paul Valéry (1871-
1945). With respect to these thinkers we see how, on the one hand, the question of Europe 
occupies a position of paramount importance for them as the basis not only for their own 
writings, but also for how they regard their European contemporaries and the spirit of 
their time in general. On the other hand, however, these same thinkers also recognise how 
the European spirit has suffered a blow and thereby has been subjected to a crisis. 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind how this entire dynamic of spirit, for both 
Heidegger and Valéry, plays out on the background and under the sway of nihilism that 
Nietzsche had already designated as being central to a Europe imbued with a ‘self-
devaluation of its highest values [die obersten Werthe sich entwerthen]’ (KSA 12, 350). 
Engaging with the duality of rise and fall as well as that of significance and 
devaluation that we have introduced here, it is worth reminding ourselves that such a 
duality emerges from within a particular historical context. Put in another way, it is not 
insignificant that Valéry is writing in the proximity and aftermath of the Great War or 
that Heidegger is writing in the proximity and aftermath of the Second World War, for it 
is precisely in relation to these concrete situations that each of these thinkers arrives at 
his particular view regarding the twofold nature of the European spirit. Although it is 
16 
 
indeed important for us to take note of the historical background informing the ideas of 
Heidegger and Valéry, it is also important for us to point out that this thesis will not be 
concerned with either the Great War or the Second World War as such, that is, in a 
historiographical manner. Instead, our focus in what follows will be on the implications 
that such historical events carry for the manner in which Valéry and Heidegger think 
about the spirit of Europe. 
Having now touched upon the notion of spirit, it would be good at this preliminary 
point in our discussion for us briefly to point out how this notion fits within the general 
mood of the twentieth-century Europe. In the first half of the century, and particularly in 
the aftermath of the Great War, Europe was undergoing an increasingly forceful shift in 
which an increasingly intimate relation between Europe and spirit was being drawn. One 
characteristic example of this shift came in the form of the so-called “conservative 
revolution”1 in Germany in which Germany, seen to occupy a privileged position at the 
centre of Europe, would eventually be regarded as being essentially of spirit. This theme 
concerning the intimacy between Europe and spirit is a central one for our argument, and 
for this reason it is a theme to which we will return often in the discussions that follow. 
What is also important to notice at this preliminary point is how the question of Europe 
in the twentieth century and its presumed spiritual tradition to which both Heidegger and 
Valéry seem to be loyal (at least in part and each in his own manner), appears to be 
inextricably woven into the idiom of philosophy. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
provocatively puts it, ‘Europe is philosophy [L’Europe, c’est la philosophie]’ in such a 
manner that Europe is something like the ‘spiritual fatherland [patrie] as philosophy.’ 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 2012: 89) 
In my view, what Lacoue-Labarthe intends to call attention to with this statement 
is that ‘Europe has invented philosophy’ in such a radical sense that philosophy is perhaps 
‘the only real backbone of the European history since the Greeks.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 
2012: 103)2 This claim will prove useful to our purposes in this thesis not only in that it 
calls attention to “the Greeks,” which will be a crucial philosophical locus of this thesis, 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of the controversial term “Konservative Revolution,” understood as the collective 
designation of a multifarious political and intellectual movement, see Mohler and Weissmann 2005: 93ff.   
2 In this sense, Lacoue-Labarthe believes that ‘Europe is, very simply, the land of philosophy [le pays de 
philosophie], of this form of thinking, which one calls philosophy and which has its own history and internal 
ruptures’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 2012: 103). As will become evident in Chapter Two, Heidegger too would take 
up this idea in the form of “European philosophy,” which he refers to as a tautology.  
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but also in that it illuminates what one might dare to call a “philosophy of Europe.”3 Thus, 
what is important for Lacoue-Labarthe to stress is that “the Greeks” represent a pivotal 
point of reference in the European history of the “philosophy of Europe.” 
Such a relation between Europe and the Greeks drawn here by Lacoue-Labarthe, I 
would suggest, provides us with a suitable backdrop against which it becomes possible 
for us to trace out the distinctive contours of what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the philosophical 
backbone of Europe. Let us therefore move forward here in briefly outlining these 
contours in order to elucidate their pertinence to the present work on the spirit of Europe. 
In doing so, we may focus our attention on Edmund Husserl’s famous Vienna lecture 
from May 1935, entitled Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen Menschheit.  
Towards the end of his lecture, Husserl observes that there are only two exit 
strategies available for escaping the crisis to which he regards Europe to be subjected: 
either the decline of Europe because of an estrangement and hostility toward the spirit 
(Geistfeindschaft) or ‘the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy through a 
heroism of reason’ (Hua VI, 347-348). It is important to note, however, that prior to laying 
out this binary disjunction, Husserl had already been meditating in his lecture on what he 
calls ‘“the spiritual figure of Europe” [“die geistige Gestalt Europas”]’ (Hua VI, 319).4 
In order to shine some light on this figure, Husserl turns his reflections towards that which 
he characterises as the ‘original phenomenon [Urphänomen] of spiritual Europe’ and 
whose traits he claims can be established by considering this original phenomenon’s 
‘spiritual birthplace in a nation’ (Hua VI, 321). Such a nation, Husserl muses, must be 
identified with the ancient Greek world in that it is precisely here that we find the basis 
of a new orientation of the world (that is, of the ‘Umwelt’ (Hua VI, 317) characterising 
the spiritual sphere of our historical life in the world) that the Greeks themselves called 
“philosophy.” Whether or not one accepts Husserl’s claim here, what is important to 
understand is how the Greek word φιλοσοφία, according to Husserl, must be translated 
                                                          
3 I borrow this expression from Simon Glendinning, who is himself sort of adapting it from Derrida, in 
order to emphasise the shift of focus from a “European philosophy” to a “philosophy of Europe.” 
(Glendinning 2006: 43) In undertaking an analysis of Europe as ‘a question that will always be of current 
interest’ (AC, 11/5), Derrida prepared a way to the question of Europe that has now made its way into 
philosophy. Hence, the year after Derrida published L’autre cap (1991), a group of philosophers from the 
University of Strasbourg, including Daniel Payot, Denis Guénoun, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, dedicated an entire conference to the question of the “geophilosophy of Europe” under the title 
Penser l’Europe à ses frontières (Guénoun et al. 1993).            
4 The quotation marks here do not indicate reservation, I believe, but rather emphasises the citation and thus 
a re-citation of a tradition of the spirit of Europe. Yet, the question remains whether or not Husserl’s 
repetition merely supports the tradition of Europe’s spirit in spite of its supposed crisis. 
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correctly and ‘in its original sense,’ namely, as a ‘universal science, science of the 
universe [Weltall]’ (Hua VI, 321). 
To be sure, when Husserl says that Europe has a spiritual birthplace, he does not 
refer to Europe merely as a geographical designation, as if the exact extension of Europe 
could be mapped out in a neat and unambiguous manner.5 Rather, in putting forth the idea 
of Europe as belonging to a sort of “spiritual geography,” Husserl seeks to transgress the 
boundary of an empirical geography in the direction of the infinite idea of philosophy that 
finds both its place and time of birth in the Greece of the sixth and seventh centuries B.C.6 
Indeed, as Husserl argues in his lecture from 1935, in that the idea of Europe is the 
philosophical idea itself, the name “Europe” thereby comes to designate the event of 
philosophy as history. In other words, when Husserl situates the breakthrough of 
philosophy in ancient Greece, he also recognises in this event the original spiritual 
phenomenon of Europe. In the words of Jacques Derrida (the thinker whose work 
undergirds my readings of both Heidegger and Valéry and in this fashion figures 
significantly within this thesis), ‘Europe is not the cradle [le berceau] of philosophy, it is 
itself born as a spiritual meaning from the idea of philosophy.’ (PG 250/155)7 
Having rounded off these preliminary remarks concerning the philosophy of 
spiritual Europe, let us now offer a brief characterisation of the chief philosophical 
motivation for this thesis. In order to do this, we may begin by turning to Derrida’s 
remarkable work L’autre cap (1991). This work, I suggest, proves an effective device not 
only for attuning our attention but also for preparing us to embark on the central task of 
this thesis, that is, the task of taking up the question concerning the spirit of Europe in 
                                                          
5 In a similar fashion, Husserl does not identify the European humanity with the groups of people who 
inhabit this appointed geographical site of the world. I note here that Husserl’s infamous inclusion of the 
United States and the English dominions and exclusion of the Indians, Eskimos, and the Gypsies (die 
Zigeuner) vagabonding around Europe, belongs to his discourse about Europe (Hua VI, 318-319).       
6 Surely, a paradox seems to be involved in Husserl’s question to situate the birth of the infinite in a definite 
time and place in history. Marrati describes this aporia as follows: ‘If the infinite idea of philosophy, as 
absolute idea, is buried, hidden, but also present in the empirical history that precedes its happening, one 
would have to say that its “birth,” at a particular time and place, and, in the most extreme case, not appeared 
at all. Europe has no right to be such a privileged place.’ (Marrati 2005: 22) 
7 Derrida skilfully deals with these issues in his Master’s Thesis (1953-1954) Le problème de la genèse 
dans la philosophie de Husserl (PG, 249-254/155-159) where he writes that ‘Husserl would not dispute 
that Europe in its empirical facticity has no privileged relation to the idea of philosophy. And yet, Europe, 
philosophy’s spiritual place of birth, its mysterious and immaterial residence, resists variation. There is a 
European eidos merging itself with the idea of philosophy.’ (PG, 250-251/155) Derrida’s interest in this 
problem is reissued in his 1962 translation and introduction to Husserl’s Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der 
Geometrie als intentional-Historisches Problem. 
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relation to Heidegger and Valéry.8 In an important portion of this work, Derrida makes 
the following important claim: 
 
In its physical geography, and in what has often been called, by Husserl for 
example, its spiritual geography, Europe has always recognized itself as a 
cape or headland, either as the advanced extreme of a continent, to the west 
and south (the land’s end, the advanced point of a Finistère, Europe of the 
Atlantic or of the Greco-Latino-Iberian shores of the Mediterranean), the 
point of departure for discovery, invention, and colonization, or as the very 
center of this tongue [langue] in the form of a cape, the Europe of the middle 
[milieu], coiled up, indeed compressed along a Greco-Germanic axis, as the 
very center of the center of the cape. (AC, 24-25/19-20) 
 
With respect to this guiding intuition regarding the Greco-Roman and the Greco-
Germanic axis of Europe’s spiritual geography, it becomes possible to see how Derrida 
himself draws a connection between Valéry and Heidegger. As Derrida suggests, when 
one turns one gaze to that period between the two world wars one thereby runs up against 
these two thinkers and their influential thought. On the one hand, one is met by Heidegger 
and his discussion concerning “the danger of spirit” as central to the danger of Europe as 
this theme is traced out in the 1935 lecture course Einführung in die Metaphysik; and, on 
the other hand, one discovers (what is, in this respect, Derrida’s primary concern in 
L’autre cap) Valéry’s engagement with the crisis of spirit as a crisis of Europe, that is, as 
a crisis of the cap, the cape, or the head of Europe.9 Indeed, regarding the latter Derrida 
remarks, ‘Valéry is a Mediterranean spirit. […] All Valéry’s works are those of a 
European from the Greco-Roman Mediterranean world’ (AC, 37-38/35).10 
                                                          
8 In this work, I shall not engage in an analysis of the whole range of topics covered by Derrida in L’autre 
cap. Excellent discussions of Derrida’s text from which I have benefited are Naas 1992: vii-lix; Bennington 
2005: 95-108; Redfield 2007: 373-392; Gasché 2009: 265-338; Weber 2014: 9-29.  
9 As can be seen from the title of two lectures,“La mort est l’union de l’âme et du corps dont la conscience, 
l’éveil et la souffrance sont désunion”—P. Valéry, Tel Quel, II, XLI, Derrida had already discovered Valéry 
when teaching at the Sorbonne in 1961-1962. On the centennial of Valéry’s birth, Derrida revisits Valéry 
to regret not having “reread” his work for a long time (M, 331/278). In his rereading of Valéry in 1971, 
Derrida finds a displacement of his relationship to Valéry’s texts, especially the notebooks in view of which 
the theme of ‘Valéry for us, Valéry now, Valéry today, Valéry alive, Valéry dead,’ appears to us twenty 
year prior to his appeal to Valéry’s capital challenge to us today about the “AUJOURD’HUI”  (AC, 17-
18/11-12). Thus, after his early encounter with Valéry in 1960s and 1970s, as well as that after L’autre cap 
in the early 1990s, Derrida circles back to Valéry in his final years of teaching when he, at the end of both 
session four and five of the seminar La bête et le souverain (2001-2002), announces his intention to take 
up Valéry’s Monsieur Teste. Thus, during the sixth session, Derrida reflects on Valéry’s famous statement, 
‘La bêtise n’est pas mon fort’ (BS I, 255/188). Furthermore, towards the end of his fascinating reflections 
on Valéry, Derrida returns to his 1991 encounter with Valéry, ‘who decidedly wagers a lot, stubbornly and 
pigheadedly,’ (BS I, 270/200) on the word cap, cape, or head. 
10 When Derrida shows an interest in the Mediterranean shore, it is not only because of its French, Italian, 
Latin, or Christian heading, but also because of the “other shore,” the “other heading,” which is not merely 
another heading (l’autre cap), but rather something other than the heading (l’autre du cap), emphasising 
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Given the connection between Heidegger and Valéry that Derrida draws, it is 
noteworthy that Heidegger himself, in his lecture Hölderlins Erde und Himmel, delivered 
at the Hölderlin-Gesellschaft in Munich in 1959, cites Valéry and the latter’s famous 
collection of letters entitled La crise de l’esprit from 1919.11 Heidegger quotes from 
Valéry’s second letter: 
 
This Europe, will it become what it is in reality (en réalité), that is, a little 
cape of the Asiatic continent? Or will this Europe, rather, remain as what it 
appears to be (ce qu’elle paraît), that is, the precious part of the whole earth, 
the pearl of the sphere, the brain of a spacious body? (GA 4, 176) 
 
In recognising Valéry’s timely questions regarding whether Europe is to become what it 
is, that is, a mere cape, or whether Europe is to remain as the brain of the entire terrestrial 
body, that is, the brain that manages the technological-industrial calculation, Heidegger 
allows himself to add another question by which he presents his own philosophical 
thought as being essentially that of a questioning.12 As he asks, ‘Must Europe, as this cape 
and brain, first become a land of an evening from which another morning of world-destiny 
prepares its rise?’ (GA 4, 177/201) What we therefore see in this question from 1959, I 
would suggest, is that Heidegger does not pass over or move beyond Europe in his 
questioning. Rather, with his question he instead turns his gaze back by inquiring into the 
beginning(s) of Europe. 
 Whereas Valéry characterises Europe as that which has already become what it is, 
that is, a mere cape at the same time that it remains the (apparent) brain of the terrestrial 
body, Heidegger, in contrast, conceives Europe fundamentally as an occurrence of the 
Evening-Land. In mentioning “the Evening-Land” here, we may point out that 
                                                          
the alterity within the very existence of the heading of Europe (AC, 33/29; cf. Bennington 2005: 106; 
Crépon 2006: 195). We will return to this point later in the dissertation. 
11 This is, however, not the first time that Heidegger mentions Valéry. During the early stage of the 
denazification proceedings, Heidegger applies for readmission on November 1945 to teach as an emeritus 
professor at Freiburg University. In his application, Heidegger explains his position as a rector of the 
Freiburg University in 1933-1934 by reference to his work on the spiritual made as an attempt to contribute 
to the ‘overcoming of the bewildered site of Europe and the crisis of the Western spirit.’ (GA 16, 398) In 
this regards, Heidegger refers to Valéry’s three discourses (La crise de l’esprit, La politique de l’esprit / 
Notre souverain bien, Le bilan de l’intelligence) as a proof of his ‘earnest’ and ‘careful’ attention not only 
to Germany but also to the ‘destiny of the Evening-land’ (GA 16, 398). 
12 While appreciative of Valéry’s timely question, Heidegger himself regards philosophical questioning as 
‘essentially untimely [unzeitgemäß]’ in that philosophy either exceeds its own time or ‘binds its time [das 
Heute] back to this time’s earlier and inceptive past.’ (GA 40, 10/9) Certainly, as Bennington points out, 
‘nothing hopes to be more timely than meditations which proudly claim to be untimely. The proud or 
apologetic claim to untimeliness is just a claim that the timeliness of what is being presented as untimely is 
not obvious or widely perceived, and it thereby adds a supplement of timeliness to the untimely.’ 
(Bennington 2000: 129)  
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Heidegger’s distinction between this notion and Europe will serve as a crucial leitmotif 
of the thesis. Although we will reserve a more detailed discussion of this leitmotif for 
later on, we may nevertheless make one brief point regarding the Evening-land. Although 
Heidegger recognises that Europe has become a mere cape (albeit a cape that still operates 
as the brain of the globe), which is to say that Europe has become something inessential 
in the history of the Evening-land, he also claims that the Evening-land has itself, in turn, 
become Europe. In this fashion, suggests Heidegger, the spirit of Europe is perhaps not 
entirely missing from this history of the Evening-land. It is precisely in this sense that 
Heidegger argues in Einführung in die Metaphysik, for example, that if the Europe of 
1935 is not to go down the path of annihilation, it must be itself brought to ‘the 
development of new, historically spiritual forces’ (GA 40, 42/41). 
 Having now drawn several possible relations between Heidegger and Valéry in 
these preliminary remarks, we may now proceed with several historico-philosophical 
reflections on the double axis of Europe’s spiritual geography. In doing so, we follow the 
lead of Derrida who has, in his own explorations of this crucial topic, left us a well-
trodden path on which to move forward. 
 
 THE SPIRITUAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE  
In his 1939 work La liberté de l’esprit, Valéry introduces the idea of ‘the Mediterranean 
basin’ as ‘the most striking and conclusive example’ (HP, 195) of the manner by which 
the freedom of spirit has developed itself. Moreover, in this same work Valéry claims that 
the shores of the Mediterranean are ‘by contagion or dissemination’ a ‘machine for 
making civilisation.’ (HP, 196)13 What is significant about this notion of the 
Mediterranean, for Valéry, is not merely that it carries a geographical-historical meaning, 
but also that it serves a function that is crucial to the ‘development of that European spirit 
with which we are concerned.’ (HP, 312) 
                                                          
13 Interestingly, at this point Valéry refers to another ‘example,’ albeit less commonplace than that of the 
Mediterranean, namely, the ‘Rhine basin.’ (HP, 196) Thus, for Valéry, the central example of the Rhine is 
built up under ‘analogous conditions and showed a remarkable similarity in spirit’ (HP, 197). See Derrida’s 
essay “Envoi” for a discussion of the Latino-Germanic translation of the relation between repraesentatio 
and Vorstellung, Darstellung, or Gestell, in which the Rhine (and Strasbourg) plays an important role as ‘a 
place of passage and of translation, a margin, a privileged site for encounter or competition between two 
immense linguistic territories, which are also two of the most densely inhabited worlds of philosophical 
discourse,’ such that one finds oneself ‘already caught up, surprised, preceded, anticipated by the linked 
co-destination, the strange co-habitation, the contamination and the enigmatic co-translation of these two 
lexicons. The philosophical […] can no longer in this case allow itself to be shut up within the closure of a 
single idiom, without thereby being set afloat, neutral and disembodied, far from every body of language.’ 
(PSY I, 96-97) 
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In order to provide a richer account of this spirit of Europe mentioned here, Valéry 
points to three significant conditions that he argued proved crucial to its formation. The 
first of these is “Rome,” which, for Valéry, is characterised by its power to assert itself as 
an ‘eternal model of organized and stable power’ (HP, 316). The second is “Christianity,” 
which transformed ‘distant and incongruous gods’ into a ‘universal and to some extent 
common’ (HP, 317) religion. And the third is “Greece.” Of this third condition, Valéry 
remarks that not only did it transmit to us the virtues of knowledge, science, progress, and 
technology, but, more fundamentally, it finished ‘the portrait of us Europeans,’ (HP, 319) 
In his own words, ‘What we owe to Greece is perhaps what has most profoundly 
distinguished us from the rest of humanity. To her we owe the discipline of the Spirit 
[…], the method of thought that tends to relate all things to man, the complete man.’ (HP, 
320) 
With this brief outline of Valéry’s notion of the “Mediterranean” I would suggest 
that we are thereby provided a good picture of the role played by the Greco-Roman axis 
within Derrida’s schema of the spiritual geography of Europe. Let us, therefore, turn to 
the second axis of the spiritual geography of Europe posed above by Derrida, namely, the 
Greco-Germanic. 
In exploring the notion of the Greco-Germanic, Derrida primarily has Heidegger in 
his sights. It is worth recalling, however, that long before Heidegger formulated his views 
another German had already emphasised how the ‘origin and well-spring [Brunnquell] of 
the European essence is mostly to be sought by us.’ (Leibniz 1794: 42) These are the 
words of Leibniz from the 1697 essay Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken, betreffend die 
Ausübung und Verbesserung der Teutschen Sprache. In this work, Leibniz develops the 
claim that the “us” that he mentions in the quotation above refers to the Germans to whom 
the languages of French, Spanish, and English (the latter language called half-German, 
halb Teutsch) largely owe their origin. With this claim, he thus suggests that the arch-
ancient (uhralten), if not immemorial, German language therefore exceeds the ancient 
Greek and Latin grammar and in this fashion throws light on the language and people of 
the entirety of Europe (Leibniz 1794: 38-41). In this fashion, then, Leibniz places 
Germany at the very centre of Europe—a move reflective of the claim he makes in another 
work that ‘the kingdom is the centrepiece [Hauptglied], Germany the middle of Europe.’ 
(Leibniz 1670: 198)14 
                                                          
14 The Heidegger-Leibniz relation has been examined by Riedel 1993: 51-53. 
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The theme of Europe’s Germanic centre also makes an appearance in Hegel’s 
Vorlesungen über die philosophie der Geschichte. Here we are told that ‘the heart of 
Europe [das Herz Europas]’ (HW 12, 133) consists of only three countries, England, 
France, and Germany, which together constitute the ‘centre [Mittelpunkte] of Europe’ 
(HW 12, 133). Moreover, in the fourth and final part of this same lecture, Hegel gestures 
again to the Germanic world, this time making reference to the ‘Germanic spirit’ as ‘the 
spirit of the new world’ (HW 12, 413). Prior to these reflections, Hegel has undertaken 
the task of examining the geographical preconditions of history that themselves serve 
both to determine the ‘ground of the world-historical people’ (HW 12, 106) and to help 
us unearth the ‘true theatre for the world history’ (HW 12, 106). Towards this end, he 
divides the “old world”15 into three parts: Africa, Asia, and Europe. Whereas, for Hegel, 
“Africa” is abandoned and excluded from the world-history due to its deprived relation 
to spirit (HW 12, 120; 129) and “Asia” is seen merely as that which marks the beginning 
(Aufgang) of history, it is “Europe” that takes centre stage in the world-historical theatre. 
With the West thereby serving as the end (Zweck) of the trajectory of spirit that had begun 
in the East (i.e., ‘the Orient quarter of the globe—the region of origination’ (HW 12, 130; 
133-134)) that itself draws the unfolding of spirit to this end, Hegel concludes that the 
end must thereby have been established from its very beginning (von Anfang an 
festgestellt). From this we may therefore note, along with Marc Crépon, that the arche-
teleology of a Hegelian notion of history seems to build upon an understanding of how 
the spirit becomes itself through its historical-geographical figurations (Crépon 1996: 
327-363). 
At this point, let us return to the double axis schema of Europe that we introduced 
above. Regarding this schema, allow me the liberty of briefly complicating the relation 
between the Greco-Germanic and Greco-Latin axes of Europe. As Lacoue-Labarthe has 
shown, the Greeks have been ‘transmitted to modern Europe through the Roman filter.’ 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 107n.18) What this means, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, is that 
Europe, ever since the Renaissance, ‘has been prey to the Ancient’ because ‘it is imitatio 
that governs the construction of the Modern’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 117). Accordingly, 
what Lacoue-Labarthe envisages within the history of Europe is the historical drama by 
                                                          
15 Hegel’s distinction between an “old” and “new” world is not a matter of geological age but rather of the 
world’s ‘physical and spiritual character [Beschaffenheit]’ (HW 12, 107). According to this schema, 
“America,” in Hegel’s view, designates the land of the future but only as a ‘land of nostalgia [Sehnsucht]’ 
in that the spiritual history still ‘echoes the old world,’ so much so that America is yet to play a role in its 
course (HW 12, 114). 
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which Germany, in its very formation, has suffered an imitation twice removed from its 
ancient Greek origin. What this means is that Germany thus finds itself obligated to 
imitate the imitation of the Greeks. In addition to this, however, such a Germanic process 
of imitation is itself mediated through the Roman tradition of France and its own “quarrel 
between the Ancient and the Modern.”16 With Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, we may thus 
say that, in the end, Germany only comes into being by entering into a sort of mimetic-
agonistic relation with France (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 117; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 
1990: 299). 
The conclusions drawn above carry significant implications for how we are 
ultimately to conceive of Germany. As Lacoue-Labarthe argues, if “Germany” exists, it 
does so primarily as a ‘force of resistance against Rome and all its various substitutes’ 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 107n.18). Moreover, continues Lacoue-Labarthe, in order to 
validate itself Germany was forced to ‘“invent” a Greece which had up to that point 
remained unimitated, a sort of meta-Greece if you will, which would allegedly be at the 
foundation of Greece itself’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 120/79). In other words, Germany 
sought in its “invention” of the Greeks a manner by which to establish a model of a more 
“direct” imitation that rids itself of the intermediary Latin imitatio. Such a Germanic 
attempt of self-identification by means of attempting to trace a direct and unmediated line 
to the Greek other is nicely summed up by Johann Joachim Winckelmann when he notes, 
‘There is but one way for the moderns to become great, and perhaps inimitable; I mean, 
by imitating the ancients.’ (Winckelmann 1969: 2) 
But what consequences does this dynamic of identification, a dynamic by which 
Germany imitates the Greeks in order to make itself inimitable, carry for Germany? In 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s view, such a dynamic, in which Germany attempts to accede to its 
historical Dasein and thus to become a “people” who aspire to appropriate the 
unappropriability of the Greeks, ultimately leaves Germany in a state of ‘historico-
spiritual schizophrenia’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 122/80). Schizophrenia here is but 
another way to say that Germany never really possessed a sense of “people” to begin with. 
As Lacoue-Labarthe nicely sums up this point, Germany ‘never belonged to World 
History (Weltgeschichte) as politically identifiable peoples, that is, as properly national 
peoples. What the spiritual history of Germany indicates—and there is one, it is even the 
                                                          
16 This quarrel is often referred to as the querelle des anciens et des modernes, that is, a cultural discussion 
in France between 1685-1715, which had its relation to the Ancient as its point of departure. For a 
discussion, see Cave 1999: 417-425. 
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history of Germany—is that Germany […] is lacking in identity [en défaut d’identité]. 
“German distress,” die deutsche Not, has but one meaning: Germany does not exist.’ 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 2002: 170-171/90) 
Having now complicated the relation between the Greco-Germanic and Greco-
Latin axes of Europe, let us proceed in the penultimate section with the task of unravelling 
the logic of Europe’s spiritual landscape. 
 
 THE LOGIC OF EUROPE 
It is my hope that with our brief outline of the disjunction of either the Greco-Latin or the 
Greco-Germanic at play in the question of Europe’s heading we have been able to display 
how Heidegger and Valéry might prove to be invaluable resources for our discussion of 
Europe. For, not only does each of these thinkers trace his origin back to his respective 
German and French context comprising the disjunction, which means that each has a 
particularly important perspective on his respective aspect of the disjunction, but, (to 
recall what I have suggested above) in that these two thinkers share a similar account of 
the significance and crisis of Europe, they can both as a crucial mochlos offering us the 
leverage to displace and as such to approach what would otherwise be an intractable 
either/or. In short, in Heidegger and Valéry we find ways of taking up the historical 
question of Europe anew in repeating it one more time differently. Furthermore, in 
carrying out a reading of Heidegger and Valéry as examples of readers of Europe, my aim 
is not only to illustrate how they (albeit in different ways) consider Europe as being 
essentially of spirit, but also to demonstrate how their exemplary illustrations of Europe 
bring into view an entire European discourse about Europe. Such a reading, in other 
words, is not a matter of ‘mixing everything together,’ as Derrida would have it, ‘but of 
analysing the traits that prohibit [interdisent] a simple break between the Heideggerian 
discourse and other European discourses’ (PS, 198/185) such as that of Valéry. 
 Hence, if we are to understand the differing discourses of Heidegger and Valéry 
regarding Europe, we must also understand how these discourses resemble each another 
in a resemblance of discourses.17 Of course, this does not mean that we can merely 
                                                          
17 Here Derrida speaks about how the discourses from Hegel to Valéry, from Husserl to Heidegger, 
differences notwithstanding, still resemble one another due to their resemblance to a ‘traditional discourse 
[that] is already a discourse of the modern Western world. […] This old discourse about Europe, a discourse 
at once exemplary and exemplarist, is already a traditional discourse of modernity.’ (AC, 31-32/27-28) In 
De l’esprit, Derrida addresses a similar issue by directing our attention to the ‘common focus towards 
which, between 1919 and 1939, the discourses of worry gather or rush headlong: around the same words 
(Europe, Spirit), if not the same language.’ (DE, 97/61) However, Derrida adds, ‘the perspective would be 
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employ the examples of Leibniz, Hegel, Valéry, Husserl, Heidegger, etc. as instantiations 
of the self-same European discourse. Rather, as Michael Naas has demonstrated in his 
introduction to the English translation of L’autre cap, what one can do is to extract a sort 
of logic of the example from Derrida’s argument concerning Europe that rests on ‘a 
certain relationship between a particular place and the general notion of place’ (Naas 
1992: xxv). Thus, even if it may seem that Derrida’s logic of the example would afford 
Europe a place of privilege, this logic in fact demonstrates how the particular example of 
Europe’s heading turns out to be essential to the world in general. That is to say, the logic 
of the example concerns how a particular example becomes a ‘universal heading for all 
the nations or peoples of the world’ (Naas 1992: xxvi). 
It is against this background that I would like to argue that Europe is not just an 
example among others, but rather it constitutes the example of the example of spirit. When 
it comes to examples, Derrida suggests that spirit is already both an example and 
something more than an example among others, namely, exemplary. As he notes, ‘Spirit 
is one of the categories of the analogy and the incomparable condition, the transcendental, 
the transcategorical of the whole economy. It is an example and an exemplary example, 
the example par excellence. There is no other.’ (AC, 94n.8/123n.8) Thus, what Derrida 
helps us to realise is how Europe is bound together with spirit in such a manner that the 
particularity of Europe—for example, as a geographical designation belonging to the 
Asian continent—discloses the more general idea of Europe due to Europe’s very position 
within the composition of an arche-teleology. As Derrida writes, 
 
The idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, 
its eidos, at once as arché—the idea of beginning but also of commanding 
(the cap as the head, the place of capitalizing memory and of decision…)—
and as telos, the idea of the end, of a limit that accomplished, or that puts an 
end to the whole point of the achievement, right there at the point of 
completion. (AC, 29/24-25) 
 
With these preliminary remarks on the historico-philosophical example of the European 
spirit now adequately developed, we may now bring our introduction to a close by 
providing an overview of the structure of this dissertation. 
 
                                                          
falsified and the most acute difference missed if certain analogies between all these discourses—troubling 
and significant, although local—were selected, on the pretext, for example, that Heidegger might have 
subscribed to such and such a formulation.’ (DE, 97/61)   
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COMPENDIUM 
This thesis is divided into two main parts that correspond respectively to the two thinkers 
involved in working out the question of Europe. Moreover, each of these two parts is 
further divided into three main chapters. The first part is concerned with Heidegger’s 
question of Being as the very locus where the question of the spirit of Europe comes into 
play. The focus of this first part is above all the 1935 lecture course Einführung in die 
Metaphysik. The second part is dedicated to Heidegger’s contemporary, Valéry, whose 
work on Europe resembles Heidegger’s in that both of these thinkers emphasise the motif 
of spirit in relation to Europe. For the remainder of this introduction, I will now offer a 
brief chapter-by-chapter outline of the thesis. 
Chapter One, entitled “Introducing Heidegger’s Europe,” introduces Heidegger’s 
question of Europe and its intimate connection with the question of Being. Here I seek to 
broach a path unto the question of Europe in Heidegger’s thinking by means of a 
preliminary discussion of Heidegger’s focus on the fundamental question of metaphysics 
in the 1935 lecture course Einführung in die Metaphysik. This chapter should provide the 
necessary background for Heidegger’s important discussion of both the question and the 
word of “Being.” Furthermore, in order to understand why Heidegger himself raises the 
question, ‘Is “being” a mere word and its meaning a vapour, or is it the spiritual destiny 
of the evening-land?’ (GA 40, 40/40) I trace this discussion of the word “Being” back to 
Heidegger’s Nietzsche. This task, in turn, leads us to a consideration of “European 
nihilism.” 
 Chapter Two, “Heidegger and the Greeks,” looks closer at Heidegger’s engagement 
with “the Greeks.” Whereas the preceding chapter dealt with the question of Being and 
the manner by which this question has been bequeathed to us through the history of 
metaphysics, this chapter explores Heidegger’s return to “the Greeks” in whom he finds 
the first and definitive unfolding of metaphysics as well as the true beginning of the 
question of Being. This return to “the Greeks” brings us to the central question of what 
philosophy is—a question which Heidegger discusses in his 1955 lecture Was ist das—
die Philosophie? In light of this investigation, we focus in on Heidegger’s somewhat 
provocative declaration that “Western-European philosophy” is a tautology, after which 
we conclude the chapter by making several remarks on Heidegger’s Der Spruch des 
Anaximander wherein he develops the claim that the destiny of Europe hinges on the 
manner that Being has been translated. 
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 Chapter Three, “Breaking the Silence on Spirit,” begins with an overview of the 
central features of Heidegger’s engagement with the spirit motif. By means of this 
overview (which extends from Heidegger’s influential work Sein und Zeit (1927) up 
through his infamous Rectoral Address delivered at the University of Freiburg in 1933) 
we will see how Heidegger wrenches “spirit” out of its quotation marks and allows 
something like the spirit as the empowering of the powers of beings to move from a 
metaphysical concept of spirit to a being-historical designation. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a description of how spirit gains renewed significance in Heidegger’s 
work from the 1930s onwards. By doing so, we follow closely the argument from 
Einführung in die Metaphysik in which Heidegger enacts the drama of spirit upon which 
the destiny of Europe hangs. A special emphasis will be placed on Heidegger’s 
understanding of the “darkening of the world”—a term that indicates a characteristic 
feature of the prevalence of modern technology. To conclude this chapter, I discuss 
Heidegger’s exposition of the German question in which the inner relationship between 
the German and the Greek language comes into view. I argue that the singularity of the 
German language and, in particular, the German word Geist, brings along with it a 
redoubling of spirit inasmuch as Geist, as Derrida argues in De l’esprit, assumes the figure 
of ‘the Geist of Geist’ (DE, 67/41). 
Chapter Four, “The Archive of Europe,” examines Valéry’s understanding of 
Europe in La crise de l’esprit. This chapter begins with a preliminary outline of the 
manner by which Europe becomes pertinent to Valéry in 1919. I argue that the experience 
of the Great War is a fundamental issue in Valéry’s reflection on Europe. One way in 
which I seek to articulate this is to look at Walter Benjamin’s essay on Valéry from 1931 
in which Valéry’s approach to the world is oriented towards an “infinite horizon.” I then 
go on to explain how the experience of war carries with it an alteration of our relation to 
death in such a radical sense that this experience disrupts the very historical self-
understanding of Europe as being privileged over against all the other civilisations of 
history. Finally, in drawing on Derrida’s claim from L’autre cap that the term “crisis” is 
perhaps no longer an appropriate term to describe the situation of Europe, I conclude the 
fourth chapter by affording attention to how Valéry’s understanding of the “crisis of 
Europe” carries along with it a sort of “crisis of crisis.” 
 Chapter Five, “Disorder as a General Equality,” deals with the notion of disorder in 
Valéry. This is a notion that Valéry hits upon in La crise de l’esprit but more fully 
develops in La politique de l’esprit. I argue that this disorder is the result of the 
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globalisation of the world according to which the inequality on which the predominance 
of Europe had hitherto been based is gradually disappearing. To understand how the 
disappearance of (international) inequality for Valéry results in a “perfect state of 
disorder,” we must therefore try to understand how Europe has specialised itself in the 
universal in such a manner that it has organised the world to its own ends only to reach 
an experience of no longer being anywhere or anyone in particular. 
 Chapter Six, “Economy of Spirit,” turns to the question of spirit from the point of 
view of the disorder treated in Chapter Five. I begin here with a brief sketch of Valéry’s 
notion of spirit, as developed in La liberté de l’esprit, after which I briefly demonstrate 
how the question of spirit that Valéry read in the fateful signs of his own age leads him 
to ask about our belief in the spirit as the foundation of the world. Following this, I 
introduce and discuss Valéry’s definition of the spirit as a power of transformation in 
order to examine in greater detail the intimate relationship between spirit and disorder. 
The challenge is to shed light on what Valéry at one point describes as the spirit that has 
not been exempt from the disorder of the world. I approach this relationship through 
Valéry’s employment of the analogy between spiritual and material values in order to 
describe, on the one hand, the decline of the value of spirit, and, on the other hand, the 
manner by which the spirit appears as an analogical equivalent to matter only in its 
withdrawal. 
 The journey through Europe and its spiritual crisis taken in this thesis, via 
Heidegger and Valéry, is far from smooth, and it may come to seem that the spirit in 
question has exhausted itself, or simply given up the Geist. However, at the end of our 
journey, I hope to show that we have perhaps not yet arrived at the end of the end of spirit, 
even though the spirit perhaps does not name anything else than the exhaustion of the 
very power of spirit. As we shall see, for both thinkers, Heidegger and Valéry, Europe 
appears as such only as it is shaped and reshaped by its spiritual relation, but it is one 
which Europe today retains only in its absence, that is, in its spiritlessness. 
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PART ONE 
HEIDEGGER’S EUROPE 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
ich weiß, 
ich weiß und du weißt, wir wußten, 
wir wußten nicht, wir 
waren ja da und nicht dort, 
und zuweilen, wenn 
nur das Nichts zwischen uns stand, fanden 
wir ganz zueinander. 
(Celan, Soviel Gestirne, GW1, 217) 
 
In the following three chapters, we shall be concerned with Heidegger’s approach to the 
question of Europe. This task, however, is complicated by the fact that the notion of 
“Europe” does not appear to be a hallmark of Heidegger’s philosophy. Indeed, we do not 
find a place within Heidegger’s oeuvre where he consistently engages with the notion of 
Europe.18 Yet, as some attentive readers of Heidegger such as Rodolphe Gasché, Marc 
Crépon, Peter Trawny, Françoise Dastur, Jacques Derrida, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
have pointed out, one can recognise in Heidegger certain indications of how the name of 
“Europe” is inextricably woven into the history of Being.19 
 However, although Heidegger does not thematise Europe as such or for itself, the 
notion of Europe nevertheless forces its way into his account of the history of Being in 
the form of an effect of what Heidegger calls the Evening-land (das Abendland).20 Seeing 
as the notion of the Evening-land gathers momentum in Heidegger’s thinking of Being 
during the 1930s and 1940s, this term could therefore also be read as an indicator of an 
implicit thought of Europe. Such a gesture of reading would seem to be validated by 
Heidegger’s own claim that Europe is to be found exclusively in the realm of the ‘modern 
                                                          
18 I note here that Ziegler, as Heidegger himself, places quotation marks around “Europe” so as to mark 
how this word appears somewhat unfit to designate the thinking of Being conceived of in relation to Being’s 
history. Cf. Ziegler 1991: 340. Concerning Heidegger’s use of quotations marks around “Europe,” see, for 
example, an entry from his Schwarze Hefte: ‘“Europe” is the modern figure of oblivion, in which the 
Evening-land is withheld.’ (GA 97, 144) More on this below.   
19 See, for instance, Gasché 2009: 95-207; Crépon 2007: 105-124; Trawny 2004; Dastur 2006: 1-22; 
Lacoue-Labarthe 1987; Lacoue-Labarthe 2002. 
20 By employing the word “Abendland,” Heidegger becomes interlinked with an entire tradition of which 
Spengler’s Das Untergang des Abendlandes (1918) presents the following conception of das Abendland: 
‘We select a single province [eine einzelne Landschaft] as the natural centre position of a historical system. 
At this place is the central sun [die Zentralsonne]. From it all the events of history receive their true light.’ 
(Spengler 1972: 23) To my knowledge, only a few comparative dictionaries suggest the translation of New 
High German word Abendland coined by the theologian Kaspar Hedio in his Chronica der alten 
Christlichen Kirchen from 1529-1530 in order to designate the Latin occidens with the “Evening-land” or 
“land of the evening.” See Berthold 1830: 2; TRE I: 17-42. Nevertheless and in spite of the history of this 
word, I prefer the term “Evening-land” over terms such as “West” or “Occident” for two reasons. The first 
has to do with Heidegger’s claim in Der Spruch des Anaximander that das Abendland overwrites the 
distinction between the Occident and the Orient (GA 5, 326). The second reason is that Heidegger plays on 
the word “evening” which prepares the way in Heidegger for its overcoming in the Morning-land (GA 71, 
94-100). 
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Evening-land,’ (GA 71, 155) which is characterised by the hegemony of technology and 
machination (Machenschaft). Sceptics might object that such an excavation of the notion 
of Europe from out of Heidegger’s history of the Evening-land will require what may 
very well look like a forced reading of his texts. Nevertheless, this is a risk that I am 
willing to run in order to see what might come into view through such excavation work 
the results of which must be assessed at its completion. 
To begin excavating, then, one of the few places where Heidegger mentions Europe 
explicitly is in his work from 1941-1942, entitled Das Ereignis, which was published 
posthumously.21 In the second chapter of this text, Heidegger draws on the notion of das 
Abendland to describe how it—in contrast to the notion of Europe—plays into the history 
of Being. As Heidegger explains, whereas ‘[w]hat is European is a preliminary form of 
the planetary,’ which designates ‘the ending and completion’ of metaphysics, the 
Evening-land, in contrast, ‘is the beginning.’ (GA 71, 95/80) 
Leaping forward in time, Heidegger in his 1959 lecture Hölderlins Erde und 
Himmel radicalises the relationship between Europe and the Evening-land by raising the 
question whether or not ‘the Evening-land still is [Ist das Abendländische noch]’ (GA 4, 
176). After discussing the manner in which the smallness (das Geringe) of the Evening-
land means that the Evening-land only is insofar as it becomes, Heidegger gives a 
surprising answer to his question, namely, that the Evening-land ‘has become Europe 
[Europa geworden].’ (GA 4, 176) This answer already seems to confirm our excavating 
approach to Heidegger’s texts, yet, in order to understand Heidegger’s answer it is 
necessary to explicate the difference between the Evening-land and Europe, which is of 
utmost importance to Heidegger’s thinking of the history of Being. First, in Heidegger’s 
writings “Europe” frequently but not exclusively functions as a historiographical-
geographical designation, whereas the “Evening-land,” even if not entirely deprived of 
geographical designations, concerns the history of Being (GA 13, 88; GA 39, 171; GA 4, 
13; 22). Accordingly, in his 1946 essay Brief über den “Humanismus,” Heidegger 
distinguishes between Europe and the Evening-land in that the latter ‘is not thought 
regionally as the Occident in contrast to the Orient, nor merely as Europe, but rather 
world-historically out of nearness to the origin [Nähe zum Ursprung].’ (GA 9, 338) We 
will return to the question of what this origin designates in the chapters to come, but for 
                                                          
21 This work is closely related to Heidegger’s better known Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-1938). 
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now we will stay with our preliminary characterisation of the various manners in which 
Heidegger employs the terms of “Europe” and “Evening-land.” 
When Heidegger in 1959 argues that the Evening-land is becoming Europe, it is 
because Europe represents the ‘technological-industrial district of hegemony 
[Herrschaftsbezirk]’ (GA 4, 176). Thus, Europe serves not only as a geographical 
designation, but also assumes a figure in the history of Being. Given that Europe as the 
hegemony of technology ‘takes over the entire earth’ and, even more ominously, distends 
itself ‘in the interstellar cosmic space’ (GA 4, 176). In this regard, what becomes 
important for our excavation project of Europe is to chart the landscape that Heidegger 
characterises as the ‘present planetary-interstellar condition of the world [Weltzustand]’ 
whose ‘inalienable essential beginning [unverlierbaren Wesensanfang] is determined 
through and through by that which is European-Evening-landish-Greek.’ (GA 4, 177) We 
shall return in more detail to the Greek question and its relation to Europe in Chapter 
Two, but for now it remains an open question whether Heidegger, when he begins to write 
more explicitly about “Europe” from the 1930s and onwards, primarily identifies Europe 
as a planetary concept conceived solely in terms of a technological framework or whether 
the notion of Europe has more to offer. This question, moreover, leads directly to others: 
Does Heidegger’s account of the incipient Evening-land remain unaffected by the 
vicissitudes pertaining to the history within which Europe is conceived as nothing but an 
ending and a completion? Does the notion of the Evening-land remain uncontaminated 
by this Europe, the latter of which Heidegger intends to abandon by drawing attention to 
the opening of another beginning?22 Furthermore, considering Heidegger’s planetary and, 
as will become evident, eschatological designation of Europe within the history of Being, 
one might question whether or not Europe, in addition to possessing a geophysical 
signification in Heidegger’s work, also belongs to a spiritual geography. 
As any attentive reader of Heidegger will recognise, the concerns raised by the 
questions above touch upon very difficult matters that, as Derrida has shown in De 
l’esprit, have to do with the notion of spirit (Geist). To be sure, the notion of spirit displays 
itself at various places within Heidegger’s textual corpus, but one significant place is his 
1935 lecture course Einführung in die Metaphysik where precisely a sort of 
geophilosophy is woven together with a spiritual geography. Moreover, one could 
mention the way in which “spirit” figures into Heidegger’s numerous commentaries on 
                                                          
22 Cf. Vallega-Neu 2016: 136-137. 
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Hölderlin, Schelling, Hegel, and Nietzsche as well as into his later 1952 essay on Trakl 
in “Sprache im Gedicht”—to say nothing of the role played by spirit in Heidegger’s 
understanding of the Jews, most notably in his Schwarze Hefte (1931-1948).23 
Hence, if indeed it is the case that Europe plays a covert, yet significant role with 
regards to Heidegger’s history of Being, then a better understanding of the issues 
introduced here is certainly warranted. Moreover, this would mean that Heidegger’s 
works in the 1930s and 1940s certainly serve as interesting sites for our excavating 
inquiry into the relation between Europe and the Evening-land and their respective 
destinations within the history of Being. 
My plan for the first part of the thesis concerning Heidegger’s Europe is therefore 
to begin with a brief introduction to Heidegger’s notion of Europe in the 1930s in order 
to address what I see as Heidegger’s most explicit even if not consistent engagement with 
the question of Europe, namely, his lecture course entitled Einführung in die Metaphysik. 
Having established a provisional account of the occurrence of Europe in Heidegger’s 
thought, we then proceed in a more piecemeal fashion to examine a number of 
Heidegger’s key claims concerning both the Evening-land and Europe. In this fashion, 
we will come across several attempts to delineate Heidegger’s understanding of Europe 
when viewed in the light of the question of Being. 
Let it be clear from the outset, however, that the approach to Heidegger’s thought 
and texts that I assume here is concerned less with either scholarly exegesis or political 
assessments and more with exploring the questions of Europe that through Heidegger’s 
text open themselves up to us.24 As such, my intent is not merely to examine the historical 
                                                          
23 In the present work, I shall not give voice to the topos of “Heidegger and the Jews.” Instead of pretending 
to be able to delimit such a topos, if it is one at all, let me merely outline the main interpretative problem, 
which is to understand how Heidegger understands “the Jews” as part of the history of Being. In one of his 
ponderings (Überlegungen XII) from the fall 1939, Heidegger speaks about ‘why Judaism has temporarily 
increased its power’ (GA 96, 46). This escalation (Steigerung), he argues, has to do with the metaphysics 
of the Evening-land particularly in its modern shape. Metaphysics, Heidegger continues, offers a starting 
point for the spread of ‘empty rationality and calculating ability, which have, consequently, acquired a 
shelter [Unterkunft] in the “spirit” without nevertheless being able to grasp […] the hidden ambits-of-
decision [Entscheidungsbezirke]. The more original and captured in their beginning the prospective 
decisions and questions, the more they remain inaccessible to this “race.”’ (GA 96, 46) Whilst metaphysics 
gives way to the calculative mentality, this mentality is itself sheltered “in” spirit. For a discussion of 
Heidegger’s “Judaism” with respect to spirit, see di Cesare 2016b: 183-186. The literature on Heidegger 
and the Jews has attracted much attention both before and after the publication of the controversial 
Schwarze Hefte. See, for instance, Lyotard 1990; Trawny 2014; di Cesare 2016a; Heinz and Kellerer 2016; 
Nancy 2017. 
24 This is, of course, not to say that an exegetical or a political assessment of Heidegger’s writings are less 
accurate investigations of Europe. It is not to say, either, that the present excavation of Heidegger’s Europe 
could escape Heidegger’s engagement with politics in the 1930s and the political overdetermination of 
identification (or mimetology as Lacoue-Labarthe calls it) as well as the overdetermination of politics with 
identification (Lacoue-Labarthe 1986: 170/297). 
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sequence of Heidegger’s development of thought, but also, following to some extent the 
advice of Reiner Schürmann, to read Heidegger ‘backward, from the end to beginning.’ 
(Schürmann 1990: 13; 2003: 581-582) The scope as well as the strength of such an inverse 
reading becomes evident, however, only under the condition that we refrain from treating 
Heidegger’s earlier texts as nothing more than a frame awaiting to be saturated with 
Heidegger’s later political discourse. For, as Lacoue-Labarthe underscores, we cannot be 
content with stating that ‘Heidegger put the thought and the language of Sein und Zeit at 
the service of National Socialism’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1986: 141/271). To proceed in this 
fashion, Lacoue-Labarthe continues, would be ‘to provide oneself in advance with the 
means of breaking through, of making the leap from the philosophical to the political—
which is precisely what is to be called in question.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1986: 141/272) 
According to Schürmann, the ‘hermeneutical dilemma of whether Heidegger should be 
read forward or backward’ thus serves to specify how Heidegger, if he is read backwards, 
may come to ‘appear in a different light’ (Schürmann 1990: 13-14). In other words, to 
read Heidegger should be understood as an attempt neither to save nor to reject, but rather 
to recognise how Heidegger’s thought allows us to pose the questions and problems of 
the political.25 
Before exploring Heidegger’s “Europe” in more detail, let us therefore clarify that 
the introductory remarks we make here are meant to emphasise that if one wants to focus 
on Heidegger’s treatment of “Europe,” one should remember that this term becomes 
interesting (and perhaps the most troubling) for us when it is understood as playing a 
covert role in the history of Being, rather than, as it often does in Heidegger’s writings, 
the role of a geographical-historical designation. As such, one of my aims in this chapter 
is to bring to the fore Heidegger’s Being-historical (seinsgeschichtliche) understanding 
of “Europe” and to show how this understanding creates the scaffolding for Heidegger’s 
more well-known investigation of the Evening-land. I will argue that the term “Europe” 
serves as a monitor for a recurring problem, namely, the difficulty of understanding the 
word “Being”—a difficulty that lies at the heart of Europe’s spiritual situation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe 1987; Lacoue-Labarthe 2007; Janicaud 1989; Krell 1992: 137-216; Beistegui 2002; 
Bennington 2016. 
36 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCING HEIDEGGER’S EUROPE 
 
As I have already alluded to in the above, the terms “Europe” and “European” do not 
appear in Heidegger’s intellectual repertoire until the 1930s. Moreover, when they do 
finally appear, they are employed, for the most part, in reference to Western-European 
history or the modern-European scientific thought. To be sure, while Heidegger’s earlier 
references to “Europe” present many possibilities for interpretation,26  I would like to 
suggest that from his 1929-1930 lecture course Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik and 
onwards the terms “Europe” and “European” not only become more frequent in the 
Gesamtausgabe, but they also come to play a more important role in assessing the 
question concerning the sense of Being. 
Let me therefore offer a provisional and perhaps somewhat simplified account of 
Heidegger’s Europe in the 1930s by following the most evident path suggested in Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. It turns out that in Heidegger’s reflection on the task of 
philosophy and its significance to the world, ‘the spirit and future of Europe’ (GA 29/30, 
18) becomes a central issue. Moreover, Heidegger discusses four interpretations (those of 
Spengler, Klages, Scheler, and Ziegler) of “our present realm” by reflecting on the “us” 
that belongs to the university as well as on “our” participation in the formation of spirit 
(der Bildung des Geistes). In relation to this discussion Heidegger thereby raises the 
question: Does the history of spirit happen ‘only as German or as Western 
[abendländisches] and thus as European?’ (GA 29/30, 104) It is important for us to note 
already at this point that this question, as centred on the themes of Europe, spirit, and 
                                                          
26 At this point, let me provide a short overview of Heidegger’s use of the terms “Europe” and “European” 
in the time up until the 1930s. This list is by no means exhaustive, but serves to illustrate the most common 
references to “Europe.” In Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919-1920) in a discussion of the “science 
of origins” (Ursprungswissenschaft), Heidegger for the first time mentions the term “European” with regard 
to the ‘European citizen’ (GA 58, 3) called Spengler whose book Der Untergang des Abendlandes is 
referred to as ‘seinem “europäischen” Buche’ (GA 58, 9; 48; cf. GA 63, 55). However, in the section on 
the historical overview, Heidegger mentions the Geistesgeschichte, which he juxtaposes with the European 
history in that this history of spirit is stamped by the Greeks (GA 58, 23; cf. GA 60, 167). Later, in his 
lecture course on Augustine and Neo-Platonism (1921), Heidegger speaks about the formation of ideas in 
the Christian epochs ‘and thereby also the European development of culture [Kulturentwicklung]’ (GA 60, 
167). In Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (1924), Heidegger presents his notion of the being-
present-at-hand (Vorhandensein) as a mode designating a unitary reference to Being such as when ‘the 
buildings in the city of Marburg, Marburg in Hessen, in Germany, in Europe, on the earth, in a solar system, 
in the world space, in the world,’ (GA 20, 212) express an indifference towards their being-relational. 
Finally, in his 1925-1926 Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Heidegger mentions how Aristotle’s 
definition of truth and falsity appears trivial to a European (GA 21, 163). 
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“us,” will later serve as the subject for Heidegger’s August 1934 address on the essence 
of the German university.27 
However, it is not until the summer of 1935 that Heidegger’s first significant effort 
to take up the question of Europe appears in his lecture course Einführung in die 
Metaphysik at the University of Freiburg. Einführung in die Metaphysik nevertheless 
remained unpublished until 1953, but despite this late publication date, Heidegger, in a 
preface to a later edition of Sein und Zeit, remarks that he regarded this 1935 text as 
explicative of the question concerning the sense of Being that he had developed elsewhere 
(SZ, v). Following its 1953 publication, however, Einführung in die Metaphysik became 
infamous for an altogether different reason, namely its pronouncement that the ‘inner 
truth and greatness’ of National Socialism, understood as an ‘encounter between 
planetary determined technology and modern humanity,’ had only the slightest to do with 
the ‘works that were being peddled about today as the philosophy of National Socialism’ 
(GA 40, 208/213; translation modified).28 
In what follows, I do not intend to take up Heidegger’s lecture course in all of its 
complexity, politically or otherwise, for, were we to take seriously Heidegger’s political 
engagement as part of this task, it would require that we both reflect on and question the 
philosophical implications of such an engagement, which exceeds the scope of this thesis. 
I would, however, like to highlight some of the key points from the lecture course 
inasmuch as they not only record Heidegger’s first foray into a sort of geopolitics, but 
also in that they provide us with a preview of why the reflection on Europe proves 
significant for his overall outlook on the question of Being. 
 In Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger is clearly attempting to address the 
question of Being (a question that lies at the very heart of his reflections on Europe) as 
well as to bring forward “the Greeks” who are said to have laid the groundwork for such 
                                                          
27 At the opening page of his speech, Heidegger alludes to the history of the German university as the 
history of the German spirit pertaining to the destiny of the German people, wherein Heidegger sees Hitler 
representing the ‘essence of the revolution of national socialism’—a revolution out of which a new 
beginning will arise from Europe’s decline (GA 16, 285; 302; 307). 
28 In the 1953 publication of Einführung in die Metaphysik, this passage occurs in parenthesis, suggesting 
that it is added afterwards to the 1935 manuscript. Immediately after its publication in 1953 Habermas and 
Lewalter discussed in the newspaper Die Zeit the significance of this parenthesis. As Jaeger, the editor of 
the Gesamtausgabe volume in question, notes, whether the parenthesis on page 152 in the 1953 Niemeyer 
edition was already stated in the 1935 manuscript remains undecided even though it does not occur in the 
first proof (GA 40, 232-234). For a discussion of this issue, see Habermas 1993: 187-188; Pöggeler 1987: 
276-278; Janicaud 1992: 348-363. For a discussion of the expression “inner truth of National Socialism” 
in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course as well as in Heidegger’s first reference to this expression in his 1934-
1935 lecture course on Hölderlin’s hymns (GA 39), see Ireland 2015: 315-346.      
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a question. Heidegger’s purpose in his lecture, however, is not simply to replace a history 
of metaphysics, ontology, or onto-theo-logy with his own thought regarding Being, 
neither is it to serve as an annulment or refutation of such history, which, as Derrida shows 
in his 1964-1965 lecture course on Heidegger: la question de l’Être et l’Histoire, would 
implicitly presuppose ‘an anti-historical metaphysics of truth’ (HQEH, 24/2).29 Rather, 
Heidegger’s purpose is ultimately that of a destruction (Destruktion) of the way (or ways) 
in which Being has been thought throughout its history or histories. Clearly then, the 
undertaking in Einführung in die Metaphysik seeks to establish a destruction of the history 
of ontology and should therefore be located as a prolongation of the principal task set out 
in Sein und Zeit. Thus, as Heidegger himself defines such undertaking, it concerns ‘the 
destruction of the traditional content [überlieferten Bestandes] of ancient ontology which 
is to be carried out along the guidelines of the question of Being [Leitfaden der 
Seinsfrage]. This destruction is based upon the original experiences in which the first, and 
subsequently guiding, determinations of Being were gained.’ (SZ, 22)  
Yet, even if one admits that Einführung in die Metaphysik is organised in large part 
as a sort of supplement to Sein und Zeit, or even as its final part, there are, I believe, 
intimations of a sense of Being within the former that differ from the sense of Being at 
work in the latter. Allow me to make two points in support of this claim. First, the question 
with which the 1935 lecture course is preoccupied fundamentally differs from the 
‘guiding question [Leitfrage] of metaphysics,’ which, according to Heidegger, is not to 
be understood as ‘a passage over to something that lies or stands around somewhere,’ 
(GA 40, 21-22/21) but rather as something that must be (re)awakened and (re)established. 
Insofar as Heidegger sees the fundamental question (Grundfrage) of metaphysics as 
guiding our understanding of Being, the destruction of metaphysics brings with it a 
disorienting effect on the very direction of this question such that this question can no 
longer appeal to any steadfast point of departure: ‘The sheer fact, apparently so unstable, 
to which metaphysics blindly appeals, has now been shaken [erschüttert].’ (GA 40, 91-
91/90-91) 
Second, in Heidegger’s 1935 understanding of the question of Being it becomes 
interwoven more profoundly with a concern for Europe and the Evening-land. Closer 
inspection shows how Heidegger not only turns to the Greeks in order to retrieve the 
                                                          
29 Derrida explains: ‘If it is possible to refute, this is because the truth can be established once and for all 
as an object, and only particular conceptions of truth, more or less valid approximations to this ahistorical 
truth, belong to history.’ (HQEH, 24-25/2) 
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“authentic” question of Being—a question which has been covered over by the 
subsequent stratifications of a traditional ontology permeated by ontic criteria—but also 
how this very “return” to the Greeks is endowed with a thought of Europe and the 
Evening-land. As we will come to see, one can, in borrowing a term from Sein und Zeit 
(SZ, 133), say that the thought of Being happens “equi-primordially” 
(gleichursprünglich) with the occurrence of Europe and the Evening-land—an 
occurrence that appears to be far from simple coincidence. 
As far as Einführung in die Metaphysik is concerned, it appears that the equal 
originality of the question concerning Being and the question concerning the Evening-
land (or Europe) leads to the further question of whether the sense of the word “Being” 
is merely a Dunst, a stink, a reek, a vapour, or whether the sense of this word is ‘the 
spiritual destiny of the Evening-land,’ (GA 40, 40/45)—a question which Heidegger, at 
least in 1935, also sees as concerning Europe. 
 As the discussion above displays, the attempt to bring together the question of 
Being with the question of Europe within Heidegger need not to be a forced reading. 
Indeed, Heidegger himself even appears to believe that his focus on the question of Being 
will lead to (or, as Lacoue-Labarthe says, “invent”)30 a “Greece”—the idea of the 
Morning-land—that still awaits the Evening-land and thus represents, as Heidegger notes 
in the Parmenides course, the ‘coming of the great beginning’ (GA 54, 175). Before 
broaching this question of beginning and as such perhaps catching a glimpse of the 
European morning (Trawny 2004), it is imperative for us first to clarify what precisely 
Heidegger means by the question of Being and of Europe. Moreover, such clarification 
requires that we probe more deeply into Einführung in die Metaphysik insofar as this text 
prepares the first step in elaborating the relationship between these two questions. In order 
to demonstrate the problem outlined here we proceed in in four steps: first, we introduce 
Heidegger’s Einführung in die Metaphysik; second, we address Heidegger’s fundamental 
question of metaphysics; third, we discuss the word “Being”; and fourth, engage with 
Heidegger’s account of “European nihilism.” 
 
                                                          
30 This kind of Greece, Lacoue-Labarthe argues, remains ‘unimitated, a sort of meta-Greece if you will, 
which would allegedly be at the foundation of Greece itself (but which then also ran the risk of never really 
having taken place in itself).’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 120/79) 
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 TURNING TO EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE METAPHYSIK 
In the prefatory note to the 1953 publication of his 1935 lecture course, Heidegger notes 
that ‘what was spoken no longer speaks in what is printed [das Gesprochene spricht nicht 
mehr im Gedruckten].’ (GA 40, 1/xxix) thus reminding his reader that there is something 
no-longer-speaking or even unspoken within the printed text. Moreover, the printed text 
presents a challenge not only to the once-speaking subject, that is, to the Heidegger of 
1953 who no longer professes his introduction to metaphysics, but whose once spoken 
words have now turned into writing, but also to its readers who are challenged to attend 
to the sense and development of Heidegger’s discourse on Europe. 
At this point in the Einführung in die Metaphysik, however, there is still relatively 
little basis for the claim that Heidegger’s introductory remarks have Europe as their 
unspoken focus. As such, in pursuing the present chapter’s main aim of tracing out how 
the question of Europe emerges within Einführung in die Metaphysik, a good deal of 
groundwork still remains. 
Moreover, Heidegger is quite reluctant to carry out the laborious work required for 
making a serious commitment to Europe’s “minor” philosophical prominence in that he 
does not find “Europe” to contain within itself ‘the bearing that is essential here’ (GA 40, 
45/44).31 Thus far, then, the venture of excavating Europe from Heidegger’s text may 
seem to be no more than a foray into the blindness, the imbecility—or, as Heidegger 
himself says in the infamous Spiegel interview from 1966 where he reflects on his 
political career in the Nazi party, the Dummheit that reveals a “lack of judgment”32—
which are characteristics that Heidegger demonstrated throughout the decade of the 
1930s. This stupidity is what further prompted Janicaud in his careful study of Heidegger 
to ask: ‘But why believe in a philosopher?’33 
                                                          
31 When I say that the question of Europe is minor, this means neither that Europe appears less frequently 
compared to other philosophical terms in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe nor that it is of little importance. 
Instead, the minor question of Europe works within Heidegger’s major being-historical language by 
enabling a whole other but unspoken story to vibrate within it. For a discussion of the “minor,” see Deleuze 
and Guattari 1975: 16-17. 
32 For a discussion of Heidegger’s stupidity as a lack or, as Kant says, an inaptitude of judgment, see 
Taminiaux 1992: 233; cf. KrV, B173. See also Derrida’s reflections on stupidity, Dummheit, bêtise, and 
bête in La bête et le souverain (BS I, 223-251/164-186).      
33 Janicaud 1990: 14. As Arendt notes in the preface to The Human Condition, ‘nothing could be worse’ 
(Arendt 1958: 5) than believing in a philosopher. One reason why Heidegger may have failed so 
disastrously regarding the nature of totalitarianism is the fact that he saw in it a possible “liberation” of man 
from the closed horizon of what he took to be an identity. As Lacoue-Labarthe notes in a roundtable 
discussion with Derrida and Gadamer, ‘Heidegger’s gesture in favor of National Socialism […] can be 
explained in terms of the hope of seeing Germany, in revealing itself capable of fulfilling its philosophical 
destiny, become something like the last figure of the West, and precisely thereby acquire finally something 
like its identity’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 2016: 39). That is to say, Heidegger wishes to find the coming true of 
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These observations on the Europe of Heidegger’s times are, however, not 
insignificant for understanding the account of Europe that Heidegger develops in 
Einführung in die Metaphysik. Already in this text, he foreshadows a defining feature of 
Europe: ‘even if some future thinker [ein Künftiger] should reach the center [of 
philosophy] again—we today can only prepare the way—he will not avoid entanglement 
either; it will just be a different entanglement.’ (GA 40, 208/214; translation modified) It 
is therefore important to note that, if only in a preliminary manner, an account of 
Heidegger’s work from the 1930s based on the chronology of his publications, lecture 
courses, and, most recently, the Schwarze Hefte, undoubtedly cast a shadow over 
Heidegger’s thought. And, as Heidegger himself reminds us, ‘no one can leap over his 
own shadow [Keiner springt über seinen Schatten]’ (GA 40, 208/214)—not even those 
who readily acknowledge it.34 
How are we to proceed with our task of excavating Europe then? At this point, it 
may be helpful to take a look at how Heidegger’s texts from the 1930s, in likeness to (and 
perhaps in part because of) Husserl’s recurrent titles and themes, portray a historical 
period of Europe in which three types of power emerged: Fascism in the South, Stalinism 
in the East, and Nazism in the centre. These three types of power have, as the French 
translator of both Husserl and Heidegger, Gérard Granel argues, one thing in common, 
namely, ‘the claim to destroy the economic, political and spiritual order by which Europe 
(but also America) recognized itself and replace it with a “new order”.’35 Moreover, 
Granel argues that how we conceive of the 1930s (today) will, in fact, not only concern 
what is behind us, but also what lies before us insofar as Europe still faces an unknown 
figure returning to it from its past. Perhaps better put, the wholly other of Europe remains 
unfigurable and therefore incessantly threatens to disturb the European logic, its λόγος. 
Whereas Husserl recognises that the singular and decisive Krisis of Europe (with its 
capital letter) carries with it the ominous connotations of an “end of Europe,” (cf. Hua 
                                                          
his own philosophy, whose essence he searched persistently and which had to be the agreement of theory 
and praxis, but he found it, for a while at least, in a politics that represented its reversed image: a 
universalism proclaimed by nationalism, as Derrida has shown, whereby the discourse of nationalism avails 
itself of the language of universalism (OTNH, 1-2; 10).     
34 The case of Heidegger exposes the embarrassment of our confrontation with, as Janicaud says, ‘one of 
the greatest metaphysicians who ever lived’ but who, at the very same time, was ‘capable of being a 
contemptible imbecile’ (Janicaud 1990: 17). However, we cannot merely distinguish between the Dr Jekyll 
and the Mr Hyde of the sehr geehrter Herr Professor Dr Martin Heidegger, in that the stakes of his thought 
cannot be isolated within too simplistic a scheme of dark and light, bad and good sides. Janicaud is therefore 
right in saying that what the Heidegger case shows is that ‘after Heidegger, it is no longer possible to 
philosophise as before’ (Janicaud 1990: 22). 
35 Granel 2004: 113.  
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VI, 347-348) Heidegger’s engagement with Europe as the epoch marking the end of the 
Evening-land—even if such an engagement still falls prey to apocalyptic tones—
nevertheless appears to depart in an important sense from that of Husserl in that it also 
hints at a radically different notion of epochality.36 As such, rather than describing the 
thirties as a mere memory of an age of Europe long gone, we might instead ask, as does 
Granel, if not the thirties are still before us? 
In this regard, I believe it is important in our reading of the Heidegger of the 1930s 
to attempt to remain attentive to the broader temporal aspect of his writings and their 
reflections of “our history,” that is, the history of “us (Europeans).” This does not mean, 
however, that we should take this history simply as that which designates a belonging to 
some common origin or end. To the contrary, we should understand such history as that 
which refers to the condition of that age in which we live, and which Heidegger describes 
as ‘the end of the day of the gods [das Ende des Göttertages]’ (GA 5, 269). With this 
latter designation, Heidegger suggests that it is precisely the flight of gods that has 
become the defining characteristic of our “age of the world” (das Weltalter). In the years 
following Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger becomes increasingly fascinated by 
how the disappearance of the gods becomes significant for the manner by which time and 
history cease to be defined in terms of horizon-terms. As he sees it, the vanishing of such 
terms or, rather, vanishing horizons (that is, the failure of the gods to arrive, which is at 
the same time their coming on the horizon), designates what Heidegger, broadly speaking, 
calls the ‘“default of God’ [der Fehl Gottes].” (GA 5, 269) Leaving aside for the moment 
further questions concerning Heidegger’s peculiar use of terms such as “the default of 
God” and “the end of the day of the gods,” we may note here that Heidegger, in several 
of his post-war texts, links the vanishing horizons and the disappearance of the gods with 
the darkness from which the world night (die Weltnacht) unfolds itself. What does this 
vanishing, disappearance, and distending darkness entail for our discussion of Europe? In 
short and preliminarily, one could answer this question by saying that Europe is the 
destined site where these “negative” phenomena come to show themselves as such. 
According to Heidegger, however, this end site of Europe that moves emphatically 
in the direction of a closure of metaphysics is perhaps also the opening of a new enclosure, 
                                                          
36 While Husserl’s notion of the crisis of Europe is a crisis of reason that, as Gasché points out, ‘divides 
reason, but that reason is able to diagnose, and for which it can offer a critical solution,’ the crisis of Europe 
seen ‘from a Heideggerian perspective,’ is rather ‘a concept of calculating ratio, something that reason 
calculates and predicts in advance and with which it reckons.’ (Gasché 2009: 105)   
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an “other beginning.” In order to grasp how such a beginning might emerge from the 
closure of metaphysics, however, we must first understand the significance of this notion 
in Heidegger’s philosophical project. 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS 
One of the key terms in Heidegger’s vocabulary from the 1930s is “metaphysics.” As I 
hope to show in what follows, this term is not only of particularly relevance for 
Heidegger’s understanding of the question of Being, but, as indicated above, it also plays 
a central role in his scattered statements concerning Europe. It is important for us to 
emphasise, however, that Heidegger is not simply condemning or rejecting 
“metaphysics;” rather, he is engaging with this notion “destructively” in order to bring to 
light the (forgotten) question of Being. In his 1933 summer course Die Grundfrage der 
Philosophie, Heidegger discusses how the expression “metaphysics” extends back to a 
text in the Aristotelian corpus that was situated “after” his book on Physics and therefore 
assigned the title μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (GA 36/37, 20ff.). The reference to Aristotle is 
important here, because it is in the first book of the Metaphysics that the direction of a 
questioning that is of decisive importance to Heidegger is established—that is, the 
question concerning the original causes (ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτίων). Metaphysics, in other words, 
is the examination of the ἀρχή, meaning that it aims, on the one hand, to prove the essence 
of that which is (Met. 983a24-993a26), and, on the other hand, to impose on metaphysics 
an inquiry into first and last principles (Met. 994a1-995a20). 
At this point, we find an important link between Aristotle and Heidegger with 
respect to how the expression “metaphysics” carries with it a sense of reduplication of 
Being as Being, a reduplication that becomes determinative for Aristotle’s study of 
metaphysics as the τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν (Met. 1003a21). We will come back to this reduplication 
of Being in the next section, and here merely remark that when Heidegger dedicates 
several courses to the study of Aristotle, he appears to acknowledge the Greek 
philosopher as a crucial source for his own thought regarding the history of Being and 
within this history also the destiny of Europe. 
As mentioned above, the question of Europe is not, strictly speaking, a 
philosophical concern for Heidegger, but rather more of a name for the modern epoch 
signifying the end and completion not only of the Evening-land but also of metaphysics. 
Indeed, as we have already noted, Heidegger describes the figure of Europe as that which 
does not contain within itself “the bearing that is essential here.” Given this claim, one 
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might therefore raise the question of how this lack of essential bearing significant to 
Europe relates to the closure of the metaphysical quest for the essence of Being. A 
tentative answer to this question seems to lie in the manner by which Heidegger unfolds 
the very question that not only opens up his lecture course of 1935 but also, more 
pointedly, inaugurates a whole history of metaphysics. This question is, of course, the 
famous grounding question of metaphysics: ‘Why are there beings at all instead of 
nothing?’ (GA 40, 3/1) In that Heidegger returns time and again to this question, it may 
therefore be appropriate to say a few words about it as well as to investigate the manner 
by which it designates the ‘centre and core that determines all philosophy.’ (GA 40, 
20/19) 
 Throughout his works Heidegger, by means of his various engagements with 
thinkers such as Leibniz, Schelling, and Schopenhauer, assiduously approaches the 
broadest, deepest, and most originary question, that is, the question concerning Being as 
such and as a whole. While Heidegger particularly draws on Leibniz’ observations 
concerning the question of metaphysics,37 his task, as he argues, is not merely one of 
commentary, but a far more fundamental task that requires as rigorous of articulation as 
possible. As Heidegger puts it as early as his inaugural lecture Was ist Metaphysik? from 
1929, metaphysics is identified with the fundamental question (GA 9, 122) regardless of 
whether one is speaking of metaphysics as a subject of school philosophy 
(Schulphilosophie) or as a field of arbitrary ideas (willkürlicher Einfälle). When 
Heidegger therefore narrows his focus to this fundamental question, he discovers the 
central insight that Evening-landish thought (abendländische Denken), from its very 
beginning, assumes as its point of departure the wonder (θαυμάζειν) of Being. As 
Heidegger explains it in an echo of Aristotle, the hallmark of originary philosophical 
questioning and thus of metaphysics as “first philosophy” is the wonder of all wonders, 
namely, ‘that Being is’ (GA 9, 307).38 
 At this point, however, one ought to proceed with caution regarding the 
fundamental question of metaphysics, for, despite its promising beginning, its history 
                                                          
37 See Leibniz 1993: 602. 
38 After having noted that metaphysics is a science that investigates first principles and causes, whereby 
science as a matter of production is rejected, Aristotle states: ‘For it is owing to their wonder that men both 
now begin and at first began to philosophise [διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον 
ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν]’ (Met. 982b12-13). In the dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates offers a similar response 
when he speaks about the emotion (πάθος) of a philosopher, namely, that of wondering. For, Socrates says, 
‘nothing else than this is the origin of philosophy [ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας]’ (Thea. 155d). For a discussion of the 
“wonder,” see Matuschek 1991: 8-23.  
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shows that metaphysics, in Heidegger’s view, does not aim at asking about Being as such. 
Rather, metaphysics, according to Heidegger, concerns the determination of that which 
constitutes beings in their Being, that is, of the essence of Being as something and thus 
promotes Being to the highest of beings (GA 19, 221-222/153-154).39 Through his 
de(con)structive approach to the history of metaphysics, Heidegger therefore attempts to 
reformulate the question of Being, and it is precisely through such a reformulation that 
the entire building of metaphysics is made to tremble. 
 As Heidegger explains, the crucial problem with the metaphysical approach to 
“Being” is that it would appear to lead to a kind of oblivion of Being as such, that is, to 
the Being that would not be the Being of beings. Hence, Heidegger claims that if we do 
not try to reflect on the question of Being in a manner otherwise than the metaphysical 
question, then Being ‘remains in oblivion—and so decisively that the oblivion of Being, 
an oblivion that itself falls into oblivion, is the unrecognized [der unbekannte] yet 
enduring impulse for metaphysical questioning.’ (GA 40, 21/20)40 As Heidegger further 
emphasises, it is not as though Being figures into the history of metaphysics as forgotten; 
rather, in order for something to be forgotten, the forgetting itself must be forgotten. In 
this sense, any relation to the oblivion of Being consists in a non-relation that can 
nonetheless be traced in its disappearance.  
 That this issue concerning oblivion is a genuine implication of Heidegger’s 
destruction of metaphysics is confirmed by his attempt to shake up metaphysics and to 
make us realise how, as he puts it in an outline of the history of Being as metaphysics 
from 1941, there remains an unresolved (Unentschiedenheit) ambiguity between the 
nominal and the verbal construction of the Greek ὂν (GA 6.2, 417). As Emil Angehrn has 
pointed out, when Heidegger takes as his point of departure the question concerning 
Being, he thereby introduces a difference (not a segregation) between beings and Being 
as that which is other than its entities—that is to say, once again, Being not as a substance 
but as the marvellous event that there is Being.41 As such, if we entertain Angehrn’s point, 
                                                          
39 Furthermore, when Aristotle defines metaphysics as “first philosophy” (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), it is, 
according to Heidegger, intersected by “theology” (Met. 1069a18). Hence, Heidegger coins the term “onto-
theo-logy” as a designation of metaphysics. 
40 Or, as Heidegger puts it in a preparatory study for his monograph on Nietzsche: ‘Thus metaphysics thinks 
the beings as such; but it never ponders the “as such” itself.’ (GA 67, 217-218) In a sense, what remains 
forgotten is the as of “Being as Being,” that is to say, the moment in which Being itself comes to itself. 
However, in coming to itself, the essence of Being is not something “behind” the appearance but rather is 
the movement of the coming-into-appearance that is hidden (GA 67, 219). Put differently, Being is coming 
into presence as Being only insofar as it withdraws.      
41 Angehrn 2007: 187. 
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we may therefore say that Heidegger regards “Being” not as something that could ever 
be taken as a replacement of “beings,” but rather as something that serves to remind the 
human dasein of the metaphysical forgetting of the difference between Being and 
beings.42 Moreover, this forgetting of the ontico-ontological difference is tantamount to 
understanding the forgetting of the originary—a forgetting which is significant to the 
world night spreading itself over Europe. Consistent with such a view, Angehrn identifies 
a more advanced form of Heidegger’s ontological difference between Being and beings, 
which is the covering up of the errancy of metaphysics (den Irrweg der Metaphysik) in 
that such a difference designates not merely a logical distinction but rather a fundamental 
way of questioning. As Angehrn explains, ‘To fix attention on the beings as such leaves 
the “fundamental question of metaphysics” unquestioned [ungefragt]’ (Angehrn 2007: 
187). 
 
 INHERITING THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF BEING 
Without venturing into the gigantic discussion about Being in Heidegger’s work, we may 
nevertheless claim here that the single most important point to grasp at the outset is that 
Being is not itself something that “exists” like a being, which is to say that Being is neither 
one entity amongst others, nor the totality of entities, nor a property of entities. In this 
respect, in taking up the issue of Being, Heidegger ultimately aims to make a break with 
the metaphysical tradition of understanding Being—regardless of whatever such Being 
is.43 
 Many of the hallmarks of Being in Einführung in die Metaphysik are already visible 
in Heidegger’s analysis in Sein und Zeit. In this regard, I like to recall one point made in 
the 1927 analysis that carry an enduring significance for the 1935 lecture course, which 
is that the question of Being is not a question Heidegger himself invents. Rather, it is one 
that he inherits from Plato’s dialogue the Sophist (Soph. 246a5; SZ, 2) in which the 
Stranger tells his interlocutor, Theaetetus, how this particular question finds its origin in 
the struggle of the giants over Being (γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας). In other words, in 
inheriting the question of Being from Plato (and Aristotle), the question of Being as well 
as all of its misrepresentations is already given in such fashion that, as René Char puts it, 
‘our heritage is preceded by no testament [Notre héritage n’est précédé d’aucun 
                                                          
42 Because the term dasein is nowadays commonly accepted in English specialised philosophical 
vocabulary, I have neither italicised nor capitalised it.  
43 For a discussion of the various aspects of Heidegger’s question of Being, see Carman 2013: 84-99. 
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testament]’ (Char 1962: 102)44 from which it is possible for “us” to receive a single and 
unequivocal understanding of Being. 
In view of this undecided meaning of Being, Heidegger clearly wants to avoid what 
he sees as the central pitfall of metaphysics, that is, the (preconceived) identification of 
beings as Being. As we noted above, Heidegger’s venture into the question of Being 
proceeds by way of a consideration of the ontico-ontological difference. Interestingly, 
however, it turns out that there remains yet another question that comes to occupy 
Heidegger’s attention, namely, ‘“How does it stand with Being?” [Wie steht es um das 
Sein]’ (GA 40, 36/35) In seeking to understand Heidegger’s reformulation of the question 
of Being we encounter a double gesture. On the one hand, Heidegger’s use of quotation 
marks around the reformulated question of Being might suggest that he wants to suspend, 
as it were, the entire problem inherent to this question. On the other hand, the use of 
quotation marks might, in a certain sense, serve the purpose of quoting and, as such, 
repeating a deeply-seated question in the tradition of metaphysics—a question of which 
he thus finds himself to be an inheritor. By virtue of such a double gesture of suspension 
and repetition, in the act of posing the question of Being, we therefore encounter ourselves 
as standing out from the tradition of the question of Being in which we are always already 
situated.45 
 In Heidegger’s view, then, the outstanding and prior question (Vor-frage) about 
Being is a historical question through and through in that it opens up to the happening of 
human dasein in dasein’s situated relation to beings as such. Therefore, our asking the 
question of Being ‘opens it [i.e. the human dasein] to possibilities not yet asked about, 
futures to come [Zu-künften], and thereby also binds it back to its inception that has been, 
and thus sharpens and burdens it in its present.’ (GA 40, 48/47) 
In summary, Heidegger’s question of Being shows a remarkable challenge to the 
exercise of reflecting on Being in that this question has to do with a form of thinking that 
not only tries to think the sense of Being, but also—and fundamentally—is aware of itself 
as being sent or designated to think such sense. It is for this reason that Heidegger states 
that to ask the question of Being is to ‘repeat and retrieve [wieder-holen] the inception of 
our historical-spiritual dasein, in order to transform it into the other inception [den 
anderen Anfang]’ (GA 40, 42/41). Heidegger therefore asserts that the question of Being 
is not given to us as a property, but rather it is only acquired by the repetition of the 
                                                          
44 Cf. Schürmann 1990: 272. 
45 See Grøn 2007: 233-260. 
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beginning of our historical dasein in order to transform this inceptive site into a radically 
other beginning. 
As we will come to see, when Heidegger uses the term “other beginning” he is not 
describing a mere succession of beginnings. That is to say, he is not describing a 
beginning that is located within a temporal succession of multiple conclusions and 
beginnings. Instead, as Heidegger explains it in Beiträge zur Philosophie: ‘The other 
beginning of thinking is called such not because it is merely different in form from any 
given previous philosophies, but rather because it must be the only other beginning arising 
in relation to the one and only first beginning.’ (GA 65, 4)46 
Seeing as the term “other beginning” enjoys wide currency in Heidegger’s later 
writings, we should note here that it is always employed in an ambiguous fashion. Hence, 
despite the fact that this discourse is haunted by a heroic pathos47 that permeates the very 
concept of “beginning” insofar as it is accompanied by other key words such as 
“decision,” “allotment,” “abandonment,” and “leap,” Heidegger’s employment of the 
other beginning seems to signal toward an opening, which might call for a decision to be 
made, but which itself remains the undecided origin of every decision.    
In order to clarify this significance, let us look closer at Heidegger’s claim that the 
“other beginning” has to do with beginning as repetition. As Heidegger sees it, if a 
beginning is not repeated, ‘one shrinks back to it as something that once was, something 
that by now is familiar and simply to be imitated [Nachzumachendes]’ (GA 40, 42/41). 
In other words, if the other beginning ends by repeating the first beginning as what once 
was, this would mean that the first beginning is thus self-enclosed in a manner that 
essentially isolates it from the other beginning precisely because this first beginning 
would in this fashion be determined by an ideal past and by our desire to imitate it. Thus, 
Heidegger notes that the other beginning as the repeated beginning is to begin ‘more 
originally’ than the first beginning. It is this that Heidegger identifies as the metaphysical 
questioning about the grounds of beings. As he remarks, ‘With this question it [i.e. 
                                                          
46 I would even say that this other beginning puts in suspension an understanding that seeks to frame a 
theory of historical development. For a discussion of the “other beginning” in Beiträge zur Philosophie, 
see Schüßler 2007: 215-232. See also Vallega-Neu 2003: 64-75.    
47 As de Beistegui points out, ‘Heidegger’s address [i.e. Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität 
(1933)] resonates like a pathos-filled call to the will to essence of the university, like a burning desire to 
convince and to find the political legitimacy to construct the university of essence.’ (Beistegui 2002: 62) 
He goes on to suggest that ‘the whole problematic of “the other beginning”’ can be seen as ‘the direct result 
of what Heidegger interpreted as the “movement’s” [i.e. National Socialism] failure to properly respond to 
the historical challenge of the time’ (Beistegui 2002: 62).  
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philosophy as metaphysics] had its inception,’ and it is ‘in this question it will find its end 
[ihr Ende finden]’ (GA 40, 26/26). 
Hence, to say that the fundamental question of metaphysics is both the beginning 
and the end of metaphysics (or philosophy), ultimately implies a differentiation in the 
very concept of beginning itself—a differentiation between an inception and an ending. 
This differentiation, Heidegger claims, is already found in the Greek beginning: ‘We 
overcome Greek philosophy as the beginning of Western philosophy only if we also grasp 
this beginning in its inceptive end [anfänglichen Ende]; for it was solely and only this end 
that became the “beginning” for the following times, in such a way that this “beginning” 
also covered up the inceptive beginning.’ (GA 40, 188/191; translation modified) I shall 
return to this point in the next chapter, but before we approach Heidegger’s engagement 
with the first beginning of “the Greeks,” we will first attempt to draw out some qualifying 
and preparing questions for this engagement that uncover “how it stands with Being.” 
This requires, however, that we seek greater clarity concerning what Heidegger means by 
the word “Being” as this is displayed in Einführung in die Metaphysik. 
  
THE LANGUAGE OF “BEING” 
In Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger presents the question of Being as that which 
is to be disclosed by means of an inquiry into the word “Being.” According to Heidegger, 
we must therefore ask what happens when and by which path Being comes to language 
as “Being.” Whilst Heidegger’s starting point is indeed the question concerning the sense 
of Being, the manner by which Heidegger considers this question in Einführung in die 
Metaphysik nevertheless calls into question the stability of such a starting point. To begin 
with, Heidegger evokes the word “Being” as a dramatisation of the question of Being: 
‘How does it stand with Being?’ (GA 40, 37/36) Moreover, he raises the question of 
whether or not Being by this dramatisation becomes available to our senses in the same 
manner that entities become available to us through seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and 
touching. 
 In 1931, Heidegger would remind us of his ontico-ontological difference in order 
to avoid the confusion that results from misunderstanding both the difference as such and 
the ‘inner relationship [inneren Bezug]’ (GA 33, 18/15) between beings and Being. Of 
course, Heidegger’s differentiation between Being and beings is for him far from a 
senseless and arbitrary play of words. Thus, although Heidegger, in 1931, assumes that 
language is the very source and wonder of philosophy and in this respect language did 
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not misspeak at the time of its inception, his manner of transforming the question 
concerning language, as Courtine notices in his reading of Heidegger’s 1934 course on 
Logik, nevertheless reissues the question of λόγος as an endeavour to locate the essence 
of language.48 
 Thus, in 1935, Heidegger argues that what is brought to language by the word 
“Being” exceeds our attempt to exemplify what Being is. Indeed, even when we take into 
account the full weight afforded to this word by its “hints,” such as van Gogh’s sturdy 
peasant shoes, the motorcycle roaring along the street, the mountain forest, or the 
mountain range under the vast sky, the word remains curiously undiscoverable—‘almost 
like Nothing [fast so wie das Nichts]’ (GA 40, 39/38). But why this persistent interest in 
the word “Being” given that it appears to be indicating almost nothing? 
In the first chapter of Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger underscores that 
‘words and language are not just shells [Hülsen] into which things are packed for spoken 
and written intercourse. In the word, in language, things first come to be and are’ (GA 40, 
16/15). Hence, every time we speak (even if not necessarily about Being) we come to 
experience Being as that which we have always already named (Nennkraft). As Düttmann 
explains it, ‘the “naming power” has always already accrued to or grown upon us. Being 
is a being-ahead-of-itself of language’ (Düttmann 2002: 177). The problem in 
Heidegger’s view, however, is that the question of Being, as well as the question of 
language, is itself historically and destinally overdetermined by its oblivion (GA 40, 20-
21/19-20). The overdetermination of the word “Being,” however, is not just ‘a particular 
case of the general abuse of language [Sprachvernutzung]—instead, the destroyed 
relation to Being as such is the real ground for our whole misrelation to language.’ (GA 
40, 55/54) This is the case, Heidegger explains, because ‘the fate [Schicksal] of language 
is grounded in the particular relation of a people to Being, [and as such] the question 
about Being will be most intimately intertwined with the question about language for us.’ 
(GA 40, 55/54)49 
 Heidegger’s manner of inquiring into the word “Being” thus carries two important 
implications. First, it emphasises how the imposition of language (that is, language as the 
                                                          
48 Courtine 1999: 37. Part One of Heidegger’s Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache reconsiders 
the question of logic in view of a renewed understanding of λόγος (GA 38, 2-30). From this perspective, 
Heidegger goes on to discuss more pointedly the question of the essence of the human being on account of 
the pronouns “I,” “you,” “we,” and “your,” (GA 38, 30-56) so as to attend to the pertinent question of the 
lecture course, namely that of the “people” (Volk) (GA 38, 56-77) and its three modes of being: “mission 
and sending” (Auftrag und Sendung), “work” (Arbeit), and “attunement” (Stimmung) (GA 38, 126-150).   
49 Cf. Courtine 1999: 50-51n.54. 
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grammatical forms or the philosophical-propositional grammar that seizes speech) upon 
“Being” does not recognise its own subsumption of Being. As Heidegger explains it, ‘The 
word is an instrument of hunting and hitting, namely in the “process” and the “labour” of 
representing [Vergegenständlichung: reification, thingification] everything in terms of 
precision-firing [schußsicheren].’ (GA 55, 70-71)50 Second, to say that “Being” is this or 
that is to lay hold of Being, meaning that the “word” has the function of rendering Being 
into an object in retainment (sicherstellen). Yet, in such a process of naming, Heidegger 
argues, we are reaching into a void in that Being, from the perspective of the signifying 
process, is turned into little more than an empty word: ‘Its sense is an unreal vapour.’ 
(GA 40, 39/38) 
 Interestingly, Heidegger’s considerations of the word “Being” described here are 
inspired by Nietzsche. More specifically, in his Götzen-Dämmerung Nietzsche points out 
the hysteron-proteron (i.e. the latter first) idiosyncrasy of a philosophy that employs the 
‘“highest concepts,” that is, the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of 
evaporating reality [den letzten Rauch der verdunstenden Realität], in the beginning as 
the beginning.’ (KSA 6, 76)51 It is against the backdrop of Nietzsche’s unveiling of 
“Being” as an empty fiction that Heidegger attempts to disentangle the apparent 
irresoluteness of the word or the concept of “Being” from what would then in contrast be 
the sense of Being.52 That is to say that the inherited meaning of the word or concept of 
“Being” no longer refers (if it ever did) to the sense or direction of Being inasmuch as the 
sending of the question of Being arrives at or departs from a different site than that of all 
the positions handed down to us in the form of the metaphysical questioning of Being. 
Indeed, if the question of Being is bequeathed to us with any direction or sense at all, we 
                                                          
50 Today the German “schußsicher” is synonymous with “kugelsicher,” meaning “bulletproof,” whereas 
“precision-firing” would be rendered as “treffsicher” or “zielsicher.” However, from the context of 1935, 
it makes the most sense to translate it as “precision-firing.” Cf. Duden, 714-715.   
51 Already in 1931 Heidegger devotes attention to Nietzsche’s conception of Being as the ‘bloodless 
abstraction undisturbed by any reality’ (KSA 1, 836) to which Parmenides’ doctrine of Being testifies. 
Heidegger revisits Nietzsche in 1943 by discussing the latter’s conception of Being in Der Wille zur Macht: 
‘the “Being”—we have no other representation [Vorstellung] of it than “life.”—How can something dead 
“be” then?’ (KSA 12, 153; cf. GA 55, 91-92; cf. GA 51, 33-34). For a discussion, see Müller-Lauter 2000: 
184-188. 
52 However, such a discussion of Being also appears in Heidegger’s 1938-1939 unpublished thesis on Hegel 
entitled Die Negativität. What Hegel meant by “being” as “reality,” Heidegger sees as “objectivity” 
(Gegenständlichkeit) of being (GA 68, 10). According to Hegel, the pure being (reines Sein) makes the 
beginning because it is both pure thought and undetermined immediacy (unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit), 
all the while the first beginning cannot be anything mediated and determined (HW 5, 82-83). Hegel writes: 
‘But this pure being is the pure abstraction, and hence it is the absolutely negative, which when taken 
immediately, is nothing [das Nichts ist].’ (HW 8, 186) For Hegel, both being and nothingness are the 
absolute-negatives and therefore indeterminable, so much so that the negativity itself disappears in the 
positivity, which, however, is empty. See Vetter 2014: 147.      
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must take a step back through the destruction of metaphysics in order finally (if ever) to 
be able to follows this direction towards the sense of the question of Being. 
 But if we cannot meaningfully define the word “Being,” especially since the very 
manner of questioning into what Being is already seems to lead us astray, should we then 
open our eyes to the reality that that which is put into question becomes nothing but a 
vapour, and thereby give up the questioning of Being altogether? For Heidegger, this is a 
paramount question. Still, with respect to the question it remains undecided whether 
“Being” is merely vapour or smoke (Rauch), or whether, when thought properly, Being 
is ‘the innermost hidden fire [innerste verborgene Glut] of human dasein’ (GA 33, 20/16). 
Hence, it also remains undecided whether the thinking of Being will one day become 
properly epochal: ‘We do not know; for that reason we are questioning, that is, we are 
struggling to inquire correctly.’ (GA 33, 20/16). These queries will carry Heidegger 
further into a discussion with Nietzsche, and thus to another articulation of metaphysics 
in the most extreme void of Being. Here is Heidegger: 
 
The question of how it stands with Being also proves [enthüllt] to be the 
question of how it stands with our dasein in history, of whether we stand in 
history or merely stagger [taumeln]. Seen metaphysically, we are staggering. 
Everywhere we are underway amid beings, and yet we no longer know how 
it stands with Being. We do not even know that we no longer know it. We are 
staggering even when we mutually assure ourselves that we are not 
staggering, even when, as in recent times, people go so far as to try to show 
that this asking about Being brings only confusion, that it has a destructive 
[zerstörend] effect, that it is nihilism. (GA 40, 211/217) 
 
The question of our standing in history as an experience of staggering is one that we will 
reserve for a later discussion. We may, however, make one preliminary remark regarding 
this topic, namely, that the situation of the human dasein at stake in history is due to the 
fact that the word “Being” is no longer intelligible to this human dasein wherefore the 
supposed “knowing” of its own dasein no longer means anything. 
 Heidegger then critically asks whether or not we are to entertain a blind 
worshipping (einer blinden Heroisierung) of Nietzsche who, in abolishing the axiological 
schema of a true world and with this world also the apparent one, spoke the truth about 
the error of Being (GA 40, 39/39). Ultimately, Heidegger answers by arguing that 
Nietzsche himself is a product of a long-standing errancy and neglect of a rigorous 
account of the question of Being. Indeed, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche is the final 
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victim of metaphysical errancy but as this final victim he perhaps also opens up the 
thinking of Being to a new necessity (neue Notwendigkeit).53 
 Nietzsche, in Heidegger’s reading, is therefore a complex figure. On the one hand, 
he is said to be entangled in the history of metaphysics; but, on the other hand, he is 
entangled to such an extent that, through this very entanglement he is able to articulate 
and make manifest the structure of this dynamic. The consequence of all this is that 
Nietzsche thereby prepares the path to think the question of Being differently upon which 
Heidegger is ready to embark. Heidegger begins on this path of thinking Being differently 
by asking whether it might be inherent to Being that it is confused with beings, and 
whether it is a fault of the word “Being” that it remains empty or if it is rather that “we” 
no longer understand the question of Being and indeed have been drawn so far into the 
oblivion of Being that “we” have ‘fallen out of Being [aus dem Sein herausgefallen]?’ 
(GA 40, 40/39) 
 It is surely a remarkable, yet strangely unremarkable, moment in the history of 
Being if we have forgotten Being. But what does it mean to forget Being and what does 
Heidegger mean by falling out of Being? In order to avoid the impression that Being 
represents a state of fullness or even grace (status gratiae) from which the falling-out of 
Being would come to signify a state of corruption (status corruptionis), Heidegger refers 
his readers to § 38 in Sein und Zeit. In this paragraph, we are told that to ascribe to the 
“falling out of Being” metaphors is a ‘bad and deplorable ontical property’ (SZ, 176) if 
one does not first clarify in what sense dasein is determined ontologically. This then 
provides the context for Heidegger’s ontological understanding of the “falling out of 
Being” inasmuch as it designates one of the ways in which dasein is a being-in-the-world. 
In other words, just as an erring and an emptying out of itself inherently belongs to the 
very structure of Being so the possibility of forgetting and of falling out of Being belongs. 
                                                          
53 This understanding of Nietzsche as the “final victim” of the errancy of metaphysics, or better put, as “the 
last metaphysician,” is a recurrent topic in Heidegger’s works. He explores it explicitly in the section of his 
Nietzsche course entitled “Nietzsche als metaphysischer Denker,” in which he also argues that the notion 
of the will to power becomes emblematic for Nietzsche’s determination of what constitutes the ‘basic 
character of all beings’ (GA 6.1, 2; cf. GA 47, 10). The same determination is also explored by Heidegger 
in “Wahrheit im Platonismus und im Positivismus,” where he advances the argument that Nietzsche sets 
out to invert Platonism, but in doing so gets himself caught up within the very framework of thought that 
he seeks to overturn (GA 6.1, 153-154; cf. GA 5, 217). However, whether Nietzsche in fact gets tangled up 
in a thought of being qua totality so that he “is” the last metaphysician—Heidegger himself questions. 
Furthermore, whether Heidegger in fact defines metaphysics as the thinking of beings as a whole, and 
whether his own questioning of the Being of beings escapes metaphysics are, in my view, unsettled 
questions, which merit a study of their own. For an excellent account of the “at least twice-told” story of 
Heidegger’s Nietzsche, see Sallis 1986: 160-169. 
54 
 
With this peculiar formation of falling out of Being, Heidegger then sums up his 
considerations by posing yet another question: ‘“Is “Being” a mere word and its meaning 
a vapour, or is it the spiritual destiny of the Evening-land? [Ist das “Sein” ein bloßes Wort 
und seine Bedeutung ein Dunst oder das geistige Schicksal des Abendlandes?]”’ (GA 40, 
40/40) Here, then, we have an explicit relation being drawn between Being and the 
question of the Evening-land, and, as will become evident as we go along also between 
Being and the question of Europe understood as the “final” destination of the Evening-
land. As such, in moving forward with our project of excavating Europe from Heidegger’s 
work, we may suggest that the proper sense of Being for Heidegger is sought precisely 
by bringing out its intimate relation with the historical-destinal configuration of the 
Evening-land.54 In light of this relation, we will therefore proceed to question how 
Heidegger’s re-articulation of the question of Being concerns an original forgetting of 
Being that itself constitutes the spiritual destiny of the Evening-land. 
 
“EUROPEAN NIHILISM” 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the question of oblivion is crucial to that of 
Being. As Heidegger says in Einführung in die Metaphysik, to treat the question of Being 
in the midst of the oblivion of Being is to become aware of nihilism, and nihilism is how 
it stands with Being in “our age.” In this section, I am therefore going to approach the 
term “nihilism” in Heidegger’s text by examining aspects of his 1940 course on Nietzsche 
entitled Der europäische Nihilismus in which he considers Nietzsche as the thinker for 
whom Europe and nihilism coalesces as the final outcome of the history of Being. More 
specifically, Heidegger unfolds the notion of nihilism in this text (as also in the 1935 
lecture course) in terms of the ‘history in which there is nothing to Being itself.’ (GA 6.2, 
304; emphasis added) As such, the nothing (nihil) of Being that in a certain sense 
nevertheless “is,” designates the historical forgetting and annihilation of Being that 
reaches its apex in the modern epoch of technology. Nihilism is therefore not simply the 
negation of Being as a no-thing, but rather it designates precisely the inability to think the 
nothingness of Being itself and as such to properly pose the question of Being. 
                                                          
54 Without engaging in a discussion of the notion of Schicksal in Heidegger’s thinking, it is worth noting 
that in the preceding winter course of 1934-1935 Heidegger is particularly occupied with “fate,” which 
may, of course, have to do with the political events occurring in Germany at that time. Here Heidegger 
writes: ‘The first overcoming of the Asiatic sense of fatum was accomplished by the Greeks in an 
overcoming that, in the manner of its accomplishment, remains unrepeatable […]. We must not, however, 
equate Hölderlin’s knowing of destiny [Schicksal] with the Greek one. We must learn to use this essential 
German word to name an essential beyng in its true German content’ (GA 39, 173/158-159). 
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 Indeed, by 1929 Heidegger had already touched upon the question of nothingness 
as this most awkward subject of philosophy that does not allow itself to be spoken of 
without subjecting itself to the domain of philosophical-propositional logic. In 
Heidegger’s view, nothingness is not at our disposal in the same manner as a logical 
inquiry into objects or beings, and, moreover, it almost deprives itself of its own 
worthiness as a question (GA 9, 107). Furthermore, as Heidegger’s analysis of the 
experience of anxiety displays, nothingness is not nothing per se, as though nothingness 
were derived from nothing and negation; rather, nothingness “is” more original than the 
logical negation of something into nothing (GA 9, 111-112). It is precisely for this reason, 
argues Heidegger, that the negation takes its bearings from the ‘nothing that arises 
[entspringt] from the being-nothing of nothingness [Nichten des Nichts].’ (GA 9, 116-
117) 
 Given the relevance that Heidegger’s discussion of Being and nothingness carries 
for our current topic on Europe, it would be odd were we not to take into consideration 
what Heidegger in his investigation of Nietzsche’s inversion of metaphysics and its 
planetary scope identifies as “European nihilism” (GA 6.2, 325-336). In the 1943 essay 
Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot,” Heidegger explains that Nietzsche’s inversion constitutes 
a stage belonging to the metaphysical history of the Evening-land, and presumably 
heralds the end stage (Endstadium) of metaphysics as such (GA 5, 209). As the 
culmination of metaphysics, nihilism occurs within modernity, or, in German, Neuzeit, 
which, for Heidegger, designates the “new age” out of which we are compelled to ask 
‘what is now’ (GA 50, 97). 
 As Heidegger sees it, it is Nietzsche who brings into focus the force of nihilism that 
becomes manifest only in this age of closure, but this does not mean that the metaphysics 
of Plato is ‘any less nihilistic than the metaphysics of Nietzsche’ (GA 67, 210). In order 
to explicate how nihilism is related to metaphysics, I would like to underscore the radical 
nature of Heidegger’s interpretation of both nihilism and Nietzsche. This radicality 
becomes most clear, I believe, when one takes note of the degree to which Heidegger both 
borrows from and departs from Nietzsche’s account of metaphysics and its nihilism. I 
therefore bring this first chapter to a close with a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of nihilism in order to set the stage for Heidegger’s understanding of 
nihilism as a concept significant to the history of Being. 
 We find Nietzsche’s discussion of nihilism to be scattered throughout his essays, 
notes, and journals. As Nietzsche tells the story, nihilism names an epoch in which the 
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devalorisation of the highest values carries along with it a lack of direction and goals. 
Briefly put, nihilism is simply ‘the lack of the answer to the why?’ (KSA 12, 350) In other 
and more Heideggerian words, what lacks is an answer to the metaphysical question of 
“why there is something rather than nothing.” For Nietzsche, however, it is not merely 
that this question lacks an answer, but also that such lacking renders the entire 
metaphysical question radically ‘senseless [das “Sinnlose”]’ (KSA 12, 213). As 
Nietzsche explains, ‘For the history of European nihilism: what is missing? Essentially: 
sense is missing [der Sinn fehlt]’ (KSA 13, 215). The account of senselessness introduced 
here is certainly important to take note of in that such senselessness is exactly the issue 
that Heidegger desires to address in his own reflections on “European nihilism” as a 
historical attitude that neither can nor will understand the nothingness of Being. 
If indeed one of Nietzsche’s challenges to us is that one must think nihilism in terms 
of the sense gone missing in the modern epoch, it is because with the provocation of “the 
death of God” the essential horizon of orientation withdraws. Evidently, God means God 
and especially the Judeo-Christian God who “is who he is,” but God also means 
everything else that in the course of the history of metaphysics precipitately and 
inadvertently has sought to replace the monolithic position of divinity. It is for this reason 
that Nietzsche’s account of the “death of God” amounts to far more than a facile and 
simplistic claim of atheism.55 Instead, Nietzsche intends it to serve the nuanced purpose 
of displaying the mutation of the horizon passing infinitely beyond horizon: ‘In the 
horizon of the infinite.—We have forsaken the land and gone to sea! We have destroyed 
the bridge behind us—more so, we have demolished the land behind us!’ (KSA 3, 480)56 
The opening of horizon, which Nietzsche invokes in paragraph 124 in Die 
Fröhliche Wissenschaft, is not simply the delimitation of the limit within which we see 
whatever we come to see. To the contrary, the entire horizon has been wiped away 
                                                          
55 What one would have to think, Heidegger claims as he mentions how Nietzsche himself was surprised 
by this thought, is that it is humans who have killed God, which is unthinkable. Thus, to think “the death 
of God” is to think the unthinkable (GA 5, 260ff.). The time in which God has lost his power, Heidegger 
argues, is not the time when Christianity has come to an end, because nihilism, designating the end of 
power, has been acute from the very beginning of metaphysics and thus also of Christianity, although it 
becomes manifest only at their end. This is why Nancy can argue that ‘Christianity is accomplished in 
nihilism and as nihilism, which means that nihilism is none other than the final incandescence of sense, that 
it is sense taken to its point of excess.’ (Nancy 2008: 147)  
56 For a discussion of Nietzsche’s metaphoricity of the open sea, see Stegmaier 2012: 114ff. Nietzsche’s 
calling forth to the sea again—that is, calling forth ‘the man without horizon’ (Blanchot 1993: 66-74)—is 
no doubt a comment over against Hegel’s discovery that with Descartes ‘we properly enter upon a self-
supporting philosophy. Here, we can say that we are at home and, like the sailor who was journeyed on the 
stormy sea for a long time, cry: “Land-ho!”’ (HW 20, 120) A comment which Heidegger, above all, brought 
into focus in his readings of modern philosophy, cf. GA 9, 258; GA 68, 77-78; GA 5, 128-129. 
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(indeed, Nietzsche wonders who could have given us the sponge to do so now that God 
is dead) with the consequence that the horizon of finitude becomes displaced and deferred 
in infinite nothingness. To complement this point, let us read the subsequent famous 
paragraph 125 in which the madman, in an outburst of desperation, is looking for the God 
whom humans have killed:  
 
But how did we do this?...What were we doing when we unchained this earth 
from its sun? Where is it moving to now? Where are we moving to? Away 
from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, 
forwards, in all directions? Is there still an up and a down? Aren’t we straying 
as though through an infinite nothing? Isn’t empty space breathing at us? 
(KSA 3, 481) 
 
As these questions indicate, the issue here concerns not only the responsibility of those 
who have killed God, but also the terrifying and “apocalyptic” kind of catastrophe which, 
as Michel Haar points out, has been invoked by the transformation of the cosmic 
proportions pertaining to the death of God.57 In this manner, we are led back to one of the 
departure points of this chapter, namely, that the entire question of the relation between 
Europe and Being shows itself to be intimately tied to issues such as vanishing horizons, 
the unchaining of the earth from the sun, and the open, which are all associated with 
nihilism.58 Let us therefore attempt to unfold this relation a bit further. 
 The “death of God,” as Nietzsche sets it up, begins with the unchaining of the earth 
from the sun and thereby inaugurates a ‘sunset [Sonne untergegangen]’ or a ‘solar eclipse 
[Sonnenfinsternis]’ (KSA 3, 573). Moreover, this unchaining represents, in some sense, 
the realisation of a parting with an image of the earth as situated beneath the heavens that 
has already occurred but that only now is beginning to be recognised. Even more 
crucially, though, I believe this account of the death of God exposes an image of the world 
where there still remains an earth but no longer a heaven for it to imitate and reflect itself 
in. Yet, if the earth beyond which there is no longer any divine heaven is the orbit in 
which the history of the collapse of an old representation of the world, that is, the 
representation of earth as an image of the heavenly archetype, comes to the fore, then this 
same earth is ultimately left to inhabit an infinite, cold, dark, and empty space.59 One 
                                                          
57 Cf. Haar 1996: 131-150. 
58 Because the death of God is, Lütkehaus argues, ‘the true “Big bang” that tears apart the cosmos.’ 
(Lütkehaus 2010: 274) 
59 As Lütkehaus says, this emptiness carries with it a familiar yet frightening name: ‘The emptiness is the 
God forsaken space of the “infinite nothing”’ (Lütkehaus 2010: 710). He continues: ‘Nietzsche’s “infinite 
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could then say that because of this Nietzschean-proclaimed catastrophe of cosmo-centric 
proportionality, we must reassess what is undertaken in the name of the “death of God.”60 
The aim of such a reassessment is for us to witness how, as Nietzsche says, the ‘greatest 
event [Ereignis] of recent time—that “God is dead”…has already cast its first shadows 
over Europe.’ (KSA 3, 573) 
 Whereas Heidegger and Nietzsche as thinkers converge in certain important 
respects, at times they also diverge from one another. First the convergence: just as 
Nietzsche, Heidegger sees nihilism as representing the declining completion of ideals, 
values, principles, ends, and meaning—or, to say the same thing differently, for 
Heidegger the completion of nihilism occurs only when there is no longer anything to 
complete (GA 6.2, 32-33). In addition, Heidegger certainly holds an appreciation for 
Nietzsche as the thinker who was called upon to reflect on the essence of metaphysics. 
Coming to the divergences, however, Heidegger is also critical of Nietzsche’s failure to 
think through the essence of nothingness as pertaining to Being by which Nietzsche 
comes to represent the culmination of the decline of metaphysics. 
Hence, in Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of metaphysics, something more 
radical than Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism as well as his disclosure of Being as an 
empty word is required to reflect on the destitution of Being that is within the grip of 
nihilism. Moreover, for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome nihilism by means 
of a re-evaluation of values also proves inadequate to the task of raising the question of 
Being in that Nietzsche’s gesture of inversion is premised on the idea that the value of 
something is still valued as valid, which carries the consequence that Being remains 
debased (entwürdigt) to the realm of beings (GA 67, 256). As Heidegger puts it, a thinking 
of nothingness into the question of Being needs to take place, which is precisely what 
Nietzsche failed to do and which, thereby, leaves Nietzsche firmly positioned within the 
nihilism of classical metaphysics (GA 6.2, 44). 
 Heidegger therefore conceives of Nietzsche in and even as the end stage of the 
history of metaphysics, which, in Heidegger’s view, can be characterised as the historical 
moment in which metaphysics has exhausted its essential possibilities (GA 5, 209)—a 
                                                          
nothing” is the gaping heart wound [klaffende Herzenswunde] of a metaphysical fatherlessness building up 
to a cosmic catastrophe.’ (712) 
60 Maurice Blanchot has described this displacement of the horizon with respect to its cosmic catastrophe 
as introducing the necessity of thinking under a “double contradiction:” to think it first as distortion of a 
field that is nevertheless continuous, and as a dislocating and rupture of discontinuity—and then to think it 
as the infinite that is without terms ‘and as the infinite termination of a term without relation’ (Blanchot 
1993: 74).  
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movement that, as indicated above, is bound up with the oblivion of Being (GA 6.2, 45). 
Of crucial importance for Heidegger is therefore the encounter with the question of how 
Being takes itself to the limit of nothingness, which could be said to be Heidegger’s “step 
beyond” Nietzsche. Thus, in contrasting his own interpretation of nihilism with the 
Nietzschean inversion of the metaphysical hierarchy, Heidegger writes that an inclusion 
of “nothingness” into the question of Being prepares ‘the first and only fruitful 
[fruchtende] step to a truthful overcoming [Überwindung] of nihilism’ (GA 40, 
212/218).61 
 It would therefore appear that Heidegger, to some degree works within the same 
basic understanding of the category of nihilism as Nietzsche, albeit in a differing manner. 
In particular, it would appear that both of these thinkers can agree that the “death of God,” 
which includes both the infinite horizon and the collapse of highest principles, indicates 
a history-making event in a twofold manner in that it designates the end of metaphysics 
while at the same time casting its shadow over Europe by opening Europe to nihilism. Or, 
to put it differently, the European nihilism serves as precisely that which unveils the logic 
of this historical event (GA 6.2, 278-279). Furthermore, rather than designating one 
historical phenomenon among others, as though nihilism were merely a spiritual tendency 
(eine geistige Strömung) in the history of Europe, nihilism constitutes nothing less than 
‘the basic movement of the history of the Evening-land [die Grundbewegung der 
Geschichte des Abendlandes]’ (GA 5, 201). 
 However, whereas Nietzsche, with his account of nihilism, refers to the question of 
nothingness only from the ontic perspective of beings, Heidegger ventures to take a step 
further in reflecting on how nothingness and Being belong together (GA 5, 239). Given 
this line of argument, then, what generally remains unthought with regards to nihilism, 
according to Heidegger, is what he calls the essence of nihilism, that is, how Being still 
articulates itself in the epoch of nihilism (GA 5, 243).62 
As we have already touched upon above, the issue of nihilism is pertinent to the 
question of Being in that Being “is” what has no property in itself, that is, Being “is” the 
                                                          
61 To see why Heidegger seeks to take this “step beyond” Nietzsche, thereby running the risk of re-
inscribing himself in a discourse of the otherworldly, it is important to recall that his interpretation of 
nihilism is centred on what he takes to be the “inverted Platonism” of Nietzsche according to which the 
world of the beyond is abolished. One might say that Heidegger casts a bifocal glance on the history of 
metaphysics. Metaphysics is said both to have achieved its goal and to decline inasmuch as the simultaneity 
of completion and decline significant to metaphysics becomes evident in Heidegger’s synoptic observation 
of the modern human being dislodged from its essence so as to compensate its ‘homelessness by the 
organised global conquest of the earth’ (GA 6.2, 395). For a discussion, see Schürmann 1990: 191.  
62 Cf. Guzzoni 1980: 81. 
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Being of nothing. What makes one uncomfortable with this issue is not only that, as 
Nietzsche says, ‘nihilism stands at the door [Der Nihilismus steht vor der Thür],’ but also 
that there still remains something unknown and undecided of nihilism—a point reflected 
in Nietzsche’s question, ‘whence comes this uncanniest of all guests? [woher kommt uns 
dieser unheimlichste aller Gäste?]’ (KSA 12, 125; 120; GA 79, 134; GA 55, 66; GA 5, 
217-218; GA 9, 387) To conclude this discussion on Nietzsche’s understanding of 
nihilism and Heidegger’s understanding thereof, allow me to make several remarks on 
this particularly uncanny question. 
First, we may note that the uncanniness mentioned here pertains not so much to the 
de facto meaninglessness of nihilism, but rather to the notion of nothingness. According 
to Nietzsche, the will is always a will to something, even if it wills nothingness, such that 
the horror vacui of will ‘needs a goal’ (KSA 5, 339). Let us leave aside the question of 
whether Heidegger is right to suppose that Nietzsche’s account of the will to power is 
itself a purpose that refills the emptiness of not-willing (GA 6.2, 54). Let me instead speak 
of the horror vacui in relation to Being. As we have pointed out above, nothingness is not 
some-thing, as if it were a Being among other beings. Moreover, inherent to Being is no-
thing, which is to say, a void, an emptiness, an abyss of Being itself, and it is precisely 
this no-thing that both evokes uncanniness and anxiety. In other words, the word “Being” 
is as void as the empty space pressing in upon us. In this manner, Being is the horror of 
the void that constitutes the weightiness of Being that Heidegger is trying to think. 
Indeed, the uncanniness of which Nietzsche speaks Heidegger interprets as that of 
Europe inasmuch as nihilism is the basic feature, or better, the logic of the modern epoch 
that he identifies with Europe. As Heidegger sees it, Europe as the epochal determination 
of the end of metaphysics recapitulates the unfolding of the essence of metaphysics—a 
dynamic which he identifies with nihilism. In this sense, then, European nihilism simply 
is the thought of Europe. That is to say, nihilism is that which Europe thinks of itself. A 
key insight for Heidegger is therefore that nihilism does not come from outside of or 
beyond Europe, but rather it has been present and has been an issue already from the very 
beginning of European metaphysics. As such, in the process of shaking up metaphysics—
and before we have even begun to reflect on the death of God—nihilism has already 
arrived. What this means is that by the time we have greeted our uncanny guest it already 
seems too late to show this same guest the door. Moreover, we sense the disturbance of 
nihilism precisely in that, due to this uninvited intruder already roaming in the history of 
metaphysics, we are always already disturbed. In this respect, nihilism does not belong to 
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a temporal schema according to which the arrival and departure of this guest could be 
predicted. Hence, if nihilism is indeed a guest, one might suggest that it is a guest that 
either comes from or serves as the exteriorisation of the innermost essence of 
metaphysics, which is to say from the history of metaphysics that unfolds the void that 
Being is. 
As we have seen, the issue driving Heidegger is the horror of the void to which 
Nietzsche as well as “we” fall victim in that we have fallen out of Being only to discover 
how Being offers “us” nothing by which to make sense of it. That is to say that the 
experience of Being opens onto nothing other than Being and hence, as Lacoue-Labarthe 
says with Celan, onto ‘the no-thing of Being’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1999: 67).  
 It is precisely the absence of any proper Being of Being that exposes the “proper” 
horror vacui, as it were, by exposing to Being its intimate void as though it were outside 
Being itself. Thus, the nothingness of Being is that excluded interior (or emptiness), 
which, as Lacan puts it, is ‘excluded in the interior [cet intérieur exclu qui […] est ainsi 
exclu à l’intérieur].’ (Lacan 1986: 122)63 This nothingness of Being, which is also to say 
“our” falling out of Being, suggests that the horrific void of Being is also within “us.”64 
As we shall come to see in more detail in Chapter Three, Heidegger regards this unfolding 
of nihilism within the history of Being as intimately bound up with the hegemony of 
technology already ruling over the Europe of his day and spreading itself across the globe 
and into interstellar space. However, before we proceed to this end destination of 
metaphysics we must first return to its origin, which means that we must first return to 
Heidegger’s philosophical encounter with “the Greeks.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 My account of Heidegger’s understanding of the “horror of Being” is indebted to Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
reading of Lacan’s la Chose, which again borrows from Heidegger’s das Ding. See, Lacoue-Labarthe 2012: 
57-70. 
64 Hence, ‘when being lacks, when nothingness becomes power [pouvoir],’ Blanchot remarks, ‘man is fully 
historical. But when being lacks, is there a lack of being? When being lacks, does this mean that this lack 
owes nothing to being? Or rather does it mean perhaps that the lack is the being that lies at the bottom of 
the absence of being—that the lack is what still remains of being when there is nothing?’ (Blanchot 1955: 
343/251; translation slightly modified) In other words, something appears where lack is lacking, namely, 
the Being of lack that appears as an apparition of what has disappeared.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
HEIDEGGER AND THE GREEKS 
 
We are still Greeks, certainly, but perhaps other Greeks, we were not born from just that Greek send-off 
[d’envoi]; we are certainly still other Greeks, with the memory of events that are irreducible to the Greek 
genealogy, but other enough to have not only, also, altered the Greek in us, but to bear within us 
something wholly other than the Greek. 
(Derrida, “Nous autres Grecs,” 263) 
 
One of the central themes of Chapter One was Heidegger’s analysis of the question of 
Being. Moreover, while Heidegger remains appreciative of certain aspects of the 
metaphysical articulation within this analysis, with his project he nevertheless inquires 
beyond metaphysics. This double gesture, Heidegger stresses, is precisely that which is 
characteristic of the limitations of discourse, that is, the limitations where one is required 
to speak in the language of that which one is trying to overcome. Despite imbuing the 
question of Being with a metaphysical orientation, Heidegger recognises in the 
transmission of this question its very reification according to which our relation to Being 
not only attests to our knowledge of Being but also to our ‘inability to stand  by what is 
given [Gesetz] by the truth of this knowledge’ (GA 9, 304). As Heidegger points out in 
the 1943 postscript to Was ist Metaphysik?, although metaphysics is the history of the 
truth we come to know as that of Being, such metaphysics also, at the same time, renders 
the beingness of Being into a concept without thinking the truth of Being. Thus, in 
Heidegger’s view, the history of metaphysics bequeaths to us not only an understanding 
of Being, but also an unfolding of its own inability to think Being as such, that is, to think 
the ‘absolutely other [schlechthin Andere]’ than beings that ‘essentially sways [west] as 
Being.’ (GA 9, 306) 
 Yet, as one moves through Heidegger’s encounter with the history of metaphysics, 
it becomes clear that he desires to assume a more circumspect approach to the question 
of Being. As we argue in what follows, he does so by pondering (Andenken) the beginning 
of the history of Being that, as he notes in the 1949 introduction to Was ist Metaphysik?, 
reveals itself in the thinking of the Greeks. Consequently, for the one who takes up the 
question of Being, as does Heidegger,  it will be of utmost importance to keep in mind 
the basic insight that the ‘Greeks early on experienced the Being of beings as the presence 
of what is presenting itself [die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden].’ (GA 9, 376) 
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 To recall our earlier discussion, in the first chapter we pointed to how Heidegger’s 
thought of Being takes issue with the Greeks in that it was within Greek thinking that 
Being was most originarily and explicitly emplaced. This emplacement (Erörterung), as 
already suggested by Heidegger in both Einführung in die Metaphysik and Sein und Zeit, 
is itself an indication of as well as an attending to the most original place of Being. 
Throughout his philosophical undertakings, Heidegger thus never ceased to emphasise 
the central importance of “the Greeks.” The question remains, however, in which sense 
“the Greeks” are pertinent to the question of Europe in Heidegger. 
The present chapter attempts to approach this question by means of engaging with 
Heidegger’s engagement with the Greeks. In considering this task, one cannot but be 
struck by the immensity of the latter engagement—a fact confirmed not least of all by the 
vast research literature on “Heidegger and the Greeks.” In what follows, however, our 
purpose is not to account for Heidegger’s overall approach to “the Greeks,” especially 
given that Heidegger’s grasp on Greek thought tends to gather such thinking before us in 
order to open us to what remains unthought therein.  
Rather, in the following remarks my primary aim is to shed light on what Heidegger 
describes as the tautology of “Evening-landish-European philosophy,” which he points 
out is tautological not because philosophy is European, but rather because ‘philosophy is 
essentially Greek’ (GA 11, 9). What emerges from this tripartite schema of philosophy-
Europe-Greeks, I argue, is that the history of Being in which the word “philosophy” is 
determinative is philosophical through and through. Having developed these ideas, I shall 
then turn my attention to Heidegger’s essay from 1946 entitled Der Spruch des 
Anaximander, in relation to which I suggest that what is at stake is once again the word 
“Being.” According to Heidegger, a certain displacement of this word took place already 
in Greek thinking when the epsilon of the Greek word ἐόν had been elided in the later 
rendition of Being as ὃν. In raising the question of Being from this perspective, I am 
particularly interested in how, according to Heidegger, the emphasis put on the word 
“Being” and the elision of the epsilon in ἐόν are decisive in pointing to the destiny of 
Europe (GA 5, 345). 
 
“TO THE GREEKS THEMSELVES” 
The heading of this chapter, “Heidegger and the Greeks,” is less of a title than it is a 
pivotal axis around which the question of Being resolves. As many interpreters have 
noted, the conjunction “and” in “Heidegger and the Greeks” is not to be understood as 
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rendering Heidegger’s concern with the Greeks subjacent to a historiographical 
exposition of the Greeks.65 In fact, even if we consider the Greeks on account of their 
historiography, which, Heidegger concedes, may have its place, one might nevertheless 
still raise the question why this privileged appeal to “the Greeks.” Such a question is 
especially relevant given that the word “Greek” does not itself derive from the Greek 
language, but rather comes from the Latin graecus (remembering Heidegger’s often 
unflattering perspective on Latin) and connotes the belonging or relation to that which is 
characterised as “Greek.”66 
The question that remains to be answered, then, is “who” are Heidegger’s Greeks? 
Perhaps it is already apparent who “they” are: we find in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe an 
abundance of courses on Plato, Aristotle, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, as 
well as multiple references to poets such as Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, and Sophocles.67 Yet, 
for Heidegger the notion of “the Greeks” stands for more or other than a mere veneration 
of names: “the Greeks” refers not only to a concrete, historical people who lived in a 
certain place at a certain time, but such a notion also constitutes a mode of attention by 
which the question of Being incessantly yields a thinking of Being. This latter point is 
already developed by Heidegger in his early engagement with the Greeks where he notes 
that ‘the fundamental question of Greek philosophical research is the question of Being, 
the question of the meaning of Being, and characteristically, the question of truth’ (GA 
19, 190/132). Thus, as early as in the 1924-1925 lecture course on Plato’s Sophist, 
Heidegger is committed to the idea that the notion of “the Greeks” is not merely an 
arbitrary (beliebig) assertion of philosophy, but rather such a notion serves as the foil for 
understanding the question of Being. 
Heidegger is aware that his understanding carries with it a certain kind of pitfall in 
the sense that the mere attempt to convey an account of the question of Being in terms of 
“the Greeks” is inevitably to pass through an ‘exploration [Erkundung] of the past from 
the perspective [Gesichtskreis] of the present’ (GA 45, 34). Such an approach, as 
Heidegger argues, will turn out to be disappointing for two reasons. The first reason being 
that this approach is historiographical—and a historiographical orientation of the question 
                                                          
65 See, for instance, Figal 2007: 9-14; Emad 2006: 115-116; Manoussakis 2006: 2-8.  
66 To be precise, the word “Greek” is found in Greek as Γραικός (an archaic equivalent to Ἕλλην). In 
Meteorologica, for instance, Aristotle mentions the river of Acheloüs by which ‘the people then called 
Greeks and now called Hellenes’ (Mete. 352b2) dwelt.   
67 As Dastur stresses, Heidegger’s Greeks are not one but rather ‘multiple in its essence’ (Dastur 2000: 
180). 
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of Being is precisely what Heidegger wants to avoid. The second reason being that 
Heidegger’s philosophical undertaking means something quite different than an 
engagement with the Greeks as a “dead language” or a “dead body” seeing as Heidegger 
characterises “the Greeks” as the historical that ‘becomes ever again something present 
[immer neu Gegenwart]’ (HKD, 11-12). Furthermore, Heidegger’s critique of the strictly 
historiographical approach to the Greeks hinges on his distinction between Historie and 
Geschichte, which is crucial to his understanding of the question of Being, and which we 
shall therefore clarify as briefly as possible. 
In Wissenschaft und Besinnung from 1953 (as well as in other writings), Heidegger 
sets forth the distinction between Historie and Geschichte in the following manner: ‘The 
word “Historie” (ἱστορεῖν) means to explore and make visible, and therefore names a kind 
of representation [Vorstellens]. In contrast, the word “Geschichte” means that which takes 
its course [was sich begibt] insofar as it is prepared and disposed in such and such a way, 
i.e., set in order and sent forth, destined.’ (GA 7, 58/175)68 
As Heidegger sees it, in order to retrieve what remains unopened in the historical, 
one would therefore have to seek a point more originary than that which is reckoned 
chronologically “first” by historiography. To be sure, one may read within Heidegger’s 
employment of the word “first” an effort on his part to think the return to the Greeks as a 
means of recuperating the origin as ἀρχή, that is, the origin as commencement and 
commandment. On the whole, then, Heidegger’s “return to the Greeks” would seem to 
constitute a sort of “historical a priori,” to put it in Foucault’s terminology, according to 
which “the Greeks” were to establish a totality of experience pertaining to the order of 
history. In short, this would mean that for the first time “in” history there emerged an 
awareness of the possibility of defining the conditions by which a philosophical discourse 
could manifest itself in epochal terms.69 
 Although Heidegger’s return to the Greeks could certainly be seen as a sort of 
attachment to the origin, and although the archaeophilic desire for determining the 
essence of the “origin” associated with this attachment could also be seen as determinative 
of Evening-landish-European history, I would still argue that such a reading misses the 
nature of Heidegger’s engagement with the Greeks. As Heidegger himself underscores, 
                                                          
68 Already Heidegger’s habilitation from 1915 presents a tentative look into his interest in philosophy and 
its relation to the history of philosophy, which, he argues, is different from, e.g., mathematics and its relation 
to the history of mathematics, in that the emphasis is put not on ‘the history of philosophy but on the history 
of philosophy.’ (GA 1, 195) 
69 Foucault 1966: 13/xxiii-xxiv; 171/172.  
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his concern with the Greeks does not aim at reconnecting us with the mode of thinking 
that Greek thinkers had initiated, as if this return to the Greeks were ‘striving for some 
sort of “classicism” in philosophy.’ (GA 65, 504/396)70 What, then, does Heidegger’s 
“return to the Greeks” designate? How are we to think this return, which demands us to 
‘think more Greek than the Greeks themselves [griechischer denken als die Griechen 
selbst]’ (GA 53, 100)? 
As we pointed out in the first chapter, Heidegger’s retrieval of the Greeks serves as 
an attempt to attain a more originary insight into the beginning—an insight that is even 
more original than the first. Moreover, this originary beginning is related to the history of 
Being which, in Heidegger’s view, ‘is never past but stands ever before us [steht immer 
bevor]’ (GA 9, 314). Such a sentiment was already at play in the infamous “Rectoral 
Address” from May 27, 1933, where Heidegger remarks that the ‘German people’ are led 
by the ‘inexorability of that spiritual mission [jenes geistigen Auftrag] that forcefully 
stamps its proper historical character on its destiny [Schicksal]’ (GA 16, 107), in that ‘we 
[Germans] place ourselves once again under the power of the beginning of our spiritual-
historical dasein.’ (GA 16, 108) This beginning, Heidegger continues, is the ‘breaking up 
[Aufbruch] of Greek philosophy’ (GA 16, 107) so as to regain the greatness of the 
beginning. As Heidegger puts it,  
 
The beginning still is. It does not lie behind us as something that has long 
since been [das längst Gewesene], but it stands before us. The beginning, as 
what is greatest, has in advance already passed over all that is to come and 
hence over us as well. The beginning has fallen into [eingefallen] our future; 
it stands there as the distant injunction [ferne Verfügung] upon us to recapture 
its greatness. (GA 16, 110) 
 
Hence, in Heidegger’s view, to recapture (einholen) the Greeks becomes the manner by 
which to overtake or to catch up with the relation to the Being from which we have fallen 
out or grown estranged. At this point, it may therefore be worthwhile to take a closer look 
                                                          
70 See Gadamer 1986: 394-416. Certainly, Heidegger’s return to the Greeks sends us back in a questioning 
way to a sense, as Husserl notes in Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie (1939), whose sedimented 
origin is yet there for us to be unearthed (Hua VI, 366). Since Husserl’s work also contains numerous 
references to the Greeks, one may ask in what sense the “return” (Rückfrage) to the Greeks bring us closer 
to the originary origin? This is not the place, however, to rehearse Husserl’s argument, nor to present 
Derrida’s brilliant thesis Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl (1953-54), let alone his 
1962 introduction to the translation of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, even if Derrida’s analysis of the 
iterative reduction (OG, 34-35/47-50), which precedes the reactivation of the origin so that any principle 
of order is always already exposed to disturbances, seems to touch on crucial aspects of Heidegger’s return 
to the Greeks too. 
67 
 
at Heidegger’s understanding of the Greeks as origin. In doing so, it is important to keep 
in mind that, for Heidegger, what follows the origin so as to recapture this origin is neither 
less nor equally as original as the origin; rather, in a certain sense this new phenomenon 
has the possibility to become more original. Accordingly, the task set by Heidegger’s 
encounter with the Greeks would appear to touch upon the logic of origin itself. 
In developing this logic, Heidegger addresses the very economy of beginning by 
opening up a relation to beginning in terms not only of recapturing but also of repetition 
(Wiederholung). Hence, if the beginning stands before us, it appears as if it is second to 
its repetition in such a fashion that the very hierarchy of “first” and “second” or “before” 
and “after” becomes itself displaced. Indeed, while Heidegger revisits “the Greeks” with 
the intention of repeating the beginning in an even more original manner than the first 
time, what becomes apparent through this process is that the origin is already taken 
outside “itself” precisely because of the figure of originary repetition. 
Clearly, then, the return to the Greeks is not, for Heidegger, an attempt to restore to 
the origin something of what this origin has lost through the forgetting of Being as a 
forgetting of the origin. Rather, such a return has to do with the fact that, as Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy point out, the postulated simplicity of the origin ‘is always broached 
or cut open,’ and as such ‘it is divided or dissociated, set apart—set infinitely apart from 
itself.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 2003)71 Thus, if Heidegger’s return to the Greeks 
represents a certain understanding of the past, this is the case only because the past of 
which we are speaking about here is itself a retro-projection of the present that recognises 
the present as a refabrication of itself as a future anterior. The future tense employed here 
indicates what has not yet arrived and hence remains indeterminable in itself, determined 
only retrospectively as a past that will have been for the future.72 Accordingly, the 
temporality of the future anterior at stake in Heidegger’s return to the Greeks implies a 
tense in which the time of the present as an excess of “our time” is avoided by pointing 
towards both a future and a past. As the discussion on Heidegger’s return to the Greeks 
has underscored, the history as Geschichte is not the past understood as what was, but 
                                                          
71 Put differently, an origin does not have a sense, a direction, or a meaning before the arrival of what it 
originates. But this means that the origin is conditioned by a genitivity before its very own fact, which, as 
Derrida remarks, comes to only mark the origin of whatever it engenders and orients. In Derrida’s words, 
an origin will always already have been ‘an inscribed origin.’ (ED, 169/115) 
72 What one may find in the term “the Greeks,” then, is perhaps nothing but a configuration, as Derrida 
says, that cannot be configured, which lends to the ‘configuration the figure or the face of the mask or of 
the simulacrum […]. And this figure is perhaps no longer simply Greek or non-Greek’ (NG, 258/23).  
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rather a past that has been sent to the future in order to be repeated as the destinal history 
that will have been in the process of thinking. 
It could be said, then, that for Heidegger the central purpose of gathering together 
the knowledge of ancient Greek thinkers is to provide insight into the future question of 
Being. Such gathering of ancient knowledge, however, cannot mean the mere 
accumulating and continuing of an ancient tradition precisely in that lacking from this 
process is the seamlessness of time and culture that would make such accumulation and 
continuing possible. As Heidegger points out, separating ancient Greece and the Germany 
of the 1930s is not only a temporal gap of more than two and a half millenia, but also not 
insignificant cultural differences. 
What this gap calls upon, argues Heidegger, is a critical encounter with our own 
understanding of the origin. Indeed, since the idea of origin will be a recurrent theme in 
this chapter, it would be good to summarise Heidegger’s position with regards to it. To 
do so, we may look to an image he paints in his 1932 lecture course Der Anfang der 
abendländischen Philosophie—an image that takes its bearings precisely from the 
problem of the temporal span of two and a half millennia ‘between us and the beginning 
of Evening-landish philosophy’ (GA 35, 33/27) and that attempts to render this problem 
understandable. Consider, Heidegger suggests, the image of a wanderer in an arid region. 
Over the course of time, this wanderer distances himself more and more from the well 
where he draws water. At first, the wanderer, despite his wandering, retains some sense 
of contact with the well. However, with the increasing distance due to his further 
wandering the wanderer eventually loses his orientation with respect to the well whereby 
it becomes inaccessible to him. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, Heidegger somewhat surprisingly argues that this 
analogy of the wanderer displays that the wanderer retains a relation to the source 
precisely in his excessive distance from it. While tracing the relation to the source from 
distance to the proximity of which this distance is what enables a proximity with the 
source, Heidegger accentuates the fact that the ‘closest proximity of the beginning 
[nächste Nähe des Anfangs] had to remain concealed precisely on account of the 
advancement’ (GA 35, 40/32). 
Proximity, understood as a double entendre by which something remains related to 
a source in the very distance that it has to that source, is what Heidegger has in mind when 
discussing the temporal span between “us” and “the Greeks.” A chasm separates “the 
Greeks” from “us,” but in such a manner that this spacing of distance does not annihilate 
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but rather defines our relation to the origin as ‘a non-relation [Un-verhältnis]’ (GA 35, 
39/31). The fact of historical distance between “us” and “the Greeks,” he writes, ‘includes 
the possibility that the relation between us and the beginning is a non-relation, a non-
relation thanks to which the beginning stands concealed in our closest proximity.’ (GA 
35, 40/32; translation modified) Heidegger suggests that this relation without-relation is 
far from exhausted by its reference to the source (i.e., sources such as, for example, the 
fragments and thoughts of Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus) as a resource for 
our thinking today in that such thinking is ‘not the first, detached, deposited result, behind 
which we can go no further back.’ Rather, this thinking is itself a response to the question 
concerning the sense of Being. As Heidegger puts it, ‘The beginning is thus an act of 
beginning in the mode of a questioning.’ (GA 35, 49/38)73 This issue concerning 
beginning as questioning will be discussed more thoroughly in the final section of this 
chapter wherefore we may set it aside for the time being. Instead, in what follows we may 
pursue a bit further Heidegger’s question of the Greeks and his inquiry into the beginning. 
 
 BEGINNING WITH THE END 
Heidegger’s return to the Greeks in 1932 heralds the question of Being that his lecture 
course in 1935 goes on to pronounce. As suggested, Heidegger’s relation to the Greeks 
can be read in an analogous fashion to the relation between the wanderer and his source 
of water. Given this background and the way in which the analogy employed by 
Heidegger brings forward the issue of proximity, it is perhaps not surprising that one finds 
in Einführung in die Metaphysik a discussion of the word “Being” that moves towards an 
understanding of the question of Being in terms of the proximity of our questioning that 
plays out only by keeping its distance. Moreover, we must keep in mind that for 
Heidegger the question of Being arises in and as ‘the decisive beginning of Evening-
landish philosophy’ (GA 40, 132/130). In this respect, Greek thought as that to which we 
are proximally related in distance in our very act of questioning can thereby provide us 
with an indication of our originary connection to Being.  
Interestingly, this connection between the beginning of philosophy and the question 
of Being is so proximate that it has often gone entirely unnoticed, which has the 
                                                          
73 Schürmann points out that the origin to Heidegger is no longer to be understood as a desire for the fons 
et origo, meaning that the Ursprung is the source of everything (Schürmann 1990: 120). This means that 
Heidegger’s Ur-sprung, as that which literally means “primordial springing,” reveals that there is no origin 
as such. For, if it were, its very being would make it opposable to other beings. Thus, Heidegger’s source 
names this coming-to-presence of that which is never presence unto itself.  
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consequence that the history of philosophy becomes the very history in which the question 
of Being remains unasked. For Heidegger, to think the history of Being therefore means 
‘to ask again the unasked question of Being [die ungefragte Seinsfrage wiederfragen],’ 
as well as thus ‘to begin again the unbegun beginning [den unangefangenen Anfang 
wieder anfangen].’ (GA 32, 97/74) In this respect, I believe that the point Heidegger 
desires to make by speaking of a return to “the Greeks” is that if we were to achieve such 
a return, such an achievement would not represent a restitutio ad integrum, but would 
rather mean that we come to occupy the place of the “first beginning” as an “other 
beginning.” 
Heidegger’s engagement with “the Greeks” in the 1930s and 1940s, however, is not 
always enacted in his “own” name. As a case in point, in the lecture entitled “Hegel und 
die Griechen,” held at the University of Aix-en-Provence in 1958, the name Hegel plays 
the lead role. According to Heidegger, his lecture on Hegel (who arrives in the history of 
Being belatedly or after the fact) and the Greeks evinces a tension between the beginning 
and the end of philosophy, which ‘addresses the whole of philosophy in its history’ (GA 
9, 427). 
In this regard, I think that Heidegger’s essay on “Hegel und die Griechen” might 
help us to answer the question of what this return to the Greeks signifies. As Heidegger 
sees it, the lecture title is crucial because the conjunction “and” that joins together what 
two and a half millenia separates, serves to indicate an essential and being-historical 
(seinsgeschichtlich) proximity in that it prepares the path of thinking an “other 
beginning.” As Heidegger points out, the representation of Greek thinking within the 
horizon of modern philosophy brings to light how, on the one hand, “the Greeks” denote 
the beginning of philosophy while, on the other hand, the name “Hegel” and its 
conception of the system of science signifies the completion of philosophy (GA 9, 427). 
Moreover, such a view of philosophy is at the very heart of Hegel’s philosophical project. 
As Heidegger puts it, ‘Hegel for the first time thinks Greek philosophy as a whole, and, 
furthermore, thinks this whole philosophically.’ (GA 9, 428) 
Let us pass over the gaping question opened here regarding that which comes in-
between “the Greeks” and “Hegel,” that is, to follow Hegel’s image of Descartes as the 
beginning of modern philosophy, the conception of the Cartesian cogito as ‘the solid 
ground upon which philosophy can settle truly and completely’ (GA 9, 325). Instead, we 
may concentrate on the manner by which “Hegel” as the completion (τέλος) of the history 
of metaphysics makes explicit what is already presumed at the beginning of this history. 
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In this respect, the name “Hegel” thus inscribes itself within an archeo-teleological 
schema such that “the Greeks” as the first beginning (ἀρχή) becomes what they are only 
in terms of what they bring about. 
Accordingly, Heidegger’s heading “Hegel and the Greeks” provides us with an 
account of how the beginning of philosophy represents the first attempt to formulate the 
question of Being. Yet, as we have already seen with respect to Plato and Aristotle, the 
question of Being was covered up in its very beginning by the oblivion of the difference 
between Being and beings, which leads the thinking of Being on an aberrant path of 
metaphysics. For this reason, it is important to point out another feature of Heidegger’s 
Greeks, namely how they are deeply divided. Such a division of “the Greeks” runs 
between Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and the Presocratics (in particular 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides) on the other. Moreover, what this division 
reveals, as Heidegger makes clear in Einführung in die Metaphysik, is the extent to which 
the “beginning” itself is already bifurcated—that is to say that Greek philosophy divides 
itself into “the first beginning” and the “end.” 
In Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger evokes the term λόγος with the intent 
to emphasise how the dislodgment of this term from Greek philosophy already occurs 
within Greek philosophy in such a manner that it becomes Greek philosophy itself that 
determines its own end. As Heidegger remarks, 
 
We surmount Greek philosophy as the beginning of Evening-landish 
philosophy only if we also grasp this beginning in its inceptive end; for it was 
solely and only this end that became the “beginning” for the subsequent age, 
in such a way that this “beginning” also covered up the inceptive beginning. 
(GA 40, 188/191)   
 
The conclusion arrived at in 1958, that Hegel brings philosophy to its end by completing 
what was initiated with the Greek beginning, is thus anticipated in 1935 when Heidegger 
comes to realise how the ‘philosophy of the Greeks attains dominance in the Evening-
land not on the basis of its originary beginning but on the basis of the inceptive end 
[anfängliche Ende]’ (GA 40, 197/202).74 
Given our discussion here, it is important to point out, as many interpreters of 
Heidegger have already done, that Heidegger adopts a kind of philosophical-historical 
                                                          
74 As Nietzsche puts it in more graphic terms in Die Geburt der Tragödie, Greek tragedy died a tragic death 
because it committed suicide: ‘sie starb durch Selbstmord.’ (KSA 1, 75) 
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framework similar to that of Hegel.75 Thus, Angehrn, for example, develops an 
interpretation in which he claims that Heidegger’s aim—precisely in its attempt to lay 
claim (Anspruch) to the Greeks—is to challenge (Einspruch) the Hegelian understanding 
of the history of philosophy that takes its point of departure with “the Greeks” as a basis 
for the one and only development of the history of thinking.76 
To sum up, then, we begin from an imperative to return to the Greeks so as thereby 
to retrieve the basic experiences in relation to which the question concerning the sense of 
Being is bequeathed to us. This beginning to which we are being returned, however, is 
itself the “inceptive end” that has to be retrieved in order to begin the unbegun beginning 
anew. Hence, in returning to the beginning of thinking the question of Being, Heidegger 
returns not only to the history that declines from the great beginning of the Greeks, but 
also to the question of what philosophy is in the first place. Accordingly, Heidegger 
reveals that the question of philosophy as that of returning to the great beginning of the 
Greeks is attended by another question, namely, the question of the beginning in which 
the Evening-land and its European destination is situated. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE END OF METAPHYSICS CALLED “EUROPE” 
In August 1955 at a colloquium in Cerisy-la-Salle, Heidegger gave the lecture Qu’est-ce 
que la philosophie?—or, in German, Was ist das—die Philosophie? As the title suggests, 
the question Heidegger tackles here is that concerning what philosophy is. There are at 
least two good reasons for leading off with this lecture as we begin to think about the way 
in which “Europe” and “the Evening-land” become thematised as philosophical. The first 
reason is that, in Heidegger’s view, in that the term “philosophy” retains an intimate 
connection to its origin, it becomes crucial to recognise that the history into which we are 
                                                          
75 Thus, in agreement with Derrida’s 1964-1965 lecture course Heidegger: la question de l’Être et 
l’Histoire, I submit that there is a “proximity” between the Hegelian relation to the history of philosophy 
and Heidegger’s. Derrida, however, immediately points out the decisive difference between them. To put 
it briefly, Heidegger’s destruction of the history of Being is not a Hegelian refutation, because philosophy, 
for Hegel, is the logic that Heidegger sees only as a moment in the history of Being (HQBH, 29/6). In Die 
onto-theologische Verfassung der Metaphysik, Heidegger himself underscores the difference between his 
history of philosophy and Hegel’s in that the latter seeks to comprehend history as a dialectical gesture of 
thought that rules history. For a discussion, see Haar 1980: 48-59; Krell 1986: 118-121; Jeanmart 2006: 
103-114.  
76 Cf. Angehrn 1993: 183. Another interpreter of the relationship between Heidegger and Hegel, Vetter, 
discerns three differences: (1) both thinkers take issue with Being, but Hegel aims at ‘the thinking as such,’ 
(GA 88, 476) whereas Heidegger examines ‘the Being with respect to its difference with beings’ (GA 11, 
56). (2) Hegel’s history of philosophy displays the dialectic-speculative movement of absolute thought, 
while Heidegger approaches ‘the force of earlier thought’ (GA 11, 57). (3) Hegel’s encounter with history 
happens through sublation (Aufhebung), whereas Heidegger “steps back” in order to gain a view to what 
makes possible that which happens (GA 15, 367). See Vetter 2014: 143-144. 
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not only thrown but about which we also come to bear witness to an understanding of 
history is the basis upon which Europe and the Evening-land can be premised in the first 
place.77 The second reason is that the German title Was ist das—die Philosophie? already 
signals how this specific way of questioning has shaped the entire history of philosophy 
called metaphysics and thereby also paved the way to the end of this metaphysical history 
called Europe.78 
 Hence, given Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics understood as a manner of 
asking about the ground of metaphysics, and more specifically as a manner of pondering 
the oblivion of Being as significant to the history in which the question of Being is handed 
down to us, this way of questioning itself becomes worthy of questioning (frag-würdig). 
It is worthy of questioning precisely in that it has the character of asking about the 
principle, that is, the ἀρχή or the beginning of all that stands and rules (GA 31, 39). As 
Heidegger tersely puts it, ‘the question of philosophy as the question concerning the ἀρχή’ 
is about ‘what Being is insofar as it takes a view of it as Being’ (GA 44, 209).79 
When Heidegger therefore questions the question of what philosophy is he does so 
from within a history of metaphysics, emphasising that there is already at play within 
philosophy a very questioning about philosophy.80 What this means is that in the process 
of affording the question of Being metaphysical pre-eminence over the question of what 
Being is, it is nevertheless imperative that we are clear about how this essential sense of 
Being is “preceded” by another sense of Being in relation to which it is said both that 
something is and how this same something is. Heidegger, I believe, uses this distinction 
between “that Being is” and “what Being is,” that is, roughly speaking, between existentia 
and essentia, in order not only to prepare the groundwork for his understanding of the 
                                                          
77 For a discussion of this hermeneutical aspect, see von Herrmann 1999: 31-40. 
78 In a course on Nietzsche from 1937, Heidegger refers to such way of questioning as the one and only 
question of philosophy—in German, ‘die eine Frage der Philosophie’ (GA 44, 208)—or, to put it somewhat 
bluntly, the essential question of metaphysics. 
79 Heidegger adopts this question from Aristotle’s question from the Metaphysics concerning what being is 
(τί τὸ ὄν). Cf. Met. 1028b4. 
80 In a certain sense, the question of “what philosophy is” appears to be an impossible question insofar as 
the name of “philosophy” would become subordinated to the ontology at stake in the question. Thus, when 
Heidegger asks the question “what is philosophy?” he does so by already having chosen the “Greeks” as 
the metaphor whereby an interpretation of the meaning of Being is produced. In this sense, the “Greeks” 
may be seen as a kind of “ontic metaphor,” as Derrida would have it, since the “Greeks” seem to constitute 
the metaphorisation that enables Heidegger to think Being as ‘the presence of the present’ (M, 157/131). 
Interestingly, in his 1964-65 lecture course Heidegger: la question de l’Être et l’Histoire, Derrida discusses 
how Heidegger’s destruction of philosophy as metaphysics and as onto-theology seeks to break radically 
with the philosophical novel, which produces those ontic metaphors describing the philosophy that was 
supposed to be free of such (mythological) determinations (HQEH, 57-64/26-31). 
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first beginning and the history of his guiding question of Being,81 but also, ultimately, to 
set up his case for ‘the question of how this distinction arises out of the beingness of 
beings and accordingly belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng [Wesung des Seyns]’ 
(GA 65, 270/212; cf. GA 71, 123).82 
An additional feature of the question of philosophy as a question of Being is its 
critical nature. More specifically, in that the whatness is determined differently in each 
historical period, it becomes necessary, claims Heidegger, to engage critically with the 
tradition of philosophy. Tradition in this sense means not only a handing down of past 
philosophy, but, more significantly, a disclosure of the mode in which philosophy is being 
transmitted or administered institutionally. Hence, in admitting the perspectival character 
of philosophy, Heidegger argues that what the question of philosophy calls for is not a 
straightforward answer, but rather that we come to experience philosophy as a question 
so as to understand what is said in it.83 
To proceed with our reading of the 1955 lecture, then, we may note that Heidegger’s 
return to the question of “philosophy” bears on a dismantling (Abbruch) of philosophising 
that Heidegger several years prior had seen as ‘our mission [unser Auftrag]’ (GA 35, 1). 
As we have seen, this dismantling of philosophising brings into view the ‘end of 
metaphysics by way of an originary questioning of the “sense” (truth) of beyng.’ (GA 35, 
1) As such, the path that Heidegger’s 1955 lecture broaches for uncovering the originary 
sense of Being, as it were, is precisely a philosophical questioning of philosophy that goes 
                                                          
81 Heidegger criticises this opposition between existentia and essentia in order to indicate how his term 
“dasein” exceeds this metaphysical opposition. See, for instance, GA 9, 189. In Brief über den 
“Humanismus,” Heidegger stresses how the existential concern of dasein or, as he notes, the essence of the 
human being, is not identical with the transmitted concept of the existential. As Heidegger’s often-
misunderstood statement from Sein und Zeit, which he restated in his 1946 letter on humanism, says: the 
‘“essence” of dasein lies in its existence.’ (GA 9, 325; SZ, 42) 
82 The archaic spelling of Seyn indicates, on the one hand, a difference from Being as beingness (Sein als 
Seiendheit) and, on the other hand, an ‘anteriority with respect to the metaphysical concept of being’ (Sallis 
2004: 86). 
83 In what may be read as a kind of response to Husserl’s definition of “we philosophers” as the 
‘functionaries of humankind [Funktionäre der Menschheit],’ that is, the ‘responsibility of our own true 
being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation [Berufenheit], [which] bears within itself at the same 
time the responsibility for the true being of humankind’ (Hua VI, 15), Heidegger seems to disregard 
sentiments as foundational to philosophy, without, however, wanting to anticipate a decision as to what 
philosophy is, namely, ‘that philosophy is a matter of reason [eine Sache der Ratio]’ (GA 11, 8). 
Notwithstanding their significant differences, a resemblance of discourses emerges when Husserl writes 
that ‘we are what we are as functionaries of modern philosophical humanity; we are heirs and cobearers 
[Mitträger] of the direction of the will which pervades this humanity; we have become this through a primal 
establishment [Urstiftung] which is at once a reestablishment [Nachstiftung] and a modification of the 
Greek primal establishment. In the latter lies the teleological beginning, the true birth of the European spirit 
as such.’ (Hua VI, 72) For a discussion, see Gasché 2009: 30-32.   
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back to the roots of the Greek word φιλοσοφία whose sense still lies before us.84 
According to Heidegger, the word φιλοσοφία can be traced back to φιλόσοφος (a term 
presumably coined by Heraclitus), which in turn suggests that the ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος does 
not (yet) mean the “philosopher man.”85 Moreover, the one who loves the σοφόν 
expresses his or her act of love (φιλεῖν) in terms of the Heraclitean ὁμολογεῖν, meaning 
‘to speak in the way in which the Λόγος speaks, i.e. to correspond [entsprechen] with the 
Λόγος’ (GA 11, 14). 
With this understanding of “philosophy” we see the emergence of a certain thrust 
that moves beyond philosophy as a mere historiographical-geographical occurrence. It is 
for this reason that one could say that when Heidegger, in 1955, returns to the word 
φιλοσοφία, he does so because he understands it to be informative concerning the 
existence of what is properly Greek (Griechentum). Yet, what this Greek thing called 
φιλοσοφία is, seems to be held in abeyance inasmuch as the arrival of the word 
“philosophy” shows itself to us as untranslated, if not untranslatable.86 
Certainly, the idea of the relation between philosophy and the Greeks is contained 
in embryo form as early as in the doxographical work of Diogenes Laertius (floruit third 
century AD). In Lives of Eminent Philosophers, we are thus told that even if there are 
some who say that the work of philosophy (φιλοσοφίας ἔργον) has its origin among the 
barbarian (βαρβάρων ἄρξαι), it is presumably neglected that ‘the achievements which 
they attribute to the barbarians belong to the Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy 
but the human race [γένος ἀνθρώπων] itself began […], it was from the Greeks that 
                                                          
84 However, in Die Geschichte des Seyns (1938/40), Heidegger rejects the discourse of a philosophy of 
philosophy, since philosophy surely prepares a readiness (Bereitschaft) for thinking but only because of its 
belonging to beyng (GA 69, 6-7). ‘In truth,’ Heidegger says, ‘the beyng-historical thinking is no longer and 
not again “philosophy”.’ (GA 69, 167) This places the term “philosophy” in an ‘essential ambiguity’ within 
Heidegger’s thinking inasmuch as philosophy, on the one hand, can be rejected (ablehnen) with respect to 
the Being of beings. On the other hand, however, “philosophy” must be overcome inasmuch as it is the 
essence of metaphysics. Yet, “overcoming” is radically different from “rejecting” in that the latter 
represents an anti-metaphysics (Widersacherschaft) that would still remain bound to metaphysics (GA 69, 
169) all the while overcoming would “overtake” what it overcomes in projecting it repetitively towards 
another beginning.    
85 The ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος as the one who loves σοφόν is located not only in Heraclitus (DK B35) but also in 
Empedocles (DK B15) with whom Heidegger—interestingly enough—never really engages, although both 
Hölderlin and Nietzsche took issue with him. 
86 In forwarding his analysis of the special relation between the German language and the Greek, Heidegger 
was not alone. Since the German translation of philosophy as Weltweisheit never really made an impact, 
Heidegger’s view of the German language can be categorised, for example, alongside Fichte’s 1805 address 
to the German nation: ‘We have to refer to it [philosophy] by its foreign name, since Germans have not 
accepted the German name that was proposed a long time ago’ (Fichte 2013: 58). See Brague 2014: 324. 
When I suggest that the word “philosophy” remains untranslatable for Heidegger, it is to stress how this 
word no longer serves an ordinary vocabulary but rather ‘speaks in the service of thinking [im Dienst des 
Denkens sprechen]’ (GA 11, 45).     
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philosophy took its rise [Ἑλλήνων ἦρξε φιλοσοφία]: its very name refuses to be translated 
into foreign speech [αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τὴν βάρβαρον ἀπέστραπται, literally, turning back the 
name itself to the barbarous].’ (DIO, I. 1-4) 
In one sense, Diogenes’ archeophile answer appears to be a humble one in that it 
prioritises which comes earliest—as though what is closest to the origin is automatically 
accorded authority. Heidegger, however, in his argument from 1955 calls into question 
such a view. As he notes, the essence of philosophy entails an Anspruch, that is, a demand, 
requirement, or claim to the Greeks. Moreover, such an Anspruch means, first of all, that 
the Greeks have not “invented” philosophy in that even their pre-philosophical language 
is essentially philosophical, and second, that philosophy has only laid claim to the 
Greeks.87 To put it another way, if philosophy is Greek, it is not because it was 
(chronologically) “first” articulated in Greece, but more specifically because it lays claim 
to the Greeks. This is why Heidegger can write that the language of the Greeks shows 
itself to be philosophical through and through and not just in restricted areas of discourse. 
Indeed, as Heidegger emphasises, ‘Greek language is philosophical’ since it 
‘philosophises as language and as language formation [Sprachgestaltung].’ (GA 31, 50) 
What, then, does this intimate connection between philosophy and the Greeks mean 
for Heidegger? Before answering this question, allow me briefly to say that I do not 
presume the term “Greeks” to be unambiguous in Heidegger. I recognise that “the 
Greeks” means troubled waters in Heidegger’s works in general, seeing as his “return” 
passes through a peculiar distortion of the Greek language, as though it were Germanised 
and made into a conquered province so as to call into service the thinking of Being.88 As 
such, my purpose here is not to accomplish the task of defining “the Greeks” in 
Heidegger. Rather, my aim is far less ambitious: I would like to suggest that it is the 
notion of “the Greeks” that sets the backdrop for Heidegger’s particular take on 
philosophy precisely in that the Greeks remain unappropriated not only for “we 
latecomers,” but also for the Greeks “themselves.” We may say with Derrida that if 
“we”—whoever “we” are to whomever—‘are still or already Greeks, we ourselves, we 
                                                          
87 Additionally, one may say that, in Heidegger’s view, the essence of philosophy is not part of the 
institution of philosophy. If Heidegger’s return to the word “philosophy” is about reading the Greeks, one 
might say with a short piece from 1954 on reading in mind, that reading the Greeks is the ‘gathering 
[Sammlung] of what, without our knowing, has already reclaimed our being [unser Wesen in den Anspruch 
genommen] so that we might wish to respond [entsprechen] or conceal [versagen] ourselves before this 
demand’ (GA 13, 111). In other words, to read the Greeks means to have always already been addressed so 
as to answer to and for the demand—or to renounce it.       
88 Cf. Rogozinski 2014: 41. 
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others [nous autres], we also inherit that which made them [the Greeks] already other 
than themselves, and more or less than they themselves believed.’ (NG, 262/27) 
In light of these reflections, it becomes clearer that Heidegger’s retrieval of the 
Greeks as a way of repeating the question of Being constitutes a sort of appropriation 
(Ereignis) of what is proper to the Greeks (das Griechentum) only on the condition that 
we understand this appropriation as being already intimated with a certain “ex-
appropriation” (Enteignis).89 This movement of appropriation, Heidegger writes, 
 
makes manifest what is proper to it, that appropriation withdraws what is most 
fully its own from boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of 
appropriation, this means: in that sense it expropriates itself of itself. 
Expropriation [Enteignis] belongs to appropriation [Ereignis] as such. By this 
expropriation, appropriation does not abandon itself—rather it preserves what 
is its own. (GA 14, 27-28/22-23)    
 
“The Greeks” thus ex-appropriated requires careful consideration, for in order to keep 
“the Greeks” open to “our” encounter with “them,” we must try to place “them” elsewhere 
than in our metaphysical tradition only to experience how “the Greeks” have already 
displaced (Versetzt) “themselves” in the direction of another thinking.90 Accordingly, by 
this movement of ex-appropriation, “the Greeks” appear to us only from out of their own 
disappearance or from out of the disappearance of what is their own. In Heidegger’s view, 
then, the cipher of “the Greeks themselves” seems to be opening up to the unthought of 
Greek thinking—an opening by which Heidegger seeks to uncover the unasked question 
of Being present in its absence both in the first beginning of philosophy and in the history 
of metaphysics (GA 15, 366-367). 
To sum up our understanding of Heidegger’s Greeks thus far in a few words, we 
could say that it seems that whenever Heidegger attempts an appropriation of the 
“Greeks” he runs up against the difficulty of a certain “unappropriability” of what arrives 
or surges forth in his thinking of (what may no longer be) “the Greeks” such that this very 
thinking comes to surprise itself. What this failed gesture of appropriating “the Greeks” 
thus brings into view, argues Heidegger, is a kind of strangeness (das Befremdliche) that 
proves significant to the thinking of Being that celebrates its world-historical esteem 
under the name of “philosophy” (GA 9, 362). What this means, moreover, is that for 
                                                          
89 Cf. PTT, 90. 
90 Yet, as Derrida might say, this saving of the Greeks from our metaphysical conception of thought is a 
place where the Greeks will not be safe or protected from us. Cf. FS, 26-27.      
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Heidegger a radicalisation of philosophy’s “own” historicity becomes intertwined with 
the question of Being as that which withdraws from the possibility of an objectifying 
thematisation providing an answer to the question of “what is…” 
 
 THE TAUTOLOGY OF “EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY” 
After this long exploration of the ex-appropriative dimension of Heidegger’s 
understanding of “the Greeks,” one could ask why it should be necessary to go back so 
far and so painstakingly to the Greek φιλοσοφία in order to find an answer to the question 
of philosophy. The reason for the “return,” as I noted above, is that Heidegger is 
advancing the argument that the word “philosophy” is something that first and foremost 
determines the existence of what is properly Greek. But more than that, Heidegger’s 
recourse to the word φιλοσοφία shows how the ‘innermost basic feature of our Evening-
landish-European history [den innersten Grundzug unserer abendländisch-europäischen 
Geschichte]’ (GA 11, 9) is constituted by this word. Let us therefore consider how 
Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that Europe and the Evening-land are essentially 
philosophical. Heidegger’s words cut to the core of this basic feature and are worth 
quoting at length: 
 
The often heard expression “Evening-landish-European philosophy” is, in 
truth, a tautology. Why? Because philosophy is Greek in its nature; Greek, in 
this instance, means that in origin the nature of philosophy is of such a kind 
that it first appropriated [in Anspruch genommen] the Greek world 
[Griechentum], and only it, in order to unfold. However, the originally Greek 
nature of philosophy, in the epoch of its modern-European sway [Waltens], 
has been guided and ruled by Christian conceptions [Vorstellungen]. The 
dominance of these conceptions was mediated by the Middle Ages. At the 
same time, one cannot say that philosophy thereby became Christian, that is, 
became a matter of belief in revelation and the authority of the Church. The 
statement [Satz] that philosophy is in its nature Greek says nothing more than 
that the Evening-land [Abendland] and Europe, and only these, are, in the 
innermost course of their history, originally “philosophical.” This is attested 
by the rise and dominance of the sciences. Because they stem from the 
innermost Western-European course of history, namely, the philosophical, 
consequently they are able, today, to put a specific imprint [Prägung] on the 
history of humankind upon the whole earth. (GA 11, 9-10) 
 
Three points from this passage stand out in particular, which we may briefly touch upon 
here.91 (1) Philosophy is essentially Greek, and for this reason the expression “Evening-
                                                          
91 See Vetter 1993: 175-184. 
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landish-European philosophy” proves tautological because if the Evening-land and 
Europe amount to the same thing, they do so only in accordance with their innermost 
historical development as originally philosophical and thus as originally Greek. (2) The 
diremption of the originally Greek essence of philosophy occurring within the modern 
European epoch manifests itself within historical Christianity, but at the same time also 
marks its absence within such history due to the fact that philosophy must be heard 
otherwise than through revelatory Christianity and church authority. (3) Science testifies 
to the philosophical essence of Europe since such science originates from the historical 
development of Europe. Thus, science leaves an imprint upon the earthly history of 
humankind. Let us focus on the first point. 
In carrying out our interpretive task of trying to understand why the syntagma 
“Evening-landish-European philosophy” is a tautology, the first question we should raise 
is simply why Heidegger employs the specific terminus technicus of “tautology”—a word 
choice that, for a thinker who pays such careful attention to language, is surely not 
accidental. Whereas formal logic often depicts the tautology with the notation A=A in 
order to state the empty content of such a proposition, Heidegger reworks the question of 
tautology in order to run ‘counter to logic’ (Zoll, 30) so as to employ the tautology as an 
entry point into developing an understanding of the question of Being. 
According to Heidegger, Being in its original sense has drifted into oblivion due to 
the way in which λόγος has been (mis)interpreted in terms of “logic.” As he explains it, 
the formation of “logic” began when Greek philosophy came to an end, and moreover it 
began precisely by becoming ‘a matter of schools, organizations, and technique.’ (GA 40, 
129/128) In returning to the first beginning of philosophy as that which, at the same time, 
conceals the end of this beginning, Heidegger thereby prepares the way for a non-logical 
understanding of the tautology as that which in fact characterises the primal establishing 
of the task of philosophy. 
In Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, the sophist Callicles cannot hide his frustration with 
Socrates’ tiresome questions. This is due, not least of all, to the fact that these questions 
tend always to say the same thing. Even more pointedly, in replying to Callicles’ 
frustration Socrates remarks, ‘these questions even say ‘the same about the same [περὶ 
τῶν αὐτῶν].’ (490e) In contrast to Callicles who never says the same about the same, 
Socrates conceives of the very task of philosophy as that of thinking only one thing, 
namely, how to say the same about the same (ταὐτὰ λέγειν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν). In other 
words, to say the same about the same is to think the tautology (ταὐτὰ λέγειν). Heidegger 
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himself addresses this anecdote about Socrates, stressing this tautological task as the most 
difficult thing to think.92 Yet, to what degree is “Evening-landish-European philosophy” 
saying the same, and to what degree is it the most difficult to think? 
Regarding the tautology, it is significant that Heidegger too represents the figure of 
tautology as A=A. Just as significant is that Heidegger, in his 1957 lecture Der Satz der 
Identität, discusses the notation A=A as the highest law of thought. Here Heidegger sticks 
with the form and movement of the notation rather than its content. As such, he points 
out that the tautological relation between “A” and “A” makes sense only insofar as A is 
already different from A. In order, then, to articulate the principle of identity in terms of 
the tautological relation, one must therefore put the A outside of itself, as it were, so that 
identity becomes defined in terms of difference. Thus, as Heidegger stresses, A and A 
belong together (Zusammengehörigkeit) only on the condition that they constitute a 
differentiating relation (GA 11, 36-37). In assuming this approach, it may seem that 
Heidegger thereby reformulates the notion of tautology—in terms of what Figal calls 
tautophasy—in order to lay out the relation between philosophy and Europe (or the 
Evening-land) as a way of speaking about the same in the heart of which difference is 
already in effect.93 In drawing this relation, however, the problem remains concerning 
how to account for the movement or passage from A to A, that is, (to connect this 
discussion back to our previous discussion) the problem of how one moves from 
philosophy to Europe. Put differently, the problem is that the same about which the same 
is to be said, is never the same (itself).94 
As we have indicated previously, Heidegger affords a place of centrality to the 
philosopher who expresses his act of love for the σοφόν in terms of the ὁμολογεῖν, that 
is, one who speaks in the same manner as Λόγος. Given this, the relation between 
philosophy and Europe becomes a relation of one to the Greeks with whom “we 
Europeans” speak in order thereby to listen to or to hear an account of how this 
relationship is put together (zusammengehören) and belongs together 
                                                          
92 Cf. Zoll, 30. Der Spiegel interview in 1966 confirms Heidegger’s fascination with the tautology in that 
he refers to his earlier Nietzsche lecture (GA 6.1, 33) stating that ‘All great thinkers think the same—this 
same is so essential (deep) and rich that no single thinker accomplishes (exhausts) it; rather every thinker 
is bound even tighter and more rigorously to it.’ (GA 16, 674) 
93 Cf. Figal 2014. 
94 On this understanding, “there is” a difference (or différance) that passes through the difference and 
distance between A and A as A, albeit this difference “is” not. Certainly, this difference opens up the 
discussion of Heidegger that Derrida presents in “La différance:” ‘There is no essence of différance; it (is) 
that which not only could never be appropriated in the as such of its name or its appearing, but also that 
which threatens the authority of the as such in general, of the presence of the thing itself in its essence.’ 
(M, 27/25-26) For a discussion of Derrida’s reading of Heidegger on this matter, se Brogan 1988: 31-40. 
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(zusammengehören). In that Heidegger clarifies his approach to the relationship between 
Europe and the Greeks in Der Spruch des Anaximander from 1946,95 we will dedicate the 
next section of this chapter to drawing out and exploring Heidegger’s reflections on this 
thesis concerning the dynamic of speaking and hearing that he develops in this particular 
work. Towards this end, we divide our project along the lines of two major tasks. First, 
we explore the sense of history, tradition, and transmission of classical texts as well as 
the manner by which such texts have been translated. Second, and more important to our 
context, we engage with Heidegger’s question of Being as decisive to the destiny of 
Europe. In that Heidegger’s argument in Der Spruch des Anaximander is highly complex, 
we may proceed slowly in pursuing this second task. 
 
 ANAXIMANDER’S SAYING TO HEIDEGGER: THE WITHDRAWAL OF BEING 
In an effort to explain how ‘beings are spoken of in such a way that their Being is 
expressed’ (GA 5, 332/22), Heidegger, in Der Spruch des Anaximander, declares that 
‘Being comes to language as the Being of beings’ precisely in that we speak out of 
‘participation [Zugehörigkeit] in the Same.’(GA 5, 332/22)96 For Heidegger, this way of 
coming to language is crucial, and, moreover, the participation in the Same is the very 
thing that enables him to draw the relation between philosophy and Europe. This relation 
represents, in fact, the abyss of history between the beginning of Evening-landish-
European philosophy understood as the language of Greek philosophy and the language 
of our thinking placed at the ‘summit of the completion [Vollendung] of Evening-landish 
philosophy.’ (GA 5, 332/22) Still, the question remains why this relation is tautological. 
At first glance, the “Evening-landish-European philosophy” relation appears 
tautological in that the first beginning found in the ancient fragments of early Greek 
thinking is essentially tied to the “end of philosophy” that is perhaps most emblematically 
                                                          
95 Heidegger’s work with Anaximander in 1946, where he has been forced to retire from his position at the 
University of Freiburg as a consequence of the denazification process, is in fact preceded by the preparation 
of a manuscript presumably intended for a lecture course in 1942 but which was never carried out (GA 78). 
See Richardson 2003: 514-526. 
96 One can say that Der Spruch des Anaximander is part of a “turning” in Heidegger’s writings according 
to which “the Greeks” receive increasingly more attention from the 1932 course Der Anfang der 
abendländischen Philosophie (GA 35, 1-100) onwards. According to the editor of the lectures, Peter 
Trawny, this text prepares a shift from Heidegger’s previous and more thorough engagement with Plato 
and Aristotle to an engagement with the Presocratics (Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus) (GA 35, 
269-271). In 1938-1939, Heidegger himself notes that he in the spring of 1932 becomes aware of a change 
in line with his draft of Ereignis by which his distinction between a “first beginning” and an “other 
beginning” comes to the fore (GA 66, 424). Even though Heidegger’s engagement with the Presocratics 
takes off from 1932 and onwards, he already dealt with Parmenides as early as in the summer of 1922 (GA 
62, 209-231). 
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characterised by Nietzsche’s late fragment of recent European thought. But what would 
it mean to pursue this relation beyond the limits of the “same” and into the trench 
(Graben) of history that distances us from Being, all the while accepting this distancing 
as the very law (without law) that allows us proximity to Being only in the very 
abandonment of such Being (GA 5, 325/16)?97 
With Heidegger’s turn to the Anaximander fragment, it thus becomes evident from 
the very first page that Heidegger’s task is less that of offering a reading of an old 
Presocratic fragment, and rather more that of encountering (Auseinandersetzung) what is 
considered to be the oldest fragment of the thought of the Evening-land.98 As such, the 
Anaximander fragment is important to Heidegger’s approach to the origin of this thought 
in that it requires that one reflects on ‘the essence of the Evening-land in terms of what 
the early saying says’ (GA 5, 325/16). As Heidegger further emphasises, it is only 
thinking that can help us ‘in our attempt to translate the fragment of this early thinker.’ 
(GA 5, 323/14) 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary for us neither to follow in a 
systematic fashion Heidegger’s encounter with the ancient transmission of the 
Presocratics, nor to evaluate, on the basis of a philological and historical-critical outlook, 
Heidegger’s translation of Anaximander’s fragment.99 With respect to what still needs to 
be addressed in the chapter, we may nonetheless move forward in attending to 
Heidegger’s concluding historical-critical considerations of the origin of the 
Anaximander fragment. 
To summarise in brief the direction in which Heidegger takes his text on 
Anaximander, we may say that Heidegger makes reference to the Greeks with the strict 
                                                          
97 I am here drawing on Derrida’s translation of the Heideggerian Ent-Fernung as l’é-loignement. Whilst 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘de-severing’ is a way of ‘bringing something close by’ so that in dasein ‘there lies 
an essential tendency towards closeness,’ (SZ, 105) Derrida argues that there is no essence at stake in this 
movement inasmuch as the “de-distancing” concerns ‘the impossible topic of essentiality.’ (P, 33/25) 
98Although Heidegger refers to both Hermann Diels’ authoritative portrait of the Presocratics in Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1903) as well as to the young Nietzsche’s account of the same thinkers in a 
treatise entitled Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (1873), there is nothing inherent to 
the transmission of this fragment of Anaximander that would substantiate the claim that this particular 
fragment is of greater importance than any other fragment. Heidegger himself remarks that, sensu stricto, 
when one attempts to locate what is chronologically the first in early Greek thinking, one is necessarily 
‘expiating on archaic logic, not realizing that logic occurs for the first time in the curriculum of the Platonic 
and Aristotelian schools.’ (GA 5, 322/14) 
99 Although I shall not elaborate the implication of this claim, some of which I have attempted to outline 
above, what Heidegger is getting at, I believe, concerns his critical view of classical philology that suffers 
from its incapacity to begin by thinking itself. Indeed, philology remains part of what Heidegger has 
understood by the term “regional ontology,” wherefore the philologists, as Rogozinski explains, ‘are 
content with the knowledge of one region pertaining to beings [l’étant] without, however, opening up the 
question of Being.’ (Rogozinski 2014: 39) 
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purpose of laying hold of what comes to language via the return to the Greeks. As such, 
Heidegger’s engagement with the Anaximander fragment is not an attempt to render the 
Greek text as literal as possible in that, as Heidegger writes, a reading ‘is faithful 
[Wortgetreu] only when its terms are words which speak from the language of the matter 
itself.’ (GA 5, 322/14) In other words, with Der Spruch des Anaximander, Heidegger is 
attempting to lay hold of what he identifies as a Gespräch, that is, a dialogue or a 
gathering of Greek language. Given this aim, Heidegger centres his “return” on ‘that 
Same [Selbe] which fatefully [geschicklich] concerns the Greeks and ourselves, albeit in 
different ways.’ (GA 5, 336/25) As Heidegger continues, 
 
It is that which brings the dawn of thinking into the fate of the Evening-land 
[das Geschick des Abend-ländischen]. Only as a result of this fatefulness do 
the Greeks become Greeks in the historical sense. […] What is Greek is the 
dawn of that destiny [Frühe des Geschickes] in which Being illuminates itself 
in beings and so propounds a certain essence of the human being; that essence 
unfolds historically as something fateful, preserved in “Being” and dispensed 
by Being, without ever Being separated from Being. (GA 5, 336/25) 
 
In light of the quotation above we may note that Heidegger’s point in Der Spruch des 
Anaximander is plain enough: we return to the Greeks in order to reach ‘what wants to 
come to language in such a conversation’ with the Greeks, ‘provided it come of its own 
accord’ (GA 5, 336/25) This accord, as Heidegger further suggests, is the destiny (das 
Geschick) that we share with the Greeks—that is to say, it is the Evening-landish-
European history (Geschichte) as understood in terms of a decline of the “early” Greek 
dawn into the European twilight of the Evening-land. For Heidegger, this history in which 
the Greeks continue to address “us” is a matter of grave concern in that it questions “our” 
very historical situatedness. In Heidegger’s words, 
 
Are we latecomers [Spätlinge] in a history now racing towards its end, an end 
which in its increasingly sterile order of uniformity [ödere Ordnung des 
Gleichförmigen] brings everything to an end [verendet]? Or does there lie 
concealed in the historiographical and chronological remoteness of the 
fragment the historical proximity of something unsaid, something that will 
speak out in times to come? Do we stand in the very twilight [Vorabend] of 
the most monstrous transformation our planet has ever undergone, the 
twilight of that epoch in which earth itself hangs suspended? Do we confront 
the evening of a night which heralds another dawn? Are we to strike off on a 
journey to this historic region of earth’s evening? Is the land of evening only 
now emerging? Will this Evening-land overwhelm Occident [Occident] and 
Orient alike, traversing [hindurch] whatever is merely European to become 
84 
 
the location of a new, more inceptive destinal history [der kommenden 
anfänglicher geschickten Geschichte]? (GA 5, 325-326/16-17; modified 
translation)        
 
Over the course of the remainder of this chapter we will have occasion to return to the 
questions raised in the quotation above. This proves an important task precisely in that 
these questions help to bring to the fore in greater detail Heidegger’s understanding of 
Europe.  Moreover, these questions are important in that they usher the reader to the first 
of two occurrences of the word “Europe” in Der Spruch des Anaximander.100 
In continuing with his argument, then, Heidegger refers for the first time to the word 
“Europe” by quoting from Nietzsche’s Der Wanderer und sein Schatten where the name 
of Europe indicates a tension between that which is one’s own and that which is foreign: 
‘A higher situation for humankind is possible, in which the Europe of nations [Völker] 
will be obscured and forgotten, but in which Europe will live on in thirty very ancient 
[Klassikern] but never antiquated books’ (KSA 2, 608; GA 5, 326/17). 
At this point there is no need for us to dedicate any further attention to the impact 
that Nietzsche has had upon Heidegger. Instead, we may merely note that from the 
questions raised above in Heidegger’s quotation—questions that once again bring 
Heidegger into proximity with Nietzsche, we discover the transforming orientation of 
Heidegger’s Europe that we have been seeking thus far. This transforming orientation 
consists, essentially, in the questioning of the Greeks—the Greeks who are not meant to 
represent ‘a people [völkisch] or nation, nor a cultural or anthropological group,’ (GA 5, 
336/25) but rather the Greeks who represent an epoch of Being. As we have suggested in 
Chapter One, what Heidegger is driving at with this questioning is the unity of this one 
great epoch of the world—a unity on the basis of which both Greek antiquity, Christianity, 
and modernity are ruled by philosophy (GA 5, 336/26; HQBH, 199/131). As we have also 
seen, however, throughout this philosophical ruling the thought of Being has been more 
concealed by oblivion than it has been revealed by the unconcealment of beings, which, 
in fact, obscures the light of Being (Licht des Seins). 
 It is worth recalling that already in Sein und Zeit one of the hallmarks of 
Heidegger’s philosophical thinking is the notion of the oblivion of Being. However, while 
working through the history of Being in 1946, Heidegger subtly shifts the emphasis in his 
thought from an oblivion pertaining to our thinking of Being to an account of oblivion as 
                                                          
100 The second occurrence of the word ”Europe” appears in the passage above when Heidegger asks whether 
the Evening-land will traverse whatever is merely European (hinweg und durch das Europäische hindurch).   
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essential to Being itself. This shift is instructive with respect to the question of Being in 
that the unconcealment of beings has to do with a certain concealment and withdrawal of 
Being. In this respect, we may say that the belonging-together of concealment and 
unconcealment becomes increasingly significant to Heidegger’s thinking of Being. It is 
important to note, however, as does László Tengelyi, that it is not thinking that is 
responsible for such a belonging-together.101 To the contrary, it is Being that serves this 
function, and in such a fashion that Being befalls thinking. While this interplay of 
concealment and unconcealment is determined by and thereby changeable in terms of 
each epoch of Being, the withdrawal (Entzug) of Being remains constitutive of the 
configuration of the thinking of Being pertaining to each of these epochs. As Heidegger 
puts it in his text on Anaximander, if Being reveals itself to thought in beings, it does so 
only by withdrawing (GA 5, 337/26). 
 Indeed, if I have adequately traced out Heidegger’s description of the withdrawal 
of Being (a description which indeed is manifold), then it is difficult to avoid the question 
of whether Heidegger’s understanding of the concealment of Being carries along with it 
a sort of irreducible buttress of Being. Furthermore, if the withdrawal of Being is that 
which enables the appearance of beings, and with this appearance also the emergence of 
the history in which Being has lapsed into oblivion, then this history of Being becomes 
the realm of error. Underlying the idea of opening up to history the realm of error lies a 
singularity of Being that, because of its withdrawal, remains uncontaminated by this error. 
Due to such an avoidance of contamination, we could thus say that Being in a certain 
sense “saves” itself by way of Heidegger’s thought. In the lecture Die Kehre from 1949, 
Heidegger closes in on what Nancy suspects to find in the reformulation of the question 
of Being, namely, ‘a secret egoity of Being’ (Nancy 1993b: 134), that is, an ego-ism 
associated with Being’s act of self-preservation. As Heidegger notes, ‘what properly is, 
that is, what properly dwells in and essences [west] in the Is, is uniquely Being. Being 
alone “is;” only in Being and as Being does what is called the “is” appear [ereignet]; what 
is, is Being on the basis of its essence.’ (GA 11, 120) In venturing a reading of this 
passage, Nancy has posed the question of Being not merely in terms of withdrawal and 
no-thingness, but rather put forward an even more radical interpretation. For, as he asks, 
does the being-proper (être-propre) of Being preserve its property, its essence by once 
again withdrawing ‘from the withdrawal of Being’ (Nancy 1993b: 134)? 
                                                          
101 Cf. Tengelyi 2014: 43. 
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In following Nancy’s lead, we might attempt to circle around the issue we have 
been discussing here by raising several questions of our own. Consider the following. 
Does the interplay between concealment and unconcealment of Being according to which 
Being keeps to itself so as to manifest itself only as no-thing, make space for the evil 
without, however, exposing Being itself to this evil? In other words, is Heidegger with 
his thinking of Being’s withdrawal, in contrast to what one might have expected from his 
critical destruction of onto-theology, advancing an ontodicy? Does Heidegger’s history 
of Being constitute a narrative of struggle between salvage (das Heile) and fury (das 
Grimmige) (GA 9, 359)? Is Heidegger’s Being like Plato’s god who is not responsible for 
evils: ‘Guilt lies with the one who chooses: god has none [αἰτία ἑλομένου: θεὸς ἀναίτιος]’ 
(Rep. 617e4-5)? Is Heidegger’s notion of Being, as Rogozinski argues, ‘an 
undeconstructed configuration’ that marks ‘the limit of Heideggerian deconstruction—of 
any deconstruction?—the irreducible abutment of the ontological reduction that it cannot 
break up, because it has not taken the step toward ethics?’ (Rogozinski 1995: 51) As these 
questions display, the notion of evil is certainly significant for the notion of Being. Indeed, 
as Heidegger himself notes, ‘evil and the most acute danger is thinking itself, insofar as 
it has to think against itself, yet can seldom do so.’ (GA 97, 153) As interesting as this 
discussion is, for the sake of brevity we will not go into any further detail here concerning 
Heidegger’s understanding of Being as a justification of evil.102 
 
 THE DESTINY OF EUROPE: A MATTER OF TRANSLATING BEING 
In order to elaborate further on the history of Being, Heidegger concentrates on the 
withdrawal of Being in order to emphasise the suspension, ἐποχή, or Ansichhalten by 
which Being retains its truth while at the same time allowing the various epochs of history 
to emerge (GA 5, 337-338/26-27).103 When Heidegger therefore returns to the oldest 
saying of the thought of the Evening-land supposedly announced in the Anaximander 
fragment, his intention is to show how that which is the “earliest” exceeds the “latest,” 
and in this fashion he attempts to set the being-historical stage for the dawn of our destiny 
                                                          
102 Interestingly, Hamacher pursues a reading of Heidegger’s ontodicy in terms of an either-or, either Being 
or beings. The decision between the singularity of Being and the ordinarity of beings, Hamacher says, is 
always made in favour of Being. Yet, at one point, Hamacher sees how Heidegger cannot maintain this 
either-or: a singular “or” is no “or,” because wherever there is a “or,” there is always a double “either-or” 
which receives its singularity from the possibility of repetition. In this sense, Hamacher suggests, the 
singularity of Being is no singular being—the ontodicy is originally an ontocide. See Hamacher 1997: 50.    
103 At this point, Heidegger refers to Being in terms of ἀλήθεια with the intent to think Being as that 
ambiguous process of revelation, which withdraws itself from the very beings that it brings to revelation. 
For a discussion, see Taminiaux 1991: 46-48. 
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that arrives at last (ἔσχατον), that is, ‘at the departure of the long-hidden destiny of Being.’ 
(GA 5, 327/18) 
Heidegger, I believe, uses the Greek term ἔσχατον (meaning the “last,” “end,” or 
“uttermost”) to prepare his definition of the uttermost end of Being as such. In other 
words, by employing this term he aims to establish the framework of an eschatology of 
Being, and, ultimately, to make his case for an (apocalyptic) history of Being that is 
coming to an end. All of this is nicely summed up in Heidegger’s terse phrase: ‘Being 
itself is inherently eschatological.’ (GA 5, 327/18) The eschatological moment of Being 
introduced here indirectly reveals what Heidegger has identified as the “sterile order of 
uniformity,” or, what could be described in other terms simply as the essence of 
technology with respect to which the history of Being is coming to an end—and, 
moreover, an end that has been stripped of any sense of teleology (whether in the sense 
of progress or decline). Moreover, and just as importantly, Heidegger’s account of 
eschatology allows him to raise the question concerning the degree to which the history 
of Being is indeed coming to an end. It is important, however, to keep in mind here that 
when Heidegger speaks of the “end” in this context, he is referring to an end that, as it 
were, terminates (verendet) the end. What this means, then, is that the ending, which we 
are discussing here, does not refer to a simple finality but rather concerns a sort of “end 
without end.”104 
It is upon Heidegger’s arriving at this endless ending in his reading of the 
Anaximander fragment that we as readers discover that Heidegger has already prepared 
us for the withdrawal of Being that sets beings adrift in the world. As Heidegger argues, 
the very manner by which beings come to pass, is determined by the ‘errancy by which 
they [beings] circumvent Being and establish the realm of error [der Irre]’ (GA 5, 
337/26). According to Heidegger, then, insistence on the errancy of Being as ‘the space 
in which history unfolds’ (GA 5, 337/26) leads ultimately to the movement by which the 
unconcealment of beings simultaneously discloses the oblivion of Being. Consequently, 
the notion of “errancy” is not to be understood as ‘an isolated mistake [Fehler] but the 
kingdom (the dominion) of history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring 
                                                          
104 As Schuback has argued, such an end without end transforms our very understanding of, for example, 
“the death of God” in such a way that the significance of this phrase—that is, the exhaustion of the very 
regime of signification—does not cease to end and therefore reminds us of ‘the death without end of God’ 
(Schuback and Nancy 2014: 255). 
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gets interwoven.’ (GA 9, 197)105 Ultimately, then, it is Heidegger’s desire to avoid a 
relation to the Greeks defined in terms of either chronology or teleology that leads him, 
in the end, to claim that ‘we are in errancy toward’ (GA 5, 337/26) them. 
To be sure, this claim puts quite a twist on Heidegger’s question of the Greeks in 
that the challenge of engaging with the Greeks now becomes one of ‘translating what is 
said in Greek.’ (GA 5, 333/19) However, as we have already seen, to translate the 
Anaximander fragment is not about providing a translation of it that is as literal as possible 
(as if such a translation (Übersetzung) would situate us in a more privileged position for 
reading the fragment). Rather, to translate (über-setzen), as the emphasis on the 
preposition highlights, indicates a ‘leaping over an abyss’ (GA 5, 333/19). In other words, 
to translate the Anaximander fragment is a matter of the trans-, or the Über-, that is, of 
being in a position to the Greeks such that this position is preceded by the detachment of 
a fixed posture whereby this leaping “we” is exposed to an abyssal openness. In fact, as 
Heidegger sees it, the abyss is not a chrono-historical distance of two and a half millennia. 
Rather, it is a deeper and wider problematic. This is precisely the case in that, on the one 
hand, our relation to the Greeks is severed; yet, on the other hand, the non-relation 
consequent to such severing becomes our very relation to and our proximity with this 
abyss at the edge of which we are standing. Indeed, Heidegger argues that when we stand 
on the ground at the edge of the abyss in preparation for our leap the very sense of being 
grounded that we experience in that moment is subjected to a trembling, and, moreover, 
to a trembling that in turn propels us to leap. Such is the dynamic, argues Heidegger, at 
play in our attempt to trans-late, or rather to carry over Being as that which withdraws 
and separates itself from itself. 
For Heidegger, the dynamic described above is only made possible when we 
‘translate ourselves to the source of what comes to language’ (GA 5, 339/28) in the word 
Being. Such a task, moreover, requires that we listen to the Greek τὰ ὄντα. But what, asks 
Heidegger, do we hear when the Greeks say τὰ ὄντα? This question entails, as Dennis 
Schmidt points out, a move ‘outside of the orbit of metaphysics’ (Schmidt 2001: 262). It 
is here that two important points from Heidegger’s exposition of the Anaximander 
fragment come to the fore. 
                                                          
105 However, this is not to say that the history of philosophy becomes the ‘“history” of errors in the sense 
of the historiographic apposition of one inaccuracy after the other,’ but rather a movement ‘in which errancy 
has come to be experienced’ (Trawny 2015: 62). As Trawny underscores, in ‘the truth of being, errancy is 
not only inevitable; it belongs as an essential possibility to truth itself.’ (Trawny 2015: 50-51) 
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The first point is established when Heidegger in Homer’s Iliad (l. 68-72) discovers 
a chance ‘to cross over to what the Greeks designate with the word ὄντα’ (GA 5, 344/32). 
Heidegger notes initially that what prohibits us from following the Greek way of 
understanding ὄντα is the same thing that prohibits us from assuming philosophy as the 
guarantee of the future destinies of humankind. Interestingly, then, in his recourse to what 
he believed to be the highest and ultimate word of the Greek language, ὄντα, Heidegger 
discovers that this word in actuality is merely a truncated form of the original construction 
of ἐόν ἐόντα. 
With this discovery, Heidegger accentuates the importance of translation for the 
thinking of Being, since the epsilon in ἐόν—in contrast to the participial ending of ὄν—
constitutes the very root of ἔστιν, est, esse, and is. For Heidegger, this aspect of the present 
participle ἐόν, when compared with the nominal participle “being” and the infinite verb 
“to be,” displays how ἐόν constitutes the participle into which all other participles are 
gathered.106 Apropos the ambiguous (Zwiefalt) aspect of ἐόν, Heidegger remarks that ὄν 
says “Being” in the sense of “to be” a being, while, at the same time, it names a “Being” 
which is in such a way that the distinction between the twofold senses of Being remains 
concealed. Moreover, to draw out this point even further Heidegger says that the verbal-
nominal ambiguity of ἐόν already in Greek thinking becomes dislodged from its sense as 
presencing and absencing, in that ὄν comes to designate the difference between a 
foundation and its entities. 
 The second point of Heidegger’s exposition of the Anaximander fragment is that 
the emphasis placed on the archaic ἐόν in the Homeric construction of ἐόν ἐόντα 
introduced above not only designates the singular participial form of ἐόντα, but also 
designates ‘what is singular as such [das schlechthin Singuläre], what is singular in its 
numerical unity and what is singularly and unifyingly one before all number.’ (GA 5, 
345/33) Furthermore, the epsilon of ἐόντα designates Being in the sense of the present 
(Gegenwärtigen) by means of which that which is present arrives so as to ‘linger within 
the expanse of unconcealment,’ that is to say, that which comes into presence arrives 
                                                          
106 In Was heißt Denken? Heidegger addresses the issue of ἐόν in Parmenides: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ᾽ ἐὸν 
ἔμμεναι (DK B6). The Diels-Kranz translation sounds as follows: ‘Nötig ist zu sagen und zu denken, dass 
das Seiende ist.’ In English: it is necessary to say and to think that being is. Heidegger suggests a paratactic 
construction of Parmenides’ sentence so that the present participle stands next to the infinite: ἐὸν: ἔμμεναι. 
The duality contained in the present participle is explained by an example of the blooming flower: blooming 
means: something that blooms (verb), and something that blooms (noun). Cf. GA 8, 221-229.   
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properly (die eigentliche Ankunft) from beyond what is presently present (GA 5, 346-
347/34-35). 
 However, I would like to suggest that Heidegger’s harkening back to ἐόν cannot be 
considered apart from his claim that this singular word, as Schürmann rephrases it, means 
‘the ensemble of structures that allow one to grasp both Being’s genuinely temporal 
nature and its metaphysical reification.’ (Schürmann 1990: 171) Accordingly, the 
participial nature of ἐόν is restricted to its nominal meaning, a restriction that places 
‘subsequent European thinking on its enjoined itinerary [Bahn].’ (GA 8, 241) Given the 
attention that Heidegger devotes to this archaic word, it is telling how he makes the 
suggestion that one ‘might assert in an exaggerated way, which nevertheless bears on the 
truth, that the destiny of the Evening-land hangs on the translation of the word ἐόν, 
assuming that the translation consists in crossing over to the truth of what comes to 
language in ἐόν.’ (GA 5, 345/33; translation modified)107 
 The tone of this quite grandiloquent statement is oddly dramatic. Moreover, the 
statement carries particular implications for developing an account of the Evening-land 
and Europe’s role within its destiny—keeping in mind that this destiny exceeds the 
difference between Occident and Orient alike. Thus, Heidegger affords significant 
attention to the translation of the word ἐόν in which he emphasises the elision of the 
epsilon as a means of shedding light on the question of whether or not the Evening-land 
(das Abend-Land) will traverse whatever is merely European so as to herald another 
dawn, another beginning. Significantly, “Europe” becomes the sign for this space of 
traversal or this passage through which (hindurch) the end of the Evening-land might 
herald a new dawn. Yet, if the Evening-land will need to pass through this space in which 
the epoch of the history of Being is coming to an end—an “end without end,” as we have 
seen—then one might ask in what sense the land of twilight, meaning the ‘fore-time 
[Vorzeit] of that night which is the mother of the day of the more inceptual beginning’ 
(GA 71, 98/83), can give rise to a forthcoming morning and day?108 
 What are we to make of this single letter “ε” on which the entire destiny of the 
Evening-land appears to depend? How do we understand the sense in which the Evening-
                                                          
107 Let me refer to the discussion between Schuback and Nancy 2014: 243-273, from which my reading of 
Heidegger’s passage benefits. 
108 On this understanding, Europe shows itself as a kind of traversal through which the Evening-land must 
pass, all the while Europe remains in, or better as, this space in which it is not fully within itself but rather 
exposes the Evening-land “itself.” As this space of experiencing the traversal of limits, Europe comes to 
designate an exposition of the self-enclosed landscape of the Evening-land. 
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land is dependent on the forgetfulness of Being, a forgetfulness that hangs on an elision 
of this presumably fairly insignificant epsilon that itself represents the movement of the 
history of Being?109 
 The play on the epsilon and its diacritical mark is no doubt terribly allusive. Despite 
this, allow me nevertheless to note two things about this “ε” in particular as well as about 
the word ἐόν in general. First, when Heidegger says that the destiny of the Evening-land 
depends on the translation of ἐόν, one might suggest that this destiny is tied up with 
anxiety precisely in that the Latin origin of the word “dependence” (pendere) implies a 
state of hanging in suspension (cf. GA 9, 112). Second, if the Evening-landish-European 
thinking translates ἐόν in such a manner that Being becomes buried in the unconcealment 
of beings (ὄν), then the destinal sending of Being bears witness not only to the oblivion 
of Being but also to the exposition of the Evening-land into the elision of the epsilon, 
which thereby gets entangled in its errant path (Irrweg) into Being. 
With these points established, let us make one additional suggestion. Were we to 
accept the Latin translation of the German anhängen as depending (something to which 
Heidegger himself most likely would object), we would thereby come to see that what is 
suspended in the process of translation concerns the language of the Greeks to which we 
harken back precisely in order to listen to and to translate the abyssal word of Being—a 
word which is at once ours and not ours. As Heidegger will remind us in one of his 
significant later works, the participle ἐόν means neither Being nor beings but rather names 
the ambiguous participation of what comes to presence in the presencing itself 
(Anwesend: Anwesen selbst). In this respect, ἐόν says the same about the same and thus 
becomes a tautology (GA 15, 397-398).110 Or, to put it bluntly, ἐόν serves as the tautegory 
of Being insofar as Being enunciates itself at the “heart” of unconcealment (GA 15, 405). 
What, then, has been brought to language through this listening to the way in which 
ἐόν says the same about the same? We have already seen how “we latecomers” hang 
suspended in the history of Being from which we are ‘exiled, [gebannt]’ as Heidegger 
says, due to of all the notions and representations we have inherited from Greek 
philosophy’ (GA 5, 335/25). Furthermore, that which Heidegger seeks to evoke is that 
                                                          
109 To speak of “Being” in terms of translation, transition, or passage, entails a twofold gesture: on the one 
hand, it is a transition of sense, and, on the other hand, it is sense itself that is the transition back and forth. 
Transition is therefore not conserving one signification of sense but exposes the tension from one sense of 
Being to another. 
110 In Parmenides’ fragment DK B8, Heidegger observes signs (σῆμα), meaning that which makes 
something manifest in that it shows what is to be seen, which indicate how ἐόν ‘as the same in the same 
staying it stands for itself [ταὐτόν τ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ᾽ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται]’ (GA 15, 398).  
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which is to be thought from within the history of Being wherein he finds ‘the abyss 
[Abgrund] of that relation by which Being has appropriated the essence of the Evening-
landish man.’ (GA 5, 335/25) However, the trouble, as Heidegger sees it, is that we cannot 
disentangle ourselves from the errancy essential to the destining of Being by attempting 
a more accurate translation of ἐόν. Given these remarks, it is perhaps worthwhile to reflect 
in a bit greater detail on what we have been outlining here, namely, Heidegger’s argument 
from 1946 in which he urges us to listen to the language of ἐόν. 
Heidegger’s stubborn inquiry into the Greeks has to do with this almost obsessive 
insistence on the most original form of the word Being—ἐόν—a word that, in Heidegger’s 
view, yields not so much the determination of Being as it reiterates the inherent difficulty 
in the announcement of Being as such. When Heidegger therefore returns to the Greek 
language, as though he were attempting to access ἐόν itself out of love for this particular 
word, he is also attempting to rekindle a sense in which ‘our German language,’ (GA 53, 
75) as Heidegger says of Hölderlin’s hymns, responds to the injunction of Being 
concerning the translation of the untranslatable singularity of ἐόν.111 Certainly, in 
listening to the word ἐόν, the smooth breathing of the epsilon has withheld itself from our 
eyes and ears by turning into ὄν. In addition to this, however, we may also note that the 
unarticulated, inaudible, or weak aspiration with which the word ἐόν (about to become 
Being) is pronounced, announces nothing but the laryngeal voice. Such a voice, as 
Nietzsche would have put it, may never have enabled us to gather the moment in which 
the word “Being” disappears into the last breath of a vaporised reality.112 If we take into 
account our earlier discussion of the vaporisation of Being, we recognise that if the 
thinking of Being is a thinking of the voice that pronounces this inaudible spiritus lenis 
(a voice that perhaps never has been),113 then this thinking of Being has no-thing but 
vaporised smoke to think about. 
Indeed, in Der Spruch des Anaximander Heidegger offers no more than hints with 
regard to the acoustic aspect of ἐόν. Nonetheless, he does make it clear that the destiny of 
the Evening-land depends on the translation of ἐόν, in the sense that it is left hanging in 
                                                          
111 Beistegui discusses Heidegger’s ‘detour through an idiom other than Greek […] that defines the site of 
our historical being today to the Greek idiom, yet in such a way that this repetition constitutes a moment of 
invention.’ (Beistegui 2003: 175) 
112 Interestingly, in discussing the Hebrew aleph (א), Scholem finds that this consonant represents nothing 
but a laryngeal performance (Stimmeinsatz), which corresponds with the Greek spiritus lenis, and which 
precedes a vowel in the beginning of a word. Cf. Scholem 1973: 47.   
113 In his understanding of Heidegger’s voice, Agamben suggests that if the voice is placed as the origin, 
for Heidegger, it is only because the voice is, from the beginning, ‘conceived as removed, as voice.’ 
(Agamben 1991: 39)  
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the very anxiety that is essential to the Being of which there remains nothing to hold onto. 
In this fashion, the Evening-land becomes attuned as a medium percussum,114 that is, as 
a sound box through which we fail to hear both the inaudible aspiration of the voice of 
Being (Stimme des Seins) and its smooth breathing of the single letter that appears so as 
to disappear and expire into another pronunciation of Being as ὄν. 
It is impossible to provide a full account of the dependency of the Evening-land 
upon the disappearance of the aspirated epsilon within the scope of this thesis in that such 
a task would require an extended analysis of Heidegger’s voice (Stimme) and attunement 
(Stimmung), hearing (Hören) and listening (Horchen), speaking (Sprechen) and silence 
(Schweigen).115 Let me nevertheless briefly suggest how the destiny of the Evening-land 
proves to concern a difference in the way of aspirating Being, in such a manner that the 
spiritus lenis of ὄν is stressed by the acute accent of the vowel in order to indicate the 
expiration of ἐόν. 
Hence, it is perhaps with the word ἐόν that the omission of this inaudible spirit 
catches Being short of breath. One might, in this regard, recall Celan’s words from Der 
Meridian in order to explicate what might be at stake here: ‘But who hears the speaker, 
“sees him speaking,” who perceives language as a physical shape […], and also breath, 
that is, direction and destiny [Der aber den Sprechenden hört, der ihn “sprechen sieht,” 
der Sprache wahrgenommen hat und Gestalt […], und zugleich auch Atem, das heißt 
Richtung und Schicksal]’ (GW 3 188).116 Of course, Celan’s appeal to Schicksal diverges 
considerably from Heidegger’s since it is embedded in Celan’s own understanding of an 
asphyxiating spirit according to which we can no longer seize upon the sense that may 
have been sent in the direction of the one who hears the word ἐόν spoken. 
Still, if the speaker’s voice is that of Being (Stimme des Seins) calling the listener, 
who is the human being, to hear the ‘word of the soundless voice [lautlosen Stimme] of 
Being’ (GA 9, 310) and holding the Evening-land in suspension so that we become 
attuned (stimmt) to ‘the horror of the abyss’ (GA 9, 306), then one might ponder the 
critical question that Heidegger poses in Einführung in die Metaphysik: ‘“Is “Being” a 
mere word and its sense a vapour, or is it the spiritual destiny of the Evening-land?”’ (GA 
40, 40/40) 
                                                          
114 I borrow this expression from Sloterdijk 1993: 313. 
115 See Agamben 1991: 54-62 
116 As Pöggeler points out, in the marginal notes to his copy of Celan’s Der Meridian Heidegger had 
underlined the word “Atem.” (Pöggeler 1994: 436) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HEIDEGGER’S SPIRITUAL EUROPE 
There is only one proof of spirit, and that is the spirit’s proof within itself 
(Kierkegaard, SKS 4, 398) 
 
In the first two chapters on Heidegger we offered a survey of the question of Being with 
particular emphasis on Einführung in die Metaphysik. Moreover, we focused on the 
history according to which the transmission of the question of Being is conceived not 
merely as a story of the decline of Evening-landish-European philosophy, but also as an 
occasion for returning to the Greeks in order to attend to the way in which the question 
of Being has been articulated throughout the history of Being. The chief task of this 
chapter, then, is to explore the impact that this double-edged history has upon Heidegger’s 
understanding of Europe. We will approach this task largely, though not exclusively, by 
returning to Einführung in die Metaphysik in order to show how a key aspect of 
Heidegger’s understanding of Europe is its emphasis on the theme of the spiritual destiny 
of the Evening-land. In drawing on this theme, the aim of this chapter therefore becomes 
that of highlighting and exploring how the motif of spirit is central to Heidegger’s text. 
In developing my argument, I divide this chapter into several sections. In the first 
section, I review the main tenets of Heidegger’s thought about spirit. In the second 
section, I will briefly recall our previous discussion regarding the question of Being in 
preparation for our discussion in the third section on Heidegger’s notion of the “world-
darkening.” In the fourth section, I elaborate on the darkening of the world in the context 
of Heidegger’s question of technology. In the fifth and sixth sections, I turn to another 
aspect of Heidegger’s notion of spirit, namely, the “people” by which I attempt to address 
the “German question” in Einführung in die Metaphysik. Finally, I conclude the chapter 
with a discussion of the inner dynamics of spirit—a dynamics which, I suggest, have been 
reverberating throughout the entirety of the chapter. 
 
ENGAGING WITH THE AVOIDED: BREAKING THE SILENCE ON SPIRIT 
Heidegger’s interest in the question of spirit extends as far back as his 1919-1920 lecture 
course Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Already on the first page of the manuscript 
we stumble upon the word “spirit” as Heidegger employs it in his characterisation of 
phenomenology in terms of ‘the science of origins, the science of the absolute origin of 
spirit in and for itself’ (GA 58, 1). In addition, Heidegger would go on to modify the term 
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“science of origins” (Ursprungswissenschaft) into ‘science of the spirit-life’ (GA 58, 2; 
19)117 via a discussion of Dilthey’s Geistesgeschichte. Despite this early interest in spirit, 
however, and with the exception of Sein und Zeit in 1927, Heidegger remains remarkably 
silent up until 1933 concerning the question of spirit.118 
As Derrida has shown in De l’esprit, we find two important references to spirit in 
Sein und Zeit.  The latter reference, about which we will not go into detail here, concerns 
Heidegger’s discussion of Hegel’s conception of time (SZ, 420-428; DE, 46-47/29). The 
former reference on which we will focus our attention here, occurs in the context in which 
Heidegger, after having initially outlined his project regarding the analysis of dasein, 
remarks that it is important to show what is to be ruled out by this analysis, namely, ‘the 
definite phenomenal domains which can be “given forms” [ausformbare]’ (SZ, 46), 
among which one together with the “subject,” “soul,” “consciousness,” and “person” 
finds the term “spirit.”119 Henceforth, when Heidegger uses the term “spirit” in Sein und 
Zeit, he puts quotation marks around it in order to demonstrate its improper presence in 
the existential analysis of dasein due to how it has been intertwined with the stratifications 
of Christian-metaphysical meaning. Of this particular use of spirit ‘between quotation 
marks, thus using it without using it, avoiding it yet not avoiding it’ (Sallis 1995: 25) 
there is certainly something excessive. More specifically, the excessiveness plays out in 
the manner by which the quotation marks withdraws spirit from its metaphysical 
determination all the while leaving it readable. 
In that spirit proves to be a key term in this chapter, I would like to begin here with 
a brief review of Heidegger’s account of spirit from 1933 to 1935. In doing so, we may 
consider a few crucial places in Heidegger’s thought where the notion of spirit plays an 
important role. First, in the summer course Die Grundfrage der Philosophie Heidegger 
addresses the ‘spiritual-political mission [Auftrag]’ (GA 36/37, 3) of the German 
people—a theme on which he had also touched in his Rector’s Address of May 1933 (GA 
16, 107). In a critical review of the alleged improvement (veredlen) and spiritualisation 
(vergeistigen) of the revolution of National-Socialism, Heidegger asks the question 
concerning exactly which spirit is being spiritualised. Is it the Christian spirit of the 
                                                          
117 Later in his 1919-1920 course Heidegger speaks about ‘a crisis of spirit [Krisis des Geistes] that in no 
way has been radically and purely overcome,’ a crisis concerning the work of scientific philosophy that 
paves the way for the ‘experience of a radical renewal of the Geisteswissenschaften’ (GA 58, 88). 
118 Cf. Trawny 2004: 93-112.      
119 In the famous Davoser disputation between Cassirer and Heidegger in 1929, Heidegger refers to his 
analysis of dasein, which is not determined by spirit (without quotation marks) but rather by the immanent 
structures of human corporeality (GA 3, 289-290).    
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πνεῦμα, the breath (Hauch), or the wind (Wehen)? Is it the Greek spirit of the θαυμάζειν, 
the wonder (Staunen)? Is it the spirit of technology as enterprise or energy (Antrieb)? Or 
is it the intellectual spirit of the effort and achievement (Einsatz) (GA 36/37, 7)?120 
Furthermore, in a brief discussion from the same 1933 course regarding the 
ubiquitous motif of spirit that has culminated in his own time and by which spirit has 
presumably become the talk of the town, Heidegger makes the stark claim that no one 
really knows what spirit is. In the 1933 course, however, it nevertheless remains unclear 
what Heidegger himself means by spirit, except that he employs the notion when arguing 
that spirit remains present, yet in a manner by which it appears before us as enslaved to 
an enclosed world (verschlossene Welt). In his Rector’s Address, Heidegger expands 
further on this negative characterisation of spirit by clarifying the intrinsic relationship 
between spirit and the question of Being. For, as he remarks, ‘“spirit” is not empty 
cleverness, nor the noncommittal play of wit, nor the boundless drift of rational 
dissection, let alone world reason; spirit is the primordially attuned, knowing resoluteness 
toward the essence of Being.’ (GA 16, 112) Later that same year, in the winter course 
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Heidegger once again returns to the question of spirit in his 
consideration of the precarious and unavoidable question of essence pertaining to the 
human dasein in the world. How we are in the world, argues Heidegger, brings with it the 
carrying of our destiny (Schicksal) in such an essential manner that ‘the spirit of the earth 
is transformed [verwandeln].’(GA 36/37, 86) 
The final point that I wish to highlight as part of our review of Heidegger’s account 
of spirit concerns the 1934 summer course Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der 
Sprache. In this course, Heidegger draws an intimate connection between the notion of 
spirit and the notion of the people (Volk)—a connection that he will further develop in 
Einführung in die Metaphysik. According to Trawny, Heidegger’s notion of the “people 
of spirit,” a notion that is perhaps not far from Hegel’s Volksgeist,121 serves to provide 
spirit with its sense of heritage (Erbe) and dowry (Mitgift). As Trawny writes: ‘The 
                                                          
120 In his 1941-1942 course on Hölderlin’s hymn “Andenken,” Heidegger complicates the opposition 
between materiality and immateriality with regard to spirit. As Heidegger puts it, ‘Perhaps any conception 
of spirit [Geist] as “spiritual” [“spirituelle”] and “pneumatic” is very un-spiritual [ungeistig] and therefore 
particularly vulnerable to the pseudo-essence [Scheinwesen] of spirit.’ (GA 52, 55) Hence, by determining 
spirit as immaterial, one still determines spirit as a kind of “materiality,” namely, as breath or wind.    
121 Hegel explains: ‘The spirit in history is an individual which is both universal [allgemeiner] in nature and 
at the same time determinate, that is, it is the people in general, and the spirit we are concerned with is the 
spirit of the people [Volksgeist]. But the spirits of peoples differ in their own conceptions of themselves, in 
the relative superficiality or profundity with which they have comprehended and penetrated the nature of 
spirit […]; the peoples are the concepts which the spirit has formed of itself. Thus it is the conception of 
the spirit which is realised in history.’ (VPW I, 59) 
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“spirit” is therefore the attitude of the human being towards the “people,” as well as that 
which makes this “people” into what it is in the first place […]. Spirit is at once an attitude 
and that toward which the attitude is related.’ (Trawny 2004: 101) 
With this review of the main tenets of the spirit motif in Heidegger’s thought, it 
now becomes easier for us to see how Heidegger, in 1935, could link his thought of spirit 
to the question of Europe. As our first step in shedding some light on this link we may 
begin by reflecting on the manner by which Heidegger introduces the spirit motif in 
Einführung in die Metaphysik. In so doing, however, we must once again recall our 
previous discussion concerning the question of Being so as to open it up to the question 
of Europe.   
 
OPENING UP THE QUESTION OF BEING 
As suggested in Chapter One, the notion of “Europe” in Heidegger’s thought does not 
receive its own philosophical treatment. Despite this, Europe nevertheless remains a 
relevant notion for Heidegger in that it is intimately bound up with the question of Being. 
It is therefore not surprising that Heidegger, in attempting within Einführung in die 
Metaphysik to grasp the question that precedes the fundamental question of 
metaphysics—that is, “why are there beings at all instead of nothing” brings ‘the question 
about Being into connection with the fate [Schicksal] of Europe, where the fate of the 
earth is being decided, while for Europe itself our historical dasein proves to be the centre 
[die Mitte].’ (GA 40, 45/44) In what follows, I shall divide this broad claim into two parts. 
The first part, which I discuss in this section, concerns the connection between the 
question of Being and Europe; and the second part, which I address in a later section, 
concerns the question of the people standing at the centre of such a Being-Europe 
connection. 
In approaching the connection between the question of Being and Europe we may 
begin by noticing that if Europe has anything to do with philosophy it is, according to 
Heidegger, solely because the ‘historical dasein of human beings’ needs the question of 
Being. But not only this, we could also say that this question is crucial for us in that it 
touches upon ‘our ownmost future dasein’ (GA 40, 45/44). Furthermore, by raising the 
question of Being Heidegger wants to explore the essential state of Being—albeit not on 
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account of some empty discourse of universality so as to set up a principle of thinking,122 
but rather, as suggested in Chapter One, on account of how the question of Being recoils 
on the questioner. In considering the title of his course from 1935, Heidegger thus argues 
that Einführung in die Metaphysik refers to a leading (Führung) into the asking of the 
fundamental question of Being. Now, on a first glance, this might sound as if Heidegger 
is subscribing to some sort of individualistic notion of the questioner, envisaging the 
questioner as the sole power that inquires into the state of Being. This, however, is 
certainly not the case given that Heidegger, in 1935, places great emphasis on the “dasein 
of a people.” Hence, in the 1953 annotation to Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger 
clarifies his argument by suggesting that the dasein who questions Being does not ask this 
question as an isolated ego, insofar as the very question of Being bears witness to this 
dasein that is itself only on the condition of its historical relation to Being (GA 40, 31-
32/31). 
 When Heidegger thus emphasises the relationality of the question concerning 
Being, he points time and again to the question of “how it stands with Being” in order to 
display the relationship between how ‘human beings leap away from all the previous 
safety of their dasein’ (GA 40, 8/6) and what makes the question of Being decisive to an 
opening up of the history of the Evening-land. As we have seen in Chapter One, to appeal 
to Being is to seek the grounding for everything that is, or rather, to get to the bottom 
(ergründen) of beings. At the same time, however, Heidegger also notes that precisely 
because we are questioning in our appeal to Being, ‘it remains an open question whether 
the ground [we are seeking] is a truly […] originary ground [Ur-grund]; whether the 
ground refuses to provide a foundation [Gründung], and so is an abyss [Ab-grund]; or 
whether the ground is neither one nor the other, but merely offers the perhaps necessary 
illusion of a foundation and is thus an unground [Un-grund].’’ (GA 40, 5/4)123 
In my view, the point Heidegger makes by speaking of the trembling question 
before the ground of Being is that the fundamental question of metaphysics—“why are 
there beings at all instead of nothing?”—is so deeply entrenched in the adverb “instead” 
that it prevents us, in our very questioning, from ‘beginning directly with beings as 
                                                          
122 In 1930, for instance, Heidegger asks whether the question of essence is not asking about the ‘emptiness 
of the universal [die Leere des Allgemeinen], which betrays the breath of any thinking [den Atem versagt]?’ 
(GA 9, 177) 
123 As Heidegger would put it years later, the prefix Ab- of the Grund marks an absence of ground, which 
is characteristic of ‘the age of the world for which the ground fails to come [ausbleibt], hangs in the abyss’ 
(GA 5, 270). 
99 
 
unquestionably given’ (GA 40, 30/30). This is why Heidegger says that the ground of 
Being into which we inquire is ‘supposed to ground the dominance of beings as 
overcoming of Nothing.’ (GA 40, 22/31) However, for Heidegger, the question of Being 
as a question about the ground of beings leads to a kind of double bind inasmuch as the 
ground is that which ‘sustains us and unbinds us, half in Being, half not in Being’ (GA 
40, 31/31). Hence, to reiterate the reformulation of the fundamental question of 
metaphysics, the adverbial construction “instead of nothing” ties together Heidegger’s 
question of Being with his understanding of nothingness in such a manner that ‘the 
questioning itself loses every secure foothold [festen Boden]’ (GA 40, 32/31). And 
because the questioning opens up the very site of the question, ‘our dasein, too, as it 
questions, comes into suspense [in die Schwebe], and nevertheless maintains itself, by 
itself, in this suspense.’ (GA 40, 32/31)124 
These initial remarks on the connection between Europe and the question of Being 
may help us to begin to rekindle Heidegger’s question from Einführung in die 
Metaphysik:  “Is “Being” a mere word and its sense a vapour, or is it the spiritual fate of 
the Evening-land?”’ (GA 40, 40/40) In order to venture a response to this question, I will 
divide my response into three themes that comprise the next three sections:  (1) the 
darkening of the world, (2) the spirit of technology, and (3) the German question. 
 
STAGING THE DRAMA OF SPIRIT: ON THE DARKENING OF THE WORLD 
As we have seen, Heidegger’s starting point for posing the question of Being in 
Einführung in die Metaphysik is the emptying out of the word “Being.” Such an emptying 
out is precisely what he alludes to when he writes of the open space whereby the sense of 
Being is divested of any ultimate or fundamental principality. Whilst tracing the empty 
word of Being from the sense of nothingness that characterises Being as other than beings, 
Heidegger accentuates how the question of Being ‘loses its rank at once in the sphere of 
a human-historical dasein to whom questioning as an originary [als ursprünglichen: in 
the previous section Heidegger specifies the Ur-sprung as a leaping from the ground] 
power remains foreign [fremd bleibt].’ (GA 40, 8/7)125 Considering the fact that Being is 
                                                          
124 According to Gasché, the suspending question of Being demands that ‘an individual, or for that matter, 
a people, depart from oneself—from an understanding oneself in the self-referential terms of, for instance, 
the natural, the biological, the native, the ethnic—and face the strangeness, and insecurity of the to-come, 
in order to have a historical-spiritual fate to begin with.’ (Gasché 2009: 116)   
125 In a similar manner, Schürmann argues that ‘National Socialism raises the collective subject to the rank 
of the standard sense of Being, conferring upon it the function that subjectivity has for modernity.’ 
(Schürmann 2003: 516) 
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almost nothing more than a word (fast nur noch ein Wort) and its (es)sen(c)se an 
evanescent vapour, Heidegger argues that dasein ‘does not just stand before [wovor] this 
fact as something alien and other [als einem fremden Anderen]’ (GA 40, 54/53), but rather 
dasein stands within (worin wir stehen) the strange question of Being in such a manner 
that that with which dasein concern(s) itself remains unthought and without a place 
(keinen Ort). 
 On this view, the dislocated question of Being becomes situated in connection with 
the spiritual destiny of Europe as the place where the destiny of the earth is to be decided. 
Before inquiring further into the essential connection between Being and Europe, we 
should first step back for a moment and ask to what extent the question of Being 
intrinsically belongs to what Heidegger identifies as the world history of the earth and to 
what he assigns another title, namely, the ‘darkening of the world [Weltverdüsterung]’ 
(GA 40, 48/47).126 Important to note here is how Heidegger, in explicating this history of 
world-darkening, draws attention to five essential events: the flight of the gods, the 
destruction of the earth, the reduction of human beings into a mass, the pre-eminence of 
the mediocre, and the hatred and mistrust of everything creative and free (GA 40, 48/47; 
41/40). With respect to these five events associated with Heidegger’s account of the 
world-darkening, I argue that each one can be understood as a prolegomenon to and 
preparation for the question of the spirit of Europe. 
The main thrust of the rest of this chapter is therefore to shed some light on the 
issues that are at stake in this world-darkening that itself extends from the oblivion of 
Being and the resulting abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit) to the age of nihilism 
in which the fall of Being as equivalent to the spiritual decline of the earth has advanced 
through technology to such degree that the entire world will be enfolded into darkness. 
Ultimately, all of this work is meant to serve the simple purpose of helping us to attain a 
better understanding of the interrelatedness of the question of Being and Europe’s destiny. 
Let us begin with an examination of the world-darkening itself. In saying that the 
gods have withdrawn with the light of Being, Heidegger calls attention to how the 
darkness is spreading across the world. Such darkness falling upon the world carries with 
                                                          
126 In 1946, for example, Heidegger in Wozu Dichter? points to a poetic opening of our age pertaining to 
an already imminent nightfall (GA 5, 269). Guided by his poet laureate, Hölderlin, with whom a relationship 
between the Germans and the Greeks is envisaged, Heidegger is able to characterise the needy times 
(dürftiger Zeit) of our age as belonging to the darkening of the land of evening, which has taken place ever 
since the God trinity of Heracles, Dionysus, and Christ “withdrew” from the world. Yet, as Courtine 
suggests, Christ, who is the secret brother of Heracles and Dionysus, could be the indication of a coming 
of the Morning-land. See Courtine 2000: 121-141.     
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it the risk that the day may turn into a world night where sleep becomes preferable to the 
task of reflecting on the dissolution, diminution, suppression, and misinterpretation of the 
question of Being. In an attempt to avert this risk, Heidegger therefore turns his attention 
to the darkening in order to show how this phenomenon concerns the question of Being 
on which hangs the spiritual destiny of both the Evening-land, Europe, and the earth (GA 
40, 34/47; GA 5, 259).127 In making this point, it is important for us to bear in mind that 
for Heidegger the earth is not identical to the (historical) world, but rather constitutes a 
space for the darkening of the world to take place.128 
The attention Heidegger devotes to the moment of world-darkening helps us to 
establish the double-edged question of Being. For Heidegger, such world-darkening is at 
once an opening of what is and an exposure to the ‘threat [Bedrohung] of Being as such 
through non-being.’ (GA 39, 62) Such danger of Being signifies that perhaps the spiritual 
decline (geistige Verfall) of the earth has advanced so far that ‘peoples are in danger of 
losing their last spiritual strength, the strength [with respect to the destiny of “Being,” as 
Heidegger adds in 1953] that makes it possible even to see the decline’ (GA 40, 41/40).  
To further clarify the question of the world and what it means when we speak of its 
darkening, it is important to stress that the world to Heidegger is ‘always [a] spiritual 
world’ (GA 40, 48/47). Given this spiritualisation of the world, the world-darkening and 
its concomitant events taking place due to the bereavement of the light of Being indicates 
a sort of index to what Heidegger refers to as the misinterpretations (Mißdeutung) of spirit 
the degree of which is correlative with the degree of darkening.129 
                                                          
127 Although such a view appears pessimistic, Heidegger claims that neither pessimism nor optimism are 
adequate terms in this context insofar as they designate value assessments in relation to beings and among 
beings and therefore operate in the realm of metaphysics (GA 6.2, 393; 92; GA 40, 41/40). Nevertheless, 
for Heidegger, the question of the “flight of gods” runs parallel with another question that comes close to 
the issue of the holy (das Heilige) to which “evil” (das Böse or das Grimme) responds, in such an essential 
manner that evil becomes a being-historical question bound up with nihilism. 
128 Even if the term “earth” appears rather late in Heidegger’s works, we are told in Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes from 1935-1936 that the earth is not itself historical, whereas the world remains on the side 
of history. However, in Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger seems not yet to have completely grasped 
the non-historical site of the earth as that which enables the human dasein to let things be and, moreover, 
to be bound together with the earth and heaven, mortal and gods. Crucial to Heidegger’s understanding of 
the relation between the earth and the world is that they at the same time move apart from and come near 
to one another. This double movement is defined in the strife from which an openness of the “there” into 
which dasein may come to dwell. Thus, according to Haar, the darkening of the world does not point to the 
rejection of the world in Heidegger, but rather, to the task of the human dasein to live in the world ‘a sort 
of double life with a double thinking’ (Haar 1985: 183). 
129 Yet, one might ask, as does Derrida, whether it is possible to distinguish between the darkness of the 
concept of “spirit” (or “world”) and the darkness of spirit (or world) itself? That is, do the misinterpretations 
of spirit merely indicate a misconception of spirit so that spirit itself remains unaffected by these errors, or 
does the world-darkening as significant to the disempowerment of spirit become revelatory of a spirit 
depriving itself of its power? (DE, 92/58-59)    
102 
 
It is on precisely these misinterpretations that Heidegger focuses in his description 
of the eclipse of the world as that which promotes a ‘disempowering of the spirit 
[Entmachtung des Geistes]’ (48/47).130 For not only is the world always spiritual, but the 
spirit is always world-laden (Welthaft), which in turn suggests that the manner by which 
the world is enfolded into darkness not only affects the world but also the spirit. Despite 
Heidegger’s previously dismissive critique of spirit, I argue that such a character of spirit 
indeed suggests a surprising moment in Heidegger’s writings, as it traces out a decisive 
but ambiguous notion of spirit. For Heidegger, there exists within spirit a certain duplicity 
in that spirit is not merely power, but in a certain sense also impotency. Moreover, it is 
this impotency that makes all the difference for Heidegger’s notion of spirit in that it 
implies a sort of dynamics by which spirit is destined to turn against itself and that the 
place where this turning becomes manifest is Europe. We will return to this point in the 
final section of this chapter. For now we will pursue our quest for arriving at a satisfactory 
interpretation of Heidegger’s somewhat strange notion of spirit, which requires some 
initial reflections on the misinterpretations of spirit and their relatedness to the 
disempowering of spirit.  
Although a thorough explication of the misinterpretations of spirit would require 
greater time and space than I can afford here, we may nevertheless undertake a more 
modest task of drawing attention to what I take to be the crux of Heidegger’s argument. 
The four misinterpretations that Heidegger himself lists are as follows: (1) the spirit as 
intelligence, (2) the spirit as a tool serviceable for goals, (3) the spirit as depicting the 
realm of culture, and (4) the spirit becoming a matter of showpieces and spectacles, or 
indeed an alibi of political systems (GA 40, 50-53).131 Common to all four 
                                                          
130 I have kept Fried’s and Polt’s translation of the German Entmachtung as disempowering, even though 
Derrida’s De l’esprit that will be guiding us in this chapter renders Entmachtung as destitution in order to 
underline how spirit is deprived ‘of its power or its force (Macht), its dynasty’ (DE, 92/59), as well as how 
the loss of power is not “natural.” On this point, Oisín Keohane has criticised Derrida (and the Bennington-
Bowlby translation) for associating impotence (impouvoir) with Entmachtung (DE, 98/61-62), since the 
German word, so Keohane claims, ‘signifies a loss of power, a deprivation of power’ (Keohane 2016: 126), 
whereas impouvoir better translates Heidegger’s term Machtlose. However, I believe Keohane’s 
observation downplays the word play that Heidegger performs in Einführung in die Metaphysik between 
the prefixes Ent-machtung and Er-mächtigung, where the prefix Ent- (not only signifying a privation) 
determines the relation of power, so much so that the disempowerment (Entmachtung) of the enabling of 
power (Er-mächtigung) designates a sort of intensification, actively and transitively, of power, of Macht 
and machen. 
131 Heidegger mentions ‘Russian Communism that after an initially purely negative attitude went directly 
over to such propagandistic tactics.’ (GA 40, 53/52; translation modified) At this point, it becomes clear 
how Heidegger’s discourse on Europe and spirit cannot avoid a sort of geopolitics. As we shall see, 
Heidegger’s question of Being as significant to the destiny of Europe entails what Crépon calls a “spiritual 
geography,” which, in the 1930s, concerns a political thought essential to history as the inscription of the 
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misinterpretations is the manner by which they identify spirit as a function, a capacity, or 
a power to calculate so as thereby to serve the production of commodities. In this process 
then, spirit turns into a spectacle, that is, into a representation by which the spirit becomes 
a figure for such things as religion, politics, science or the fine arts. Interestingly, these 
misinterpretations prove not to be something external to spirit, but rather exhibit an 
‘intrinsic belonging’ (GA 40, 48/47) of the historical question of Being to the world 
history of the earth, which includes the world-darkening, disempowerment, and 
consequently the misinterpretations of spirit. 
As we shall expand on in the final section of this chapter, spirit thus serves as a sort 
of transcategorical condition for its own (mis)interpretations whereby spirit, on the one 
hand, seems to be called into question by its misinterpretations; yet, on the other hand, 
spirit is itself that which makes these (mis-)interpretations possible all the while 
withdrawing from them. In relation to this duplicity, one could perhaps suggest that the 
question of spirit might very well reflect, to put it in Derrida’s terms, ‘the apparently 
absolute and long unquestioned privilege of the Fragen’ (DE, 24/9).132 Derrida therefore 
further suggests that spirit ‘is perhaps the name Heidegger gives, beyond any other name, 
to this unquestioned possibility of the question’ (DE, 25/10). 
Against the backdrop of the four misinterpretations of spirit outlined above, 
Heidegger, in Einführung in die Metaphysik, reiterates the main idea of spirit that he had 
previously developed in his 1933 Rectoral Address, namely, that ‘spirit is originally 
attuned [gestimmte], knowing resolution [Entschlossenheit] to the essence of Being’ (GA 
40, 53/52). Building upon this characterisation of spirit’s intimate relationship with the 
essence of Being, Heidegger in 1935 continues to say that ‘Spirit is the empowering of 
the powers [Ermächtigung der Mächte] of beings as such and as a whole. Where spirit 
rules, beings as such always and in each case come into Being.’ (GA 40, 53/52). 
As we develop our argument, we will have much more to say about the central 
aspects of this passage. For the moment, however, we may make a brief remark that will 
point us further in our investigation of spirit. For, if the world is always spiritual and the 
spirit is always worldly, then the world-darkening cannot be understood as an event taking 
place independently of the powers of spirit. Rather, the world-darkening contains within 
                                                          
sense, that is, meaning and direction, of the new beginning of the Evening-land. Cf. Crépon 2000: 167; 
Crépon 2007: 121-122.   
132 While I shall not repeat the discussion undertaken in the chapters on Valéry, concerning the 
dissymmetrical analogy between spirit and value according to which spirit is both a value and the source 
of all value, I will merely note that a similar structure appears to repeat itself in this context as well. 
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itself a disempowering of spirit that, in turn, turns out to be a potential outcome of the 
spiritual powers. As Heidegger therefore argues, the situation of spirit into which Europe 
becomes ‘all the more dire [verhängnisvoller] because the disempowering of the spirit 
comes from Europe itself […] is determined at last [endgültig] by its own spiritual 
situation in the first half of the nineteenth century.’ (GA 40, 49/48) The situation to which 
Heidegger alludes in this context is that which is ‘all too readily and swiftly characterized 
as the “collapse of German idealism.”’ (GA 40 49/48)133 Importantly, under this heading 
of the situation of spirit in Europe, Heidegger argues, lies the dissolution of spiritual 
powers into spiritlessness. As he writes: ‘it was not German idealism that collapsed, but 
it was the age that was no longer strong enough to stand up to the greatness, breadth, and 
originality of that spiritual world’ (GA 40, 49/48). 
 What this discussion above reveals is that spirit is fundamentally ambiguous. For 
Heidegger, spirit is essential to the world to such a degree that the age and the world can 
no longer stand up to the originality of the spiritual world. As such, the phenomenon of 
the world-darkening brings into view how spirit is, as Krell says, ‘both the power of all 
power and the helpless victim of the vulgar forces that reduce its power to impotence.’ 
(Krell 2015b: 88) Having now outlined the notion of the world-darkening, we may begin 
to trace the manner by which Heidegger carries this notion over into his reflections on the 
disempowering of spirit. 
 
THE SPIRIT OF TECHNOLOGY 
My aim thus far has been to show how the disempowering of spirit is intimately bound 
up with the situation in which Heidegger finds Europe in 1935. Heidegger describes this 
situation in a key passage from Einführung in die Metaphysik where he broadens its scope 
by making reference to three names. As he notes, ‘Europe lies in the pincers between 
Russia and America, which are metaphysically the same, namely in regard to their world-
character and their relation to the spirit’ (GA 40, 48-49/47-48; my emphasis).134 
                                                          
133 In an essay on Heidegger from 1960, Gadamer calls attention to Paul Ernst’s Der Zusammenbruch des 
deutschen Idealismus (München: Müller 1918), which plays into the philosophy of the day when the 
slaughter of the Great War came as a shock to the intellectual life of Germany (Gadamer 1976: 213). 
Precisely the German intellectual life (deutsche Geistesleben) is the theme in Husserl’s 1917 lecture Fichtes 
Menschheitsideal in which Husserl addresses the question whether fullness (Fülle) of the cultural value 
(Kulturwerte) pertaining to the German idealism has been exhausted, to such a degree that it comes to affect 
‘our spiritual life’ and suddenly immerses it into a thick fog (Nebel) (Hua XXV, 267-268). 
134 In this very specific usage, the twin notions “America” and “Russia” have made their way, Trawny 
argues, into the language of Heidegger through Alexis de Tocqueville’s De la démocratie en Amérique 
(1835/1840) in which de Tocqueville says that two great nations exist on the earth—the Russians and the 
Anglo-Americans (Trawny 2004: 101-102n.212). Donatella di Cesare, on the contrary, finds the topos in 
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Beginning in this way with what seems to be a geopolitical perspective on Europe, 
Heidegger refines his approach in terms of what Derrida calls a diagnosis of the spiritual 
configuration of Europe whose most distinctive feature is the misinterpretations of spirit. 
One should note, however, that Derrida here raises doubt about the discourse of diagnosis. 
As he points out, it is important to remember that the verb διαγιγνώσκειν (“to discern” by 
learning something thoroughly) plays together with κρίσις in the process of knowledge, 
in that it is neither ‘that of knowledge nor clinical or therapeutic,’ (DE, 73/45) but rather 
refers to all the resources of the spirit. 
 Putting aside, for the time being, the question of Europe’s Being situated in the 
pincers between Russia and America, let us turn now to an analysis of what Heidegger 
means in saying that Russia and America are essentially the same. Concerning this 
“sameness,” Heidegger emphasises two things. First, from a metaphysical perspective, 
Russia and America are the same in that they share the same kind of relation to the world 
and hence to the spirit. Put in another way, America and Russia both assume the same 
metaphysical perspective insofar as they belong to the history of metaphysics 
characterised by the forgetfulness of Being. Second, Russia and America are the same 
because of what they share, namely, the same.  
Given this second point, I would like, in what follows, to address a claim I take to 
be central to Heidegger’s view of the situation of a spiritual Europe, namely, that the same 
implies the notion of “exchangeable equivalence.” Although Heidegger examines this 
notion in detail in one of his Bremer lectures, I will argue that the same notion is 
foreshadowed in Einführung in die Metaphysik. For Heidegger, such a rendering of the 
same in terms of equivalence is precisely what he understands to be the function of 
technology. On this view, then, Heidegger finds that that which Russia and America share 
is the ‘same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless [Bodenlosen] 
organization of the average man [Normalmenschen].’ (GA 40, 40-41/40)135 As Heidegger 
makes clear about the technological uprooting of the earth becoming global:  
                                                          
Hermann Keyserling’s Das Spektrum Europas (1928: 383; 397; di Cesare 2000: 116n.39), whereas Crépon 
suggests Spengler’s last work Jahre der Entscheidung from 1933 (Spengler 2014: 45; Crépon 2007: 114) 
in which it is argued that North America’s ‘hunt for dollars’ subverts European economy, and by levelling 
its political power to ‘economic trends [wirtschaftliche Tendenzen]’ America has become an equivalent to 
bolshevism which in turn reflects the Asian power. In this thesis, I, however, follow Derrida’s claim that 
Europe, America, and Russia are proper names, which still just mean “Europe.” What is crucial to this 
claim is that ‘geopolitics conducts us back again from the earth and the planet to the world and to the world 
as a world of spirit. Geopolitics is none other than a Weltpolitik of spirit’ (DE, 73/45-46).        
135 In his 2015 study Banalité de Heidegger, Nancy has made a similar observation, arguing that 
Heidegger’s “metaphysical anti-Semitism” can be described in terms of Marx’ qualification of “money” as 
a general equivalent in which ‘productive humanity is alienated and flattened down from its own proper 
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When the farthest corner of the globe [Erdballs] has been conquered 
technologically and can be exploited economically; when any incident you 
like, in any play you like, at any time you like, becomes accessible as fast as 
you like; when you can simultaneously “experience” an assassination attempt 
against a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo; when time is 
nothing but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity, and time as history has 
vanished from all dasein of all peoples […]; yes then, there still looms like a 
specter over all this uproar the question: what for?—where to?—and what 
then? (GA 40, 41/40)    
 
Whatever we make of Heidegger’s disparaging remarks about the framework of 
technology (as inseparable from that of science and economy), such as when he observes 
that the darkening of the world discloses a conquest and exploitation of the globe, it is 
nevertheless important for us to keep in mind that Heidegger does not intend to dismiss 
technology as such. This much is made clear from even a quick survey of Die Frage nach 
der Technik, for it is hard to miss here such passages where Heidegger remarks that ‘The 
essence of modern technology rests on enframing [Ge-stell]. This enframing pertains to 
the destiny [Geschick] of disclosure [Entbergung]. These sentences say something 
different from the frequently blared prattle that technology is the fate [Schicksal] of our 
age, where fate means: the inevitableness of an unalterable course’ (GA 7, 26). 
Given these remarks above, Richard Rojcewicz suggests, in his engagement with 
Heidegger’s 1942-1943 lecture course on Parmenides, that Heidegger’s discourse of 
technology is neither capitulating nor oppositional in that ‘everything “anti” thinks in the 
sense of that against which it is “anti”.’ (GA 54, 77; Rojcewicz 2006: 140-141) If we 
follow Rojcewicz here, it thus becomes possible for us to see Heidegger’s remarks on 
technology from 1935 in a different light than merely that of anti-technology, that is, if 
we may consider the metaphysical sameness as a response to the question of technology, 
which resides in the spiritual configuration of the modern epoch emerging towards the 
end of the history of Being. 
                                                          
existence and therefore from its value or sense.’ (Nancy 2017: 15) In his account, Nancy introduces a fourth 
name to the central names of the Evening-land, Americanism, and Bolshevism, namely, that of the Jewish 
people, who, according to various entries in Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte, represent the figure of the very 
uprooting of the Evening-land. Nancy explains: ‘the Jewish people claims for itself a racial principle. Such 
a principle itself comes from a “domination of life by machination.” [GA 95, 56] But the machination that 
gives rise to such a naturalist principle leads in the direction of a complete “deracialization” (Entrassung) 
of a humanity reduced to the undifferentiated equality of all, and in general of all beings.’ (Nancy 2017: 
15)      
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Before broaching this spiritual configuration, let us briefly recall Heidegger’s 
notion of technology. In light of our discussion of Heidegger’s take on European nihilism, 
we may draw attention to two important points. First, the will to power is ultimately a 
matter of the essence of power, according to which power as the power is always already 
an insatiable will to more power (Übermächtigung der jeweiligen Machstufe; 
Machtsteigerung) (GA 6.2, 239). Second, the will to power is always already a will to 
will (Willen zum Willen) in that the autotelic power of the will is not directed towards a 
specific goal but aims at nothing other than the objectification (Vergegenständlichung), 
conquest, and exploitation of the earth (GA 6.2, 240; GA 9, 303). 
 On the basis of this provisional outline of the conditions underlying Heidegger’s 
metaphysical determination of technology that we have been developing thus far, we 
begin see how the parallelism between America and Russia consists in the participation 
of both these “countries” in the same metaphysical binding to the question of Being—a 
question “hopelessly” intertwined with technology as the manifestation of the modern 
epoch of metaphysics. Indeed, some years later, Heidegger refers directly to this 
manifestation in his characterisation of Europe as a concept of modernity. As he writes 
in Das Ereignis: ‘What is European and planetary is the ending and completion’ (GA 71, 
95/80). In other words, Heidegger suggests that the parallelism of America and Russia is 
itself modelled on Europe’s ending insofar as it represents the name of the dire situation 
of the world—a situation permeated by the disempowering of spirit stemming from the 
spirit of Europe itself (GA 40, 49). 
 When speaking of technology in this context, Heidegger insists that such 
technology ought not to be understood instrumentally, but rather essentially. However, as 
Heidegger famously puts it, the essence of technology is not itself technological (GA 7, 
36).136  Here it is worth emphasising that the essence of technology manifests itself in 
what Heidegger calls the enframing (das Ge-stell) (GA 7, 31). To put it provisionally, the 
enframing opens up the world as a sort of horizon upon which beings are revealed and 
understood as disposable (Bestand)—an understanding which can be traced in a line back 
to Descartes’ metaphysics according to which beings are reduced to objects for the 
representation (Vor-stellen) of a subject. 
                                                          
136 This claim, according to Derrida, joins a traditional discourse on essence, which entails that the essence 
of technology is protected from any contamination by technology. As Derrida sees it, it is spirit that 
Heidegger seeks to save from technology by determining its essence elsewhere than within technology. By 
distinguishing between “Geistigkeit” and “Geistlichkeit,” Heidegger doubles spirit, according to Derrida, 
in an attempt to save spirit from spirit (DE, 26-27; Sallis 1995: 22). 
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For Heidegger, however, this mode of subjective representation not only results in 
an objectification of beings but also—and more importantly—it intervenes in the nature 
of beings by rendering them disposable and thus calculable to technology. As such, the 
subjective representation of beings as objects carries along with it the reduction of the 
spiritual character of the world to ‘extension [Ausdehnung] and number.’ (GA 40, 49/48) 
The question remains, however, in what sense the power of technology as the insatiable 
will to more power seeks to subdue the spirit. 
 When Heidegger, in 1935, considers the question of spirit, he finds himself 
preoccupied with a notion of spirit that is thoroughly imbued with Christian-metaphysical 
connotations right down to its very core, while at the same time, attempting to resist the 
metaphysical notion of spirit that has resulted in a reduction of the world and Being to 
sheer calculability. As Heidegger writes: ‘Being as calculable in this way [i.e. becoming 
thinking in the pure thought of mathematics], Being as set into calculation, makes beings 
into something that can be ruled in modern, mathematically structured technology, which 
is essentially something different from every previously known use of tools 
[Werkzeuggebrauch].’ (GA 40, 202/207) 
In light of this discussion, we are now in a position to grasp more clearly 
Heidegger’s understanding of technology in what would seem to be its role as the 
condition of the world-darkening. Moreover, if we comprehend this darkening as 
grounded in an understanding of the world that is represented with a specific enframing, 
it becomes apparent that the ‘lofty overabundance and the mastery of energies [Kräfte],’ 
(GA 40, 49/48) is not simply to be understood in terms of the problem of how quantitative 
significations can disclose anything about the world. Rather, such overabundance is 
instead to be understood as that which is associated with what Janicaud refers to as an 
‘inversion of less within more,’ that is, a ‘scarcity in overinformation.’ (Janicaud 1997: 
138) Janicaud’s description of a paradoxical structure of simultaneous abundance and 
scarcity is congruous with what Heidegger himself writes in 1935 when he notes that in 
‘America and Russia, then, this all intensified until it turned into the measureless 
[maßlose] so-on-and-so-forth of the ever-identical [Immergleichen] and the indifferent 
[Gleichgültigen], until finally this quantitative temper became a quality of its own [dieses 
Quantitative in eine eigene Qualität umschlug].’ (GA 40, 49/48) 
Within the framework of technology, the ultimate level of indifference is that 
associated with the principle of “exchangeable equivalence.” Such equivalence implies 
not only a shift in the reversal of everything into a value of things, that is, an 
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objectification of beings, but also a reversal in terms of which the determination of beings 
becomes reversed by its very indeterminacy.137 In his Bremer lecture on Das Ge-Stell 
(1949), Heidegger provides an account of this indeterminacy entailing the universal 
(Universal) principle of enframing. According to Heidegger, such a principle is 
characterised by the coordination of uniformity, instantaneity, and simultaneity of 
everything. Moreover, he also describes this principle in terms of replaceability. As he 
explains it, ‘everything is imposed upon for the constant replaceability of the equivalent 
by the equivalent. […] A constantly exchangeable equivalence holds equally in 
everything constant. The equivalence of value in everything constant secures for this its 
constancy through a replaceability that is orderable and in place.’ (GA 79, 44/42) 
In his 1942 summer course on Hölderlin’s hymn “Der Ister,” Heidegger reflects on 
the ultimate indifference of technology as an immense prioritising of quantity over 
quality, which has itself become ‘a quality, that is, essential in kind, namely as that of 
measurelessness.’ (GA 53, 86)138 The logic at stake in this priority of quantity, Heidegger 
argues, is not itself anything quantitative, but rather concerns the metaphysical allure to 
convert (“Umschlag”) quantity into quality. As Heidegger writes in 1936, ‘it is no longer 
the representable object of something “quantitative” without limit; instead, it is quantity 
as quality.’ (GA 65, 135/106)139 
 What we have here, then, is an outline of Heidegger’s notion of technology whose 
principle of exchangeable equivalence throws the world into a darkness of endless 
accumulation of the same. Moreover, we are likewise provided here with a picture of how 
the world, by means of technology, detaches itself from its own spirituality—or even falls 
away from itself, as Heidegger puts it in Sein und Zeit, in emphasising how the world 
                                                          
137 In Janicaud’s terms: ‘the reduction to the quantitative, a cold rationality cynically accounting for its 
effects of power, and most of all, a notion of Spirit limited to one superior principle reversed by the course 
of things, whimpering over “mental order” and its lost content.’ (Janicaud 1997: 139) What is at stake, then, 
is not only an efficiency of things whose meaning functions ‘whenever and wherever as whatsoever,’ but 
also an inefficiency of a world that, as Schuback argues, does not allow transformation to assert its 
unsurpassable heterogeneity in the continuous efficiency (as well as efficient continuity). Cf. Schuback 
2013: 14-15. 
138 In this context, in 1942, Heidegger identifies this logic of priority with “Americanism” of which 
“Bolshevism” is only a derivative form (GA 53, 86). Some pages earlier, Heidegger writes: ‘We know 
today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved to annihilate [vernichten] Europe, that is, 
the homeland [Heimat], and that means: the commencement of the Evening-land. Whatever has the 
character of commencement is indestructible [unzerstörbar]. America’s entry into this planetary war is not 
its entry into history; rather, it is already the ultimate American act of American ahistoricality 
[Geschichtslosigkeit] and self-devastation [Selbstverwüstung].’ (GA 53, 68)    
139 See Nancy 2015a: 34.  
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unworlds itself (die Entweltlichung der Welt) (SZ, 75; 112).140 Furthermore, in light of 
Heidegger’s problematisation of technology that we have been outlining here, it is 
important for us to keep in mind that the unworlding of the world and the spiritual world 
are not mutually exclusive. This is the case precisely in that the latter holds the possibility 
within itself of becoming uninhabitable through the dissolution of spirit. 
 If we return to the initial point above that started us down the path of discussing 
technology, namely, Heidegger’s suggestion that Russia and America, from a 
metaphysical perspective, are the same, it becomes clear that we must approach this point 
in terms of an “exchangeable equivalence.” 
 Furthermore, we may note that the manner by which Heidegger reflects on Russia 
and America with respect to their metaphysical sameness may be said to intensify not 
only the embodiment of the misinterpretations of the spirit, but also the unchained 
technology and its rootless organisation of the world, which carries on until spirit “itself” 
is turned into the measureless indifference. Such indifference of spirit serves, as it were, 
to indicate how dasein begins to slide into a world that, as Heidegger argues, lacks ‘that 
depth from which the essential always comes and returns to human beings, thereby 
forcing them to superiority and allowing them to act on the basis of rank.’ (GA 40, 49/48) 
The consequence of this lack is, claims Heidegger, that ‘all things sank to the same level, 
to a surface resembling a blind mirror that no longer mirrors, that cast back nothing’ (GA 
40, 49/48). If this is the case, however, one might suggest that the problem for Europe is 
that Europe is also submitted to this ultimate level of indifference such that it may no 
longer identify itself with respect to its superior difference from other regions of the 
world.141 
Moreover, as Heidegger proceeds his analysis, it becomes clear that he intends to 
ponder technology in its most extreme of potentiality. Whereas the first incursion from 
the world-transforming power of technology represents, for Heidegger, an expansion of 
quantity to the farthest corner of the globe resulting in its exploitation and conquest, the 
second gesture of technology turns out to be even more important to Heidegger’s thought 
concerning the spiritual Europe precisely due to the fact that the essence of technology is 
not itself anything technological. As Heidegger succinctly puts this latter point, ‘Modern 
                                                          
140 Nancy associates Heidegger’s notion of “enframing” with the general equivalence in such a manner by 
which the singularities of the world are reduced to a principle of exchangeability (Nancy 2007a: 34).     
141 As Dastur argues, the danger of Europe becoming planetary is the uniformity by which Europe opens 
up its ability to govern, that is, Europe’s way of approaching the other or its possibility towards others such 
that Europe loses its ability in general (Dastur 1993: 195).  
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machine technology is “spirit” [Die neuzeitliche Maschinentechnik ist “Geist”]’ (GA 53, 
66).142 Without developing this point at any great length, we may nevertheless note that 
Heidegger ultimately identifies the essence of technology as “spirit,” and in such an 
essential manner that through such identification we come to see how the dire situation 
of Europe has to do with a spirit whose essential characteristic is the uprooting of a people 
that ‘conceives its dasein in the historical-spiritual world (GA 40, 8/11; 42/42). 
Accordingly, when Heidegger, in his infamous Rector’s Address argues that ‘the 
spiritual world of a people is not the superstructure of a culture any more than it is an 
armoury filled with useful information and value,’ but rather constitutes ‘the power that 
most deeply preserves the people’s earth- and blood-bound strengths as the power that 
most deeply arouses and most profoundly shakes the people’s existence,’ (GA 16, 112) 
we stumble upon an ambiguity inherent to his insistence on a “people” inhabiting the 
middle of Europe. On the one hand, the dire situation of Europe reminds the “people of 
the middle” of the fragile situatedness of Europe, a fragility which has to do with Europe’s 
historical-spiritual dasein and hence with the disempowering of spirit. On the other hand, 
however, Europe, serving as a sort of privileged access to the spiritual world, experiences 
how its self-inflicted disempowerment of spirit is at the same time accompanied by an 
excessive sense of spirit that is no longer to be situated anywhere. 
 
THE GERMAN QUESTION 
Up to this point, we have been concerned with uncovering the degree to which 
Heidegger’s discussion in Einführung in die Metaphysik is beholden to the question of 
the world as well as the question of Europe’s place within this world and in relation to the 
metaphysical bond that Heidegger draws between America and Russia. 
In order to proceed with our reading of Heidegger’s spiritual Europe, we must try 
to understand what exactly it is that affords Europe, and in particular what Heidegger 
refers to as the centre of Europe such an extraordinary position in the darkening of the 
world. As Heidegger writes, ‘We lie in the pincers. Our people, as standing in the centre 
[Mitte], suffers the most intense pressure—our people, the people richest in neighbours 
                                                          
142 Indeed, when Heidegger puts quotation marks around the term “spirit,” it is not with the intent to ‘return 
to a previous state of the world’ where we would also return to an authentically spiritual world. Such a 
‘childish’ wish, Heidegger argues, would be just as naïve as to state the overcoming of metaphysics by 
denying the significance of metaphysics to the history of Being (GA 53, 66). Yet, as we shall see below, 
Heidegger’s recourse to the quotation marks around spirit suggest, according to Derrida, that the spirit 
returns in order to ‘designate something other which resembles it, and of which it is, as it were, the 
metaphysical ghost [fantôme], the spirit of another spirit’ (DE, 45/24). 
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and hence the most endangered people, and for all that, the metaphysical people.’ (GA 
40, 41/41)143 
For, Heidegger, this level of danger, exposition, and suffering of the people 
inhabiting the centre of the centre of Europe, becomes a kind of index of greatness. This 
is because, as we have seen in the previous section, those countries in-between which 
Europe lies are said to intensify ‘the predominance of a cross-section of the indifferent,’ 
that is, ‘the onslaught of that which aggressively destroys all rank and all that is world-
spiritual’ (GA 40, 49/48-49). What is ultimately at stake in the characterisation of the 
European centre and, in particular, the “people” who are most exposed to danger, is the 
question of Being that has become denuded by virtue of its loss of significance in the 
spiritual history of Europe.144 This is what I have attempted to show in the previous 
sections by distinguishing between two aspects of the question of spirit: on the one hand, 
the spirit as the heritage that represents the manner by which the human dasein relates to 
the world, and, on the other hand, the spirit understood as determining the historical 
character of the world. On this background, Heidegger now says: 
 
Asking about beings as such and as a whole, asking the question of Being, is 
then one of the essential conditions for awakening the spirit, and thus for an 
originary world of historical dasein, and thus for subduing the danger of the 
darkening of the world, and thus for taking over the historical mission 
[Übernehmen der geschichtlichen Sendung] of our people, the people of the 
centre of the Evening-land [der abendländischen Mitte]. (GA 40, 53/52) 
 
                                                          
143 Undoubtedly, these remarks signal toward a highly debatable point in Heidegger’s writings. Bambach, 
for instance, argues that ‘to miss the political significance of this attempt at repatriation,’ that is, the attempt 
to repatriate ‘the German Volk at the origin of Western philosophy’ in order to meet, in an autochthonous 
manner, the rootlessness of American and Russian technological frenzy, ‘is to lose the very thread that 
binds Heidegger’s thought and language.’ (Bambach 2003: 50-51) However, notwithstanding the fact that 
central themes from the 1935 lecture course play directly into the hands of Heidegger’s critics, we must try 
to pay attention to the way in which Heidegger himself characterises “Europe,” “earth,” and “people” in 
view of a historical-spiritual properness. Thus, in contrast to Bambach’s reading, which not only arranges 
its argument based on conclusions drawn from Baeumler, Jünger, Krieck, Otto, etc., rather than Heidegger 
“himself,” but also fails to consider more carefully the implications of Heidegger’s notion of the “earth,” 
Gasché argues that beneath the surface of geopolitics, the German people and their central position in 
Europe has to do with a sort of geophilosophy, according to which the question of Being as determinative 
for the spiritual fate of the Evening-land ‘can always only be asked on the basis of the inception of the 
historical-spiritual Dasein of a people, from and in view of this particular people’s ownmost future Dasein.’ 
(Gasché 2009: 117) To quote Nancy’s succinct observation: ‘The obligation that we face today belongs 
above all to analysis, not because we ought to forget moral judgment (or political or philosophical 
judgment), but because up to now we have still not gone far enough in thinking the deep reasons for our 
condemnations.’ (Nancy 2017: 10-11) 
144 Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 20. 
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How can we understand this historical-spiritual mission of “our people”? And who, 
exactly, is this people? A preliminary answer to these questions could be the one Gasché 
provides when he claims that Heidegger ventured a harkening back to the Greeks whose 
voice of Being, as it were, enables this missioned people to reawaken the spirit. As Gasché 
writes, ‘Greece claims only Europeans, and within Europe […] the people of the middle 
in particular—the Germans.’145 
It is significant to note, however, that in all the cases where Heidegger mentions 
“the people of the centre,” “our people,” or “the metaphysical people,” he does not 
explicitly associate this “people” with the “Germans,”146 but this does not indicate that 
Heidegger’s understanding of the European centre carries no significance for the question 
of the Germans. Yet, in order to see how a relation between the centre of Europe and the 
Germans might be established, we need to take a closer look at precisely how Heidegger 
depicts “the people of the centre” in Einführung in die Metaphysik.  
When Heidegger invokes the various instances of “people” by employing the 
possessive pronoun “our” in the first person plural, he does so chiefly to indicate the 
manner in which “our people” assumes the historical-spiritual mission. In the introduction 
to his French translation of Heidegger’s Die Armut, Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that 
Heidegger’s employment of the possessive pronoun “our” serves to indicate a sort of 
“solidary inclusion” on the condition that such an inclusion is essentially “German.”147 
                                                          
145 Gasché 2009: 107. Gasché adds, however, that the thought of Being, even if it is conceived in terms of 
‘a particular language and a people (as a result of which the universal loses its abstraction and acquires a 
hold on what is), does not in principle preclude the possibility of other incarnations.’ (Gasché 2009: 107)   
146 If one allows oneself to be seduced by the fascination which language has for Heidegger, then one might 
say that Heidegger does not have to say “the German people” in order to describe the “people,” since the 
German “deutsch” is not a tribal name. As he would have read in Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch, the 
adjective “deutsch” stems from the Old High German diutisc, whose Latin cognate, theodiscus, designates 
that which “belongs to the people.” Through a Western Frankish mediation, “deutsch” goes back to the Old 
High German diot[a] whose Gothic þiuda and þiudiskô cognate what is related to the Greek ἐθνικῶς, 
thereby emphasising the kinship between “deutsch” and “people,” “nation,” “tribe,” or “land.” (GDW, 
1043-1051; Duden, 142-143) The point of these remarks, however, is not to belittle the aspect of 
“nationalism” in Heidegger’s thought of “the people.” But this nationalism, which matured in the folklore 
(Volkslied), that is, the ‘postromantic peasant imagery and hanseatic cities, anti-Napoleonic student 
councils, medieval guilds, chivalric orders, the Holy Roman Empire,’ (Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 
292), draws a complex picture in which “nationalism” serves as ‘nothing but the consequence of a 
philosophical commitment (if not of philosophical commitment itself), and it aims at nothing other, 
politically, than submitting politics itself to the sense of this political commitment.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1986: 
158/287)  
147 Lacoue-Labarthe 2004: 8. While Heidegger in August 1933, in referring to Hitler’s revolution of 
National-Socialism, encourages ‘the German people’ to recover its own essence by reestablishing the 
dignity (sich würdig machen) and greatness of its destiny—a greatness lying in ‘its blood, its root, and its 
corporeal growth [leiblichen Wachstum]’ (GA 16, 151), in the 1934-1935 Hölderlin course, distances 
himself from such determination of the people in terms of ‘Blut und Boden’ (GA 39, 254). Cf. Vetter 2014: 
362-363.       
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But who, then, are the Germans?148 This question is posed by Lacoue-Labarthe in 
Heidegger, la politique du poème in order to underscore the geo-philosophical point of 
Heidegger’s answer, namely, the “metaphysical people” or, as Lacoue-Labarthe puts it, 
the “philosophical people par excellence” and the “people of thinkers and poets.” 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 2002: 127/65) Although Lacoue-Labarthe’s claim here might strike us 
as somewhat grandiloquent, the use of such strong language, in my view, serves the 
purpose of stressing the aspect of Heidegger’s geophilosophical model that designates a 
people that carries with it the idea of philosophy as imposing a spiritual meaning on its 
geographical designation. Hence, in defining the essence of philosophy, Heidegger writes 
that philosophy is ‘a thoughtful opening of the avenues and vistas of a knowing that 
establishes measure and rank, a knowing in which and from which a people conceives its 
dasein in the historical-spiritual world and brings it to fulfilment’ (GA 40, 12/11).149 This 
geophilosophical model drawn up by Heidegger, I would argue, carries two important 
implications that prove especially relevant for gaining an understanding of the role of the 
“German people” in the destiny of the Evening-land. The first implication is that “our 
people” as the people of the middle of Europe must assume the spiritual mission that 
stamps the historical destiny of the Evening-land. The second implication, which is 
implied by the first, is that this “metaphysical people” is determined through its language. 
Let us consider these two implications each in turn. 
First, as Heidegger clarifies in the 1953 annotation to Einführung in die Metaphysik 
(GA 40, 41/40), the destinal stamp on the metaphysical people concerns the question of 
Being to such an extent that the spiritual destiny of Europe becomes amalgamated with 
the destiny of Being. Hence, the “Germany” of the people situated in the centre of Europe 
marks the site where the destiny of Europe asserts itself as the oblivion of Being. In 
Heidegger’s view, then, the oblivion of Being proper to the thinking of Being becomes a 
task to be assumed exclusively by the “German people” in order to restore the dignified 
                                                          
148 According to Wahl’s existential perspective, Heidegger’s inquiry into “who we are” fails to ponder the 
proper philosophical category of the individual (Wahl 1956: 57). One sees a connection between Wahl’s 
perspective and one of Dastur’s comments to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger: the crime of Nazism as a 
wickedness of the metaphysical spirit of a people not only loses ‘the idea that crime is always singular and 
individual,’ but also that the metaphysics of Geistlichkeit falls ‘back into a mere metaphysics of Geistigkeit, 
that is, into a metaphysical construction that cannot account for the always individual deeds’ (Dastur 1992: 
34). As a ramification of this discussion, one may refer to Lacoue-Labarthe’s discussion of Heidegger’s 
surreptitious way of ‘restoring a subject (of history) at a point where the thinking of ek-static Dasein and 
finitude […] should have prevented any confusion of Mitsein with a notion of community as substance or 
even, quite simply with an entity’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 115/78) of the people whether Greek or German. 
149 Cf. Crépon 2007: 109. 
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destiny to a declining Europe as well as to return to the ‘spiritual forces’ to the Evening-
land (GA 40, 41/41; GA 13 117; 301).150 As Heidegger writes: 
 
All this implies that this people, as a historical people, must transpose itself—
and with it the history of the Evening-land—from the centre of their future 
happening into the originary realm of the powers of Being. Precisely if the 
great decision [Entscheidung] regarding Europe is not to go down the path of 
annihilation—precisely then can this decision come about only through the 
development of new, historically spiritual [geistiger] forces from the centre. 
(GA 40, 42/41) 
 
Hence, just as Heidegger paints the picture of a Europe that is coming to an end by virtue 
of both its technology and its movement of planetarisation, he also sketches out a sort of 
narrative of the history of Being in which Europe is granted the possibility to rescue itself. 
Accordingly, to this history of ending there belongs also a history of a new beginning, as 
when Heidegger asks the question of Being in order to retrieve the ‘beginning of our 
historical dasein, in order to transform it into the other beginning’ (GA 40, 42/41). As we 
saw in Chapter Two, this first beginning is the one of “the Greeks,” which, in order to 
entertain the narrative of the “history of Being” as other than a history of decline, must 
be connected with the other beginning of “the Germans.” 
 At this point, however, it is important that we proceed carefully in that the narrative 
of the history of Being at stake in Heidegger seems, paradoxically, to point to itself as an 
end of the very possibility of a narrative of history. When Heidegger thus speaks of the 
“end,” he has in mind neither the end perceived as something merely negative that puts a 
stop to something positive, nor the end as something that has been wholly overcome. 
Instead, the “end” of the history of Being as metaphysics signifies an exhaustion or 
completion ‘in the sense of coming to fulfilment [Vollendung]’ (GA 40, 64/63)—even if 
this exhaustion keep on going after its own coming to an end, which is thus an end without 
end unceasingly surviving itself.151 Toward the end of Einführung in die Metaphysik, 
Heidegger explicitly reflects on the end in terms of the history of Being: 
 
The philosophy of the Greeks attains dominance in the Evening-land not on 
the basis of its originary beginning [ursprünglichen Anfang] but on the basis 
of the inceptive end [anfängliche Ende], which in Hegel is brought to 
                                                          
150 See Lacoue-Labarthe 2004: 22. On this understanding, Lacoue-Labarthe refers to Heidegger’s 
nationalism as spiritual, that is, as a ‘national-spiritualism’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 2004: 27).  
151 In Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens (1964), Heidegger recalls the etymology of 
the German word “Ende,” meaning place (Ort). Hence, the end is that place in which the whole of 
philosophy’s history is gathered (versammelt) in its uttermost possibility (GA 14, 70-71).     
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fulfilment in a great and final manner. Where history is genuine, it does not 
perish merely by ending and expiring [ver-endet] like an animal. It perishes 
only historically. (GA 40, 197/202) 
         
For Heidegger, “our people” have thus already entered the end of the history of Being 
and continue to exist in it. This in turn indicates that these people thereby stand in the 
shadow of the oblivion of Being that is itself proper to the thinking of Being. Yet, one 
might still ask how the narrative of the history of Being is, more specifically, said to be 
one that “the Germans” must retrieve from the first beginning of “Greeks” that is itself 
coming to an end so as to transform this ending into an other beginning.152 
This brings us to the second implication of the “metaphysical people,” namely, that 
they are determined through their language. In order to see why this is the case, let us 
begin by considering the manner by which Heidegger elevates “the Germans” to a 
privileged position—a position which they achieve because of the ‘special inner 
relationship [innere Verwandtschaft] of the German language with the language of the 
Greeks and their thinking’ (GA 16, 679).153 In addition to this, we shall also explore how 
the semantics of spirit, as Derrida has argued, assigns to the German Geist an intrinsic 
relation with the Greek “spirit” in terms of which Heidegger subscribes to a European 
history of the meaning of spirit, while at the same time, asking about the spirit of spirit, 
gestures towards a sort of transgression of the boundaries of the European representation 
of the Evening-land. 
 In order to demonstrate the inner relationship between the German and the Greek, 
Heidegger directs his attention to the fundamental Greek word for Being, φύσις, as well 
as the manner by which it has traditionally been translated as “nature.” For Heidegger, 
however, the word “nature” can be employed to challenge the simplistic limitations set 
up by this traditional translation precisely in that it also unearths an entire history of 
translation significant to our (ill-conceived) understanding of Being. For, as Heidegger 
stresses, to render the Greek φύσις with the Latin natura is not only a matter of translation, 
but also ‘the first stage in the isolation and alienation of the originary essence of Greek 
philosophy.’ (GA 40, 15/14) Indeed, Heidegger even argues that the Latin translation 
destroys (zerstört) the ‘authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word.’ (GA 40, 
                                                          
152 See Trawny 2014: 17-30. 
153 While these words are taken from the 1966 interview in Der Spiegel, I shall argue that this inner 
relationship is laid out by Heidegger already in 1935. This relationship between “the Greeks” and 
“Germany,” which was indicated already in Chapter Two, will be laid out in the next section dealing with 
what Trawny calls the “being-historical landscape” into which these two protagonists play a decisive role. 
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15/14) That is, as the Latin language cultivates the alienation of the Greek philosophy, 
Heidegger finds in the history of metaphysics (as a history of the forgetfulness and 
mistranslation of Being) a transference of alienation via Christianity and the Christian 
Middle Ages up through modern philosophy (GA 40, 16/14-15). 
 Having established part of the background of Heidegger’s provisional account of 
the Greco-Latin relationship in place, we may now turn to the theme of the grammar and 
etymology of the German word “Sein” that Heidegger develops in the second chapter of 
Einführung in die Metaphysik. To put the matter as directly as possible, for Heidegger, 
the return to the Greek language serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it extirpates 
the Latin and Roman culture that, by appropriating the Greek language, represents 
metaphysical decadence. On the other hand, it re-enacts the first beginning of the Greeks 
so as to underline the inner relationship between Greek language and the German 
language in order to prepare an-other beginning.154 
As such, Heidegger’s return to the Greek language—and Heidegger italicises 
“Greek”—gives the very development of Western grammar ‘its whole meaning.’ (GA 40, 
61/60) What is perhaps more surprising is that in order to retrieve Greek as the language 
of philosophy, Heidegger argues that ‘only our German language has the emerging deep 
and creative philosophical character to compare with the Greek.’ (GA 31, 61) 
 
 THE GERMAN GEIST 
In contrast to all other languages of the world, the Greek language is, next to the German 
language with which it stands in intimate relation, ‘at once the most powerful and the 
most spiritual of languages.’ (GA 40, 61/60) However, over the course of his attempt to 
define the spiritual character of language, Heidegger claims that not even the Greek 
language has a word to name the German Geist.155 In order to see what Heidegger has in 
mind with “spirit,” or rather Geist, we can draw some interpretive help from Derrida’s 
1987 study De l’esprit. In this study, Derrida demonstrates that, for Heidegger, the motif 
                                                          
154 I note here that Heidegger’s attempt to reestablish the relationship between Greek and German can be 
traced throughout his authorship. For instance, in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes Heidegger discusses the 
Latin trans-lation of ὑποκείμενον to subiectum (GA 5, 7-9), and in Der Satz vom Grund he devotes the 
thirteenth session to discuss the implications of the Latin ratio as a translation of λόγος (GA 10, 153-169).   
155 Heidegger was certainly not alone in emphasising an intimate relation between the spirit and “we 
Germans.” Let us take only one example. In the preface to Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen 
der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) about which Heidegger lectures in 1936, Schelling calls for this particular 
spirit—in contrast to a sectarian spirit (Sektengeist) that all too often rules over the Germans—‘whose 
perfect configuration [Ausbildung] seems to have been destined to the Germans since the beginning of time’ 
(Schelling 1997: 335).    
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of spirit occupies ‘a major and obvious place in this line of thought,’ (DE, 16/3) in such 
a manner that ‘it seems to withdraw itself from any destruction or deconstruction, as if it 
did not belong to a history of ontology’ (DE, 18/5). Moreover, Derrida also remarks that, 
given that the force of naming for Heidegger is crucial to philosophical thinking, German 
is thus ‘the only language, at the end of the day, at the end of the race, to be able to name 
this maximal or superlative (geistigste) excellence which in short it shared, finally, only 
up to a certain point with Greek.’ (DE, 113/71) 
By emphasising how Heidegger’s Geist amounts to a warranting of any question by 
means of its own unquestionability, Derrida suggests the following characterisation of 
Heidegger’s spirit: ‘Geist cannot fail to gather this interlacing insofar as […] it is another 
name for the One and the Versammlung, one of the names of collecting and gathering.’ 
(DE, 24/9) Such account of spirit echoes Derrida’s numerous readings of Heidegger’s 
notion of λόγος in terms of the notion of gathering (Versammlung)—the latter of which 
we find, for example, in Heidegger’s essay  “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)” (GA 7, 225). 
According to Derrida, Heidegger by issuing forth this notion of gathering indirectly 
criticises the subjectivist determination of spirit in opposition to that of the material 
(Stofflichen), and alters its use to fit another sense than that of a metaphysical 
determination of spirit. As Derrida argues, an example of this other sense of spirit can be 
found in Heidegger’s 1952 reading of Trakl concerning the inherent relation between the 
spirit and the flame (DE, 129/98; GA 12, 55).156 
 My aim here is neither to undertake a detailed analysis of Heidegger’s reading of 
Trakl nor to offer a full account of Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s reading. In spite of 
this, I would nevertheless like to make a brief point regarding these readings. What they 
both call attention to, I would suggest, is what Derrida points out in his final chapter of 
De l’esprit, namely, the claim of a ‘linguistico-historical-triad.’ Heidegger, in drawing on 
the semantics of spirit according to which both the Greek πνεῦμα and the Latin spiritus 
align with spirit the connotation of “breath,” ascribes a ‘supplement of originary status’ 
(DE, 163-164/99-100) to the German Geist.157 In order to support this view, Heidegger 
                                                          
156 As Derrida underscores, while Heidegger made visible his avoidance of the term “spirit” in 1927, he 
may in 1952 be examining his own prior as well as Trakl’s avoidance of the word “spiritual” (geistig). 
157 In Derrida’s view, however, the status of originality makes sense only insofar as one ‘grants a sort of 
history of the meaning of the “thing” pneuma-spiritus-Geist which is both European and, by means of Geist 
interpreted in this way, has a bearing beyond or before Western Europe in its usual representation.’ (DE, 
164/100) I note here that Derrida brings to mind the omission of the Hebrew language wherein one also 
finds spirit (ruah) spoken as breath. For Derrida, this omission opens the path to a deconstruction of 
Heidegger’s notion of the history of Being in which the Platonic-Christian formation has repressed the 
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does not so much reject the pneumatic tradition of spirit, as he seeks to unearth the 
“original sense” (ursprüngliche Bedeutung) of Geist as *gheis-, meaning “to arouse,” “to 
excite,” “to be indignant,” (Duden, 262) as well as Geist as connoting ‘fire’ and 
‘flame.’158 In that Heidegger has a deep confidence in the words of his language to be 
able to serve as exemplary vessels of truth and meaning, he thus conceives of the word 
Geist as carrying a hidden truth, which, as Blanchot stresses, a well-conducted 
interrogation is apparently able to unveil: ‘So certain words have a meaning that goes past 
us, one we manage only slowly to discover’ (Blanchot 1949: 114). 
 Heidegger’s insistence that a negative approach to the spirit must be initially 
assumed in order to prepare the way for approaching spirit in a more positive manner as 
flame bears within it a radicalisation of spiritual power insofar as it comes to include the 
potential of its own incineration and along with this of the scorching of the whole 
world.159 In the next section, I return to Heidegger’s Einführung in die Metaphysik in 
order to discuss this possibility of self-incineration inherent to the power of spirit in terms 
of Derrida’s account of the logic of autoimmunity. 
 
                                                          
Hebraic origin of Christianity itself, so that a return of the repressed will make the very formation of this 
history tremble (Dastur 1996: 1-13; 1992: 25-41; 2010: 43-57; 2011: 273-298; 2016: 191-229). 
158 In Die Armut (1945), Heidegger draws on the Greek πνεῦμα and the Latin spiritus, in arguing that ‘spirit 
is the effective power of enlightenment and wisdom, what the Greeks call σοφία.’ (A, 6) Through modern 
metaphysics and Descartes, spirit is rendered as self-consciousness, subject, reason, and finally as the will 
that wills itself, thus forgetting the pneumatic tradition. In contrast to such a view of spirit, Heidegger turns 
to Hölderlin for whom Geist is something hidden that takes place by withdrawing in Being: ‘We experience 
“the spirit” in the openness of this relationship of beyng to the human essence—it is that which sways 
[Waltende] from out of Beyng and presumably for Beyng.’ (A, 7)            
159 This potential of (self-)destruction inherent to spirit is, for Heidegger, bound up with the question of 
evil. Heidegger notes: ‘Evil is always the evil of a spirit. Evil, and its malignity, is not the sensible, the 
material. No more is it of a simply “spiritual” nature. Evil is spiritual’ (GA 12, 56/179; DE, 167-168/102). 
Hence, when Derrida in De l’esprit refers to Heidegger’s ‘literally Schellingian’ formulations, owing to the 
1936 course on Schelling’s essay on the essence of human freedom, such reference is meant to draw 
attention to the manner by which Heidegger seeks to withdraw the thinking of evil from a Christian-
metaphysical determination towards a being-historical sense. Whilst privileging the German Geist over the 
Greco-Latin and Platonic-Christian axis of πνεῦμα and spiritus, seeing that Heidegger hears in the tradition 
of Geist an ancient echo of the spirit in-flame, Derrida demonstrates how Heidegger gathers and forecloses 
the historical triad of Geist- πνεῦμα-spiritus and asks: ‘what justifies the closure of this triangle 
“historically”? Does it not remain open from its origin and by its very structure onto what Greek and then 
Latin had to translate by πνεῦμα and spiritus, that is, the Hebrew ruah?’ (DE, 165/100) What the issue of 
the Hebraic ruah brings into view, Derrida suggests, is a whole tradition of Jewish thought in which one 
finds ‘an inexhaustible thinking about fire’ (DE, 165/101). As Derrida further argues, the very theologico-
philosophical tradition in which Heidegger continues to interpret the relationship between Geist and Seele, 
a distinction found in Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians (2:14) between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, which is based 
on the Hebraic distinction between ruah and néphéch, brings into focus how the origin of evil can be 
understood as the discordance between spirit and soul. For a discussion, see Dastur 2010: 55-56; Krell 
2015: 102-104. 
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THE SELF-DISEMPOWERING MISSION OF SPIRIT 
As we have noted above, Heidegger, within Einführung in die Metaphysik, puts forward 
a two-fold account of spirit. First, he claims that spirit is the empowering power of beings 
of the world, and in such an essential manner that everything of the world is held together 
by spirit. Second, he notes that spirit contains within itself a disempowering of its own 
power, which the world-darkening and the four misinterpretations of spirit bring into 
focus. Moreover, such a disempowering renders the situation of Europe all the more dire 
precisely in that Europe is the historical place where the self-disempowerment of spirit 
plays itself out. 
My aim in this section will be to trace out how Heidegger’s duplicitous 
characteristics of spirit can be fruitfully described by appealing to Derrida’s notion of 
“autoimmunity.” This notion, which Derrida formulates in his later writings and which 
belongs to a variety of what Michael Naas calls ‘deconstructo-nyms’ (Naas 2008: 135) 
(including, for instance, the pharmakon, aporia, and double bind), retains a singularity, 
which is difficult to translate from one context to another.160 Nevertheless, the singularity 
of Derrida’s deconstructo-nyms is not immune to a certain generality and I believe it 
possible to employ Derrida’s notion of autoimmunity in order to describe the logic of 
Heidegger’s spirit. 
 To recall a point that we have already outlined above, Heidegger, in Einführung in 
die Metaphysik and by a recourse to his Rector’s Address, proposes that the proper way 
to conceive of spirit is as ‘the empowering of the powers [Ermächtigung der Mächte] of 
beings as such and as a whole.’ (GA 40, 53/52) As such, for Heidegger spirit thus becomes 
something of a mission (either Auftrag or Sendung) for “our people” to subdue the 
dangers of the world-darkening. Such world-darkening, however, harbours within itself 
a disempowering of the spiritual empowering of power, that is, a Vergeistigung as de-
spiritualisation, which means that the spirit (of technology) is itself a threat to this spiritual 
mission and to the protection of Europe against the situation in which it finds itself.161 
 Furthermore, if Europe is not to go down the path of annihilation, a path that can 
only be eschewed insofar as Europe assumes “the great decision,” it must develop ‘new, 
                                                          
160 Derrida himself employs the term “autoimmunity” in various contexts. What these contexts share, as far 
as I can see, is a presupposed “immunity.” While the biological process of immunisation seeks to protect 
the body by producing antibodies against antigens, the process of autoimmunisation consists of an organism 
‘protecting itself against its self-protection by destroying its own immune system.’ (FK, 72-73n.27) On this 
account, Derrida develops what he calls a general logic of autoimmunisation.   
161 As Derrida’s French, which is difficult to translate, reads: ‘La destitution de l’esprit est ainsi une 
destitution de soi, une démission.’ (DE, 81/63; emphasis added) 
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historically spiritual [geistiger] forces from the centre.’ (GA 40, 42/41) Yet, since the 
relation to spirit is itself essentially European to such an extent that the external threats to 
Europe from Russia and America are in fact internal, Europe’s task of inventing “new, 
historically spiritual forces from the centre” comes to be haunted ‘by none other than 
what it itself has given birth to’ (Gasché 2009: 118). 
 On this view, one might suggest that the ‘historical mission of our people, the 
people of the centre of the Evening-land,’ (GA 40, 53/52) is a spiritual task that spirit 
must undertake against itself. It is in relation to such a task that Heidegger, ten years later 
in Die Armut, quotes the following line from Hölderlin, ‘for us everything is concentrated 
upon the spiritual [Es koncentrirt sich bei uns alles auf’s Geistige]’ (A, 5).162 Yet, if the 
ambiguous spiritual forces emerge from the centre upon which everything is 
concentrated, one could thereby venture to suggest that the centre of Europe, in its very 
Germanic heart, has turned into something eccentrically psychotic due to the internal 
movement of disempowering proper to spirit itself.163 Insofar as the darkening of the 
world, which resembles a sort of black hole whose absolute gravity conceals its own light 
and swallows up everything from within, is not something foreign to the spirit—or, to be 
more precise, is that within the spirit which is foreign to itself— we may therefore say 
that the disempowering of spirit is in fact nothing other than spirit’s own self-
disempowering. 
 It is with respect to this internal movement of the spirit turning against itself, that 
Derrida argues, in his commentary on Heidegger’s discourse on the disempowering 
(Entmachtung)164 of spirit, that if ‘Entmachtung dooms spirit to impotence or 
powerlessness, if it deprives it of its strength and the nerve of its authority,’ it is because 
‘spirit is a force and is not a force’ and, moreover, ‘that it has and has not power.’ (DE, 
                                                          
162 When Heidegger quotes Hölderlin’s saying, the terms “Germany” and “German” have more or less 
disappeared from his philosophical language, now arguing that when Hölderlin speaks of history he always 
has the Evening-land in mind. Yet, as Lacoue-Labarthe argues, the ‘schema of historiality’ (1998: 164) 
remains the same. In this context, it is interesting that Heidegger, despite his suspicion of Latin, employs a 
word of Latin origin, namely, “koncentrirt,” so as to designate the relation (which is the centre) of Being to 
human beings. Later in Die Armut, Heidegger stresses that ‘the concentration is enowned [ereignet sich] as 
the gathering upon the relation to Beyng to our essence, a relationship that is the centre, the midpoint, that 
is everywhere as the midpoint of a circle whose periphery is nowhere [nirgends].’ (A, 7)  
163 In discussing the German distress, Lacoue-Labarthe thus speaks of a ‘threat of psychosis’ (1986: 72)   
164 While I will not delve into the matter here, Derrida’s invocation of the term “destitution” seems to tie 
the question of politics in Einführung in die Metaphysik, which Heidegger wants to avoid (itself a gesture 
of destitution) by reemphasising the πόλις as the ‘ground and place of human dasein itself’ (GA 40, 
161/162). 
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98-99/61-62) In this fashion, Derrida therefore recasts Heidegger’s logic of spirit in terms 
of a general autoimmunity: 
 
Heidegger says that destitution is a movement proper to spirit, proceeding 
from within it. But this inside must also enclose the spectral duplicity, an 
immanent outside or an intestine exteriority, a sort of evil genius which slips 
into spirit’s monologue to haunt it […]. All of that, which accepts lie and 
destruction, is evil, the foreigner: foreign to spirit in spirit […]. The 
destitution of spirit is thus a self-destitution, a resignation. But it must be that 
an other than spirit, still itself however, affects and divided it. (DE, 99-
102/61-63)   
 
There is far too much at play in this passage for us to adequately address here. But why, 
one might ask, include such a long quotation from Derrida? In response, I can simply say 
that I have quoted this text concerning Derrida’s reading of Heidegger because it is here, 
I would suggest, that we finally begin to understand how self-disempowerment of spirit 
can be described in terms of autoimmunity. 
 Hence, by way of closing this chapter we might say that if the spirit follows the 
general logic of autoimmunity, as Derrida describes it, then the movement of this logic 
displays a double horizon or double apprehension. On the one hand, in wanting to save 
itself from its own disempowerment, spirit is, in Heidegger’s view, the very saving power 
of the world. On the other hand, however, spirit encloses a “spectral duplicity,” an 
“intestine exteriority” that creeps up on it from within and incessantly haunts Heidegger’s 
attempt to let the spirit salvage itself from its own disempowerment. On this latter point, 
Derrida follows closely Heidegger’s argument in Einführung in die Metaphysik regarding 
how the disempowerment of spirit comes from within spirit and thus resembles the 
autoimmune logic according to which spirit divides or indemnifies itself in a movement 
that is both immunising and autoimmunising. In this respect, the logic of the autoimmune 
process can be described in terms of a movement that, in an almost suicidal manner, 
attempts to destroy itself through its own mechanisms of protection, that is, by 
immunising itself, as it were, against its “own” immunity. In other words, the internal 
splitting becomes the paradoxical mode of spirit that keeps unravelling the consistency 
of its “own” interiority, and thereby reveals a foreign outside or extimacy of the inside in 
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the form of a non-dialectisable contradiction that simultaneously figures and disfigures 
the spirit from within.165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
165 Elsewhere, Derrida describes the logic of autoimmunity as ‘an internal contradiction’ consisting of ‘an 
internal-external, nondialectizable antinomy that risks paralyzing.’ (R, 35)  
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PART TWO 
VALÉRY’S EUROPE 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ARCHIVE OF EUROPE 
 
Valéry is a symbol of Europe and of its delicate twilight 
(Borges, Valéry as Symbol)  
 
This chapter is the first of three that, when taken together, serve to explore and elucidate 
the question of Europe as it is developed by the French thinker and poet Paul Valéry. This 
question, moreover, is intimately bound up with yet another question central to the 
intellectual discussion of Valéry’s time, namely, the question of spirit. Each of these three 
chapters will comprise a specific, though not exclusive, manner of approaching the 
matter. While this opening chapter aims to provide a general introduction to Valéry’s 
preoccupation with the question of Europe by affording particular attention to the 
experience of the Great War as this experience proves significant to Europe’s self-
understanding, the subsequent chapters will focus both on the radical disorder to which 
the experience of war exposes Europe and on Valéry’s conception of Europe as a spiritual 
matter. By the conclusion of the sixth chapter, it should become clear how the question 
of spirit constitutes a key part of Valéry’s general understanding of Europe. 
 Before getting started, however, let me stress that I intend here neither to present an 
introduction to Valéry’s thought in general nor to offer an exegesis of particular texts, but 
rather I focus in a systematic fashion on a limited number of issues in Valéry’s thinking. 
This approach enables us to pick up on three crucial points related to the theme of Europe, 
namely, crisis, disorder, and spirit. Moreover, each of these points serves as the respective 
theme for each of the three chapters to follow. On this note, let us proceed with our general 
introduction to Valéry’s early thoughts on Europe. 
 
 THE MEMORY OF EUROPE 
Valéry was among those in Europe for whom the Great War in 1914 furnished an 
experience of profound despair—an experience that would remain in effect long after the 
end of the war in 1918. Reflecting on the fact that Europe felt an extraordinary shudder 
running through its marrow due to the war, Valéry, upon the heels of the armistice, 
sketches out the following account of the state of Europe: 
  
She [Europe] felt in every nucleus of her mind [noyaux pensants] that she was 
no longer the same [in French: ne se reconnaissait plus—that she could no 
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longer recognise herself], that she was no longer herself [in French: cessait 
de se ressembler—that she had ceased to resemble herself], that she was about 
to lose consciousness, a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable 
calamities, by thousands of men of the first rank, from innumerable 
geographical, ethnic, and historical coincidences. So—as though in desperate 
defense [défense désespérée] of her own being and her physiological 
recourse—all her memory confusedly returned [revenue]. (HP, 24/989)166     
 
This passage appears in the first of two letters from 1919 that were published together 
under the title La crise de l’esprit, and it is within this collected work that Valéry portrays 
the crisis afflicting Europe in terms of a “crisis of spirit.”167 The passage not only recounts 
the fragile condition of Europe’s self-understanding allegorised as a woman who has lost 
her ability to orient and to identify herself in the world, but it also amplifies the very 
structure of a defense mechanism in and of Europe’s own being. While remaining 
sensitive to the risk of stretching the notion of defense mechanism too far in our reading, 
I would nevertheless like to suggest a particular manner of understanding how this notion 
functions in terms of a form of memory where Europe becomes haunted by itself. As 
Valéry points out, such European memory, when it returns, only does so confusedly. As 
such, the work of remembrance might be compared to a kind of (medical) anamnesis, 
which in this comparison would mean that the crisis of Europe might also be read as the 
history of an illness. This anamnestic remembrance breaking into the defense mechanism 
of Europe must be analysed in the attempt to reach the internal tremors of its being. 
Given this discussion above, I would argue that one fruitful manner of reading 
Valéry’s writings on the European spirit and its crisis, would therefore be to trace out how 
Valéry perceives the memory of Europe as a question concerning whether memory, in 
preserving Europe’s ancestral heritage, also reveals the finitude related to such heritage. 
Before proceeding in the task of drawing out the aspects of this memory, let me begin 
with an inquiry into the “whence” of Valéry’s thinking. 
 
                                                          
166 Valéry uses the French adjective désespérée to describe the divided consciousness of Europe and, as 
such, to intensify the split that is put in motion by the crisis of spirit—a crisis whose phase, as will become 
evident, remains hard to grasp. Even though a hope might remain we should bear in mind that for Valéry 
hope (ésperance) is only a sign of ‘mistrust [méfiance] of the clear foresight of its spirit’ (HP, 26), wherefore 
it is precisely as a lack of hope (desperatio) that the inability of Europe to constitute herself as a whole 
comes into view. See Löwith 1971: 84. 
167 By request of The Athenaeum editor, John Middleton Murry, who in 1917 had introduced a hitherto 
unknown Paul Valéry to an English audience (“Paul Valéry’s La Jeune Parque,” Times Literary 
Supplement, 23 August 1917), Valéry’s two letters were published first in English in two parts: “The 
Spiritual Crisis” (11 April) and “The Intellectual Crisis” (2 May) and then subsequently published under 
the title “La crise de l’esprit” in La nouvelle revue française.   
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 UNDER THE HORIZON OF INFINITY 
In reading the two letters on the crisis of spirit we begin to see that Valéry’s foremost 
preoccupation therein is with the Great War. Not only this, but through his writing Valéry 
engages with the phenomenon of the Great War on a variety of levels by which he 
develops several insights that themselves contribute to the continuing debate concerning 
the accentuated consciousness of Europe’s crisis and decline that accompanies the havoc 
of war.168 Such reflections on war, however, were not new for Valéry, for already in an 
essay from 1897, he has observed that ‘war itself must no longer break out, end, or be 
carried on at the mere whim of events or passions,’ since it will be ‘made rationally’ (HP, 
53-54). In 1915, Valéry reprints this essay, entitled Une conquête méthodique, in order to 
illustrate ‘a kind of general theorem,’ namely, that ‘“the conqueror is always stronger than 
the conquered.”’ (HP, 54) He stresses that this theorem is, in fact, a ‘tautology’ insofar as 
it expresses that ‘“there is no such thing as equal arms,”’ and that the very principle of 
battle is to ‘plan and bring about inequality.’ (HP, 54) 
 My aim for what follows is not to offer a detailed discussion of the entirety of 
Valéry’s 1897/1915 essay, but rather to try to highlight one aspect of it, namely, Valéry’s 
understanding of how Germany’s success in both techno-scientifically organising and 
mobilising the military proves to be a success of method characteristic of the mode in 
which everything is classified and correctly defined (HP, 52; 56).169 As will be made 
clearer in Chapter Five, the generalisation characteristic of the “German method” largely 
has to do with the gradual disappearance of the inequality that once existed between the 
regions of the world and that had once served as the basis for the predominance of Europe 
(HP, 35). Up to this point in our discussion the issues we have introduced remain quite 
abstract and, consequently, they are in need of further development. Let us therefore leap 
forward into 1931 where Valéry, in reconsidering the development of his thought from 
La crise de l’esprit and onwards, reflects on “the result” of the Great War and concludes 
that it ‘was what it was bound to be: it but accentuated and hastened the decadence of 
Europe.’ (HP, 19) In other words, what the experience of the Great War made visible was 
                                                          
168 On Valéry’s view on the “crisis” and “decline” of the European civilisation at war with itself, see 
Koselleck and Widmer 1980: 229. 
169 Regarding this German success, Valéry states that the military build-up of German technology is one 
according to which everything is ‘reduced to groups of abstractions that can enter into every kind of 
calculation; those great strips of land, really complex entities swarming with many different individuals, 
where customs seem so impenetrable to analysis, become objects of thought, manageable quantities, 
marked weights, all of which can be compared, to show which will be heavier or lighter in the scales of 
war.’ (HP, 55)    
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not only the continuity of the horrors of war, but also a radical discontinuity of the way 
in which war in general is understood. 
Although the Great War factors largely into Valéry’s work in that he, as many other 
inter-world-war thinkers, finds it impossible to avert the intrusion of contemporary events 
into his intellectual work, my primary concern here will not be to make a contribution to 
the study of the Great War or to some of the key texts that would be seminal in dealing 
with such a complex phenomenon.170 Moreover, even if there are many themes and 
tendencies to be found in Valéry’s work that overlap with those of other contemporary 
thinkers—themes such as spirit, crisis, decline, war, peace, modernity, loss of illusions, 
or  technology, to mention only a few—I shall touch on such interconnections only 
tangentially.171 In order to approach and to open up Valéry’s texts, let us proceed 
indirectly by way of another reader of Valéry, namely, Walter Benjamin.  
In an essay from 1931 commemorating Valéry’s sixtieth birthday, Benjamin writes 
of what he calls an “approach” (nahen) to the world that he finds within Valéry’s work—
an approach characterised by its sensitivity towards the abominations of the Great War 
(Benjamin 1991: 390). Interestingly, Benjamin begins and ends his essay by recounting 
an anecdote about how Valéry had once wanted to become a naval officer, after which he 
displays how this youthful dream of the ‘wide horizon where the sailors go’ (CW 1, 322) 
can still be discerned in the writings that Valéry would eventually come to author 
(Benjamin 1991: 386). The manner by which Benjamin concludes his essay, however, 
serves as a radical displacement of Valéry’s naval dream in that the view (Blick) that 
Benjamin assumes on the ‘approaching world [kommende Welt] is no longer that of the 
officer, but simply that of the experienced [wetterkundigen: weather-wise] sailor who 
feels the approach of the great storm’ (Benjamin 1991: 390). For Benjamin, what this 
means is that Valéry’s approach to the world has ceased to be concerned with how to 
conquer a point of view from which one achieves an outlook on a specifiable horizon—a 
conquering task that is precisely what Europe, by figuring ‘at the head of the list’ (HP, 
32) of world regions, had carried out for centuries. Years after his youthful naval dream, 
then, Valéry’s approach would instead be concerned and oriented towards what one could 
                                                          
170 Spengler 1972; Husserl (Hua VI); Freud (FGW 10); Simmel 1999; Scheler 1917. 
171 To analyse individual phenomena of the interwar period would require a study in itself. As Lützeler 
argues in his extensive study on the Europe of that period, the attempt to analyse any fixed referent to 
determine the unity of terms such as “Europe” and “Europeans,” as well as “crisis,” “decline,” and “spirit, 
risks running into great difficulties because such terms cannot by themselves account for any discursive 
continuity or unity, inasmuch as they underwent profound transformations as the image of Europe advanced 
into a ‘theme in vogue [Modethema]’ (Lützeler 1992: 344; 298).  
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perhaps most readily call an “infinite horizon.” What we see here is how the maritime 
setting of Valéry’s thought plays a crucial role in this latter phrase, which we largely 
borrow from Nietzsche’s Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (KSA 3, § 125), and brings to light 
the significant transformation that has occurred in our general orientation within the 
world. The displacement of the naval dream thus happens at the very place where the 
defined horizon borders on the exposition of its becoming indeterminable. 
Hence, by tracing how Benjamin’s German word “nahen” imposes on us a coming 
nearer the world, we are thereby provided with insight into Valéry’s approach to the 
world. Such coming nearer, moreover, indicates that at some point we must have been set 
at a distance from the world. Put tersely, the approach under consideration here signifies 
a coming nearer to the world that at the same time retains a distance from it. What this 
means, then, is that the approaching proximity does not define itself in opposition to a 
distant world; rather, the approach to the world essentially belongs together with the 
distance of what remains distant in this approach. In this respect, Valéry’s engagement 
with the world in the year of 1919 serves primarily to account for the way in which he 
and his European contemporaries, in the aftermath of the Great War, found themselves 
exposed to a distant world. That is to say, rather than this approach affirming a proximity 
to the world, it seems to disclose a distance that may be beyond measure insofar as there 
no longer remains any standards for the horizon. As such, any attempt to measure the 
distance to the world is deferred in an infinite indeterminacy or undecidability. 
 Indeed, in my view, what Valéry’s approach-to-world opens up is a nearness that is 
no longer simply given. Or, to put it another way, the approach forces us to acknowledge 
that the world exposes to us an estrangement from the question of approaching Europe 
“today,” that is to say, from the question of Europe’s attenuated position in the world (HP, 
17-19). It is important, however, to be precise when we talk about this no-longer-given 
nearness of the world, for what Valéry’s approach to the world opens up is not set by 
virtue of any given end, but rather by the withdrawal of anything given—whether as a 
substance, result, product, or property.172 Such a withdrawal is radical in nature precisely 
in that it is a withdrawal to the point where there is nothing more “to be” withdrawn, that 
is, nothing but the nothing of ends transposing the very approach to the world into an 
approach of the groundlessness or aimlessness of world. To put it in Valéry’s terms, ‘from 
the ever tighter organization of the world, where measurable things more and more 
                                                          
172 Cf. Nancy 2007a: 68-69. 
130 
 
dominate the scene, where the vagueness of vague things is more and more obvious’ (HP, 
106), the growth, or, quite simply, the transformation of the world into a resource for 
technological power, is undermining the very foundations of the world. 
In following Valéry’s approach, we will come to see how the Great War does not 
merely represent a limited breaking point of the twentieth century. This is particularly the 
case if by the notion of breaking point we mean knowing on what conditions such a break 
is possible. Rather, the issue at stake for Valéry is something far more significant, that is, 
that the Great War has become an event determinative for the entire history of the world 
and, by extension, of Europe’s position therein. As Valéry points out in 1922, ‘everything 
essential in the world has been affected by the war.’ (HP, 307) This is because, as far as 
I understand Valéry, what is at stake in the experience of the Great War (and perhaps war 
in general), is the very matter of thinking. Although it may appear that the task of 
reflecting on war in terms of explaining and responding to such an event is a 
straightforward exercise, as if war had the power to ascribe to itself its own sense that we 
could thereby simply assimilate, for Valéry there nevertheless exists to the contrary a 
certain recalcitrance to assimilation evinced by the thought of war. Indeed, the experience 
of war amounts to a kind of response to what seems inevitable, namely, that in organising 
death war also changes our thought of death. As I will try to show in what follows, the 
originality of Valéry’s approach lies in his indications of how the experience of war binds 
Europe to a sense of estrangement to the world through an altered relation to death. 
 
BEING NOT AT ONE WITH WAR: ON UNDOING DEATH 
There is surely nothing surprising about the relationship between thinking and death. 
Indeed, as Dastur suggests, thinking itself is ‘intimately bound at its very birth to the event 
of a singular death’ (Dastur 1996: 20). Such an envisaging of the homology between 
thinking and death—a homology which is described pre-eminently by Socrates in Phaedo 
(81a) in terms of the care taken with death (μελέτη θανάτου)—seems, however, to 
undergo a transformation as a result of the experience of the Great War. More specifically, 
it would appear that the Great War is responsible for putting the very principle of 
homology into question. In what follows, I propose to show that Valéry’s experience of 
the Great War prepares the way for his understanding of an altered relationship between 
thought and death. As a preface to my argument, I would like to make a brief digression 
by considering the startling insights that can be gleaned from the contemporary German 
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thinker Sigmund Freud and his reconsideration of the effects of war upon our relationship 
to death.  
In his principal writing on war and death entitled Zeitgemäßes über Krieg und Tod, 
which was written in 1915 only one year after the outbreak of the Great War and long 
before the worst of the atrocities from the conflict would occur, Freud comes to the 
realisation that ‘death is no longer to be denied [verleugnen]; we are compelled to believe 
in it. The human beings really die and no longer one by one, but in large numbers, often 
ten thousand in one day. It is no longer an accident [Zufall].’ (FGW 10, 344)173 On this 
view, even if death is said to be ‘the necessary outcome [Ausgang] from all life’ (FGW 
10, 341)174—or, as Prince Henry replies to Falstaff ‘thou owest God a death’ from the 
moment you are born—the experience of war still imposes itself upon our lives as an 
unsuturable wound that alters our very attitude toward death by calling into question our 
relation to mortality. As Freud notes, while we, in times of peace, adhere to our customary 
relation to death, that is, to the ‘unmistakable tendency to set aside death, to eliminate it 
from life,’ (FGW 10, 341), in times of war we must ‘sweep away this conventional 
treatment of death.’ (FGW 10, 344) 
The experience of war therefore intensifies the experience of death, and to such an 
extent that the relation every one of us has to death can no longer be denied.175 
Furthermore, it is not only that the all-pervasiveness of death cannot be denied in war, but 
also that war no longer allows us recourse in any “reassuring” understanding of death as 
either a transition, or as the paying of a debt to a God who “giveth and taketh away.” 
Returning to Valéry, we might say that the question of death that arises in wartime 
and that diverts us from our “customary” understanding of death is instigated by an 
“obsolescence of mortality.” As Valéry sees it, such obsolescence of death is a 
consequence of ‘modern technology’ as ‘the way of power and precision’ (HP, 90-91) 
whereby the mortal beings are transformed into what Günther Anders, in a comment on 
the eradication of difference between singular deaths, has called ‘“killable” entities 
[“tötbare” Wesen].’ (Anders 1980: 405) This transformation of our relation to mortality 
                                                          
173 See Freud’s other text on war from 1933 entitled Warum Krieg? (FGW 16, 13-27) 
174 Shakespeare, Prince Henry IV, Part One, V.I. 
175 Freud observes how the Great War not only exposes the deposits of civilisation but also forces us to take 
ourselves to be the ‘heroes who cannot believe in their own death.’ (FGW 10, 354) In wartime, Freud says, 
civilisation runs the risk of turning the stranger into the enemy so as to distinguish between the enemies 
whose death we disregard and the death of friends and family whom we mourn. For this reason war reissues 
the fiction of “primeval man” and his contradictory conception of death as both to be feared and to be 
denied. (FGW 10, 345) See Crépon 2013a: 6.  
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is, I think, what Valéry is pointing to when he writes how the experience of war does not 
expose death as an occurrence that happens only to anonymous others—indeed, perhaps 
death is no longer even something, as Aristotle seems to think, that happens only to the 
“noblest” (καλλίστοις) in battle (EN, 1115a30-31), but rather it would seem that the 
experience of war has made the relation to death “as such” impossible for everyone. 
In order to discover how Valéry was able to discern this radical alteration of death 
that emerged as a consequence of the Great War, we must take a closer look at the 
technological aspect of war as well as the bellicose madness that, as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
stresses, brought with it the estrangement of Europe in a world affected by the threshold 
(Schwelle) of a technology specialising in material slaughter (Materialschlacht). Hence, 
in the aftermath of the Great War the unconditional belief in Europe’s progress 
(Fortschrittsoptimismus) had become unbelievable, especially in light of what Gadamer 
has pointed to as the ‘suicidal nationalism of this war.’ (Gadamer 1985: 181) 
A crucial component of Valéry’s account of the advent of the Great War is his 
description of the war in terms of ‘a new era’ during which ‘a certain order sets in’ (HP, 
14). This order, as Valéry identifies it, is one of modern technology, and its power is what 
makes it possible for its administrators, i.e. human beings, to rule the world with precision 
and dominance. Paradoxically, however, it is at the very peak of modern technology 
where the abundance of its “great virtues” from which humankind was supposed to 
“profit” that the same technology renders the human being impotent. In 1935, Valéry 
portrays this contradiction of technological power, according to which we might have 
thought ourselves to be in control of technology, but where technology has rather made 
us into its accessory, as being fundamentally ambiguous: ‘we are blind and impotent, yet 
armed with knowledge and power, in a world we have organized and equipped, and whose 
inextricable complexity we now dread.’ (HP, 91) 
We have then, on the one hand, the means of power to dominate the world and to 
create material wealth, that is, ‘an apparatus for exploiting the resources of the whole 
planet’ (HP, 34), and, on the other hand, the awareness of how this new order of 
technological power is being ‘adapted to appalling ends’ (HP, 24). That is to say, the 
fundamental ambiguity of technological power lies in the human attempt to gain control 
over—and here I quote from Freud’s 1930 essay Das Unbehagen in der Kultur—‘the 
forces of nature to such an extent that with their help the human being would have no 
difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man [einander bis auf der letzten Mann 
auszurotten].’ (FGW 14, 270) 
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Once we begin to think of war in terms of this ambiguous power we begin to see 
the manner by which such a power has significantly altered our relation to death. Not only 
does this power carry the risk of exterminating each and every human being, but it is 
actually in the process of doing so by turning each and every human being into a killable 
entity. With respect to our altered relation to death, Crépon contends that, while Europe 
drew itself and the rest of the world into the Great War, the disillusionment that followed 
the Great War and permeated the transition from war to peace, ‘was and still is nothing 
more than the complement of the unequal apportionment of force and power.’ (Crépon 
2013a: 70) 
Recognising that the Europe of the Great War finds its sense in the world by means 
of technological power paves the way for another array of questions that reveals how 
peace no longer represents the end of war as such. In his recollection of the sense of 
uncertainty dominant in the early postwar years unfolded in his lecture from 1922, Valéry 
draws attention to the fact that the end of war still harbours anxiety: 
 
THE STORM is over, and yet we are still uneasy…anxious…as though it were 
just now going to break. Nearly all human affairs are still in a state of terrible 
uncertainty. We ponder on what is gone, we are almost ruined by what has 
been ruined; we do not know what is to come, and have some reason to fear 
it. (HP, 307/1000)       
 
For the moment, we need not dwell any further on the importance of “uncertainty” at 
present, particularly in that this notion will return later in this chapter. Instead, we may 
focus in on what I would argue is a crucial theme in Valéry’s passage:  the transition not 
from war to peace, but rather from peace to war—a transition that itself continues to 
trouble us. In light of this troublesome inversion of the relationship between war and 
peace, Valéry raises the essential question: ‘…And what is peace?’ (HP, 29), which he 
attempts to answer with his own provisional definition. As he remarks, ‘Peace is perhaps 
that state of things in which the natural hostility between men is manifested in creation, 
rather than destruction as in war. Peace is a time of creative rivalry and the battle of 
production; but am I not tired of producing?…Have I not exhausted my desire for radical 
experiment?’ (HP, 29-30)176 
                                                          
176 Agamben suggests that there can only be an image of true peace ‘there where all signs were fulfilled and 
exhausted.’ (Agamben 1995: 81) Accordingly, the kind of peace that follows from a conflict among men is 
‘only a convention instituting the signs and conditions of mutual, precarious recognition […], which comes 
from war and will end in war.’ (81-82) When Valéry argues that he is tired of producing, it seems to be 
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For Valéry, with all peace lingers some sense of war.177 The underlying reason for 
this is due to the fact that the world of peace is ultimately no different from the world of 
war, that is to say, the time of peace belongs to the same production of technological 
power that produced war.178 While there was, nevertheless, a kind of balance of power 
before 1913 in that an inequality still prevailed between the regions of the world regarding 
the scientific instruments of war and peace, Valéry observes how that inequality begins 
to disappear after 1918. As such, the newly attained peace following the end of war comes 
to attest to an unstable relationship between war and peace (HP, 19; 35; 90). 
It is important to note that the Great War cannot be contained within spatiotemporal 
notations such as “18 July 1914” or “11 November 1918”—as if the history of the war 
could be designated strictly in terms of the calendar. Such restrictive categories are not 
possible given that the Great War renders the previously established geopolitical, 
economic, cultural, and national boundaries permeable. As we have already suggested, 
this unstable relation of peace and war imposes on Europe an incessant threat of death 
and thereby an instability that remains averse to any restoration of balance and that 
exposes Europe to “the fragility of life.” Moreover, with regard to the unstable relation 
of peace and war, this exposure entails that the way in which the threat of war is 
constituted already hints at the ambiguity of technological power. Such ambiguity lies 
precisely in that this power may, on the one hand, be employed to protect human beings 
from the threat of war, while it may also, on the other hand, be employed as lethal 
machinery that turns our previous understanding of the human being as one who 
undergoes singular death into nothing but a killable entity. As we now begin to see, an 
awareness of the ambiguity of technological power therefore helps us to approach more 
carefully the difficult question of the memory of Europe’s mortality that prevails in the 
experience of war. 
 
                                                          
because the image of peace has been exhausted to the extent that he can no longer recognise himself in this 
peaceful image subsumed as it is under the overarching power of production and technology. 
177 Valéry’s reflections on war and peace appear to have a close affinity to at least one leitmotif from the 
Kantian discourse on eternal peace, which retains a trace of “natural hostility” manifested in the imminent 
threat of the outbreak of war. In this regard, it would therefore be interesting—although I do not have the 
space to do it here—to read closely those passages from Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) in which Kant states 
that the ‘state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state (status naturalis), which, 
rather, is a state of war. That is, even if it is not always an outbreak of hostilities, but at least an unceasing 
threat of war.’ (KW 9, BA 18) 
178 Cf. Crépon 2013a: 64-70. 
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MORTAL EUROPE 
As the pivotal point for his discussion of Europe in La crise de l’esprit, Valéry begins by 
elaborating on his approach to the world, which is ultimately rooted in the perturbations 
of our relation to death because it proceeds from the site of war. In establishing a kind of 
memorandum on Europe, Valéry therefore leads off in the following manner: ‘WE LATER 
civilizations…we too now know that we are mortal.’ (HP, 23)179 Valéry’s placing of this 
memorandum at the very beginning of his letters seems to bring a kind of substitutability 
into the self-understanding of Europe by putting into play the adverb “too” in order to 
display how this exposure to mortality has bereft Europe of a unique and unsubstitutable 
sense of death that it could make claim to as its own. 
As is illustrated by the ellipsis within the memorandum, the substitutability of death 
forces Valéry to exhale, or, rather, to cut off his breath, before he comments on the anxiety 
associated with becoming a part of those ‘whole worlds that had vanished [disparus]’ or 
of those ‘empires sunk without a trace, gone down with all their men and all their 
machines into the unexplorable depths of the centuries, with their gods and their laws’ 
(HP, 23). As the reference to vanishing worlds, gods, and laws indicates—and as Valéry 
himself was more than keenly aware of—Europe is haunted by exactly the same prospect 
of obliteration, that is, by the always-impending disappearance of its traces. Moreover, 
Valéry reinforces this sense of obliteration that is gapingly opening itself in the memory 
of Europe by calling forth historical names of empires long disappeared: ‘Elam, Nineveh, 
Babylon were but beautiful vague names, and the total ruin of those worlds had as little 
significance for us as their very existence.’ (HP, 23) Furthermore, a few lines before this 
quotation, we read the following: ‘Through the obscure depths of history [l’épaisseur de 
l’histoire] we could make out the phantoms of great ships laden with riches and intellect 
[d’esprit]; we could not count them. But the disasters [naufrages] that had sent them down 
were, after all, none of our affair.’ (HP, 23; emphasis added) 
In these statements we hear an explicit recognition of past civilisations that do not 
belong to themselves insofar as their names depend upon a ‘collective memory of a 
community’180 always already at risk of forgetting their existence, and as such we are 
provided an insight into the fragility that lies at the very origin of history. In what follows, 
I shall address these issues by tracing the fragile and enigmatic conditions of history, 
                                                          
179 In Valéry’s French, the text says ‘Nous autres, civilisations,’ (Œ I, 988) literally meaning ‘we other 
civilisations.’ 
180 For an excellent analysis of the vulnerability of collective memory, see Crépon 2013b: 1-18. 
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especially as exemplified in the disappearance of ancient names, and by turning once 
more to Valéry’s memorandum on Europe’s mortality and its ostensible concern for the 
relation to death that has been altered by the Great War. 
 
 HISTORICAL NAMES 
As we have already noted above, the claim that “civilisation” is mortal is surely not 
unique to the European civilisation. Indeed, ancient empires, such as Elam, Nineveh, and 
Babylon attest to an entire lineage of vanishing civilisations. For this reason, the lesson 
of mortality cannot be said to be constitutive only of the European civilisation. 
Furthermore, for Valéry, the memorandum on Europe’s mortality is announced at a time 
in the twentieth century when Europe is at war with itself, and it is precisely through this 
conflict of war that the mortality of Europe is experienced by means of a radical 
transformation of the European attitude towards death, that is, by means of the experience 
of a wounded self-understanding from which Europe does not (yet) appear to have 
recovered. What is “new” about this transformed relation to mortality is how the 
European civilisation, as Nancy suggests, no longer knows ‘how it is different from 
previous civilizations’ (Nancy 2015a: 56). 
 Hence, by his narrative regarding historical names that have disappeared into the 
nothingness of history, Valéry is showing us how the very sense of this history with the 
Great War has shifted in such a remarkable fashion that we are now witnessing for the 
first time, Valéry claims, how history has become something extraordinary. Before 
inquiring into this extraordinary sense of history, however, we first need to situate the 
“reversals of history” that have made it possible. In doing so, I draw largely on 
Schürmann’s riveting account of the Inca culture in Cuzco, the puma-shaped city that was 
destroyed by the Spanish conquistadors in the sixteenth century.181 According to 
Schürmann, the principle of this ancient civilisation is internally coherent in that it serves 
as both the foundation, reason, and authority for itself. However, as he underlines, such 
principle is essentially finite in that the Incas ‘have their genealogy and their necrology. 
They are epochal. They establish themselves without a blueprint, and collapse without 
warning.’ (Schürmann 1990: 25) What this means, by extension, is that the principle of 
civilisation only becomes an issue for thinking in the moment when it has lost its 
authority, which is to say in the moment of crisis when the supreme referent of the epoch 
                                                          
181 Cf. Schürmann 1990: 26-29. 
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realises how it has lost its foundation. Equipped now with these insights, let us return to 
Valéry. 
In his later work Le bilan de l’intelligence (1935), Valéry notes how history used 
to be safeguarded by the continuity that crossed over the nothingness of history and thus 
made the development of past events intelligible to our ‘historical perspective’ (HP, 
135/1062). In modern times, however, such historical continuity has been interrupted by 
what up to that point had been the most emblematic of interruptions, namely the Great 
War. In the Great War Valéry finds the turning point of his age and a new condition. As 
he writes, ‘Interruption, incoherence, surprise are the ordinary conditions of our life.’ 
(HP, 130/1058) 
In light of this situation in which history has been brought face to face with its own 
brokenness, one might ask if we nevertheless still have recourse to any standard of 
measurement by which we can readily scan the lines of history so as to be able to 
understand such history through the very division of its various periods. Perhaps. In 
Valéry’s context, however, such a task of historical measurement would surely take on a 
strangely singular intensity in that no measure other than our ‘helplessness is a measure 
of the change that has taken place.’ (HP, 131) As Valéry turns our attention to the broken 
phantasm of continuity, the interruption of history could in fact be seen in light of a 
caesura that marks the interminable moment in which the fracture of history opens. 
From this discussion we see the extent to which Valéry resists measuring history 
according to periodisation. Moreover, such resistance is perhaps not unlike what Derrida 
has suggested in his deconstructive encounter with the modern historicist’s compulsion 
to periodise the time of history in terms of an order of linear succession whereby the 
distinction ‘between the before and the after [is maintained], to limit the risks of 
reversibility or repletion, transformation or permutation’ (PSY II, 88). Reading Valéry in 
this manner, however, does not mean that his notion of history need be understood as 
ahistorical. To the contrary, Valéry’s account may be seen in terms of keeping open that 
which happens, as Derrida would have it, ‘precisely without any foundation or decision 
coming along to make it certain’ (BS I, 442/333). In our view, then, what Valéry’s 
understanding of the Great War exposes is how the presupposition of a solid limit, which, 
if nothing else, would hold the events of war and peace clearly separated, ultimately 
falters. 
Given that for Valéry the relationship between war and peace is ultimately an 
unstable one, we may therefore characterise the past of the Great War in terms of a history 
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taking place. What this means, furthermore, is that the understanding of this war as past 
already involves the opening of a history in which the past only takes place as not yet 
achieved and therefore as still uncertain. As such, the event of the Great War provides us 
with neither an understanding of history as premised on continuity, succession, or 
transition, nor an account of clearly demarcated interruption insofar as such an account 
would likewise presuppose history as built upon a solid foundation. In the aftermath of 
the Great War, then, history leaves intact neither the future as something to be anticipated 
or calculated from out of a present, nor the past as the basis on which such anticipation 
or calculation can be constituted. As Valéry succinctly puts it: ‘We no longer look on the 
past [le passé] as a son looks on his father, from whom he may learn something’ (HP, 
131/1059). 
From the quotation cited immediately above, we see how Valéry’s argument, rather 
than venerating the past as history’s paternal authority, instead exposes how the function 
of the past in the present has been broken. At this extreme point, where the condition of 
our being implies that we can no longer orient ourselves on the basis of some foundational 
authority of the past, we begin to understand how, in Valéry’s account of history, the gaze 
of the son upon his father appears to have wrested itself from any ultimate authority. In 
other words, such a gaze appears to have orphaned itself though the very act of displacing 
the father who has long been endemic to history.182 
Furthermore, with his reflections Valéry also describes the change of history not in 
the manner of how a new regime replaces an old, destitute one—as if history were a 
process of continuity—but rather in terms of discontinuity such as in how the Phoenix 
wondrously returns to life from the ashes of its own death. As Valéry notes, then, when 
our present epoch appears ‘without precedent and without example’ (HP, 131/1059; 
modified translation) an understanding of it requires that we must rethink the very nature 
of history and presence. 
Despite the brevity of the remarks above, they may nevertheless be helpful in 
shedding light on the complexity of Valéry’s challenge to us both to think Europe today 
and to think the enigmatic conditions of history. As we have already mentioned, Valéry 
goes so far as to say that the total ruin of whole worlds has had little significance for us 
                                                          
182 In “La pharmacie de Platon,” Derrida examines the notion of logos in terms of the relationship between 
the son and the father. Surprisingly, perhaps, Derrida suggests that the father is not exactly the logos but 
rather its origin: ‘The logos is a son, then, a son who would be destroyed without the presence and the 
present attendance of his father. His father who answers. His father who speaks for him and answers for 
him.’ (D, 86/82; translation modified) 
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today, and in this manner he touches upon the problematic issue of a “collective memory” 
and its risk of forgetfulness. Valéry’s approach to history does not lie in recollecting the 
past, as would be the case in a historicist’s account of the causal formation of historical 
events, in that such undertaking would be ‘comparable to that of constructing the future 
[…]. The prophet is in the same boat as the historian.’ (HP, 27) Hence, as Janicaud says, 
‘let us not try to predict it; the future will only contradict us […]. Perhaps it will help us 
to remember that the world changes and makes fun of us.’ (Janicaud 1997: 134) With this 
discussion in mind, let us now turn to the manner by which Valéry conceives of the future 
and the past. 
 
 AN ABYSS OF HISTORY 
Some thirteen years after his two letters on the crisis of spirit, Valéry makes some of the 
key assumptions in his approach to history more explicit. According to Valéry, the true 
events in history that constitute our knowledge of the past are not mere historical facts. 
Instead, these events belong to an enigmatic history over the course of which ‘predictions 
that are too precise’ have only exposed the failure of history’s ability to manoeuvre 
‘against the unexpected,’ which further means that history is an area in which we find 
very ‘little repose, prosperity, continuity, or security’ (HP, 127).183 In order to exemplify 
his view on this matter, Valéry refers to the year 1715. Although this year had borne 
witness to an infinite series of infinitesimally accidents, none of these was included in 
“history proper,” and moreover, to preserve the happenings of the year would require an 
infinite number of words.184 To appropriate history as that which remains essentially 
inappropriable, ‘we must,’ Valéry says, ‘therefore choose’ (HP, 121). History, as 
determined by the appropriator, thus features both as a selection of accidents and as a 
rewriting of these accidents into causalities and necessities. 
 Indeed, as Valéry points out in an essay from 1925, the power to choose is the 
specialty of the European spirit, that is, ‘to take in everything and transform it into our 
own substance, for this has made us what we are.’ (HP, 325) What we must choose, 
however, is not simply to accept the occurrence of this or that historical accident, but 
                                                          
183 Three years later Valéry notes how we are ‘entering a phase of its [the human race] history in which all 
predictions becomes—by the sheer fact of being a prediction—a risk of error, a suspect product of our 
minds.’ (HP, 133)  
184 In her remarkable study Between Past and Future (1968), Arendt says that events belonging to history 
might be certain and even constant—but not necessary. Historical facts, then, are ‘but the other side of the 
disturbing contingency of all factual reality. Since everything that has actually happened in the realm of 
human affairs could just as well have been otherwise’ (ibid. 235). 
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rather to “decide” on their “importance.” Moreover, in making such a decision we keep 
the chosen accidents from drowning in the infinitude of other accidental facts that are 
thereby deemed less important to the historical archive of Europe. Furthermore, in thus 
organising the past events of history we are, as Valéry says, conditioned by ‘our own 
forms of thought and attention, things essentially of the present’ (HP, 123)—that is, by 
our own finitude—to such an extent that a “living time” is always introduced into the 
history of the past. While Valéry thus underlines the difficulty of conceiving of history 
by looking either backward to the past or forward to the future, he is aware of the way in 
which the life of present time is not a pure presence but rather is ‘like an interval between 
equidistant suppositions, one assuming the past and the other presuming a future.’ (HP, 
124) 
Valéry’s purpose, therefore, in lingering on the interval between the past and the 
future is not to ‘deduce from knowledge of the past some foreknowledge of the future.’ 
(HP, 125) Rather, his intention is to point out how the interval of the present discloses a 
double bind. This double bind can be described as follows: on the one hand, almost 
nothing from the past will help us to orientate ourselves in this present, let alone help us 
to imagine its future; yet, on the other hand, despite the historical disorientation that we 
experience from within the present there remains a future without horizon. It is precisely 
because of this double bind of inheriting a past in terms of which only an unimaginable 
future remains, that Valéry says we are everyday ‘at the mercy of some invention’ (HP, 
136; my emphasis). Hence, the question of history allocates the contradictory injunction 
both to receive an old, exhausted subject of Europe as such and yet, at the same time, to 
reinvent it. Such a paradox becomes the case precisely because, as Derrida on his part 
points out, history ‘is a testimony to our finitude.’ (FWT, 5) Moreover, in describing 
historical testimony with respect to the finitude of heritage, Derrida writes, ‘Only a finite 
being inherits, and his finitude obliges him. It obliges him to receive what is larger and 
older and more powerful and more durable than he. But the same finitude obliges one to 
choose, to prefer, to sacrifice, to exclude, to let go and leave behind.’ (FWT, 5) 
In returning to Valéry’s discussion of how ancient civilisations have passed almost 
unnoticed in the history of his day, we now see that something other is at stake in this 
description than a deprecatory gaze on historical events. In my view, Valéry’s aim here 
is to emphasise the mortality of the European civilisation that has hitherto believed itself 
to be providing a determined purpose and idea of history but which after the Great War 
finds nothing to which it can attach itself. Valery writes as follows: 
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It was not enough for our generation to learn from its own experience how 
the most beautiful things and the most ancient, the most formidable and the 
best ordered, can perish by accident; in the realm of thought, feeling, and 
common sense, we witnessed extraordinary phenomena: paradox suddenly 
become fact, and obvious fact brutally belied. (HP, 24)  
 
As a means of perhaps condensing the varied thoughts from the quote above into one 
single idea, Valéry makes the simple rhetorical move of adding ‘France, England, and 
Russia’ to the previous line of beautiful historical names and thus emphasises how ‘we 
see now that the abyss of history is deep enough to hold us all.’ (HP, 23) To put it in 
another way, what these beautiful names attest to is that paradox has become fact, that 
both historical emerging and perishing remain accidental, and that the accident must 
therefore be acknowledged as the strange law by which history surprises itself by its own 
happening.185 Hence, if there is a paradox that suddenly becomes fact, as Valéry argues, 
this dynamic would be nothing less than the paradoxical movement of necessity or of fact 
opening onto its own abyss of contingency. 
It is therefore not a coincidence that Valéry, in articulating the indifference of 
Europe’s memory with respect to her beautiful singular names, recounts the future of 
Europe in the past tense. Yet, even if the future might belong to the past, as suggested by 
the memorandum on Europe’s mortality, what we have seen with respect to Valéry’s 
understanding of history is that the past nevertheless also belongs to the invention of the 
future. Or, to put it another way, in becoming part of the abyss of history the teleological 
order of history no longer serves as the direction or ground of history. Even more 
precisely, for Valéry there is no foundation beneath history and the historical events and 
the names of history make out an abyssal abundance, which implies that there is no one 
abyss.186 
                                                          
185 With reference to Malabou’s study on the ontological-existential structure of the accident, one might 
say that to perish by accident also requires the event of perishing that suddenly and unpredictably upsets 
the very order of that which perishes. Cf. Malabou 2012: 41; 30. 
186 According to Derrida, such an abundance of abysses inversely means that the ‘abyss, if there is an abyss, 
is that there is more than one ground [sol], more than one solid, and more than one single threshold [plus 
d’un seul seuil]’ (BS 1, 443/334). This whole scene of the threshold of history could be read together with 
Valéry’s Hamlet: ‘Standing, now, on an immense sort of terrace of Elsinore that stretches from Basel to 
Cologne, bordered by the sands of Nieuport, the marshes of the Somme, the limestone of Champagne, the 
granites of Alsace…our Hamlet of Europe is watching millions of ghosts. But he is an intellectual Hamlet, 
meditating on the life and death of truths; for ghosts, he has all the subjects of our controversies […]. Every 
skull he picks up is an illustrious skull. Hamlet hardly knows what to make of so many skulls. But suppose 
he forgets them! Will he still be himself?’ (HP, 28-29) These skulls, for Valéry, constitute a sort of spectral 
lineage of Europe’s history of which Hegel and Marx, as we will see in the course of the next two chapters, 
will play an important role in Valéry’s understanding of Europe. 
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CREMATORIA EUROPE: ON ASHES, ARCHIVES, AND MEMORIES 
Part of Valéry’s aim in alluding to history as an abyss that holds sway over all civilisations 
is to draw attention to the significance that such an all-encompassing hold has in 
awakening awareness to the fact that a ‘civilization has the same fragility as a life.’ (HP, 
23) Furthermore, Valéry emphasises how such awareness within European civilisation in 
the aftermath of the Great War attains a life for itself by incorporating the consciousness 
of its own mortality into its self-understanding. If it is indeed correct to say that Europe 
has been affected by the experience of war to such an extent and in such an essential 
manner that death becomes transformed into mere annihilation and the dead into mere 
killable entities, it therefore follows that Europe can neither be said to properly die nor to 
recover from its crisis. Rather, it would appear that the relation Europe has to death has 
become one not only in which death is deferred interminably, but also in which the 
opposition of death to life has been dismantled. Such deferral and dismantling of the 
oppositional logic is significant to the way in which Valéry makes us reconsider life and 
death in terms of memory and the archive. For, as we shall see in the pages that follow, it 
is precisely through this deferring dismantling that a certain life ‘more obscure and more 
profound than death’ (HP, 30) comes into view. 
 However, this dismantling of the opposition between life and death does not serve 
to render Europe a witness of its own immortality. Rather, it serves the function of making 
clear how the task of thinking about death (and the internal relationship between the two: 
thinking and death) introduces the strange thought of surviving one’s own disappearance 
that is central to the idea of the “spectral existence” of Europe.187 
 But what, exactly, is implied by this abyss of history that exposes Europe to its own 
mortality? One way of describing this abyssal opening is in terms of a “reversal of 
history,” whereby it becomes possible to see how the order of a civilisation is questioned 
precisely in terms of its ruins. True, as Valéry suggests, we ‘were aware that the visible 
earth is made of ashes, and that ashes signify something [la terre apparente est faite de 
cendres, que la cendre signifie quelque chose]’ (HP, 23/988). Yet, how are we to think 
such signification of ashes when ashes are in fact signified by not having a place of their 
                                                          
187 As this spectrality indicates, it is a question of a haunting of Europe, not merely by some apparition from 
the “outside,” seeing as ‘Europe had it within her to conquer, rule, and organize the rest of the world to 
European ends’ (HP, 226) but rather from its own “insides.” In Spectres de Marx, Derrida recognises within 
‘a certain dramaturgy of modern Europe’ the modality of haunting which ‘would mark the very existence 
of Europe. It would open the space and the relation to self of what is called by this name.’ (SM, 23/3) 
Accordingly, Europe is herself the spectre whose haunted identity becomes the unsolid threshold on which 
we stand.   
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own in that, due to them being scattered, they are, as Derrida notes in one of his last 
seminars, ‘both everywhere and nowhere’ (BS II, 169/243)? Moreover, what happens to 
this earth that, Valéry tells us, is made of nothing but ashes—ashes that are without 
dwelling place and without a home? Indeed, from this discussion, we see how the 
Derridean thought that “there are ashes there” (il y a là cendre) (FC, 3) comes strikingly 
close to Valéry’s own reflections. It is interesting, however, that Valéry’s name, save for 
(as far as I know) one crucial reference to Valéry in De l’esprit (DE, 98n.1/122n.2), is 
absent from Derrida’s writing on cinders. Such an absence, though, far from being a sign 
that Derrida was not inspired by Valéry, is more likely indicative of the fact that the 
proximity between the two thinkers is almost too close to notice. In what follows, we will 
nevertheless attempt to take notice of that which has remained unnoticed. 
The employment of the past tense in Valéry’s statement that “we were aware,” 
offers us a way by which to understand how the signifiable appeal to ashes transposes 
itself into a fragile experience of how entire worlds have been incinerated in and by 
history. Moreover, if ashes are still recognised to signify something, such “signification” 
could be interpreted (precisely because of the experience of global incineration) as an 
eradication of meaning. That is to say, the ashes of previous worlds upon the earth signify 
the visibility of their disappearance and therewith also the meaning that used to prevail 
within these worlds. 
This line of thought thereby brings us back to the issue raised earlier concerning the 
ashes of vanishing civilisations as well as to what Valéry sees as the irrecoverable wound 
of Europe experiencing itself as pervious to the same destiny of disappearance without 
difference. Interestingly, Valéry provides an example of the indifference that arises from 
the disappearing of difference when, in the first letter of La crise de l’esprit, he writes the 
following: 
 
The physicists tell us that if the eye could survive in an oven fired to the point 
of incandescence, it would see…nothing. There would be no unequal 
intensities of light left to mark off points in space. That formidable contained 
energy would produce invisibility, indistinct equality. Now, equality of that 
kind is nothing else than a perfect state of disorder. (HP, 27)  
 
In the next chapter I will unfold this passage in far greater detail in my discussion of 
disorder as “general equality,” but for now we may make a brief observation about 
Valéry’s claim. As I see it, the remark about the incandescence that fires up the memory 
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of Europe as it smoulders away, offers us a way of understanding how our attitude 
towards death appears to have been altered with the experience of global incineration.188 
For, if, following the all-consuming burning crematory of the Great War (which becomes 
all the more clearer, if we ever were to admit of a clarity of any such thing, with the 
Holocaust of the Second World War) there is no point of distinction left and nothing 
remains but an indistinct equality according to which everything is equal to itself and thus 
to nothing (or almost nothing), then the single and unique death of the European 
civilisation is worth exactly as much or as little as any other dead civilisation. In short, 
one could argue, the civilisation of Europe dies the same death as any other civilisations—
an improper death, then, insofar as it belongs properly to no one. 
It is precisely because of this account of death that Valéry, writing at the outbreak 
of the Second World War in 1939, reiterates his memorandum that ‘civilizations are as 
mortal as any living creature’ (HP, 209). But while this thought of Europe’s mortality 
might have seemed somewhat strange beforehand, Valéry now realises how ‘it is no 
longer strange to think that our own civilization can vanish, with its methods, its works 
of art, its philosophy, and its monuments, as so many other civilizations have vanished 
since the beginning’ (HP, 209). 
Vanishing, however, need not necessarily mean total disappearance. As Derrida has 
aptly pointed out, as soon as there are ashes, there is also the possibility of preserving 
them in an archive—whether in a cremation urn or in a memorial urn. Yet, as we have 
already suggested above, despite any effort to gather and to collect the ashes there also 
remains the possibility that these same ashes will become dispersed. Such an ambiguity 
regarding collection and dispersion points to yet another phenomenon, namely the ashes 
of ashes or the incineration of cinders—a phenomenon that signals the disappearance of 
disappearance the witnessing of which, echoing Celan, no one may bear witness: 
‘Niemand/zeugt für den/ Zeugen’ (CW2, 72). Although it is not my intention to trace out 
in detail Derrida’s intricate but rewarding account of the relation between ashes and 
witnessing,189 I will nevertheless follow Derrida in attempting to reflect on ashes in terms 
of their finitude, that is, on the idea that not everything can be saved by history (let alone 
saved from history). Accordingly, what speaks in history, I would argue, is not merely an 
                                                          
188 In a similar manner, Lévinas calls attention to a nocturnal space (l’espace nocturne) in which the points 
of orientation do ‘not refer the ones to each other, as in illumined space, there is no perspective, the points 
are not situated. It is a swarming of points [grouillement de points].’ (Lévinas 1963: 95-96)   
189 For an excellent account to which this account is deeply indebted, see Naas 2014: 125-141.  
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insufficiency or a privation of saving its events, but a demand that comes before and 
exceeds history by beginning with the selection and de-selection of history’s infinitesimal 
advent of accidents to which Valéry has already drawn our attention. Moreover, it is 
precisely such a process of selection and de-selection that opens up history to an original 
violence that carries with it the threat of absolute incineration understood as the 
disappearance of disappearance. 
In light of the terms developed above, we may note that it is precisely with respect 
to the issue of forgetting that Valéry considers the memorandum on Europe to serve as 
an effective reminder of Europe that its impending death does not belong to itself but in 
fact already belongs to a collective memory of a community. Indeed, this is a community 
always already in danger of losing the designation “European” in memory itself—or, 
more precisely, of losing itself in the selection or the archive in which its memory was 
supposed to be preserved in the first place. Memory, as understood in this manner, then, 
is not at all independent in its desire to preserve and organise itself; rather, such memory 
has to be supported by (destructible) things. As Valéry remarks: 
 
In the first place, it [i.e. the European civilisation] is composed of things, 
material objects—books, pictures, instruments, etc.—having the probable 
life-span, the fragility, and the precariousness of things. But this is not 
enough—any more than an ingot of gold, an acre of good land, or a machine 
can be capital unless there are men who need them and know how to use them. 
(HP, 200)  
 
Two points must be made about this passage. First, we should note that, for Valéry, in 
order for something to retain its memory, this retaining must take place within a medium 
that will secure the legibility of such memory for the future. What this suggests is that the 
memory of Europe need to remain riveted to a site of technology that preserves its 
memory by repeating it in the form of an archive. It is important, however, to point out 
here that, as Derrida emphasises in Mal d’archive (1995) with a view to Freud’s work, if 
there is no archive without repetition then one must also acknowledge that repetition 
remains inseparable from a certain death drive (MA, 26/12). The reason for this 
inseparability of archivalisation from a death drive, which is also what gives the archive 
its singularity, is that without such a death drive that threatens to turn the totality of 
material objects into ashes there would be no desire to save such material objects in the 
first place. Accordingly, what we find in the archivalisation of Europe’s memory—if one 
dare transpose the autoimmune structure of the archive in Derrida to Valéry’s 
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memorandum—is nothing other than that which ‘exposes to destruction […], introducing, 
a priori, forgetfulness and the archiviolithic into the heart of the monument.’ (MA, 
27/12)190 In summary, then, there cannot be an inerasable trace in the archive because the 
very structure of the archive depends upon the essential possibility of erasability 
pertaining to whatever it chooses to save for memory (TA, 23-26).191 In this sense, the 
infinity of traces haunts the selection of traces that are appropriated in the attempt to 
organise an archive with the consequence that the finitude of the archive is thereby 
revealed.192 
In other words, the disappearance of whole worlds leaving no traces of their 
previous presence—or better put, leaving within history traces so as to disappear within 
them—becomes all the more urgent for Valéry inasmuch as we, in a paradoxical manner, 
become the witnesses of the “historical reversal” of our own epoch. This historical 
reversal concerns how the European civilisation has established itself, ruled, and is now 
faltering to such an extent that that which disappears in this faltering may never again 
come to be, precisely in that its inheritors—“we Europeans”—are incapable of inheriting 
it. Hence, if Europe “today” discovers itself to be in an anxious situation—remembering 
that Valéry inaugurates his letters on the crisis of Europe with a memory of mortality (and 
a fortiori of a mortal memory)—then “we Europeans” must inherit a Europe that, in 
Patočka’s words, ‘has stopped believing in itself’ (Patočka 2002:151). 
 In order to develop this intricate relationship between heritage, history, traces, and 
archives in greater depth, I turn now to the memory of Europe that, according to Valéry, 
                                                          
190 Thus, even if Valéry says that there is ‘an element of suicide in the feverish and superficial life of the 
civilized world,’ (HP, 201) this is not to say that the archivalisation of her memory is only a threat to Europe. 
There is in Europe’s memory a structure of autoimmunity that, to put it in Naas’ terms, is ‘a threat insofar 
as it compromises the immune system that protects the organism from external aggression, but as in the 
case of immuno-depressants, a chance for an organism to open itself up to and accept something that is not 
properly its own […], to the other.’ (Naas 2008: 131) 
191 While thinking and death, since Socrates’ care for the soul in life is sought to overcome life in the name 
of a life beyond life, can be said to have changed with the experience of war, one might say that a care for 
the archive comes to be of utmost importance in that it will only remain provisionally and only for a time 
after the lifetime of Europe. On this view, Derrida regards the question of the archive as a question of 
survival understood as that which both preserves and destroys the archive, while to protect the survival of 
one archive necessarily means to destroys other archives: ‘To assure survival, one must kill. That’s the 
archive, archive fever’ (TA, 36; quoted in Naas 2015: 137).  
192 Crépon argues that the relation between the “politics of memory” and the past is never simply “rational” 
since the grounds of its construction, restoration, and instrumentalisation holds something fortuitous and 
anarchical about them. Like Valéry, the power of politics of memory cannot lie in the past as such, in that 
selection (and thus knowledge) of past events ‘only makes up an infinitesimal part of the past’ (Crépon 
2013b: 14). Here Crépon refers to Halbwach’s La mémoire collective in which it is argued that ‘the memory 
is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with data borrowed from the present, and 
reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already 
been altered’ (Halbwachs 1968: 57/69; 12/31).     
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has been ‘wasted, neglected, and debased by us all’ (HP, 201). Accordingly, if there is no 
one to attest to the traces of Europe, the memory of Europe—and hence its future—
encounters its limit; for if there is no one to testify to the trace, even if it is only a trace of 
disappearance, then the archive of memory becomes so fragile that Europe runs the risk 
of becoming unable to survive its crisis. 
 
 THE CRISIS OF EUROPE AS A “CRISIS OF CRISIS” 
The preceding discussion of Valéry’s Europe has been guided by the experience of the 
Great War serving as the basis for the memorandum on mortality that has imbued Europe 
with its sense of crisis. The question that therefore remains is what the crisis of Europe 
means to Valéry. In this section, we will address this question by discussing two main 
topics: (1) Valéry’s interest in crisis; and (2) the move in Valéry’s text towards the 
moment for which the word “crisis” of Europe, as Derrida remarks in L’autre cap, ‘is 
perhaps no longer appropriate’ (AC, 34/31). These two topics indicate in broad outline 
Valéry’s effort to substantiate his claim that if the current crisis of Europe is the most 
critical one hitherto, then the decisiveness of this crisis disturbs our very ability to define 
the crisis as such—in other words, it is a crisis of crisis.  
Valéry considers the European situation in 1919 to be one in which the military 
crisis has been averted, but nevertheless one in which despite such an aversion (or perhaps 
for that very reason) another crisis continues to live on. This other crisis, whose force that 
is as grave as it is invisible, may linger for a long time before its ubiquitous presence 
begins to draw out the shape of Europe’s “destiny.” As Valéry writes, ‘The military crisis 
may be over. The economic crisis is still with us. But the intellectual crisis, being more 
subtle and, by its nature, assuming the most deceptive appearances (since it takes place 
in the very realm of dissimulation)…this crisis will hardly allow us to grasp its true extent, 
its phase.’ (HP, 25/990) 
Valéry’s preoccupation in 1919 is therefore to make sense of this more subtle 
phenomenon of crisis by making it appear right before his eyes in all of its strangeness. 
Even on a superficial level, argues Valéry, we may observe crisis in all spheres of activity 
(HP, 91). However, to associate crisis with a mere quantitative extension would surely 
miss Valéry’s point, namely, that because something “more” or something “less” lies 
hidden in the phenomenon of crisis it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to see such 
crisis simply as a phenomenon. Thus, Valéry writes, one ‘wanders from one point of view 
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to another, from crisis to crisis, from a crisis in one’s faculties, to a crisis in value, to a 
class crisis.’ (HP, 75)  
To be sure, since the Great War the word crisis has held a privileged position within 
the self-understanding of Europe. Moreover, crisis even appear to be at the heart of the 
European diagnosis of itself. In this respect, by invoking both crisis and diagnosis, we 
implicitly refer to a medical register that brings the signs or symptoms of one’s own time 
into a binary account—a situation akin to how a doctor at the critical turning point in the 
course of a disease judges or decides whether the patient is going to survive or die.193 
Indeed, crisis is, at first glance, of a nature that is “genuinely” European and features 
prominently in European literature. 
For example, Reinhart Koselleck argues that at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century the term “crisis” becomes the ‘structural signature of modernity.’194 By this he 
basically means that crisis represents the emergence of a “new” time-consciousness that 
defines the procedural determination of historical time. In setting “crisis” in the context 
of a conceptual history, Koselleck makes a clear statement that modernity is ‘an age of 
crisis [ein Zeitalter der Krise]’ (Koselleck 1982: 648),195 an age that comes to experience 
itself in need of time. Hence, the age of crisis is an age that experiences or discovers the 
negativity of time, that is, the negativity of the sense of time and history according to 
which the very meaning of time, history, and direction appear radically uncertain.196 
In returning once again to Valéry and his categories, we can therefore ask the 
question of whether Europe, as Valéry’s patient, is going to survive or die from its crisis. 
As an initial step towards answering this question, let us briefly consider the notion of 
crisis more generally. 
                                                          
193 In Fundamenta Medicinæ (1695), Hoffmann introduces the chapter “De crisi” as follows: ‘The change 
in nature for better or worse is called a crisis; the change is a sudden one, either to death or to recovery 
[Crisis dicitur mutatio naturæ in melius vel deterius, sive est subita aliqua vel ad morten, vel ad sanitatem 
mutatio]’ (Hoffmann 1695: 169). Cf. HWP 4, 1235-1242.  
194 Koselleck 1982: 627. In the last half of the eighteenth century a certain displacement of crisis took place, 
whereby another mode of experience came to the fore and with which the epochal inflection of the term 
gave rise to the related term “diagnosis.” This term that also stems from Greek (διαγιγνώσκειν) includes 
the sense of “knowing” what “to discern.” Cf. HWP 2, 162-163. 
195 Cf. Koselleck 1977: 291.    
196 Yet, the negativity of temporality becomes a question of the negativity of becoming in that the negativity 
is neither a lack of time nor a transition to another time, or better, the negativity cannot be conceived in 
terms of becoming something. Thus, the negativity of becoming itself becomes powerless with respect to a 
representation of the transition from past to future, and just as ‘cities collapse and grow desolate where 
there is an earthquake,’ Nietzsche says, the becoming of time ‘caves in and grows weak and fearful when 
the concept-quake [Begriffsbeben] caused by science robs man of the foundation of all his rest and security’ 
(KSA 1, 330). Cf. Schuback 2005: 107. 
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Consider first the term “crisis.” Crisis is a word of Greek origin (noun κρίσις) and 
is derived from the verb κρίνειν. Moreover, it traces its etymological lineage from the 
Proto-Indo-European root *krei-, meaning “to separate,” “to sieve,” “to distinguish,” “to 
decide,” or “to judge” (LSJ, 996-997). As is well known, these meanings are all found 
within disciplines such as politics, medicine, and theology, where they describe the 
decisive moment in the course of a conflict, trial, disease, or judgment when the result 
under question could go in two directions. This vectorial force of crisis creates a residual 
uncertainty in any situation precisely because the very decision to be made between 
alternatives is possible only at a certain impossible moment that is at the same time both 
suspended and threatening (AC, 35/31-32).197 Yet, even if the word crisis involves the 
injunction to depart from it in terms of a decision or a judgment, the suspension of 
decision nevertheless seems to prevail in the moment of crisis. 
As I will try to make evident in what follows, the crisis at stake in Valéry’s writings 
takes the form of an ungraspable sense of something escaping or exceeding the firm grip 
of resolution and decision. At the risk of repeating what has already been established, let 
us return to Valéry’s notion of crisis and the role that it plays in his understanding of 
Europe and spirit. Before doing so, let us briefly recall Valéry’s preliminary approach to 
the question concerning what a crisis is. In his 1925 essay Sur la crise de l’intelligence 
we find the following key passage: 
 
A crisis is the passage from one particular mode of functioning to another; a 
passage made perceptible by signs or symptoms. During a crisis, time seems 
to change its nature, duration no longer gives the same impression as in the 
normal state of things. Instead of measuring permanence it measures change. 
Every crisis involves the intervention of new “causes” that disturb the existing 
equilibrium, whether mobile or immobile. (HP, 72) 
 
The issue at stake for Valéry is not to settle the crisis of Europe in terms of history, 
politics, economy, or even philosophy, but rather to refer it to what he, in 1934, calls the 
‘general crisis [crise générale]’ (IPE, 95).198 In this sense, the crisis of the “crisis of 
                                                          
197 Cf. Garnier-Pagès 1848: 298-299. 
198 In the afterword to the second edition of Das Kapital (1873), Marx too refers to a “general crisis”—but 
of capitalism that ‘is once again approaching, although as yet it is only in its preliminary stages’ (MEW 23, 
28). What Marx points to is how the unity of discrete objects makes itself felt in the phenomenon of crisis 
(e.g. the antithesis between commodities and their value-form, money, is raised to the level of absolute 
contradiction (MEW 23, 152). On this view, crisis is not only the point of dispersion but also the point of 
unity—even when experienced as disintegrated (MEW 23, 127-128). 
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Europe” is the critical moment in which the very configuration of Europe suddenly 
changes and thereby changes our understanding of crisis itself. 
Thus, although a conceptual-historical framework from within which a notion of 
crisis can be worked out may serve an informative function for our question, such a 
framework will not suffice to make comprehensible the conditions on which Valéry 
develops his account of crisis. What is required, instead, is that we carefully consider the 
crucial significance that Valéry places on the difficulty of a critical solution to the crisis, 
which may take place but whose very taking place renders it especially difficult to grasp. 
According to Valéry, then, we need to explore why the crisis of Europe is not merely 
some transient episode whose starting and end points may be localised. 
Hence, even if Valéry may to some extent still be enlisted among the vocal 
spokesperson of an already traditional discourse of modernity,199 as Derrida suggests, it 
is important to note that, on Valéry’s account, the use of this old discourse is made in the 
name of a “discourse about the crisis of Europe,” which already takes part in an entirely 
different sense that ends up suspending the very homogeneity of the word Europe. 
If this is the case, then our analysis suggests that the discourse of crisis, which I 
have been developing here with more than a little help from Derrida, brings into our 
discussion on Europe a confrontation with the limits of modernity. Moreover, our analysis 
also suggests that such limits are perhaps no longer as indivisible, secure, and absolute as 
one might initially have conjectured. The insights we have articulated here certainly carry 
an important implication for our evaluation of Valéry’s crisis, but in addition they also 
address the very condition of speaking or evaluating this old discourse of “the crisis of 
Europe.” For, what comes into crisis is, as it were, not only the intellectual or self-critical 
imperative of spirit, but also the very language of crisis and that of κρίνειν. In short, what 
comes into crisis is “the crisis of Europe” related to diagnosis as a way in which Europe 
comes to an experience of itself. 
 Still—and this is precisely what comes into view with the word crisis—we may 
nevertheless ask whether the language of crisis and of κρίνειν as well as the account of 
critique that is conveyed by a recourse to the very criterion of critique does not itself 
belong to an act of critique. One might argue, however, that the discourse on crisis is 
                                                          
199 Cf. AC, 31-32/28. The trouble with this discourse is, in Derrida’s view, that by determining crisis ‘one 
tames it, domesticates it, neutralizes it—in short, one economizes it. One appropriates the Thing, the 
unthinkable becomes the unknown to be known, one begins to give it form, one begins to inform, master, 
calculate, program. One cancels out a future.’ (NEG, 71) 
151 
 
more than a mere act of critique, for, as Derrida notes, the way of European philosophy 
has always been to live by ‘questioning itself about its own resources, its own possibility, 
in the critical instance of judging or deciding [krinein] on its own meaning, like its 
survival, and of evaluating itself, of posing itself the question of its right and legitimacy.’ 
(WAP, 101) In this respect, there is perhaps more to Valéry’s discussion of the crisis of 
Europe than a recourse to a criterion of critique insofar as within this very recourse there 
seems to be a withdrawal of critique from critique—indeed, ‘the very condition of critique 
is withdrawn by critique’ (Sallis 2005: 8)—that does not leave behind pure absence but, 
rather, a trace inscribed in the critique turning into crisis. 
Furthermore, belief in the self-critical aspect of philosophy as well as its evaluation 
of crisis that has repeated itself by preserving its onto-encyclopaedic authority is precisely 
what should be understood as being ushered into vacillation. And with such vacillation is 
also called into question ‘the very concept of “crisis” insofar as it belongs to a logic of 
opposition and decidability.’ (WAP, 101-102) Would it thus be possible, then, if we were 
to remain with Valéry, to think of crisis as a thought of the unthinkable? Would there be 
a thought of crisis, that is, do we have a discourse that can measure up to the crisis at 
stake, and that we would be able to follow when everything—not only the discourse of 
crisis but also the discourse of the crisis of crisis—is being broken apart? Ultimately, 
then, even if there remains an old discourse of crisis, there nevertheless seems to be no 
recovery in sight from the crisis of this same discourse.200 
We seem then to come face to face with the question whether crisis is still an 
appropriate term to describe what takes place in Valéry’s Europe. Indeed, Derrida 
concedes that this crisis is so much in crisis that it has become ‘the abyssal “crisis,” the 
crisis of crisis: there is no more philosophy of crisis,’ wherefore the very concept of crisis 
appears to have ‘deserted the philosophical vocabulary after Valéry and Husserl. (NEG, 
70)201 It is therefore not without paradox that one can speak self-referentially of the crisis 
that is itself in crisis. This is made clear, I would argue, in the manner by which Derrida 
asks us to consider the statement “the crisis of crisis.” In this phrase we see that the words 
“crisis” and “crisis” in their two occurrences here are not merely to be thought of as 
homonyms in that ‘“crisis” does not have the same meaning twice’ (WAP, 102). Rather, 
                                                          
200 See Janicaud 1997: 131. 
201 Derrida goes on to say that some even find this crisis to be the worst, namely, that there is not even a 
crisis of the present world. Hence, there is no crisis, not because there are no threats, but because the 
identification of the crisis and its conditions prove to be impossible in light of the vacillations exposed to 
and by the tribunal of reason. 
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the doubling of the word marks how the very concept of crisis is becoming exhausted. If 
we return to Valéry’s discussion of the crisis of Europe, we could therefore say that this 
exhaustion associated with the crisis of crisis even spills over into the discourse one might 
carry out regarding Europe. 
As I will show in the next chapter, Valéry is aware that the task of describing this 
crisis of Europe both as a crisis of spirit and as a crisis of crisis requires of us that we 
delve deeper into ‘what made that disorder in the mind of Europe [ce désordre de notre 
Europe mentale].’ (HP, 27/997) To this theme we may now turn.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISORDER AS A GENERAL EQUALITY 
 
Hell must be like that, a place where everything that’s said, everything that’s expressed, 
comes forth equalized with everything else, homogenized, like a drunkard’s puke. 
(Robert Antelme, The Human Race, 135) 
 
 THE IMAGE OF EUROPE AS A DISORDER OF THE REAL 
If the aim of Chapter Four was to provide an overview of Valéry’s understanding of 
Europe in the aftermath of the Great War, after which he became more and more an 
expositor of the exhausted discourse of crisis, the aim of this chapter is to consider this 
exhaustion and, more particularly, to show its impact on Europe and the world on account 
of what Valéry himself sees as a disorder. In order to meet this aim, however, we will 
have to establish Valéry’s understanding of disorder. As Valéry sees it, what makes it 
difficult to understand the phenomenon of disorder is that any reflection on disorder seeks 
to create an image of disorder, even if this image is itself engendered by the disorder. In 
a rephrasing of Valéry’s well-known line ‘the image of chaos is chaos’ (HP, 89), we may 
formulate our current problem by saying that the image of disorder is disorder. 
As far as an image of the disorder is concerned, it appears that the representation of 
the disorder, which is built into ‘our daily life, in our manners, in our pleasures, even in 
our knowledge’ (HP, 89), is established on the basis of what Schürmann calls ‘aprioric 
imagination of order’ (Schürmann 2003: 327). That is, the legislating position of 
imagination that seeks to posit an orderly image of disorder. In other words, the genitive 
of the “image of disorder” takes possession of the disorder. Yet, if Valéry insists on a 
more crucial connection between image and disorder, it is because in trying to portray the 
indeterminacy of disorder the determinative aspect of the image withdraws, whereby the 
disorder comes to dismantle the possessive genitive function of the aprioric imagination. 
To put it in Schürmann’s terms, the disorder ‘disabuses us of the eidos’ (Schürmann 2003: 
327). 
As will become clear in the following sections, if a disorder has built itself into the 
mind of Europe, as Valéry argues, it is because the image of Europe has hitherto been 
supported by the supreme position of Europe in the world. However, now that this 
position has been shaken, the difference between “Europe itself” and the “image of 
Europe” comes to the fore not as a clear cut opposition between the “real” and the “unreal” 
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Europe, but rather as a manifestation of how Europe in showing itself as an image also 
shows itself as different from itself—or, to put it in Valéry’s terms, it shows ‘the real as 
a kind of disorder’ (HP, 102). This is indeed a remarkable claim and one that clearly 
shows how the image of Europe exposes itself to a rupture of its own self-imposed 
legislating phantasm whereby the unreality of that which drives such “hegemonic dream” 
becomes manifest (cf. Schürmann 2003: 328). 
 In this sense, the image of Europe is already differentiated in itself so that the 
Europe that seems to be saturated with an image of its own hegemony in the world now 
appears as broken in two by a disorder of images that cannot be resolved into unity.202 
For Valéry, such a broken image of Europe brings into view how Europe comes to see 
itself wither away (cf. HP, 331) in one of two ways: either Europe will disappear entirely 
and become a name on the list of past civilisations or its spirit will be carried on and 
transformed into its ‘formidable creation’ (HP, 323) named America.203 
After these preliminary remarks on the question of disorder, let us approach in more 
detail how Europe is brought into proximity with this disorder. 
 
THE RESULT 
Toward the end of his second letter on La crise de l’esprit Valéry directs our attention to 
the result of his endeavours to explicate the disorder that changes how the whole scene 
of Europe and the world appears to us and to which the “crisis of Europe” has become an 
index. As Valéry summarises the result, ‘the inequality that once existed between the 
regions of the world as regards the mechanical arts, the applied sciences, the scientific 
instruments of war or peace—an inequality on which Europe’s predominance was 
based—is tending gradually to disappear.’ (HP, 35) The disappearance of inequality that 
we note in this passage will be crucial for Valéry’s attempt to explicate what he considers 
                                                          
202 Schuback describes such issue in terms of an antinomy: ‘there is no image of the image […] and every 
image is an image of imagining’ (Schuback 2014: 71). 
203 In the 1938 essay L’Amerique, projection de l’esprit européen, Valéry develops his notion of America 
as a kind of hope to which his thought turns when “Europe” becomes too obscure and anxious. Valéry 
divides his thinking of the “New Continent” into ‘two Americas’ to which ‘Europe has sent her message, 
the communicable creations of her spirit’. In this message Valéry extracts those ‘products having universal 
value’ from the European spirit, whereas ‘whatever was too conventional or too historical in content was 
left behind in the Old World.’ (HP, 330-331) This is not to say that the best has ‘crossed the ocean’ but that 
‘those things most capable of living in a climate remote from their home have crossed the ocean and taken 
root in a soil that was to a large extent virgin.’ (HP, 331) Although Valéry appreciates “America” as the 
future place for the “European spirit” to live on, he also stresses that “Europe” ‘will be punished for her 
politics […]. Europe aspires visibly to being governed by an American Commission. Her whole policy is 
leading to this.’ (HP, 227) 
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to be the ‘perfect state of disorder’ (HP, 27), namely, a general equality the full meaning 
of which will become clearer as we proceed. 
Two points are worth initially emphasising, as they together constitute what we 
might think of as the fulcrum of Valéry’s broader attention to the disorder of Europe. The 
first point concerns Valéry’s understanding of result and may be posed as a question: Is 
the result of Valéry’s endeavours to reflect on disorder to be understood as the conclusion 
of his thought, as if this thought were to achieve its goal and hence to put an end to 
thinking and disorder alike? Or is it the act of thinking that is itself exposed to disorder 
in such a way that the very end of disorder must be deferred? 
The second point concerns the interrelation according to which there is no science 
without technical instruments—that is, an interrelation of techno-science to which we 
shall return later—and which is of major importance with regards to Valéry’s 
understanding of the result. For not only is science a privilege attributed to Europe, for 
Valéry, science as inextricably bound up with technology is also a means of power that 
carries the risk of turning this privilege against Europe itself. 
In linking together these two points of concern, we may take up a third point with 
respect to two considerations: on the one hand, the experience of the gradual 
disappearance of European hegemony, and, on the other hand, the experience of another 
hegemony arising from out of this damaged hegemony. We may speak of this other 
hegemony, a bit anachronistically, as one of globalisation.204 It should be noted 
immediately, however, that the world becoming global, whereby Europe, in turn, is 
caught up in this process of globalisation, is not merely given with the rise of a 
geopolitical development. Rather, as Janicaud puts it, globalisation has to do with a 
transformation of the world, which may be deeply constitutive of the explosive mutations 
of technology (Janicaud 1997: 132). 
In order to gain a clearer view of what the disorder from La crise de l’esprit is about 
and where Valéry is headed with it, it may be helpful at this point to step back for a 
moment from the textual details and instead to take a look at how Valéry comes to the 
“result” of a disorder that pushes Europe to its limits. To begin with, I shall do this by 
attending to the way in which Valéry regards the name of Europe as a particular way of 
looking towards the Occident based on a horizon of universality that allows Europe to 
hold its position in “the world.” In light of this discussion, we shall then proceed to what 
                                                          
204 In her reading of Husserl’s 1935 Vienna lecture, Ströker shows how the term “globalisation” can hardly 
be categorised a foreign word any longer (Ströker 2000: 137). 
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I hold is a general equality in terms of which Europe fails to retain its unequally 
privileged—even if artificial—position in a global world, and which in turn engenders 
another inequality by means of which the world becomes unable to make sense of itself 
as anything other than this globalising movement of general equality. 
Part of my task in what follows is therefore to look at how the disorder, which, as 
we have already seen in the previous sections has to do with Europe losing its sense of 
direction in the world, plays out in those decisive Valéry texts from the period of 1919-
1939. My argument will be that if disorder has to do with a loss of sense both in and of 
the world, it is because all differences in and of the world have been levelled out by being 
placed in a relation of indifference engendered by the global spreading of techno-science 
and general equality (HP, 77). 
Hence, when Valéry speaks of the crisis or decline of Europe as a way of losing its 
sense of direction in and of the world, he holds out for something more radical than merely 
lamenting the loss of European domination in the world. Instead, I would suggest that 
what Valéry is pointing to is that Europe in its success of becoming worldwide and thus 
of extending itself everywhere also brings Europe to an experience of no longer being 
anywhere in particular, which renders any return to some unique spirit of Europe 
impossible.  
In order to unravel in full this line of thought, we will have to consider Valéry’s 
understanding of the name of “Europe” as a spiritual name for a geographical designation 
as we work to discover in what sense Europe has lost its sense of direction.205 
 
 “EURYOPA:” LOOKING TOWARDS THE OCCIDENT  
After having recalled that “Europe” is nothing but a peninsula of the Asian continent, but 
before broaching a sort of Hegelian geo-spiritual designation of the Mediterranean basin 
as the most temperate region of the globe, Valéry in The European (1922) undertakes a 
                                                          
205 In contrast to Husserl, for example, for whom the thought of Europe remains wedded to a certain logic 
of opposition with respect to which he distinguishes between a geographical-cartographical notion of 
Europe and a spiritual Europe, thereby risking to fortify the proper name of “Europe” as a conceptual name 
(Begriffsnamen), Valéry views Europe in a two-fold sense as, on the one hand, what it is in reality, that is, 
a little peninsula on the Asian continent, and, on the other hand, what it seems to be, that is, the privileged 
position of the globe (HP, 31). However, this imaging of Europe seems to bring into view how the 
appearance and being of Europe in fact amount to “the same” on the condition that Europe differs in itself. 
Accordingly, an image of Europe comes to reverse the scheme of being and appearing by replacing its being 
for that of the replacement in such a manner that Europe presents itself only in and as the dissimulation of 
itself. 
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reappraisal of the name “Europe” whereby he attempts to show how Europe ‘looks 
naturally toward the Occident.’ (HP, 312) 
It is worth noting at the outset that the origin of the name “Europe” appears to be 
so ancient that it has never been present in such a manner that it could be unequivocally 
represented in the current sense of the word. To my knowledge, there are two sources 
undergirding the name of Europe—neither of which is entirely without question. On the 
one hand, there is the assumption that the name of Europe is of Semitic origin and derives 
from the root ע  ָ֫ רֶב (the noun ‘rb is most often vocalised as ereb), which is rendered into 
Greek as ἔρεβος and alludes to the terms “evening,” “darkening,” “obscurity,” or the 
“setting of the sun.” On the other hand, Europe might be of Greek origin whereby the 
Greek name Εὐρώπη not only refers to the myth of the Phoenician princess abducted by 
Zeus, but also to the Greek noun Euryopa, meaning the “wide-eyed,” a “looking far into 
the distance,” etc.206 Setting aside the question concerning the ultimate veracity of these 
etymologies, we may nevertheless point out that  Valéry’s notion of Europe as that which 
looks “naturally” towards the Occident is clearly reminiscent of both the Semitic and the 
Greek connotations—especially given that the “Occident,” taken here to be another name 
for the “setting of the sun,” becomes that into which Europe is looking, that is, into its 
very own obscurity. 
With its gaze toward the Occident, Europe figures as the headland of the Asian 
continent from where Europe advances, as Nancy puts it, ‘towards the remaining world, 
and from which the conquest, the invasion [Einfall], or the world-making of the world 
has emerged (Nancy 1996: 11; cf. HP, 32).207 In the sections that follow, I shall examine 
more closely the manner by which Europe has operated as a conquering force that has in 
turn been responsible for forming the world. Suffice it here to say that, in Valéry’s view, 
the phenomena of “discovery” and “conquest” are significant to an understanding of 
Europe that has specialised itself in the universal (HP, 98; 186-187; 318; 436). 
It is important to note, however, that the manner by which Europe makes itself 
worldwide is nevertheless duplicitous in the sense that behind the process of conquering 
the world there is, as Waldenfels has shown, a philosophical Eurocentrism that fights with 
                                                          
206 Cf. Erdmann 2007: 298-302; von Geisau 1967: 446-448. 
207 This process of becoming worldwide of the world is what Nancy calls “mondialisation,” which is not to 
be confused with “globalisation” as a techno-economic-scientific phenomenon consisting in, on the one 
hand, an accumulation of richness, and, on the other hand, heaping up what bears the name of poverty. Cf. 
Nancy 2007a: 14; 20n.    
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spiritual weapons (Waffen des Geistes).208 According to this ‘“spiritual” Eurocentrism,’ 
Europe represents itself and its uncontested superiority by continually re-appropriating 
itself in a process whereby it begins with its universal horizon and passes through its 
otherness so as ultimately to be able to organise the world with fundamental concern for 
its own ends.209 Yet, in keeping with its own universalisation by which it expands itself 
into the world and launches itself into the universe, Europe also exposes itself to its very 
own dis-identification due precisely to such a movement of general equalisation. 
This is indeed a remarkable twist given that the expansion of Europe into the world, 
whereby it at the same time exits itself, comes to imply that there is no escape from the 
world. In other words, the same power Europe possesses to dominate and to form the 
world inverts into an experience of powerlessness. To put it bluntly, in seeing itself as the 
forming power of the world, Europe also testifies to what one might call the 
pharmacology of power—a phrase which designates a powerlessness to control one’s 
own power. The result of this is that Europe’s ability to form a world becomes, ultimately, 
a un-worlding.210 
In Nancy’s terms, Europe ‘goes out and further than itself all the way to the end of 
the world and, at the same time it sees itself as another, an other than itself in that it is not 
the orient. Europe [as the Occident] is not the birth of a world, but rather is the completely 
occupied world, that is, the world completely made conform, and which comes back to 
itself as its end.’ (Nancy 1996a: 15) What this means is that ever since Europe has become 
                                                          
208 According to Waldenfels, this kind of Eurocentrism contains an element of egocentrism in that it 
appropriates and reduces the “other” to a part of “its” own sphere. Moreover, it contains an element of 
logocentrism whose centring on logos (whether language, reason, or ground) reduces the alien to the 
common. Thus understood, what is proper and alien or other are merely parts of a whole, which is 
determined by Eurocentrism and its monopoly of logos that is itself depending on the thematisation of an 
appropriation of the world. See Waldenfels 2007: 14-15. 
209 Waldenfels writes: ‘Whoever wants to be equal [gleichtun] to him [the European] must be Europeanised, 
whereas the European does not see any reason to assimilate himself to other cultures.’ (Waldenfels 1997: 
80) This definition of “Europeanisation” in many ways resembles Joachim Ritter’s description of the same 
from 1956 as ‘the process in which non-European [außereuropäische] peoples detach themselves from their 
rooted [bodenständigen] forms of life (1) and take on the European forms of social production, education, 
and state institutions, (2) and spontaneously and actively appropriate it.’ (Ritter 2003: 324) However, while 
Waldenfels demonstrates how everything is not told with the story about Europe becoming worldwide thus 
seeking to dismantle the hierarchy of “Europe first world,” a more conservative-minded thinker such as 
Ritter embraces the ‘hideous word “Europeanisation”,’ arguing that modern science, technology, and life 
forms, which have their ‘legitimate place all over the earth’ (Ritter 2003: 336), obtain their origin in Europe. 
Even though Ritter acknowledges an ambiguity pertaining to the expansion of the European civilisation, he 
sees in the end of the ‘old world history,’ a movement in which the ‘interior universality’ of Europe unfolds 
itself in an ‘exterior reality’ so that ‘the Europeanisation is not the negation of European substance, but 
rather belongs to the history of its realisation.’ (Ritter 2003: 338) This conservative point of view, is exactly 
what I have attempted to challenge in the course of this study. 
210 Cf. Nancy 2007a: 34. 
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worldwide, as it were, there is no longer anything strange, foreign, or other to this 
(Occidentalising) movement of the world.211 In other words, the world becomes a world 
for all in that it covers over the differences between ownness and otherness, yet in such a 
manner that it thereby overlooks the difference, otherness, and foreignness that it contains 
within itself. 
In my view, this digressive route by which we reach the changed scene of Europe 
and its relation to the world is significant for Valéry’s understanding of a Europe that 
looks naturally towards the Occident in that it already foreshadows how Europe exhausts 
itself by way of becoming itself. As Valéry sees it, there is at the heart of the Occident 
that Europe is becoming a double bind at play. On the one hand, the process of becoming 
the Occident leads to the dismantling of the very opposition of Occident and Orient in 
that it rejects everything outside of itself. On the other hand, however, an Occident 
without an Orient not only disorients the sense of the world understood here as both the 
direction and meaning of orientation, but it also renders this sense an absent sense in that 
it marks the loss of a previously present sense while at the same time making present its 
originary absence. This is to say that Europe’s process of becoming itself as a kind of 
auto-occidentalisation is simultaneously a gesture of exhaustion insofar as this looking 
towards the Occident is like ‘the day that sees itself waning’ (Nancy 1996a: 15). 
In what follows we shall try to trace out this double movement that is characterised 
by the effort of Europe to form the world according to its universal significance so as to 
render the world worldwide—an effort which is, at the same time, expressed in the 
manner by which the entire world exhausts itself. 
 
  THE UNIVERSAL HORIZON 
Central to the idea of Europe is what Valéry in La liberté de l’esprit identifies as a vision 
of “universality.” In short, by having the universal in view Europe becomes the horizon 
of the entire world. Bearing in mind the meaning of horizon (ὁρίζων) as a boundary that 
determines our sense of orientation, we may thus elucidate two simultaneous movements 
that are disclosed through the process of the “successful” organisation of the world in 
accordance with European ends. First, the movement by which one region of the world 
hides its own particularity by ascending beyond itself with a view to universality. And 
second, the movement by which this universal organisation of the world marks the 
                                                          
211 Cf. Stiegler 2011a: 238n.50. 
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essential change of orientation from a “limited world” within which the horizon of Europe 
and its limited territory could be clearly demarcated to a world from which we can no 
longer clearly distinguish the unlimited expansion of ‘a world that is every day more 
highly equipped’ (HP, 17; 313). Taken together, these two movements bring into view 
how the world launches itself into the space of the universe, with the result that, as Nancy 
points out, this same world is exhausted by the ‘value of the universal in itself, which 
makes valuable the very figure of Europe’ (Nancy 1996a: 17).212  
 According to Valéry, this radical transformation of both Europe and the world 
carries the consequence that ‘there is no more duration, continuity, or recognizable 
causality in this universe of multiple relations and contacts.’ (HP, 16) This is, to be sure, 
what Valéry recognises as the “crisis of spirit,” a crisis that should not, he claims, be 
reduced to those particular crises in science insofar as each of these borrow their horizon, 
as it were, from an ‘ancient ideal of explaining the universe as a unified whole.’ (HP, 109) 
However, the crisis of spirit is that this ancient ideal of unification is breaking apart. In 
Valéry’s terms, ‘the universe is breaking up, losing all hope of a single design.’ (HP, 
109)213 
Although, the becoming worldwide of Europe as a surging forth on the background 
of a universal horizon is surely not yet apparent, I hope nevertheless to show that Valéry 
makes his own contribution to this problem that helps us to recognise how the 
characteristic of the world as universal horizon relies upon a particular European history. 
The problem, in other words, is that this particular region ascending beyond itself in order 
to cover the rest of the world appears in such a fashion that its universal discourse of 
science, reason, knowledge, and technology not only conceals the particularity of its 
heritage, but also strips from Europe its very singularity. To address this issue in more 
detail, let us begin by recounting Valéry’s story of this loss: 
 
Other parts of the world have had admirable civilizations, poets of the first 
order, builders, and even scientists. But no part of the world has possessed 
this singular physical property: the most intense power of radiation combined 
with an equally intense power of assimilation. Everything came to Europe, 
and everything came from it. Or almost everything. (HP, 31)  
 
                                                          
212 As Gasché explains: ‘In becoming worldwide, extending as far as the world goes, and stopping only at 
the limits of the universe itself, the world linked to the universal—hence the world of the universal—has 
become entirely suspended from the universal’ (Gasché 1997: 146).  
213 For a contemporary discussion of this issue, see Nancy and Barrau 2015b: 50. 
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It is in this manner that Valéry begins to describe the predominant order according to 
which the world has hitherto been understood. He notes: ‘Small though it be, Europe has 
for centuries figured at the head of the list. In spite of her limited extent […] she dominates 
the picture.’ (HP, 32) After the Great War, however this ordered disorder is beginning to 
become disorderly. 
In order to develop in greater detail this radical transformation whereby a European 
hegemony moves in the direction of its own disappearance, that is, in the direction of an 
“absolute” hegemony of a global world without otherness, we may dwell a bit longer on 
Valéry’s account of Europe’s loss of singularity by which ‘the illusion of a European 
culture has been lost’ (HP, 26). 
 
 “LOSS OF ILLUSIONS” 
By focusing on the superiority of Europe, Valéry draws attention to the manner by which 
Europe has created itself in the image of a Leibnizian design. As he remarks, ‘Europe 
once was the best of all possible worlds [le meilleur des mondes possibles]’ (Œ I, 513).214 
By 1919, however, when the Great War had come to an end only to reveal that the 
distinction between war and peace was breaking down, Valéry could no longer maintain 
what he now discerns as the artificial superiority of Europe. 
As we go through Valéry’s texts, this question regarding the destiny of European 
ascendency seems to be answered by the startling announcement that in this post-Great-
War-world ‘the illusion of a European culture has been lost, and knowledge has been 
proved impotent to save anything whatsoever’ (HP, 26). It is striking that, in Valéry’s 
view, the crisis of Europe discloses how the values on which European hegemony were 
based—progress, reason, knowledge, science, and so forth—are not in the first place true, 
but rather illusory. Valéry speaks about this disillusionment of European values as 
follows: 
 
[S]cience is mortally wounded in its moral ambitions and, as it were, put to 
shame by the cruelty of its applications; idealism is barely surviving […]; 
realism is hopeless, beaten, routed by its own crimes and errors […]; faiths 
are confused in their aim […] even the skeptics lose their doubts, recover, and 
lose them again (HP, 26).      
 
                                                          
214 In this context, we should remember ourselves that Leibniz was one of Valéry’s principal “skulls” to 
whom he referred because of his dream of a universal peace for which Europe was the most fitting name. 
For a discussion, see Löwith 1971: 98-102.  
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What is vital to Valéry’s disillusionment in 1919 is therefore not merely the illusory 
nature of European values, but also how the illusion of these values exposes Europe to a 
radical experience of loss. 
 As we have seen in our exposition of Valéry’s dictum concerning the mortality of 
“the European civilisation” expressed in La crise de l’esprit, there is a certain element of 
substitutability pertaining to this European civilisation whose name is at risk either of 
being forgotten or of becoming merely a “historical name” among others. This risk 
suggests two things: first, that the superior name of Europe could lose its power of 
ascendancy and take on a mere sentimental value as a consequence of this loss; and 
second, that in addition to the loss mentioned here it is possible that there could also occur 
a “loss of loss.” This latter point becomes evident by Valéry’s gesture of disillusionment, 
which draws out not so much the loss of once possessed values but rather a decomposition 
of the very composition of the civilisation supposed to have lost its values. To put it 
differently, while it is precisely the loss of values that puts “we moderns” into a 
sentimental relation to “our” lost object in such a way that a desire to return to what is 
lost emerges and thereby reinforces the space of this phantasm, we can conceive of the 
lost loss not as a return to what was lost, but rather as a moment in which the loss opens 
itself up as nothing but an empty space “preceding” that which fills it. In this sense, then, 
the lost loss remains a loss but in such a manner that it comes to disintegrate the very 
space of the phantasm of something once present being lost. 
If the disillusionment of European values can thus justifiably be seen as a 
‘decomposition of old naivetes’ (Sloterdijk 1987: 122),215 as Sloterdijk has argued, then 
the loss of illusions—as a decomposition of Europe’s composition—itself emerges from, 
and in this sense belongs to, a more burning lesson from the upheavals of the Great War. 
As Janicaud writes about Valéry: ‘He identified a complete loss of faith in the values that 
had permitted the accumulation of so much knowledge, virtue, goods, and treasures in 
our old and venerable European nations.’ (Janicaud 1997: 132) 
 We will return to consider the ramifications of this loss of faith at a later point, but 
for now we may set it aside in order to focus on what is ultimately the significance of the 
                                                          
215 This is not the place to rehearse the entirety of Sloterdijk’s fascinating and provocative analysis of the 
Great War, in which he writes: ‘Since this war the diffuse schizoid climate around the major European 
powers has not become any less intense. Since then, those who have spoken of cultural crisis, etc., have 
had the mental disposition of postwar shock unquestionably in mind that knows that the naivete of yesterday 
will never exist again.’ (Sloterdijk 1987: 385) What matters to us here is that a decomposition of old 
naivetes, or indeed of dogmatism, has taken place, which has brought us to our so-called crisis. 
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belief in European progress conceived in terms of the best of all possible worlds—a belief 
in which, as Stefan Zweig notes in his important testimony to the “old Europe,” we tend 
to believe more than we believe in the Bible.216 Yet, there is something uncanny at work 
in paradise, an uncanniness revealed in how the essence of progress (as unable to 
substantiate itself) comes to harbour within itself a complicity of the most contradictory 
principles that, as we have seen, points in the direction of Europe’s hidden disorder. It is 
to this dynamic that we must now turn our attention. 
  
 THE LIMIT OF MODERNITY 
Valéry addresses the disorder of Europe explicitly in stating that it is ‘characteristic of a 
modern epoch.’ (HP, 27) While we might intend to read Valéry’s statement as implying 
that the loss of European values is significant to a modern experience of loss, wherefore 
Europe, to put it in Nancy’s words, ‘is obliged by this loss to invent itself or to lose itself 
in its own future’ (Nancy 2005: 128), it seems to me that what Valéry is also implying 
with respect to “Europe in 1914” is that we have ‘perhaps reached the limit of modernism 
[à la limite de ce modernism] in this sense’ (HP, 28/992). 
Valéry describes this limit of modernity as the ‘free coexistence, in all its cultivated 
minds [les esprit cultivés], of the most dissimilar [dissemblables] ideas, the most 
contradictory principles of life and learning [connaissance].’ (HP, 27/992) Yet, what 
happens when (if ever) this limit is arrived at? Despite its decisiveness, there seems to be 
an irresolvable uncertainty about what Valéry means by the limit of modernity as alluded 
to both by his employment of “perhaps” and by the hesitancy of the text to designate the 
essence of modernity, as it were. This uncertainty is only reinforced by the fact that the 
limit described here appears to be a part of modernity itself such that it becomes difficult 
to discern the delimiting from the delimited. If we are, however, to avoid what Düttmann 
calls the ‘infinite regression from the determined to the determined,’ (Düttmann 1996: 
34) it becomes imperative for us to try to delimit the limit of modernity from the 
modernity it delimits. 
At first glance, it would appear that the limit is the boundary between the modern 
epoch and its sequel as if these were two monolithically separated epochs. To the 
contrary, however, the very crisis we are trying to understand here calls into question 
                                                          
216 Cf. Zweig 1964: 3-4. 
164 
 
whether such an order of epochality can still be maintained.217 Considering this difficulty, 
it may be said that the limit differs from a mere boundary in the sense that it interrupts 
(and links) rather than demarcates that which it delimits. As such, the limit does not 
designate the end-point of a succession of epochs, which, when applied back to our 
discussion above, entails that the limit of modernity thus becomes a relation of modernity 
to itself that cannot maintain itself as relation. In other words, the without-relation of the 
limit reveals how modernity is not one with itself (Düttmann) as well as how it remains 
unable to stabilise itself—even at the limit, but rather how it carries with it a continual 
de-limitation of the limit. 
Given Valéry’s remark concerning the limit of modernity that we perhaps have 
reached, we might therefore say that this limit is never presently reached but rather signals 
a desire toward the reclining threshold of modernity beyond which nothing comes to the 
fore. At this point, then, another limit arises. For, even if we know that there is a limit of 
modernity, suggesting that there is something beyond it, and even if we have perhaps 
reached this limit, there is still no knowledge of that which could possibly lie beyond it. 
The question of non-knowledge as a question of the limit of knowledge and its 
transgression is, according to Nancy, the very experience of modern thought or even, 
inseparably entwined, the thought of the experience of modernity.218 
With these considerations in mind, we may profit from Valéry’s questioning of 
modernity and thus rephrase our problem. Aware of the vagueness of the notion of 
modernity, Valéry calls attention to “we moderns” in order to ‘designate a certain way of 
life’ (HP, 27). Modernity, in this sense, ponders the loss of both foundations and points 
of orientation, and therefore modernity becomes a term to describe the re-turn to a lost 
ground for orientations (whether God, nature, reason, science, culture, or spirit). Without 
going into too detailed a discussion, we may benefit from an engagement with Max 
Weber’s allusion to modernity as a disenchantment of the world. There is much to be said 
for viewing Valéry’s sense of his “modernity” in a Weberian light, though this study is 
not quite the venue for such a task.219 
                                                          
217 As we have seen in Chapter One, introducing Heidegger’s Europe, the issue of epochality concerns how 
one comes to see an epoch as epoch, that is, how conflictual truths are suspend such that one epoch comes 
into view as an idea that puts an end to questioning and thereby posits an order of the epoch. Cf. Schürmann 
2003: 556.  
218 Cf. Nancy 2003: 36-37.  
219 Weber’s famous definition of Die Entzauberung der Welt is taken from his 1917 lecture Wissenschaft 
als Beruf: ‘The destiny of our age is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation, and, above all, 
by the disenchantment of the world.’ (Weber 2002: 510) 
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Within our narrow consideration of Valéry’s notion of modernity (and its limit), we 
may note that Valéry and Weber share an understanding of modernity with respect to the 
idea that “modern science” and its re-instalment of a teleology of progress imposes itself 
upon the world in such a manner that results in the scientific process of disenchantment. 
However, this process of disenchantment in turn comes to imply a kind of re-enchantment 
of the world precisely in that this (still too effective) process provides the world (that 
itself lacks any given ground) with a “being given” of its measurability.220 This dimension 
of modernity as perceived in the sentiment of loss, that is, of having lost one’s naiveté, 
affirms a sort of sentimental relation to that which is no longer given. It is for this reason 
that Valéry says that ‘we moderns could return without too greatly disturbing the harmony 
of those times’ (HP, 27).  
Taking the passage with which we began this section in its strongest sense, we 
might now say that the European loss of illusion, on account of which the sense of 
knowledge reveals itself to be powerless (l’impuissance), is rendered incapable of 
maintaining its value of sovereignty. As such, the disillusionment of Europe discloses a 
powerlessness internal to the very structure of power in the experience of its own 
exhaustion. 
It is important for us to be precise here in that the point of exhaustion serves as the 
entryway into an understanding of the crisis of Europe as a movement by which Europe 
has exhausted itself in an end that it encounters as a consequence of looking towards the 
Occident with a universal view of the world. This sense of exhaustion therefore opens up 
a world in an “infinite horizon,” by which, as Valéry describes it, everything becomes 
open, yet open in such a manner that it is ‘stripped of any future’ (HP, 229). Put 
differently, the future as conceived within a horizon of expectation is exposed to an 
exhaustion or an inability to identify what is proper to it, thus emptying it of any pre-
given sense. In this respect, the sense of exhaustion is also an exhaustion of sense. 
Indeed, if we return to the initial point that started us on the path of Valéry’s claim—
that Europe in 1914 had perhaps reached the limit of modernity—we now know that we 
must cast this dynamic in terms of a “lost loss.” That is, we must cast it as an experience 
of exhaustion that exposes not only the so-called “modern epoch” as a groundlessness of 
the world, but also the essential ambiguity of science. This ambiguity becomes evident 
                                                          
220 Lingering in the ‘virtual space and time of the “perhaps,”’ it would seem too strong to be in the process, 
as Derrida notes, ‘for the very presence of such a process would be reassuring and still too effective’ (PA, 
93/75).  
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when Valéry, at the outbreak of the Great War, observes how science, knowledge, reason, 
and technology attest to a reversal of death into mere killing: 
 
So many horrors could not have been possible without so many virtues. 
Doubtless, much science was needed to kill so many, to waste so much 
property, annihilate so many cities in so short a time; but moral qualities in 
like number were also needed. Are Knowledge and Duty, then, suspect? (HP, 
24)      
 
In order to come to grips with this questioning of knowledge and duty as suspicious, it is 
worth noting that Europe, in shifting from an experience of modernity to an experience 
of itself as the very limit of such modernity, is responding to a world that is becoming 
globalised and to which the experience of groundlessness becomes its present-day 
grounding. This shift exposes us not only to a loss of orientation but also to an event of 
the contemporary world that manifests itself as an openness of non-given senses of the 
world.              
 
 THE AMBIGUITY OF SCIENCE 
In addition to the suspicion of both duty and knowledge, Valéry also argues that science 
has been mortally wounded by the Great War both in its moral ambition and in its power 
(puissance) of knowledge, that is, its very ability of knowing (the pouvoir of savoir) has 
turned out to be a powerlessness (impuissance) and an inability (impouvoir). Stiegler has 
pointed to this duplicitous dimension of science as the ability to know by referring to the 
so-called pharmacology of knowledge. As Stiegler puts it: ‘this pharmacology is 
irreducible, which means that there is no knowledge incapable of leading to the opposite 
of what was aimed at when it was conceived’ (Stiegler 2015a: 198).221 Accordingly, this 
condition of pharmacology discloses that knowledge is a power that is, at the same time, 
non-power. For Valéry, the pharmacology of knowledge is intimately related to power in 
the sense that power is able to do anything—even, as Blanchot would say, ‘to do away 
with itself as power (the explosion of the nucleus itself being one of the extremes of 
                                                          
221 Based on a reading of Derrida’s pharmakon, implying both a remedy and a poison, the double relation 
between the conditions of spirit’s growth and the self-reflection of spirit is what Stiegler calls the 
“pharmacological principle.” Cf. Stiegler 2013a: 10; Stiegler 2015a: 155. What is particularly striking about 
Derrida’s notion of pharmakon is how the distinction between the remedy and the poison cannot be 
mastered by virtue of a binary opposition (either poison or remedy) wherefore it slips out of any 
programmatic understanding (D, 118-126). 
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nihilism)’ (Blanchot 1993: 208).222 As such, Valéry’s attempt to reflect on the shaping of 
modern science as a dimension that qualifies and honours the European spirit accentuates, 
at the same time, a double bind of science that may also carry with it an undermining 
effect on that same spirit. 
 Nevertheless, Valéry also asserts that ‘modern science was born of this education 
in the grand style,’ (HP, 34) and, as Valéry’s explanation of this birth will show, the 
honour of Europe, that is, science, has its “spiritual birthplace” in ancient Greece. Indeed, 
Valéry, in a key claim from the 1922 lecture already mentioned in the above in which he 
regards Europe as the creator of science, makes this connection via what is undoubtedly 
a Eurocentric statement: ‘There have been arts in all countries, there have been true 
sciences only in Europe.’ (HP, 320) The same holds true for another passage in which 
Valéry states that during its accelerating expansion ‘Europe founded science, which has 
transformed life and vastly increased the power of those who possess it. But by its very 
nature science is essentially transmissible; it is necessarily reducible to universal methods 
and formulas. The means it affords to some, all can acquire.’ (HP, 17) 
 In thinking about what Valéry is up to here, we must bear in mind that the success 
of modern science and the concomitant objectivisation of the world, which we witness 
through the European transmission and export of science, technology, and knowledge has 
the consequence that the inequality that once existed between the regions of the world 
has begun to vanish. 
 Hence, as we have already discussed above, science for Valéry names the 
phenomenon in terms of which Europe has organised the world according to its own ends, 
so that whatever happens to Europe no longer appears to be limited to one region but 
encompasses the entire world. In the light of the Great War, Valéry gives an example of 
the ramifications of this scientific and technological transformation of Europe: ‘Now, 
local European politics, dominating general European policy […] has led rival Europeans 
to export the methods and the machines that made Europe supreme in the world’ (HP, 
17). What we have not yet fully investigated, however, is why Valéry considers this 
development of science to be radically ambiguous. 
                                                          
222 ‘Such an act,’ Blanchot continues, ‘will in no way make us accomplish the decisive step, the step that 
would deliver us over—in a sense without ourselves—to the surprise of impossibility by allowing us to 
belong to this non-power that is not simply the negation of power. For thought, the limit-experience 
represents something like a new origin.’ (Blanchot 1993: 208-209) From this perspective, the pharmacology 
of knowledge lies, on the one hand, beyond the logic of power and powerlessness, but, on the other hand, 
it is working from within knowledge so as to render the distinction between power and powerlessness 
inoperative. 
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 After stating that modern science is born of the European spirit, Valéry adds that 
‘once born, once tested and proved by its practical applications, our science became a 
means of power, a means of physical dominations, a creator of material wealth, an 
apparatus for exploiting the resources of the whole planet—ceasing to be an “end in itself” 
and an artistic activity.’ (HP, 34) In these altogether remarkable claims, Valéry identifies 
an exploitative-calculative mentality within the dominance of technology and its process 
of connecting the world, a mentality that dates back to before the Great War and that 
emerges out of the continuity of science itself. With that said, let us now look more closely 
at this development of science and the point at which such a development becomes 
ambiguous. 
 As I suggested in the section above on the result of Valéry’s endeavour to reflect 
on Europe’s disorder, there are two implications to be drawn with respect to the 
application, instrumentality, or apparatus of science that are responsible for science 
becoming a means of power. Moreover, these two implications are particularly relevant 
for gaining an understanding of the disappearance of inequality. The first implication is 
that modern science and technology are intimately intertwined. This interrelation is 
characterised by the way in which modern science has come to work in the service of the 
technology that would eventually dominate the planet.223 The issue of “techno-science” 
is, according to Valéry, inextricably bound up with the globalisation of the world insofar 
as the world as a globe is susceptible to exploitation due to ‘the general spread of 
technology’ (HP, 36). For this reason, techno-science is not merely a means of power, but 
rather it is a way both of disclosing the world as a globe and of transforming it according 
to the spirit of technology. To this point we shall return in later sections. 
 What Valéry calls the general energising of the world means that even if this 
modern science, which is born of the education in grand style, is indeed what teaches us 
how to utilise the resources of the world, it is technology that provides science with the 
idea that these resources are usable and exploitable in the first place. That is to say that 
techno-science as a means of power imposes on the world an attitude for exploiting the 
resources of the entire planet in such a manner that the world comes to be conceived as a 
                                                          
223 In Chapter Three, we have seen how the essence of technology metaphysically concerns a triumphant 
mode of being that lies at the ground of modern science, which is its method. Method, in this sense, concerns 
not so much the apparatus of science as it concerns its objectivity, whereby the world on a background of 
calculation and measure is defined in advance. As de Beistegui puts it, the ‘victory of method originated in 
Europe’ as an ‘essentially European phenomenon, albeit one that, today, has reached the most remote 
corners of the earth, and a paradigm that has come to dominate the planet as a whole.’ (Beistegui 2005: 
103)     
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reserve of ‘formidable contained energy.’ This, then, in turn produces the ‘indistinct 
equality’ that Valéry regards as the perfect state of disorder (HP, 27; 13). 
 The second implication to be drawn from Valéry’s reflection on science is perhaps 
most succinctly stated in the following passage from La crise de l’esprit: 
 
Knowledge, which was a consumer value, became an exchange value. The 
utility of knowledge made knowledge a commodity, no longer desired by a 
few distinguished amateurs but by Everybody. This commodity, then, was to 
be turned out in more and more manageable or consumable forms; it was to 
be distributed to a more and more numerous clientele; it was to become an 
article of commerce, an article, in short, that can be imitated and produced 
almost everywhere. (HP, 34-35) 
 
As things stand with this passage, Valéry would appear to be drawing upon Marx, another 
one of his principal European skulls, and on Marx’s analysis of commodity in Das Kapital 
(1867).224 My purpose in what follows, however, is not to rehearse Marx’s analysis, but 
rather to sketch out what is at stake in Valéry’s manner of reflecting on the value and 
economy of spirit. 
 
 COMMODIFYING THE WORLD 
In a later section we will return to the specific question regarding Valéry’s sense of spirit, 
but for now we may instead focus on another point, namely, that the world in which 
knowledge has become a commodity desired by everybody and nobody reveals itself to 
be a “world market” whose value has been reduced to the accumulation and exchange of 
capital. Knowledge, in Valéry’s view, is no longer appreciated as an “end in itself,” in 
that the commerce of knowledge functions strictly on the condition that it carries value 
for someone or something other than itself. Considering the world as a market, Valéry 
even ventures to claim that ‘Civilization is a kind of capital that may go on accumulating 
for centuries’ (HP, 191). As I hope to show in this and in later sections, the capital, 
“capitalism,” or indeed the heading of this civilisation, emerges on the background of a 
certain manner of evaluation, namely, evaluation based upon the assumption of a general 
equivalence.225 
                                                          
224 In a letter to André Gide, on May 1918, Valéry expresses with enthusiasm how fruitful it has been to 
read Marx’s Das Kapital and many of its ‘brilliant analyses.’ In fact, it came to his mind how it was possible 
to ‘translate his [Marx’s] language into mine. The object does not matter, and ultimately it is the same!’ (C, 
472-473) 
225 Nancy even refers to the principle of general equivalence as ‘the law of our civilization’ (Nancy 2015a: 
32). 
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 One could cite numerous quotations from Valéry’s work to support such a Marxian 
line of thought, but common to all of them is the shared idea that the commodification of 
knowledge entails that knowledge assumes manageable and consumable forms by which 
it can thereby be distributed to greater and greater numbers of clientele. 
 Since the notion of “commodity” is a central one to Valéry, it is worth considering 
Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism in general.226 In the first volume of Das Kapital 
Marx defines a commodity as a useful object—a definition that reflects the manner Valéry 
regards the utility of knowledge as that which turns knowledge into a commodity. Marx 
sums up the dynamic of commodification in the following concise manner: 
 
The product becomes a commodity [Ware]. The commodity becomes 
exchange value [Tauschwert]. The exchange value of the commodity acquires 
an existence of its own alongside the commodity; i.e. the commodity in the 
form in which it (1) is exchangeable with all other commodities; it (2) has 
hence become a commodity in general, and its natural specificity is 
extinguished; and (3) the measure of its exchangeability, that is,  the given 
relation within which it is equivalent [gleichgesetzt] to other commodities, 
has been determined—this commodity is the commodity as money (MEW 42, 
98).  
 
According to Marx, a necessary condition for the production of commodity and its utility 
value is the market that serves as the platform upon which the commodity as a ‘material 
bearer’ (MEW 23, 50) is produced for exchange. For Valéry, however, the value of 
knowledge is not depleted by the commodification of knowledge in that such knowledge 
must become an article of commerce and be put into a circulation with all other 
commodities in order to acquire its value as a commodity. On this view, exchange value 
realises itself as a consumer value, meaning that in order to enter into a ‘quantitative 
relation, the proportion, in which use values [Gebrauchswerte] of one kind exchange for 
use values of another kind’ (MEW 23, 50) there must be a ‘third thing [einem Dritten]’ 
(MEW 23, 51) between the exchange values. Moreover, this third thing is precisely that 
which these exchange values have in common, or, rather, what makes them comparable 
on equal terms, even as it remains distinct from such values. That is to say that the third 
thing is conceived as the very “value of value,” which in turn must be ‘considered entirely 
independent of its quantitative aspect.’ (MEW 23, 64) 
                                                          
226 As we will be seen in the section on the spiritual economy, the fetish character of commodity owes to 
an obsessive cultivation of a specific commodity, e.g., gold, which through social custom (MEW 23, 50-
51) is promoted as the general equivalent of all commodities whereby the ‘social relations between 
producers appear as relations between commodities, more generally: between things.’ (Quante 2005: 164)     
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 At this point, I will not retrace Marx’s various steps through either the 1857 
Grundrisse or the 1867 Kapital, but instead I will merely focus on his attempt to define 
the “value of value.” According to Marx, any “value” is calculable in virtue of its 
exchange currency—the current form of which is money. For this reason, Marx says, ‘Just 
as exchange value, in the form of money, takes its place as the general commodity 
alongside all particular commodities, so does exchange value as money therefore at the 
same time take its place as particular commodity, in the form of money’ (MEW 42,  84). 
This value allows for the exchange between commodities and thereby exceeds the utility 
value of each commodity. The form of money, in other words, is defined as a general 
form of value, that is, the mediation, the third thing, or simply the general equivalence 
(allgemeines Äquivalent) that facilitates the evaluation of any commodity on the basis of 
a single standard that itself levels out any differences occurring with respect to the 
accumulation of value (MEW 42, 153; 759; MEW 23, 101). 
 Hence, if everything could be put into an economic circulation of values whereby 
each of these values could be replaced or exchanged by another in terms of the general 
equivalence of capital, then the world would be both captured in an infinite expansion 
while at the same time enclosed within itself due precisely to the “general equality” by 
means of which all the differences within the world have disappeared. 
 With these considerations, we are brought back to our point of departure, namely, 
to the result, according to which the inequality that once existed between the regions of 
the world and on which the superior power of Europe was based, is disappearing. Seen in 
light of this discourse on disappearance, what Valéry wants to show is that in a world 
where the commodity of knowledge is completely globalised and world-relations are 
reduced to the single dimension of exchange value, Europe no longer occupies a 
privileged positioned within its corner of the world and with its European problems. 
Instead, the disappearance of inequality between regions and nations of the world leads 
to another mode of inequality, the nature of which we may now discuss in what follows. 
 
THE “WORLD” OF EUROPE 
Because Valéry, already in 1919, directly challenged the prevailing image of a Europe in 
domination of the world, it may serve us well to delve into Valéry’s geo-philosophical 
reflections on Europe. To do so, it is important for us to investigate more closely the 
discourse of disappearance that has been a recurrent theme throughout our reading of 
Valéry. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the Great War confronted Europe with its 
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mortality and finitude to such an extent that it has come to associate its own being with 
the constant threat of being transformed into nothing but an insignificant and killable 
entity in the same fashion as other civilisations have disappeared and no longer matter to 
“us.” Accordingly, the inveterate tendency to advance a universal discourse about the 
reason, progress, and civilisation of Europe (and here it is not Europe as one civilisation 
among others so much as it is the European tendency, as it were, to speak in the name of 
civilisation as such, that is given primary emphasis) has been called into question by the 
phenomenon of disappearance. The question remains, however, as to what the 
relationship between that which Valéry calls the disappearance of inequality and the 
interconnection of ‘every part of the globe’ (HP, 9), may tell us about this new European 
situation as well as its relation to the world. 
 As Valéry describes it, the situation on the earth ‘may be defined by a formula 
showing the inequalities between the inhabited regions of its [the earth projected as a 
planisphere] surfaces.’ (HP, 32) In this fashion the world and its parts can be defined on 
the basis of an inherent principle of inequality between the regions, wherefore the gradual 
disappearance of this inequality throws Europe into a crisis of indeterminacy. 
Nevertheless, with the increasing equality of globalisation, even the crisis of Europe 
becomes a general crisis inasmuch as it makes the singularities of the world indifferent to 
one another. As indicated above, the result of this process is a tying together of everything 
into one worldly sphere on account of which everything is thereby assigned value with 
respect to a general equality. 
 One can summarise Valéry’s main point in the following manner: the image of a 
global world has achieved complete success in its effort of mapping out the world. 
According to Valéry, we therefore discover how the function of “discovery” and 
“conquest” is a way to appropriate the world that ends up expropriating Europe in its 
singularity. Although Valéry never employs the expression “globalisation,” the import of 
this term (which in our discussion is to be conceived as a morphological model projected 
onto the world) cannot be underestimated in describing Valéry’s effort to think the world 
in its global figure. 
  In other words, the image of the world in which Europe finds itself dominant is not 
merely a place of inhabitation; rather, it represents the very manner by which the world 
comes to be inhabited through an image of the world as a globe. This tendency of the 
modern age toward mapping out the world is, according to Arendt, characterised by three 
events: the discovery of America, the invention of the telescope, and the Reformation. 
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Moreover, it is in virtue of these that man has taken ‘full possession of his mortal dwelling 
place and gathered the infinite horizons, which were temptingly and forbiddingly open to 
all previous ages, into a globe whose majestic outlines and detailed surface he knows as 
he knows the lines in the palm of his hand’ (Arendt 1958: 250). 
 The implications of mapping out the world as well as of gathering the infinite 
horizons that are closed in and of themselves in the global figure of the world, are too 
numerous for me to consider in extenso. Instead, let me briefly recall that Valéry turns to 
the manner by which the global world comes to signify a process in which the amount of 
the accessible space on earth—a space which is made evident both from the expansive 
discoveries on the earth and from the observation of the earth sub specie universi—
undergoes a kind of double movement. This double movement constitutes both a 
movement and a countermovement by which the forming of the world expresses an 
expansion of the phenomenon of “world” into a worldwide movement of globalisation at 
the same time that it contracts the world into a sphere.227 
 
 “THE AGE OF A FINITE WORLD” 
Even though a key passage from 1927 confirms that, for Valéry, it is intrinsic to Europe 
‘to conquer, rule, and organize the rest of the world to European ends’ (HP, 226), it is my 
intention in this chapter to call attention to what I take to be the pertinent question that 
Valéry addresses to us regarding the matter of the world. This question is not only one 
related to describing how Europe’s power to conquer, map out, and exploit the resources 
of the earth tends to decline to a level, as Nietzsche says, of ‘miserable European 
provincialism [Kleinstaaterei]’ (KSA 6, 141). But rather, it turns out that Valéry’s critical 
question concerns how Europe no longer possesses the power with which it had the 
“success” of dominating the world through assimilation, that is, through the process of 
Europeanising the world. 
 Let it be clear from the outset that Valéry’s claim is not (or at least not exclusively) 
that the inequality of power on which the predominance of Europe was founded and 
which is now tending to disappear owes to a change in geopolitics. In fact, in 1927 Valéry 
notes that ‘Europe had clearly distinguished herself from all the other parts of the world. 
Not by her politics but in spite of and contrary to her politics, she had developed to the 
                                                          
227 Arendt describes this process as an alienation significant to the modern world, which she determines as 
a ‘twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self’ (Arendt 1958: 6).        
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utmost her freedom of spirit’ (HP, 227).228 Without going into the complexities of what 
Valéry means by freedom, it is important to note that for Valéry, freedom is a freedom of 
spirit as ‘a response’ (HP, 207). 
 To what, then, is the freedom of spirit a response? Insofar as freedom is at the root 
of the question of spirit, we must acknowledge that freedom like spirit is an ambiguous 
notion. As Valéry points out, such freedom articulates, on the one hand, ‘that we can do 
whatever we wish,’ and, on the other hand, ‘that we can do what we do not wish’ (HP, 
206). Thus, as we will come to see in the following sections, in the same manner that 
spirit encounters itself in a struggle with itself, freedom likewise responds to the 
phenomenon of unfreedom through the realisation that spirit is free to make itself unfree. 
That is to say that the freedom with which Europe is able to Europeanise the world is at 
the same time what (potentially) makes Europe and the world unfree. This is, I believe, 
what Valéry ultimately means when he refers to ‘the disappearance of free land’ (HP, 
141):229  
 
Every habitable part of the earth, in our time, has been discovered, surveyed, 
and divided up among nations. The era of unoccupied lands, open territories, 
places that belong to no one, hence the era of free expansion, has ended. There 
is no rock that does not bear a flag; there are no more blanks on the map; no 
region out of the reach of customs officials and the laws (HP, 14-15). 
 
This remark, which surely invites a discussion with postcolonial studies, relates to a 
comment we touched upon earlier, namely, that the world is conceived in terms of 
mapping. Accordingly, the very freedom that Europe employs so as to organise the world 
                                                          
228 For a discussion of Valéry’s caution towards politics and its mutual exclusiveness of the freedom of 
spirit, seeing that political freedom is the sure way to slavery (HP, 206). See Löwith 1971: 103-104. In spite 
of Valéry’s often scornful view on politics, Derrida has made some fascinating remarks about ‘a sort of 
quasi-Cartesian politics’ in Valéry, which unfortunately I cannot pursue any further here. See BS I, 262/194; 
262-275/194-205. According to Stiegler, there is a moment to be found in Valéry when the question of 
spirit becomes a question of politics, that is, when the ‘general weakness of the spirit’ becomes a matter of 
‘political weakness insofar as it has renounced being a politics of the spirit or even a political economy of 
the spirit.’ Stiegler goes on to argue that spirit and world politics cannot in fact be separated: ‘Philosophy, 
in particular, is essentially a political discourse. And politics, as a modality of the process of individuation, 
is essentially a care taken of spirit, of its culture, that is, of a cult of a difference that one must know how 
to make and maintain, that can be forgotten, and that, when it is forgotten, leads to the worst.’ (Stiegler 
2011b: 101-102) 
229 However, freedom not only ends in unfreedom; it already has the experience of unfreedom in itself in 
such a way that freedom is a response to unfreedom. In La liberté de l’esprit, Valéry argues that freedom 
qualifies itself by overcoming unfreedom. This is not to be understood as though the freedom of Europe is 
able to assimilate the otherness of world to itself. On the contrary, even if the era of places that belong to 
no one has come to an end, the place from which Europe responds to that which is foreign, inassimilable, 
and other to Europe, does not belong to Europe, but is exterritorial to the very mapping out of the world. 
Cf. Waldenfels 1997: 143-144.   
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in its image at the same time exposes Europe to the unfreedom of being entrapped in its 
own limitless expansion across the globe.230 
 Hence, Valéry points to a problematic double movement, when he says that we bear 
witness to a loss of singularity of both Europe and the world through ‘the exploitation of 
the globe, and the general spread of technology, all of which presage a deminutio capitis 
for Europe’ (HP, 36). What is at stake in Valéry’s way of reflecting on this double 
movement is how the virtues of science, reason, technology, etc. that were initially 
intended to protect Europe had suddenly become shady and undermining of Europe’s 
singularity in the ascendance of these same virtues beyond their particular point of 
departure. Thus, Valéry’s assessment of the (European) history of the world is nothing 
less than a becoming attentive to the contradictory becoming of Europe, that is, to the 
paradox that, as Derrida points out, ‘globalization is Europeanization’ (FWT, 178).231 
 In thinking about Valéry’s thoughts on Europe, we must keep in mind the context 
of his analysis of a post-war world in transformation. As I hope to show below, there is 
in this context a transformation of the sense of world—a sense of the world marked by a 
general uncertainty about its sense. Of the many senses of the world, the sense that 
interests us here is whether the transformation at stake in Valéry involves a reversal of 
the very sense of sense. How are we to understand such a reversal of sense at play in 
experiencing the sense of world in terms of an explored and overexploited globe? This is, 
I believe, one of the important questions that Valéry’s thought on the Post-Great-War 
world exhibits—a thought that Janicaud, in turn, has turned into a question: 
 
It is a strange condition wherein what is new happens at the very heart of the 
too-familiar, where the mirage of an other world (in the religious but also a 
                                                          
230 As Valéry remarks, in the coming-together of an extensively Europeanised world we see ‘…nothing! 
Nothing…and yet an infinitely potential nothing.’ (HP, 27) What comes into view, then, is how the age of 
a finite world comes to disclose a kind of “bad infinite,” to put it in Hegelian terms, according to which the 
values of European civilisation appear to be instrumentalised in such a way that they reproduce their own 
power in all of their indeterminacy through a spreading of this indeterminacy unto the ends of the world. 
231 This paradox is not to be resolved by resisting Eurocentrism through anti-Eurocentrism, whether this 
unfolds as a globalisation or a provincialisation, because, as Visker notes, the provincialism of Europe 
already distinguishes itself in that it ‘leads as such to uprootedness’ (Visker 1999: 146) rather than 
providing its cure. Thus, when Iris Marion Young argues that Derrida’s appeal to Europe ‘from the point 
of view of the rest of the world’ may look ‘more like a re-centering of Europe’ (Young 2005: 153) than a 
de-centring, she is aiming at a provincialisation of Europe in terms of which Europe would be able to bring 
its own particularity up for discussion. However, Visker suggests that even if Europe is brought ‘to, abandon 
its own exclusivity, and the wish to see itself through the eyes of others,’ this exclusive wish is ‘still the 
insignum par excellence which distinguished and raised European cultures above all others’ (Visker 1999: 
147). Instead of entering into a discussion of the alternative between a re-centring and a de-centring of 
Europe, however, what we have been trying to discuss and investigate in our reading of Valéry is rather 
how Europe must orient itself—if possible—in a world that has become entirely acentric. 
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cosmo-geographic sense) has less and less credibility (the “conquest” of space 
is already retro), and wherein, in the abandonment of transcendence and 
grandiose designs, in the idleness of spirit coupled with an affair with the 
body, at the heart of these pell-mell experiences out-proliferating one another, 
we find What? (Janicaud 1997: 134) 
  
Despite its dense nature, this passage nevertheless provides us with a good sense of where 
we have been and where we are going in our reading of Valéry. Notable in this passage 
is the illusion both of a world and of another world beyond. In this respect, I agree with 
Janicaud’s two Nietzschean intuitions underlying his forceful reading of Valéry. The first 
intuition can be summarised by one of Nietzsche’s headings: How the “true world” 
finally became a fable. What is crucial about this discovery is that to disclose the fiction 
of the “true world” by dismantling the binary logic at work within the distinction between 
a true and an apparent world is not the same thing as stating the truth of an apparent world. 
Rather, as Nietzsche writes: ‘The true world—we have abolished. What world has 
remained? The apparent one perhaps? … But no! With the true world we have also 
abolished the apparent one [die scheinbare]!’ (KSA 6, 81)232 
 If we were to linger just a little longer on Nietzsche and thus approach Janicaud’s 
second Nietzschean intuition, we may argue that Valéry is confronted with the most 
extreme form of nihilism—a nihilism that proclaims any credit or faith in another world 
(that is, the faith that Nietzsche in 1887 defined as a holding-to-be-true) is ‘necessarily 
false because there simply is no true world’ (KSA 12, 354; 351). Extreme nihilism, in 
contrast to an imperfect nihilism that posits “new values” in the place of exhausted ones, 
is the interpretation of values that come to nothing. Such coming to nothing plays out not 
in the sense that ‘nothing is of value,’ (Blanchot 2010: 145) but rather in the sense that, 
as Janicaud underscores, ‘the new as such […] risks losing all meaning.’ (Janicaud 1997: 
138) 
 Hence, if the essence of the highest values are devaluated—whereby Nietzsche 
understands not the inflation of values but the implosion of accumulated values due to 
which the binding force of values becomes untied—the Nietzschean determination of the 
will to power that Janicaud appreciates as the “philosophical” core of Valéry’s thought 
thus becomes the ‘fundamental characteristic of globalization’ (Janicaud 1997: 135).233 
                                                          
232 However, to think fiction, as Lacoue-Labarthe argues, ‘is not to oppose appearance to reality, since 
appearance is nothing other than the product of reality. It is precisely to think without recourse to this 
opposition, outside of this opposition, it is to think the world as fable’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1993: 16). 
233 While Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome nihilism in terms of the principle of “will 
to power” in view of which all previous values are revaluated, makes him the last metaphysician (GA 6.2, 
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In other words, the globalisation that seeks to impose on the world its value of universality 
is at the same time an exhaustion of the very signification of values insofar as the regime 
of signification is bound up with the general equalisation of everything. This entails that 
if we want to grasp the meaning of globalisation (or, rather, of Europeanisation), we run 
up against what Nietzsche calls the “death of God,” which, in Valéry’s view, is 
understood as the exhaustion of the meaning and the supreme values representing the 
order of the world that is associated with Europe becoming worldwide and that he calls 
the ‘age of the finite world’ (HP, 15). 
 Yet, as we shall see in the next section, the “age of the finite world” understood as 
the exhaustion of those values on which the universality and power of globalisation is 
based might also lead out of nihilism all the while the general equality that has come to 
characterise the finite world confers upon it an “infinite horizon.” With this opening to 
the infinite, we are finally brought to Janicaud’s second Nietzschean intuition in his 
reading of Valéry. 
 
 GENERAL EQUALITY 
In what follows, I shall address a claim that I take to be central to Valéry’s view of the 
disappearing global inequality and, in particular, to his notion of a “finite world.” The 
claim is that with the disappearance of inequality on account of which the singularity of 
the world and its regions (including also that of Europe) is assimilated through a universal 
horizon Europe and the rest of the world are being transformed into a general equality. 
 How are we to understand this disappearance of the inequality that once existed 
between the regions of the world and on which the predominance of Europe was based 
(even if artificially so) into a general equality? This shift from inequality towards an 
increasing equality entails that Europe has entered into kinship with an indifference that 
would appear to be looming in the background of the globalisation associated with the 
singularity of the world. As we shall come to see in due course, for Valéry the inequality 
on account of which the world and its parts appear to have been founded must surrender 
to the accelerating speed by which the world and space has been conquered by the 
broadening equalisation. As a result, Valéry’s argumentation is pushed toward another 
                                                          
22-29; GA 67, 200; 206), the Nietzschean determination in Valéry’s thought points us in another direction. 
Moreover, while Janicaud rightfully points out that the will to power as the spiritual power of transformation 
is neither pure thought nor principle but ‘apprehended in its immanence’ (Janicaud 1997: 135), I believe 
that there is an opening of transcendence in this immanence insofar as the only measure provide by this 
global world is, in Nancy’s words, ‘the measure of the incommensurable’ (Nancy 2013: 21).  
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kind of inequality in terms of which the distinctions of the world are rendered indifferent 
to one another by an indistinct equality. 
 In that this issue is so crucial, let us attend to the details of Valéry’s result one last 
time as this helps to bring into greater relief his basic theorem. The main thrust of this 
theorem is that the inequality on which the power of Europe has been entrenched since 
long ago turns out to be bound up with change in the opposite direction. In anticipation 
of a more detailed discussion later in this chapter, let me at this point sketch out the central 
features of this double bind.  
 As I have indicated above by Janicaud’s Nietzschean intuitions, for Valéry, the will 
to power is the essence of power insofar as it designates the absolute essence of a will 
that wills itself as nothing but will.234 This power is ultimately what Valéry defines as a 
power of transformation, which, as the essence of the will to power, is the fundamental 
trait of reality. Whilst power is often thought to be the result of force, Valéry, in light of 
his definition of spirit as a power of transformation (HP, 94; 106), insists that power is 
essentially spiritual. Yet, as we have seen, although spirit ‘creates both order and disorder, 
for its business is to provoke change’ (HP, 100), we have also come to understand that 
‘wherever spirit is at stake, everything is at stake’ in that ‘everything is disorder and any 
reaction against disorder is of the same nature, for disorder is, further, the condition of its 
own fecundity’ (IP, 59-60). 
 With this last quotation, we begin to see how Valéry’s theorem operates in terms of 
a “reactionary logic.” According to Valéry, the very exploitative-calculative mentality of 
the transforming power called spirit brings about a disorder of Europe that causes fear 
(HP, 95). As Valéry explains it, what is feared is spirit itself insofar as the transformative 
power of spirit affects the very nature of spirit to such an extent that every transformation 
engendered by the spirit also befalls itself. In other words, the spirit incessantly haunts 
itself in that it becomes affected by the threat of its own transformative power, such that 
the fear for spirit becomes at the same time a fear of itself. Accordingly, Valéry’s thought 
of spirit as a power of transformation both is and is not a power.235 This is what we have 
called the “pharmacology of power,” but it might be better named the “autoimmunity of 
spirit” seeing as the power of spirit is structured by a duplicitous relation to itself. This 
                                                          
234 See Janicaud 1997: 135. 
235 As argued in Chapter Three, if spirit were power itself, it would not lose power; yet, if spirit were not 
power, the disempowering of spirit, as Derrida suggests, would not be something of spirit (DE, 98-100/62). 
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duplicity brings into view how the change to which Europe is bound extends from the 
reaction of Europe against its own transformative power in such fashion that an interior 
exteriority, or an extimacy, haunts the spirit from within its own double—in Valéry’s 
terms, the spirit of spirit. We shall return to a more meticulous examination of the notion 
of spirit in Valéry in the next chapter, but for now we shall remain with our initial question 
regarding equality and inequality. 
 Strikingly, at the point where Europe no longer has to prove the superiority of its 
position amongst others—keeping in mind that, in Valéry’s view, no other part of the 
world has ever had the same assimilatory power as Europe—its “success” of becoming 
worldwide turns out to be fatal in the sense it carries with it a levelling of Europe’s 
distinction from other civilisations. Thus, not only has the world been Europeanised by a 
universal distension of science and technology, but Europe has in fact reemphasised the 
value of inequality by equalising the distinctions of the world—a process whereby the 
inequality based on European hegemony has been substituted for and reinforced by an 
inequality of global hegemony. 
 Indeed, the indistinct equality that Valéry poses to us as implied in the order of the 
world constitutes the core of Europe’s disorder (HP, 27). Valéry’s way of formulating 
this double bind, that is, the appearance of one hegemony of inequality out of the 
disappearance of another, is captured nicely in the following: ‘So the artificial imbalance 
of power on which European predominance has been based for three hundred years is 
tending rapidly to vanish. And another imbalance based on crude statistical characteristics 
tends to reappear.’ (HP, 17) What Valéry here calls “another imbalance” is the effort to 
annul the inequality between the regions of the world through emphasising that the 
designation of balance comes into view as a general equality. The equality mentioned 
here is characterised by a levelling out of the differences of the world into a general 
equality that prevents such differences from coming into their own as other than others. 
What this ultimately means, then, is that the “relation” between Europe and the rest of the 
world likewise becomes levelled out. More precisely, the singularity of the world and its 
regions is already a part of an infinite exchangeability whereby the interconnectedness of 
the world places everything of the world in a process of exchange based upon the principle 
of general equality. 
 The task is therefore to shed further light on what Marx describes, in drawing on 
Shakespeare’s definition of money as the ‘equation of the unequal [Gleichsetzen des 
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Ungleichartigen],’236 or, more specifically, the ‘exchangeability [Austauschbarkeit] of all 
products, activities, and relations with a third, objective entity [sachliches] which can be 
re-exchanged for everything without distinction [ohne Unterschied]’ (MEW 42, 96). The 
term exchangeability, however, is ambiguous: On the one hand, it implies that, by 
levelling out the differences of the world, we find ourselves closer to articulating the 
extreme nihilism according to which each part of the world is essentially exchangeable 
with every other part.237 On the other hand, it refers to a discourse of inequality that is 
used in a “negative” fashion only because one presupposes an order as exhibiting the 
standard for evaluating and, thereby, for levelling out the distinctions of the world. Yet, 
as we have seen throughout our discussion, Valéry himself emphasises the importance of 
thinking about the disorder outside of the restrictions of the binary opposition of order 
and disorder (a move that itself belongs to order), all the while encouraging us to 
relinquish our pre-conceived ideas of these terms. We must try to imagine, therefore, that 
the dis-order is neither a contradiction with nor an annihilation of order, but rather that 
which surprises and exhausts the order or horizon of expectation.238 
 
 A TASK OF DIFFERENCES 
By focusing on Valéry’s double bind, we can perhaps now grasp the result of the changed 
scene of Europe and world. As we have shown above, Valéry in La crise de l’esprit 
observes the increasing disappearance of the inequality that helped to make Europe a 
unique destination and not just any old part of the world. Yet, as we have also seen, 
absorbing everything into a global figure involves the comportment towards a de-
territorialised world, which on the one hand, undoes any ordered sense of the world but 
which, on the other hand, may expose thought to an opening that is not at the disposal of 
any order. 
 Since much has already been said about Valéry’s conception of Europe and the 
world, let me focus here only on the movement that Valéry calls the becoming-one-of-
world. As Valéry remarks, ‘So, the classification of the habitable regions of the world is 
becoming one in which gross material size, mere statistics and figures […] finally and 
                                                          
236 Cf. Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, Act 4, Scene 3.  
237 Heidegger describes the process as follows: ‘Today, to be is to be replaceable [Sein ist heute 
Ersetzbarsein]. The very idea of a “repair” has already become an “anti-economical” thought. To every 
item of consumption [Seienden des Verbrauchs] there essentially belongs the fact that it has already been 
consumed and thus calls for replacement.’ (GA 15, 369) 
238 Cf. Waldenfels 2015: 205-206.  
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alone determine the rating of the various sections of the globe.’ (HP, 35; my emphasis) 
What this example shows, is how Europe ends up becoming an exemplary absence of 
destination. Bearing in mind the intimate intertwinement of Europeanisation and 
globalisation, we may point out that this absence of destination is already present from 
the outset of the “Europeanisation” of the world. Consequently, the de-territorialisation 
of such absence, which in turn allows the unlimited expansion of the general equality, 
reaffirms the power of the one that equates the inequalities of the world. In other words, 
what emerges at this point in Valéry’s thought of the world becoming one is a 
fundamental exhaustion of the universal destination of the world, which Valéry aims to 
describe with his “unique” example of Europe (HP, 28).  
 Recently, Schuback has offered a useful framework for understanding the global 
world when she argues that the disappearance of “each one” gives way to the hegemony 
of the one as the only one, which thereby entails that this one is no longer determinable 
as one among others. As she writes, ‘Each one becoming other: this is a way of defining 
the global world as a world of global fragmentation. The one without any other: this is a 
way of defining the global world as a world of global hegemony.’ (Schuback 2013: 15) 
 Indeed, with the appearance of general equality Valéry realises that the loss of 
European hegemony based on inequality is replaced by the hegemony of a global world 
without otherness, of one world without any other. Having recognised the ‘shape of the 
earth’s surface […] depicted its parts more accurately, guessed at and verified its closed 
convexity, found and summed up the laws of its movement, discovered, appraised, 
exploited the resources and usable reserves of that thin layer in which all life is 
contained…’ (HP, 13), Valéry thus sees that there is no way out of the world in that, on 
the one hand, events of the world happens simultaneously all over the world due to the 
interconnection of space and time, and, on the other hand, the space of this global 
interconnectedness of the world is without escape.239 
 In other words, the general equality according to which all points of orientation are 
equal to one another transforms the sense of the world into a closed and homogenous 
system with no space for interruptions, interventions or otherness. This transformation of 
the sense of the world shakes the self-understanding of Europe in that Europe has not only 
now become contested by, for example, a line of geopolitical factors such as its 
continental extension or natural resources, but also in that Europe, in being shaken to the 
                                                          
239 As Schuback argues, ‘because there is no way out, the only possible utopian transformation would be a 
conformation to the global, in a more just and equal globalism.’ (Schuback 2013: 16) 
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core of its being, now finds its own self-understanding to have become a part of the 
problem. In fact, the very way in which Europe understands itself via its spiritual traits of 
reason, science, and technology that have made it into an exception based on inequality 
(or, more precisely, into the exception it believed itself to be), is also the way in which 
Europe comes to understand itself as a problem. This in turn brings into focus Europe’s 
self-understanding as a relation to nothing but the world as finite.240 
 Yet, if a finite world, as suggested above, means that there is no other world, nothing 
other, and nowhere else, that is, that there is nothing but the world in the sense that the 
world is abandoned all to itself, then “we” can no longer understand “our” relation to the 
world on a model of loss, not even of a loss of illusions. In this respect, as Nancy suggests, 
‘this world consists in rendering justice to itself, to the whole world and to everyone, and 
to nothing other than the world,’ (Nancy 2007b: 533) so as to expose the global horizon 
of a finite world to an infinite opening, which concerns a future that is ‘stripped of any 
future’ (HP, 229). 
 We have seen how this infinite opening will henceforth always already have been 
exhausted of all purposes, aims, and expectations, which means that the future is by itself 
emptied of an end and thereby brings an end to closure. Put differently, the “future without 
future” brings us—I believe—to a reopening of the differences of the world—a point 
hinted at but not developed in Valéry’s writings. Allow me, however, the liberty to expand 
upon this point by reference to an essay by Valéry from 1938. As he writes, 
 
If the modern world is not to end in the universal and irreparable ruin of every 
value created by centuries of effort and experiment of every kind, and if […] 
our world is to reach a certain, political, cultural, and economic equilibrium, 
we must look to the possibility that the various registers of the globe might 
one day use their difference of all sorts to complement rather than to oppose 
each other. (HP, 329)  
 
The claim I would like to make here is not that Valéry attempts to set out an account of 
the world in which the differences of wealth (whether political, cultural, or economic) 
gesture in the direction of an inequality in favour of Europe, let alone a general equality 
that tends to level out the differences of the world, but rather that the interrelatedness of 
each part of a world becoming global opens up a difference within the world that carries 
the possibility of imagining something different from difference as opposition. Whatever 
                                                          
240 To some extent, this might seem to be what Sloterdijk calls ‘the dysangelium of modernity,’ consisting 
in a ‘loss of periphery’ rather than a ‘loss of the centre’ (Sloterdijk 1999: 825). 
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the differences of the world might be, what is important to note is that the finitude of the 
world-becoming-one serves as a marker of not only an equalisation of everything in the 
world but also of a possibility of reaffirming the singularity of the world and each of its 
parts by sharing (out) their finitude in such a manner that Europe, for example, is exposed 
to other singularities in light of its very existence. In contrast to a general equality, which 
makes everything equal in terms of an abstract substance, a third thing, or a general 
equivalence, an equality of “our world” has rather to do with each single part of the world 
and the interrelated incommensurability of these parts. In short, the equality of the world 
has to do with the world as a relation to itself. This relation, however, is not static but 
rather dynamic in the sense that it opens up the very world in which it occurs. 
 In conclusion, let us summarise our preceding points in order to outline the 
possibility of reconsidering an equality not in terms between determinable differences, 
but rather in terms of that which remains different from such determination: in short, in 
terms of a difference as non-indifference.241 We have seen that in characterising the world 
as global, Valéry not only observes the technological aspect of equalisation, which he 
registers in the calculating evaluation of everything, including spirit, but he also provides 
an assessment of the “equality” that articulates the real value of the world—or, to put it 
crudely, the economy that lies at the heart of the world as an image. It is here that we find 
the fundamental principle of general equivalence that is important for us to bring into 
relief in order to better understand Valéry’s thought of the disappearance of inequality. 
To reiterate Valéry’s result, the inequality on which the predominance of Europe has been 
based carries itself to the point of its definitive equalisation in terms of its “success” of 
becoming worldwide. It is in this sense that inequality disappears into general equality, 
which nevertheless in turn becomes an alibi for another form of inequality.242 To put it 
                                                          
241 This expression owes to Lévinas 1978: 133. Non-indifference refers not merely to a double negation, as 
though in-difference were to negate or neutralise difference; rather, the non-indifference refers to what 
cannot be negated or neutralised but remains incommensurable to general equivalence and unequal to any 
equalisation. Cf. Waldenfels 2006: 45-49.   
242 In this respect, Derrida has argued that, in a certain sense, there has never been a “globalisation” and 
that it is ‘a false concept, often an alibi; never has the world been so unequal and so marginally shareable 
or shared.’ (IW 62) Whilst globalisation connotes the geometrico-planespherical notion of the globe, as 
outlined above, Derrida, not unlike Nancy, refers instead to mondialisation so as to emphasise the 
becoming-world-wide of the world (and not the globe), according to which an other world, a world other 
than that of and heterogeneous to globalisation, may be formed. What the Americans call “globalisation,” 
Derrida notes, ‘has been a universal Europeanization through science and technology, and even those who 
oppose this Europeanization, even those who, through acts of terrorist violence, claim to oppose this violent 
Europeanization, this violent Americanization, do so most often using a certain technical, techno-scientific, 
sometimes techno-economic-scientific Europeanization.’ (IW, 61) Derrida commits himself to think ‘a new 
European responsibility’ (IW, 64), that is, ‘a type of Europe that, far from wanting to Europeanize the 
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differently, for Valéry the exhausted destination of the world as the absence of a pre-
given sense of Europe designates how the geopolitical equilibrium reaching its conclusion 
in a global world, serves as a springboard to reflect on the non-indifference of the world 
as a manner by which to reconsider the “differences” of the world in terms other than 
those of a general equality. As Valéry argues, the differences that allow the world to 
reappear otherwise, and hence not to end in a universal ruin of every value, are not to be 
conceived as mere oppositions but rather as those gestures of complementation or 
affirmation by which any difference of values is appreciated without being measured in 
advance.243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
world, could step between the hegemony of the American superpower […] and the rest of the world’ (IW, 
63). 
243 This sense of evaluation that is not based on any principle, is, as Nancy says, ‘the affirmation of a unique, 
incomparable, unsubstitutable “value,” or “sense”’ (Nancy 2010: 24), on account of which nihilism shows 
itself the door, not by reactivating any value, any principle of evaluating values, but by affirming that 
nothing is equivalent, that is, any principle of evaluation is itself an-economic or an-archic because of the 
incommensurability of every value. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ECONOMY OF SPIRIT 
What is “spirit”? 
Spirit is: to live as dead  
(Kierkegaard, SKS 26, 436) 
 
There is no definition of spirit  
where there is no moment of irony 
(Kierkegaard, SKS 26, 414) 
 
My purpose thus far has been to make visible something of how Valéry’s understanding 
of Europe develops in his work between 1919 and 1939. This development was depicted 
as proceeding from an understanding of Europe as the unique destination of the world 
onto another understanding of Europe, which, as Valéry points out, is first of all aware of 
itself as imbued with a radical sense of finitude inasmuch as its “destiny” is bound up 
with the risk of obliteration. Furthermore, in our discussion of Europe’s position in the 
world, we have seen how, on the one hand, the inequality on which Europe’s 
predominance was based is gradually put out of order, while, on the other hand, another 
kind of inequality is becoming established through the globalisation of modern techno-
science. 
What is still not clear, however, is how this way of characterising the growing 
disorder of Europe as a general equality provides us with a clue for understanding the 
notion of spirit in Valéry. In order to gain some clarity on this point, we must seek to 
understand how the crisis of Europe occurs through an equally radical crisis of spirit. An 
understanding of the notion and sense of spirit will therefore be the main subject of our 
discussion in the present and final part on Valéry in which we shall continue to follow 
some of the guiding themes developed in the previous parts. Since Valéry uses the term 
“spirit” in many different contexts, I will be obliged to skip around a bit in his authorship 
in order to provide an analysis of how this term functions in his texts. With that, much of 
my analysis will focus on scattered passages in La liberté de l’esprit. In any case, I must 
openly confess that my reading here is not intended to give an exhaustive account of 
Valéry’s sense of spirit, but rather to approach the matter in a more selective, thematic, 
and exploratory way. My goal with this approach is to explore how Valéry’s thinking of 
the value of spirit can be thought together with the process of an evanescent signification 
of spirit that opens onto what escapes or exceeds “evaluation.” This is because, as Derrida 
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shows, spirit is one value among others while at the same time it is also the absolute 
source of all value that detaches itself from any economy (AC, 94-98n.8/123-126n.8). 
 
THE “SPIRIT” OF 1919 
In La liberté de l’esprit from 1939, Valéry revisits his earlier works on the question of 
spirit and begins by squarely stating that the question of spirit is a sign of his age: ‘It is a 
sign of the times, and not a very good sign, that today it is not only necessary but 
imperative to interest people’s minds in the fate of the Spirit—that is, in their own fate.’ 
(HP, 186) With this announcement, Valéry points back to his second letter from La crise 
de l’esprit written in 1919, where he makes it clear that ‘the things of the world interest 
me only as they relate to the intellect; for me, everything relates to the intellect.’ (HP, 
31)244 Twenty years later, in 1939, the picture looks at once the same and yet different 
with respect to Valéry’s interest in spirit, with the crucial difference being that a certain 
interest in the future of humanity has become significant for his appeal to the notion of 
spirit. 
 One could then say that the difference of Valéry’s interest in spirit shows how the 
very status of the “our,” the “us,” and the “we” has become uncertain wherefore the 
imperative to reflect on ‘the future of spirit’ (HP, 183) is critical to all of us in that it 
concerns our destiny as human beings. To put it tersely, in our age, conceived of as an 
age uncertain of its plural pronouns, as it were, the question of spirit as the sign of our 
age becomes different from a ‘certain age’ that is, as Valéry describes it, ‘only too certain’ 
(HP, 186) of itself. In order to elaborate on this point of difference, let me turn to an 
example that Valéry himself employs, namely, that of a man approaching a change of 
time, a transition. 
 In his essay Le bilan de l’intelligence, delivered as a conference paper at the 
Université des Annales in 1935, Valéry recalls an episode when a friend of his had once 
remarked that the phrase “every period is a transition” is most certainly a trivial statement. 
In reflecting over this episode, however, Valéry reveals that he in contrast to his friend is 
not altogether convinced of this statement’s triviality, for, as he asks, would not someone 
who had lived through the ‘years from 1872 to 1890, and then from the years 1890 to 
1935 […] feel some difference of rhythm between these two periods of his life?’ (HP, 
                                                          
244 We should keep in mind that when Valéry speaks of (human) intelligence, he always has in mind the 
question of spirit and ‘its limits [bornes], its preservations, its probable future [avenir probable]—and for 
the spirit this is the paramount question of the day’ (HP, 137/1064). 
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134-135) Given this remark, should we take Valéry’s view of history to be one of 
continuity or discontinuity? As I read it, Valéry does not suggest that there is a continuity 
running from period to period—a continuity that would hypostatise the transitions of 
history as though it were possible to discern the ‘development of the events that had taken 
place in the past’ (HP, 135) and thereby to project a future on the basis of predictability. 
In what follows, I shall try to unfold this reading. 
 As we have seen in Chapter Four, Valéry argues that we can ‘no longer look on the 
past as a son looks on his father’ (HP, 131). One must therefore be careful to note that 
nothing can be derived from the past that would enable us to orientate ourselves precisely 
because nothing ‘will orient us in the present or help us to imagine the future.’ (HP, 136) 
What Valéry is doing here is to “reinvent” the notion of the future, and to do so by denying 
the possibility of any attempt to predict, anticipate or calculate what is coming—a 
possibility that is itself undermined by the refusal of the future to be reduced in any 
manner to a mere “consequence” of the present. Accordingly, Valéry makes the claim 
‘that the human race is entering a phase of its history in which all predictions become—
by the sheer fact of being a prediction—a risk of error, a suspect product of our spirits.’ 
(HP, 133) 
 What is notable here is not only that the risk of error, which would be intrinsic to 
all predictions, is being used to emphasise the essential instability of history, but also that 
the question of spirit as a question of “our destiny” entails the risk of error insofar as 
errancy is inherent to destiny as a product of spirit. Put differently, the future induces an 
anxious realisation of itself as an absolute break with the determinations of the present—
the reason for this being that the future, as that which remains indeterminate, opens not 
just onto another present, but rather onto the present as other. As such, the future as 
incalculable carries with it that which remains to come in the present. Valéry’s “story,” 
in which he emphasises the inherent errancy of destiny and with which he highlights the 
dis-order at stake in “our age,” therefore offers us a manner by which to reflect on the 
phase, or perhaps better put, the epoch of history otherwise. Hence, referring not so much 
to an archeo-teleology as to the ‘too many innovations […], too many surprises, too many 
things created and destroyed, and too many great and sudden developments’ (HP, 135) of 
history, Valéry sees how dis-order opens less onto the past or the future as horizons of 
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more or less predictable possibilities and rather more onto ‘the future without the least 
shape’ (HP, 136).245 
 Still, what remains a “critical” moment for Valéry is the dis-order, which is 
undeniably something of a brutal interruption of the continuity of history and of the 
unique destination of the world that “we” believed “ourselves” to have found within the 
name of Europe.246 Such a critical interruption of continuity is not the inauguration of a 
new age, as if the solution to Europe’s crisis as a crisis of spirit were located in some 
distant yet predictable future. The crisis of spirit, in other words, is not a founding event; 
rather, it suspends the continuous effort of history to decide and make a judgement 
(κρίνειν) regarding the principle of epochality.247 For Valéry, “our age” calls us to live as 
if ‘every man belongs to two eras’ (HP, 135) and in perpetual suspension of any epochal 
decision. As we have seen, this is a call that would seem to impose upon us the question 
that the “modern age” puts to itself—a question that remains without an answer insofar 
as such an answer would amount to a deciding of the undecidable.248 Put differently, the 
age of modernity has perhaps already been exposed to its own limit without, however, 
being able to anticipate or represent any future epoch that would lie beyond this limit. 
What this means is that the modern human being is no longer enclosed in one epoch, but 
rather is stretched out between several (or, at least, more than one) undecidable epochs. 
According to Valéry, this being in-between, belonging neither here nor there, is directed 
                                                          
245 Valéry expounds on this view as follows: ‘It used to be that in foresight our vision (and, consequently, 
the unforeseen at that time) was limited on the one hand by our knowledge and on the other by our means 
of action... We regarded the unknown future simply as a combination of things already known; the new 
could be broken down into elements that were not new. But this is no longer so’ (HP, 175). 
246 As a name for the errancy produced by spirit to indicate “our destiny,” dis-order may then designate a 
destinerrance, to put it in Derridean terms, which evokes our condition of being as a destiny without a 
given destination. This, however, is not the place to rehearse in detail Derrida’s notions of destinerrance, 
adestination, or clandestination, which are discussed at various places of his work. In brief, then, what in 
my view is crucial to Derrida’s notion of destinerrance is that the premise for a thinking of “our destiny” 
concerns how it inflicts an internal disturbance of destination. Thus, the question of spirit, in which Valéry 
urges us to show an interest, is an announcement of a destiny of wandering about without a principle of 
destination. In other words, destinerrance designates a wandering about in a universe not only without a 
centre but also without a periphery.     
247 In a remark on Narcissus, Valéry writes of the ‘mirrored form, the arrested being, fixed, inscribed—of 
the history, the particular with—the universal center, the capacity to change, the eternal youth of oblivion, 
the Proteus, the being who cannot be fettered [enchaîné], the turning movement, the renascent function, the 
I [le moi] that can be wholly new and even multiple.’ (C II, 284) Thus, the sort of other destiny of spirit, 
which I have tried to bring into view, pushes the past principles and idols to the past so as to prepare a 
passing from, as Schürmann would say, ‘the era of Janus to the era of Proteus,’ (Schürmann 1990: 274) 
that is, the epoch of multiple localities.    
248 In his early Heidegger course, Derrida explains that ‘this question as the in-between epochs of being 
opens onto a historicity that is no longer enclosed in one epoch […]. This question is possible only if the 
one posing it no longer simply belongs to an epoch (i.e., to the totality of beings), but to the difference 
between being and the totality of beings.’ (HQBH, 133) 
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“towards” ‘that general sense of helplessness and incoherence that pervades our spirits, 
keeping us on the alert, in a state of anxiety to which we can neither become accustomed 
nor foresee any end.’ (HP, 136) 
 In what follows, I would like to suggest that the sign of which Valéry speaks in 
order to characterise his age, is a sign of awaiting a self-understanding of that age 
perceived as an attempt to (re-)mobilise a sense of spirit. At this juncture, further 
clarification of Valéry’s notion of spirit is therefore warranted. 
  
A SENSE OF SPIRIT 
The notion of spirit is of utmost importance in Valéry’s writings. Moreover, this notion 
is so intrinsically bound up with the transformations resulting from the Great War that 
one could almost call it the ‘“spirit” of 1919’.249 For Valéry, the notion spirit and the crisis 
of 1919 are so seamlessly integrated that their interweavement becomes reflective of 
Janicaud’s blunt formulation that ‘spirit is crisis’ (Janicaud 1997: 134). In La politique de 
l’esprit, Valéry sums up his view on spirit and its relation to the critical disorder occurring 
in the aftermath of the Great War by outlining his strategy as follows: ‘I shall try to show 
you the reaction of a spirit as it observes that disorder [constate ce désordre]: how, when 
it has taken the measure of what it can and cannot do, it returns to itself [le retour qu’il 
fait sur lui-même]’ (HP, 89/1014; translation modified). 
Valery’s writings from 1919 to 1939 as well as his repeated return to the question 
of spirit as the key to his inquiry into the crisis of Europe all point to a similar account 
regarding the source of the European disorder. As I have already begun to indicate above, 
spirit strives to unravel this disorder only to discover that everything has been affected by 
it including itself: ‘The Spirit itself has not been exempt from all this damage. The spirit 
is in fact cruelly stricken; it grieves in men of intellect, and looks sadly upon itself. It 
distrusts itself profoundly [doute profondément de soi-même].’ (HP, 308/1001) 
 In his 1922 lecture L’Européen given at the University of Zürich in which he 
observes that in the pursuit of resituating Europe in the world whereby the question of 
spirit becomes central, Valéry asks, ‘What, then, is the Spirit? In what way can it be 
struck, stunned, reduced, humiliated by the present state of the world? Whence comes 
this deep concern for things of the Spirit, this distress, this anguish among men of spirit?’ 
                                                          
249 This expression stems from Rosenzweig’s (1984: 51) “Vorwort zu ‘Hegel und der Staat’” (1914/1920), 
an expression which he finds impossible to rework in that the origin and intent of this book attests to a spirit 
of the pre-war years. 
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(HP, 308) It is precisely within the fundamental distrust that the spirit has gained of itself 
that Valéry recognises the importance of reconsidering the spirit, not so much in order to 
initiate a “return” to a former trustful spirit of Europe, but rather to examine the exposure 
of its fundamental ambiguity. As Valéry puts it in 1932, ‘spirit must think of itself, of the 
conditions of its own existence (which are also the conditions of its growth [conditions 
d’accroissement]), of the dangers that threatens its virtues, powers, and possessions’ (HP, 
91/1016). 
Hence, when Valéry in the 1930s comes to locate the spiritual troubles of Europe 
in a civilisation that has repeatedly delegitimised itself, he examines the conditions 
implicit to the spirit of Europe in order to lay bare how the very freedom of spirit becomes 
that which makes it possible for spirit to be harmed by itself. In effect, claims Valéry, the 
‘working conditions of the spirit have suffered [subi] the same destiny as all other human 
affairs, that is to say, they share in the intensity, the haste, the general acceleration of 
exchanges […] the fantastic flickering of events.’ (HP, 138/1065) For Valéry, such an 
essentially ambiguous mode of both a curative and a destructive power is designated by 
the gesture of a single (albeit notoriously difficult to comprehend) notation: spirit.  
At this juncture, it is essential for us to take a brief excursus where we address our 
own contemporary intuitions about the fundamental meaning of the term “spirit.” When 
considered in retrospect, Valéry’s interest in the question of spirit may, I admit, strike 
many as strange or even preposterous. Today the term “spirit,” like “soul,” is, if not worn 
out, then at least confined to religious realms. Moreover, it is often employed as a 
designation of what we are lacking in our age—a lack is blamed for the so-called “crisis” 
of decline, decadence, and nihilism in which we presumably exist. My intention in what 
follows is to try to reopen the question of spirit in Valéry by putting aside, as much as is 
possible, any preconceptions based on the frequent religious or melancholic references to 
this term. I find this exercise important in that the very usage of the term “spirit” forces 
us to encounter ourselves as those whose inheritance remains in abeyance and in escheat 
insofar as it is “we” who have inherited disinheritance—the consequence of which being 
that we are thus presented with our very inability to understand ourselves in relation to 
“our heritage.”250 
                                                          
250 Nancy writes: ‘the vacating of the very possibility of inheritance is implied in its idea, not only because 
it is possible that there might not be anyone to inherit but because the possibility of dis-inheritance is 
contained in that of inheritance’ (Nancy 2016: 873-874). 
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In this task, we will take particular interest in exploring what spirit as a notation 
brings into view. Indeed, the difficulty pertaining to Valéry’s texts in this regard has to 
do with the two strands running through the notation of spirit. On the one hand, such 
notation constitutes a more or less stable system of symbols used for describing a set of 
‘quite objective observations.’ (HP, 95) Yet, on the other hand, Valéry maintains that the 
notation of spirit is itself characterised by a ‘power of transformation’ (HP, 104). Let us 
therefore attend carefully to this double notation of spirit in order to begin to draw out its 
fundamental ambiguity. 
 
 THE AMBIGUITY OF SPIRIT 
What is particularly significant to our present context, is the manner by which Valéry’s 
notation of spirit as a specifically European manifestation points to its originary 
dimension ‘as a sort of myth.’ On the one hand, this myth of spirit appears to found a 
community based on the ‘the sensation of being a European,’ (HP, 326) as well as to 
connect this community to a mythical past that has been handed down from our ancestors 
and inherited by “us Europeans.”251 On the other hand, however, what Valéry discovers 
in this myth of a European spirit—indeed what ‘we discover in ourselves’—is ‘a complex 
and intimate combination of elements deriving from all the cultures of Europe that we are 
forced to recognize, side by side with our national feelings, the existence of a broader 
sensibility and a capacity for understanding and—above all—a desire for understanding 
and exchange which we cannot imagine our own minds doing without.’ (HP, 326) 
Although this latter discovery by Valéry may not amount to a demythologising of the 
myth of the European spirit, it nevertheless does introduce a potentially shattering 
analysis of it. 
As Valéry notes, that which is peculiar to the desire for understanding and exchange 
pertaining to “our European” minds, can also be characterised by indicating how the 
heritage assembled under the term “the European spirit” is already in itself a multifarious 
conglomerate resulting from the ‘many exchanges between the peoples of Europe’ (HP, 
327). In light of Valéry’s understanding of the European spirit as an “original 
exchangeability,” we may note that the myth of the European spirit is not uniform. To the 
                                                          
251 In his fascinating essay on the interrupted myth, Nancy refers to Schelling’s (and thus to Coleridge’s) 
notion of the tautegorical function of myth in order to indicate that which ’says nothing other than itself 
and is produced in consciousness by the same process that, in nature, produces the forces that myth 
represents.’ (Nancy 1991: 49) 
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contrary, it interrupts itself from its very beginning by inscribing in itself both a 
responsibility to that which is different from itself and an unfinished ‘communicating or 
bringing together works and ideas’ (HP, 327). Nevertheless, the inscription of such an 
unfinished, infinite response to the other also makes the spirit of Europe vulnerable to its 
own mortality precisely in that the character of spirit’s mythology also serves as the 
means of making ‘unequal exchanges’ (HP, 105). 
The second strand of Valéry’s understanding of spirit is, to my mind, more 
important in that, by defining the spirit as a power of transformation, this strand goes 
beyond the established boundaries of a fixed notation. According to Valéry, this latter 
account of spirit is therefore not merely ‘the result of observation or notation’ (HP, 105) 
but rather draws its power from itself so as to attain its singularity. That is to say, even in 
referring to other things the spirit still refers to nothing other than itself—a process by 
which spirit autotelically establishes its own values in order time and again to overcome 
these values and itself. Yet, this definition of spirit is not, in Valéry’s view, abstract, and 
neither does it involve ‘any metaphysics’ (HP, 95). It is, rather, operative in nature. 
Moreover, it is important to remember that Valéry’s spirit is irreducible either to pure 
thought or to principles, but instead, as Valéry argues, it is a power of transformation, 
which ‘can be isolated and distinguished from all other powers simply by considering 
certain events around us, certain transformations in our surroundings that can be 
attributed only to a very different kind of action from that of the known energies of 
nature.’ (HP, 94-95) 
Yet, if it seems undeniable, as Derrida reminds us, that Valéry’s definition of spirit 
as a power of transformation is not entirely removed from the question of metaphysics, 
then we must be careful neither to dismiss this definition as a spurious conclusion nor to 
assume that Valéry simply “overcomes” metaphysics.252 This double care is necessary in 
that the declaration of the overcoming of metaphysics is at the same time a confirmation 
                                                          
252 This is a point where I deviate from Janicaud’s take on Valéry’s metaphysics. Janicaud seemingly 
accepts that Valéry’s spirit is not a metaphysical entity, and suggests that its potential for functionality lies 
in a Nietzschean “will to power.” In my view, such functionality presents itself as a too explicit affront 
against metaphysics, which only invites a discussion as to whether the statement that spirit as the will to a 
power of transformation is not of metaphysics. Derrida, of course, is most sensitive to such claim, when he 
notes that one cannot not notice ‘Valéry’s invisible quotation marks’ (DE, 98n.1/123n.2) around spirit. 
Thus understood, Valéry conceives spirit in an attempt to avoid the metaphysics of spirit by not avoiding 
the unavoidable, which is to say the double of spirit, understood as the spirit of spirit.  
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of that very order it claims to exceed—a declaration which, as Derrida reminds us, is thus 
still a metaphysical gesture.253  
To provide further support for the point raised above, let us proceed to a seemingly 
metaphysical claim that Valéry makes about the human being as a ‘bizarre living creature 
who has set himself off from all others, who stands above them by virtue of his 
…daydreams,’ and who thereby changes not only his own nature but also ‘the very Nature 
around him’ (HP, 308). What becomes clear in this passage is that the power of 
transformation affirms spirit as a subject that not only transforms itself but also the totality 
and objectification of nature such that nature is made disposable and exploited as a natural 
resource. What initially becomes clear with this passage is how it repeats Valéry’s remark 
in La politique de l’esprit that the most extraordinary invention of humankind is ‘the 
invention of the past and the future.’ (HP, 96-97) According to Valéry, it is by this 
invention that the human being sets itself apart and at a distance from the animal condition 
in which—to put it in Heideggerian terms—the temporal ecstasies of past, future, and 
present matter very little. Furthermore, the passage shows how the power of 
transformation affirms the spirit as that which alters ‘the original animal condition of the 
species,’ to such an extent that the human being is able to create a world different from 
how the world ‘originally was.’ (HP, 104) In other words, spirit is the power by virtue of 
which the human being becomes the measure of all value by becoming the subject of 
power whereby the dominance of nature over the human being is inverted into a 
dominance of the human being over nature. 
However, there still remains more to the story of spirit as a transformative power. 
Since, the spirit of modern science as technology through which the human being comes 
to dominate nature as a resource and to conquer the world as a map, also alters the very 
conditions of spirit as the power of transformation and calls its existence into question: 
 
Man has sought in Nature the means and power to make things around him 
as restless, as unstable, as mobile as himself…as admirable, absurd, 
disconcerting, and wonderful as his own spirit. Now the spirit is 
unpredictable, nor can it predict itself. […] If then we impose on the human 
world the ways of the spirit, the world becomes just as unpredictable; it takes 
on the spirit’s disorder. (HP, 176)  
 
                                                          
253 Interestingly, already in 1965 Jean Wahl discerned the involuntary potential of a great metaphysician 
(grand métaphysicien) in the thought of Valéry (Wahl 1965: 11). 
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Thus, as the human being gains the ability to transform nature through technology, this 
same human being, through the very process of technological transformation, is itself 
transformed into a resource of the technology of which it believes itself to be the master. 
The question of spirit therefore enacts an exposure to a certain power of transformation, 
which, in a somewhat Hegelian manner, creates both order and disorder that themselves 
affect the transformation. 
 
THE SPIRIT OF TRANSFORMATION 
What I would like to suggest in this section is that spirit, as a power of transformation, 
does not remain unaffected by its own capacity to create order and disorder in the world—
as if spirit were the fixed form that transforms everything except itself. This suggestion, 
I believe, finds confirmation in Valéry’s work on Europe and the world such as when, for 
example, in 1937 he writes that the ‘spirit has transformed the world, and the world is 
repaying it in kind.’ (HP, 167) This spiritual auto-transformation leaves open the question 
of whether or not, in repaying spirit in kind, the world, as the reference wherein spirit is 
encountered in its innermost being as a power to transform, at the same time prepares the 
ground for a reconsideration of spirit. This question is not to be readily answered; instead, 
it serves as a reminder of the ambiguity not only of spirit but also of that of the thinking 
of spirit. No doubt much of this ambiguity could be seen, were we to follow Marx’s line 
of thought, through the lens of how the spirit of the world has been deprived of spirit 
(Geist Geistloser Zustände).254 In order to prepare this issue, I shall expound a little 
further on Valéry’s notion of spirit. 
 The critical point Valéry wishes to raise with his call to become interested in the 
question of spirit is that there is “TODAY”255 a debate whether spirit is still spirit. We 
                                                          
254 Cf. MEW 1, 378. In Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx notes that our history turning into world history 
testifies to the fact that the current world-historical activity of human beings becomes ‘more and more 
enslaved [geknechtet] under a power alien [fremden Macht] to them (a pressure which they have conceived 
of as a dirty trick [Schikane] on the part of the so-called world spirit, etc.), a power which has become more 
and more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market.’ (MEW 3, 37; cf. Nancy 
2007a: 35-36) In Marx’ view, the transformation (Umwandlung) of history proper into world history is not 
only an abstraction of self-consciousness or world spirit, that is, of a metaphysical ghost (Weltgeistes oder 
sonst eines metaphysischen Gespenstes), but also a material-empirical fact insofar as the material power is 
also the spiritual power. Thus, for Marx, the class that have the means to material production at their 
disposal also disposes of the means to spiritual production (MEW 3, 46).    
255 In 1927, Valéry inscribed in capital letters the word TODAY in his discourse of the European spirit, as 
though he wanted to mark its questionability. Without delving into this today here, suffice it here to say 
that the “today” denotes an appointed time and a moment of radical instability, which, as Valéry reminds 
us, calls for action: ‘What are you going to do TODAY?’, as Derrida remarks in L’autre cap, reissuing 
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may therefore wonder whether what remains of spirit after the Great War might be 
nothing but a vestige. In a sense, then, the question of spirit concerns the essence of 
spirit—a question overloaded, to be sure, with both sense and suspicion. 
Given, as Valéry reminds us, that we still know very little, if not nothing, of ‘the 
spirit itself’ (HP, 184), we have no right to resort to idealism, or simply to reduce our 
understanding of the world to a principle of spirit. To expound upon this idea, let us quote 
at length a passage from 1937:         
 
The spirit has led man where he had no notion of going. It has given us a taste 
for life and the means of living, it has conferred on us a power of action 
enormously surpassing the individual’s power of adaptation and even his 
capacity for understanding […]. Hence we have moved farther and farther 
away from the primitive conditions of all life, borne along as we are at a speed 
now growing so great as to be terrifying, toward a state of things whose 
complexity, instability, and inherent disorder bewilder us, allowing us not the 
least foresight, taking away our ability to reason about the future or to make 
out any of the lessons we used to expect of the past […]. All this necessarily 
reacts on the spirit itself. A world transformed by the spirit no longer presents 
to the spirit the same perspective and directions as before; it poses entirely 
new problems and countless enigmas. (HP, 167)  
 
From this passage it becomes clear that Valéry’s aim with this inquiry into the 
transformation of spirit serves the purpose of directing our gaze to the radicality of his 
notion of spirit—a radicality that plays out in the process whereby spirit, in transforming 
itself, comes to experience a transformation in terms of which it comes to appear in and 
to itself as different from itself.256 As such, the transformation of spirit does not mean that 
the spirit departs from a state of order with the aim of entering into a state of disorder, or 
vice versa, without undergoing an essential change; but rather, the transformation of spirit 
means that spirit finds itself in the experience of transforming the world in which spirit, 
to put it in Hegelian terms, has produced itself as the spirit of the world or as the world 
spirit.257 
                                                          
Valéry’s “today” by arguing that we today are looking for ‘a completely new “today” of Europe’ (AC, 
18/12). For a discussion, Weber 2014: 14-16.  
256 As Stiegler says: ‘Nothing in this confrontation of spirit with its own achievements, with its historic 
concretizations and concretions […] is simple; it is these works and these achievements themselves that 
confront and destroy one another.’ (Stiegler 2015b: 4) 
257 At this point, I would not hesitate to say that there is much to learn from Hegel in the reading of Valéry. 
In this particular concern, for example, Hegel states toward the end of the introduction to his 
Phenomenology (HW 3, 78-79) that consciousness exercises a movement on itself to such an extent that 
both its knowledge and its object is affected—a movement Hegel refers to as “experience” (Erfahrung). 
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While much more can be said about this spirit of the world that transforms itself in 
the world, it is worth noting that, in transforming itself, spirit merges with the world and 
does so without retaining an otherworldly beyond. On these grounds, we are now prepared 
to specify the manner by which spirit comes to be as spirit in and of the world. Yet, these 
grounds are nevertheless more like an abyss in that the production of a foundation upon 
a spiritual principle is no longer tenable. This, in turn, raises the question of the spirit’s 
original creation, namely, the creation of spirit. 
 
 A DOUBLING OF SPIRIT 
The question of the spirit’s original creation hinges on Valéry’s understanding of how 
nature, on the one hand, is subjected to death by its own concept, and, on the other hand, 
awakens the “original animal condition” to consciousness by which it becomes a moment 
in the process of spirit becoming itself.258 This understanding is most directly and 
extensively attested to in La politique de l’esprit, in which Valéry meditates on the self-
reflection of spirit and identifies such self-reflection as the spirit of spirit. Recognising 
the ambiguity of the spirit of spirit, the reflexive structure at work in this doubling appears 
to hold in abeyance the determination of that to which reference is made with the 
consequence that it leaves undecided what the spirit of spirit is. To quote Valéry: 
 
I mean that, in varying degrees, he [man] has become conscious of himself. 
This consciousness makes it possible for him to be detached at moments from 
everything, even from his own personality; the self can sometimes look on its 
own person almost as some strange object. Man can observe himself (or 
thinks he can); he can criticize himself, and control himself. This is an original 
creation, an attempt to create what I shall make bold to call the spirit of the 
spirit [l’esprit de l’esprit] (HP, 98/1025; translation modified).259 
                                                          
On this note, one might suggest that the word “experience” as a matter of undergoing or crossing through 
danger (experire) also exposes the spirit to danger (periculum). Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe 1999: 18. 
258 As Hegel notes in the Jenaer Realphilosophie, ‘the animal dies; death of the animal [is the] becoming 
of consciousness’ (JS, 159-160). In this regard, Derrida is right in characterising Valéry’s proposal as a 
‘rather classical, or even neo-Hegelian, negative-dialectic definition of spirit as that which in the end 
“always says no,” and first of all no to itself.’ (DE, 98n.1/122n.2) 
259 “Self-consciousness” may very well be the hallmark of Valéry’s spirit, but, as we saw in the first chapter, 
in the same way as Europe was about to lose consciousness in the aftermath of the Great War (HP, 24), the 
human being who has acquired various degrees of self-consciousness may also lose its consciousness when 
it realises how the sign of crisis marks the course away from itself (Œ I, 1218). Indeed, the self becoming 
exteriorised in its own reflection, comes to experience the resulting situation as one of self-alienation, since 
the character of this reflection “of” itself is ‘a perpetual exhaustion, a detachment without respite and with 
exception of all that appears in it’ (Œ I, 1225). And yet, as this very detachment shows, the self-alienation 
does not reflect the loss of the property of a pre-given presence but rather calls upon the exhaustion of a 
presence that shows itself as an estrangement to self.   
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In this rich passage Valéry sheds light on crucial aspects of his philosophical inquiry into 
self-consciousness and self-understanding both of which appears to be directly informed 
by and entangled with his “neo-Hegelian interpretation” of spirit.260 With the notion 
“spirit of spirit,” Valéry characterises spirit as a doubling of itself by a sort of repetition 
or even redundancy whereby spirit discloses a perspective of a folding of itself onto itself, 
which is both a condition and a threat to the power of spirit.261 The question now is 
therefore what this essential doubling makes of spirit. 
If we return to the initial point that started us on the path of trying to think the notion 
of spirit in Valéry, namely, that the spirit itself has not been exempt from its disorderly 
transformations of the world, we now see that we must cast this question of doubling in 
light of the question of negativity. In other words, we must ask whether or not spirit, by 
redoubling itself, is able to pull itself from the wreckage it has inflicted on itself. To put 
it in more Hegelian, but nevertheless still Valéryan terms, we must ask whether or not 
negativity constitutes an economy or a method that would enable spirit to ‘dwell on it, 
accept it, and to overcome the pain [s’attarder, s’y faire, surmonter la peine]’ (Œ I, 1154) 
of disorder.262 Thus, the question becomes whether or not the “spirit of 1919” and beyond 
will be able to overcome that which it has done in the world, that is, whether or not the 
spirit will be able to save the world and thereby itself. As Valéry succinctly remarks: ‘So, 
the whole question comes down to this: can the human spirit master what the human spirit 
has made?’ (HP, 138/1065) 
This way of looking at the issue that we have been raising here seems to me to 
address a question regarding the self-inflicted wounds of spirit that the spirit, according 
                                                          
260 Wahl therefore suggests that it would be interesting to compare the thought of Valéry with Hegel (Wahl 
1965: 121). However, although Valéry regards Hegel as one of his skulls that was begotten by Kant and 
that later begat Marx, he still claims never to have read Hegel (LQU, 242). 
261 Hence, Valéry’s spirit of spirit apparently satisfies the Cartesian heritage wherein, as Derrida notes (DE, 
32-34/14-16), spirit reflects nothing but itself. Descartes undeniably plays an important role to Valéry, 
especially in concerning epistemological issues (Œ I, 812). In this sense, one might speak of a reinvigoration 
of Cartesian metaphysics in Valéry (Œ I, 804-805). However, Valéry argues that his interest in metaphysics 
consists neither in giving in to it nor in dealing with it as a mere historical interest, but rather to emphasise 
the ‘eternal actuality’ of Descartes (Œ I, 816). Thus, he sees in the Cartesian heritage of the spirit a chance 
to encounter the intelligible act according to which thought comes to inspect itself (la pensée de la pensée) 
(Œ I, 797).       
262 Without wanting to confuse different discourse about spirit, one is struck by a remarkable similarity, 
when Hegel in his Ästhetik shows just how central the issue of contradiction is to spirit: ‘Yet whoever 
demands that nothing exists that carries in itself a contradiction as an identity of opposites is at the same 
time requiring that nothing living shall exist. For the force of life, and still more the power of the spirit [die 
Macht des Geistes], consists precisely in positing contradiction in itself, enduring it, and overcoming it [zu 
überwinden].’ (HW 13, 162) 
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to the Hegel of Phänomenologie des Geistes, can itself heal in such a fashion that these 
wounds leave no scars: ‘The wounds of the spirit heal, with no scars remaining [Die 
Wunden des Geistes heilen, ohne daß Narben bleiben]’ (HW 3, 492). In approaching the 
question in this manner, we are immediately faced with what seems to be—in the words 
of Dennis Schmidt—a ‘soteriological conviction, this view that in the end reconciliation 
is possible and suffering […] comes to an end’ (Schmidt 2001: 215). But perhaps the 
crisis of spirit, for Valéry, is more profound than what is represented as the mere 
overcoming of crisis through spirit becoming itself in returning to itself. We may 
therefore ask, drawing on Janicaud, whether the ‘distant origin [of spirit] is perhaps that 
folding back upon itself of an intellect that desires certainty,’ but in such a way that spirit 
‘cuts itself off from its horizon of appearance.’ (Janicaud 1997: 139) Indeed, one may say 
that no ‘spiritual wound has truly healed over.’ (Janicaud 1997: 132) Or, to put it in 
another way, the self-inflicted wound that spirit seeks to heal is itself spirit and is itself 
the trauma such that the healing process itself becomes the reopening of a wound that is 
already there.263 
At this point, we begin to encroach upon the theme of the negative economy of 
spirit where spirit both displaces itself from itself by redoubling into the spirit of spirit 
and incessantly returns to haunt itself as the other of spirit. By redoubling itself spirit 
shifts itself from the same to the other so as to disclose the other in the same—a movement 
reflective of what we have already identified as the auto-immunity of spirit. Accordingly, 
although spirit must reflect or relate to itself in order to relate to the other, any reflection 
or relation of spirit to itself may, as Valéry remarks, ultimately turn out to affirm a suicidal 
tendency of spirit (HP, 201). Spirit as the power of transformation is able to transform 
itself in such a manner that the bearing of spirit is never present solely to itself; rather, 
spirit orientates itself by relation to itself in a differentiated manner. As such, spirit is 
essentially that which incessantly differs from itself. In this sense, then, “each” spirit 
enters the other beyond the dialectical relation between the other and itself, without ever 
returning to itself. 
With respect to the transformation of spirit, Valéry thus espouses a sense of the 
“spirit of spirit” not in terms of a transition from what spirit has been to what it will 
                                                          
263 Žižek has pointed out that spirit’s self-healing is not a ‘magic gesture of retroactive sublation.’ Rather, 
the point is that during a dialectical process, ‘a shift of perspective occurs which makes the wound itself 
appear as its opposite—the wound itself is its own healing when perceived from another standpoint.’ (Žižek 
2016: 118) 
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become—as if the mythology of spirit has already destined the return of spirit to itself—
but rather of spirit’s becoming other in its erroneous sending of itself to itself. 
Paradoxically, then, whenever spirit encounters itself it already no longer encounters 
itself precisely because, as Stiegler suggests, spirit ‘encounters itself anew as an-other, as 
incomparable with itself, or as singularity’ (Stiegler 2015b: 52). This therefore brings us 
to the final and perhaps most difficult feature of Valéry’s account of spirit, namely, his 
questioning of ‘the spirit’s current value and its future or probable value’ (HP, 138). It is 
noteworthy that in raising the question of the value of spirit, Valéry immediately flags the 
fact that he uses the term “spirit” and its qualification of value in order to pose a problem 
that he not only sets for himself, but that, as he adds, he ‘shall not solve’ (HP, 138). In 
other words, the problem of the value of spirit that Valéry lays out has no general solution, 
that is, it is not as if Valéry would be able to untangle or absolve the double bind of spirit 
by explaining what spirit is. In our discussion below, we will therefore follow Valéry’s 
lead in abstaining from seeking a solution to the problem of spirit and instead simply 
attempt to unfold and to attest to the problem’s essential irresolvability.  
 
  THE FIDUCIARY LOGIC 
With our discussion of Valéry’s definition of spirit as a power of transformation, we 
touched upon a dimension of spirit in terms of which “we Europeans” are first and 
foremost bound together because, as human beings, our “original animal condition” has 
been essentially altered with the consequence that we have managed to build our own 
world different than that of the natural world. As Valéry writes: ‘we have made the world 
like the spirit and we want to live in this spirit’s world. The spirit wants to live in what it 
has made.’ (HP, 209) At the same time, however, we have also seen how the disorder that 
is threatening the very existence of spirit, and hence those higher values that spirit creates 
within the world of spirit that Valéry identifies with Europe, is not made suddenly and 
overnight by something from outside of this world; rather, the disorder develops within 
the world of spirit as the very product of its European construction. This outline will help 
us to articulate the question of spirit and to understand what Valéry is aiming at when he 
says that the power of spirit is not given self-evidently by itself but rather is given by 
means of belief and trust. To begin with, we shall trace this logic, which we identify as a 
fiduciary logic, as it is unfolded within La liberté de l’esprit.     
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 Valéry’s claim regarding this fiduciary logic, were we to summarise it, is that there 
is a certain structure to the world that draws its power from belief and trust, that is, a 
‘fiduciary [fiduciaire] structure which is necessary [qu’exige] to the whole edifice of 
civilization’ (HP, 107/1035). The point here seems to be, in part, that the task of 
understanding oneself within the world requires faith, although this term should not lead 
us to succumb to the temptation of reducing Valéry’s fiduciary logic to a mere effect of a 
religious discourse. The question this raises is, of course, how the definition of spirit as a 
transformative power fits into this structure of the fiduciary. The most obvious place to 
begin in answering this question is with Valéry’s description of faith as having its ‘origin 
in us, in our own spirit’ (HP, 105). This description implies, for instance, that an ‘oath, a 
contract, a signature, the institution of credit, and the relations which all these imply […] 
are wholly based on the cardinal principle of our spirits, not to treat as things of the spirit 
things that are of the spirit only.’ (HP, 105) In other words, the fiduciary structure of the 
world is a ‘work of the spirit.’ (HP, 107) 
 This is a key insight for our purposes since it connects the power of spirit with the 
power of trust and thereby displays not only how faith is founded on spirit but also how 
faith in turn sustains the spiritual constructs. Yet, as I have already indicated, our age is 
one which is not only facing a decline of interest in the question and destiny of spirit, but 
also one in which the “we,” wherein the power of faith has its origin, has become doubtful 
and uncertain. We should not be surprised, then, to see Valéry introduce, along with the 
decline of interest in spiritual matters, a decline of values in that the upholding of values 
implies at least a minimal act of faith. 264 Valéry openly acknowledges this double decline 
and associates it with the ‘collapse of the securities and currencies which we, and 
everyone else, once thought were unshakable values.’ (HP, 186; translation modified) 
Needless to say, this decline brings about a radical transformation of the human world of 
spirit precisely in that through such a decline we come to witness the ruin of our ‘former 
faith in the spirit, a faith that was the foundation and, in a way, the postulate of our life.’ 
(HP, 186; translation modified) Yet, if “to believe” is just as indispensable ‘to human 
                                                          
264 In this connection, we may note that there is no oath or signature without the credit we attribute to it. An 
act of oath is a performative act (in contrast to constative speech acts such as claims). Yet, the power of 
performing an oath has its origin in “us,” Valéry says, so that the social structure is itself sustained by power 
of belief and the fiduciary gesture it performs. Which is to say: the “we” in which the act of belief receives 
its power is at the same time that which constitutes the social, judicial, economic, and political world, in 
such a way that the performativity of belief comes to be anterior to any oath, contract, signature, or credit. 
In other words, there is at the origin of belief a kind of performative gesture with which the origin differs 
from itself, and which therefore renders every ‘onto-anthropo-theological horizon,’ (FK, 16) to use 
Derrida’s expression, of Valéry’s “we” indeterminate. 
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beings as to trust in the firmness of the ground,’ (HP, 105) what then is the ground of 
faith? For Valéry, spirit is the term that ‘refers to the source and value of all other words’ 
(HP, 186), in spite of the fact that it is itself indecipherable. If it is indeed the case that 
the spirit as a power of transformation constitutes the fiduciary structure of the social, 
judicial, and political worlds, what then does it mean to have ‘faith in the spirit’? With 
this question Valéry invites his reader to consider how we are to understand what happens 
to spirit when the civilisation, which is “ours” on account of its fiduciary values, provides 
testimony of nothing but an abiding exhaustion of the ‘spiritual nature of social order’ 
(HP, 108). 
The result of this testimony is therefore that the ultimate authority, which, in 
Valéry’s view is the spirit that gives structure to the world, both lays bare all of that which 
was built on faith and undermines the firm ground of the edifice of “our” civilisation. 
Nothing is spared from this weakening. Not even the highest values associated with 
civilisation and culture that range from reason and progress to knowledge and duty are 
able to escape enervation and the decline into nullity. In other words, the crisis of spirit 
is understood not only as a decline of any given value but also as a decline of that which 
is ‘giving it all its value’ (HP, 108). As such, this implies that the very basis of values, 
and even ‘the basis of that basis’ (HP, 108), has fallen into discredit. Valéry’s questioning 
of a spirit and a civilisation in crisis seems to lead to ‘a notion of the spirit, and various 
standards of intellectual value which, though very ancient—not to say immemorial—are 
perhaps not eternal.’ (HP, 156) This implies a shift in the traditional notion of spirit, from 
the eternal necessity that produces the foundation of trust, to a collapse of the very basis 
on which trust was based—a collapse  announced by the abandonment of spirit’s claim 
to power. 
As Valéry puts it, the disbelief or discredit of the value of spirit might have occurred 
before, but never, he says, ‘to the universal extent we must unhappily recognize in our 
day’ (HP, 108). As we shall see in what follows, Valéry comprehends the discredit of 
spiritual values via analogia through that which once seemed to contain the very ‘essence 
of confidence!’ but has since lost its ‘immemorial and mythical sovereignty’ (HP, 109). 
On this view, then, the crisis of spirit proves ultimately to be a ‘crisis of confidence, of 
fundamental conceptions […], of all human relationships’ (HP, 109).   
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TRANSMUTATION OF VALUES 
The discussion of a general crisis of Europe’s spirit points to a much larger issue, an issue 
I argue lies at the base of the Nietzschean intuition of nihilism. My claim here turns on 
the idea that the “death of God” brings into relief not only a withering away of the belief 
in the otherworldly, but also, since there is no longer a “true” world beyond or behind the 
“apparent” world, a loss of faith in this world. With the death of God, an imprint of “loss” 
is left on the trust or the faith in any metaphysical or ultimate authority in which thought 
believed it had held its ground. Even if he does not explicitly address the “death of God,” 
Valéry refers to an event of a loss of faith that is intrinsically affected by the 
transformation of spirit. Here I shall draw on this outline of nihilism in order to show that, 
in Valéry’s view, such a profound crisis of spirit is not only unprecedented, but also that 
it, in the words of Janicaud, precipitates ‘a spiritual life of Man without God nor 
principles, given over to indifference’ (Janicaud 1997: 132). 
The exhaustion of spirit paves the way for nihilism. A rigorous account and 
understanding of this movement from exhaustion to nihilism certainly seems to be found 
in Nietzsche, for whom Valéry, as can be seen in his Quatre lettres au sujet de Nietzsche 
from 1927 (CW 9, 259-264), had great admiration. Short of giving an overview of either 
Nietzsche “himself” or Valéry’s “Nietzsche,” with the following reading I intend only to 
indicate a few implications of the concept of nihilism. In his writings, Nietzsche employs 
various terms in order to articulate his particular account of nihilism, and while these are 
not necessarily synonymous with one another they nevertheless paint the picture of 
nihilism as inherently ambiguous. As I show below, this account proves important to our 
project in this chapter.  
Nietzsche’s explanation of the spread of nihilism can be reiterated as follows: faith 
in the categories of reason (der Glaube an die Vernunft-Kategorien) by virtue of which 
we have hitherto ‘measured the value of the world’ has suffered a collapse. Moreover, 
this collapse is so profound that these reasonable categories ‘that refer to a purely 
fictitious world [rein fingirte Welt beziehen]’ (KSA 13, 49) will henceforth bear witness 
to nothing but a ‘general crisis of values’ (HP, 109). 
Thus, despite the many nuances that can be discerned in Nietzsche’s thought 
concerning nihilism, the most relevant point for our purpose here is found in the way in 
which the spirit of nihilism signals both an increased power of spirit and a decline of 
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spirit.265 What is remarkable in Nietzsche’s thought is that even though ‘the spirit may be 
worn out [ermüdet], exhausted [erschöpft], so that previous goals and values have become 
incommensurate and no longer believed,’ the weary nihilism still reaches its maximum 
strength as the active ‘violent force of destruction [gewaltthätige Kraft der Zerstörung]’ 
(KSA 12, 350-351) that accompanies the exhaustion of spirit. In other words, nihilism is 
the name that signifies the spirit’s turning against itself, as if the spirit were destined to 
undermine itself. On such a view, spirit represents itself to itself not as a wholesome one 
opposed to nature, but as a split in itself in terms of an inextricable double bind 
emphasising the spirit of spirit. To this distinctive way of revealing ‘a contradictory 
spirituality,’ (Stiegler 2013b: 64) Valéry also assigns a specific name: the value of spirit 
or spiritual value. Before broaching the strange economy in which the spiritual value 
appears to be inscribed, it is important first for us to get a clearer picture of what is meant 
by the “crisis of values.” 
At the outset of our clarification of the “crisis of values,” we must note that Valéry 
sees no way “back” to a discourse that would restore the value of which things have been 
exhausted.266 From here it is but a short step to seeing that Valéry’s aim is to expose how 
‘we are today witnessing a true and gigantic transmutation of values (to use Nietzsche’s 
excellent phrase)’ (HP, 189). The idea behind the transmutation of values is that the effect 
of crisis is not restricted merely to the level of values; rather, this effect, as was also the 
case concerning the loss of illusions, likewise extends to the very principle from which 
the values derive their value. This critical moment in Valéry can be considered in relation 
to the fiduciary logic with respect to which the world is given its structure by virtue of 
the power that is essentially ‘a spiritual value’ (HP, 106). The question is, then, what 
happens when the value of spirit becomes exposed to the subterranean tremors that call 
into question the function of spirit as the basis of basis. 
At the end of Chapter Five, I pointed out that the entry into the one-dimensionality 
of a global world and the hegemonic inequality of the principle of general equality not 
only makes it possible to evaluate things associated with spirit such as knowledge or 
technology, but this entry also places these same things into exchange as commodities 
                                                          
265 See our discussion of Heidegger’s nihilism in Chapter One and Three. 
266 Valéry notes that while ‘the spirit makes higher values’ out of ‘leisure and dreams,’ it is not ‘a veritable 
philosopher’s stone’ to restore values or a discourse of values, but rather, as ‘the transmuting agent of all 
material or mental things’ (HP, 96), to consider what is happening with the conditions of values.   
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with the consequence that the singularity of each “thing” is effaced by means of a general 
equivalence. In an important passage, Valéry writes, 
 
Radiating outward to thousands of other beings over the surface of the globe, 
has given rise to the whole economic machinery. But there is no place in it 
for the useless. Basically the economic machine is an enlargement, a colossal 
amplification of the human organism; and such an apparatus, founded strictly 
on the equal usefulness of all objects and services exchanged by men, cannot 
accommodate objects and services that satisfy only desires, not absolute 
needs, and cater only to individual dispositions, not to vital functions. […] 
Any exchange of things having value for all, in return for things having value 
for some but not for others. (HP, 179)  
 
This is the context for Valéry’s analysis of the value of spirit as conceived of through an 
analogy to oil, wheat, and gold values (HP, 190). That is to say, commodities such as 
those listed here all gain their value from an evaluation driven by means of equalisation. 
Referring implicitly to the principle of general equality, Valéry goes on to say that a 
commerce of spiritual values has ‘just as much meaning on the internal market […] as in 
the world of material interests’ (HP, 191). Thus, the determination of all values on the 
sole condition of their exchangeability with one another becomes the principle of the 
reification or “thingification” of every-thing. As has been seen, this principle implies that 
that which has value for all has no value in and of itself, but rather the value of something 
is evaluated strictly with respect to its comparability value to other things. Valéry thus 
analyses spiritual value by analogy with, for example, gold—an analogy with which the 
price of spirit is thereby calculated in terms of its importance, its rarity. 
Ultimately, Valéry wants to make use of the Nietzschean account of the 
“transmutation of values” in order to show how the discourse of values carries with it the 
movement of nihilism—a movement comprised of a gradual shift from an appreciation 
of the spirit as the highest value to an estimation of spiritual values with respect to a 
general equality whereby the spirit is ultimately robbed of its singular esteem. What this 
leads to is an altered sense of the spiritual value that seems ‘to be suffering the same fate 
as material values.’ (HP, 190) According to this view, the material and spiritual 
economies of “our time” are intimately bound together in an original co-belonging to the 
principle of general equality. For Valéry, this interrelation means that the different 
economies can be ‘summed up as a simple conflict of evaluations.’ (HP, 191) In light of 
this discussion, I proceed by drawing out Valéry’s implicit claim that the two economies 
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mentioned above cannot be opposed to one another, such that spirit would become 
opposed to matter. 
 
 THE ARCHI-ECONOMY OF SPIRIT 
One central purpose of Valéry’s understanding of the relation between the spiritual and 
the material is to support his key argument that these two notions are to be conceived of 
less as separated and more as contradictory economies that are bound together. While 
these two economies are distinguished in terms of that which is useful and useless, Valéry 
highlights the interrelation between the spiritual and the material by focusing in on how 
their contradictory products in actuality belong to the same organ (HP, 188). Valéry 
confirms this interrelatedness when he declares that ‘there is an analogy of functions’ 
between the two economies that has a ‘profound substantive origin, since the organism 
itself governs it.’ (HP, 189) Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of Valéry’s 
analogy, however, we should first make several observations on the material and the 
spiritual. 
 As made apparent by the etymological heritage of “spirit” as traced through the 
Greek πνεῦμα, the Latin spiritus, the German Geist, and the French l’esprit—
acknowledging the neglect of the Hebrew ruah, to say nothing of the vast differences 
between these terms—spirit is often conceived of as immaterial and is thereby held to be 
the opposite of matter and the material.267 
While at first glance it appears as if Valéry unquestioningly adopts a very similar 
spiritual/material binary view due to his definition of spirit as a transformative power, in 
a 1939 essay he straightforwardly calls the conception of the spiritual as set up in 
opposition to the material an ‘outworn antithesis’ (HP, 185). Indeed, what at first seems 
to be the result of this worn-out meaning, namely, that the discussion of the spirit is 
reduced to an estimation of its value on the global market of equalisation and thereby 
becomes emptied out of its essence, under more careful investigation turns out to be a 
derivative mode of what Valéry calls the primacy of spirit: ‘the spirit came first’ (HP, 
194). 
Again, this primacy certainly incorporates aspects of the traditional account of 
spirit, which Valéry apparently approves of when he contends that spirit is nearly 
                                                          
267 In the Buber-Rosenzweig translation of the Bible, it is stated that spirit is not the opposite of matter in 
that the Hebrew word  ֫וּח  ַ   (ruach) as a hapax legomenon, represents the archi-word (Urwort) that 
‘encompasses in itself both spirit and nature’ (Rosenzweig 1979: 793). 
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synonymous with the word, the λόγος and refers to the biblical passage from the Gospel 
of John: ‘In the beginning was the Word [Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος]’ (John 1:1). Valéry’s 
position, then, may surprise the reader, for in his view it is ‘the commerce of spirits that 
was necessarily the first commerce in the world, the very first, the one that started it all’—
that is to say, the original: ‘for before swapping goods, it was necessary to swap signs, 
and consequently a set of signs had to be agreed on.’ (HP, 194) As discussed above, 
Valéry introduces the notion that the spirit not so much “has” as it “is” the power to 
structure the world through an originary belief that is present at the origin of commerce. 
Another way of putting this is to say, in rather blunt terms, that the material and the 
economic are themselves neither something material nor economic precisely in that spirit 
constitutes the ἀρχή of economy as the condition without which there would be no market 
and no exchange. Spirit is therefore, in short, the archi-economy upon which all other 
economies are based.   
This reading may seem to open up a broader scope for the meaning of spirit than 
that allowed by Valéry’s writings themselves. This is because the manner by which 
Valéry speaks of language as ‘the first instrument of all trade’ (HP, 194) as well as the 
spirit as λόγος might lead us to the view that the word, being spoken as the first seed of 
trade, acts almost as a kind of zero point of trade, that is, a zero full (or empty) of infinite 
possibilities, in that it emerges as the founding origin of exchange.268 In order to sidestep 
such a reading that perhaps only strengthens our suspicion that Valéry adheres to a 
metaphysical account of the spirit, I would suggest that it might be more fruitful to 
articulate the word as always already referring us to a thought of spirit and hence to an 
origin that appears to have no sense before its genitive structure (cf. ED, 169/115). 
The genitive structure of spirit has been well described by Derrida, who, although 
in a context of writing on Heidegger (with Valéry nevertheless in mind), suggests that the 
λόγος entails a gathering together of spirit in its relation to itself as other than itself. Thus, 
if spirit is bound up with the ἀρχή in general, this origin, conceived of as the identity of 
spirit with itself is immediately heterogeneous (DE, 176/106-107). Yet, if the origin is 
always already heterogeneous, as Derrida reminds us, and if the spirit, according to 
Valéry, is originary, one could say that such spirit is never given as such but always as 
                                                          
268 Interestingly, however, while Valéry takes his cue from a biblical Greek tradition, Derrida provides 
another avenue for understanding Valéry’s archaeology, in that Derrida takes into account Valéry’s Au sujet 
d’Eurêka, which he ends as follows: ‘“IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE FABLE. It will always be.”’ (BS I, 
257/190; Œ I, 867) Derrida’s point is, hence, not word or λόγος was in the beginning, but the Fable, as its 
Latin name indicates, is ‘first of all Speech.’ (BS I, 257/190)    
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other than itself, that is, given as the spirit of spirit.269 In light of our discussion of the 
self-reflection of spirit, this means that spirit—having to double itself as itself in order to 
appear in the first place—brings to the fore the question as to whether the incongruous 
spirit of spirit is, in fact, capable of grasping itself “in itself” as one or whether the 
duplicity of spirit has always already contaminated its own ἀρχή, which in turn is the 
origin of everything. Hence, if spirit continues to be the origin, one could argue that this 
origin is delivered over to its own collapse in that the spirit is, from the beginning, a 
transmission, a transport, and a passage that cannot serve as a basis on which to posit a 
‘normative difference’ (Schürmann 2003: 550) between the spirit and its other. In other 
words, the gesture by which Valéry attempts to think the spirit as spirit, is not merely 
meant to state an insurmountable distance between spirit and itself, but also is intended 
to show how the essence of spirit is always already intertwined with its other. 
In other words, spirit does not name a substance resting solely on itself—unless the 
very designation “itself” also sets itself apart—but, to the contrary, spirit indicates a 
movement that is defined in virtue of what Nancy has called the exhaustion of the ‘regime 
of signification’ (Nancy 1997b, 5). Such an exhaustion signifies precisely that spirit no 
longer has (if it ever had) an assignable sense but rather designates that which remains 
measureless. That is to say, spirit is removed (or removes itself) from the property of 
being represented as a separate entity gathered in itself, as a λόγος in that spirit itself “is” 
relation—or, to be more precise, it is the very opening of relation that is separation. 
 
THE ANALOGY OF SPIRIT 
With regards to the spirit as an opening of relation or a relation to openness, Valéry’s 
reassessment of spirit as ‘the ability, the need, and the energy to separate and to develop 
thoughts and acts which are not necessary to the functioning of our organism,’ (HP, 187) 
indicates the overall structure of an analogic argument. As I have pointed out above, 
although the logic of analogy that Valéry draws on when trying to explain the notion of 
spirit, introduces a certain parallelism between the material and spiritual economy, this 
same logic nevertheless seems to refer us back to a dissymmetry between spirit and value. 
What evokes this dissymmetry is something of the spirit that does not belong to the value 
of spirit, and hence to the relation that the spiritual economy of value establishes. Indeed, 
                                                          
269 In his 1971 essay Qual Quelle, Derrida reminds us of the origins, the sources, which in Valéry—a Valéry 
other than Valéry—‘could multiply themselves infinitely’ (M, 327/275). 
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one will find in Valéry a figure of spirit that is neither “valuable” nor “spiritual” but 
“otherwise.” However, as Valéry reminds us, since the spirit “itself” is indecipherable, 
we are compelled to probe the essence of spirit by analogy to another known notion. Any 
such analogy, for Valéry, only makes sense because it reveals that there is something 
about the spirit that we do not know. In what follows, I will try to clarify Valéry’s 
employment of analogy. 
 Whilst acknowledging that there does indeed exist a rich tradition regarding the 
notion of analogy, I would here like merely to note two salient points. The first point 
pertains to the general meaning of value, regardless of whether such value is articulated 
on a spiritual or a material level. In any case, value is determined as a relation by which 
the analogy between the spiritual and the material is based upon a comparison not 
between terms but rather between relations.270 The second point is that an analogy 
expresses a similarity of relations, meaning that each value as relational stands out from 
itself and toward another as well as towards itself as an other. In what follows, it is 
therefore important to note at the outset that the type of analogy at stake in this discussion 
is one that is made up of heterogeneous relations, for example, the analogy regarding the 
functions of an organism that  Valéry employs in order to draw a connection between the 
material and the spiritual.271 
 While the first point is an explicit conception of analogy, the second pertains to the 
implicit structuring of the analogy as determining not only a similarity between relations 
but also a dissimilarity. To put it in another way, the analogy is not only constructed out 
of a mediation between the two similar economic relations, but also out of a separation in 
the sense that this analogy opens up the relation of relations to the other of the analogy, 
that is, to the aneconomy of the analogy between the spiritual and material economies. In 
this case, the analogy, as we know from Derrida’s reading of Valéry, performs a double 
gesture insofar as it determines not merely a relation as the mediation between two values, 
as if the analogy were to present spirit in itself, but also exposes a radical dissymmetry 
between these relations whereby the limits of the analogy itself are exposed. As Derrida 
                                                          
270 For instance, if two relations are symmetrical, whereby the value of one relation is analogous to the 
value of the other, then the analogy designates a (mathematical) proportionality (e.g. 2:4=8:16). See, for 
instance, Plato’s ‘proportion between the things’ (Rep. 534a). 
271 Valéry’s analogy gets even more complicated by the fact that there is not only an analogy between two 
relations, but also between these relations and the organism, designating not so much an entity as a mode 
of activities and functions as a relation between its organs. As Stiegler puts it, the analogy of organism is 
always an organology, which, because of its contradicting economies, is also a pharmacology insofar as 
what an organ can accomplish in the material economy ‘may be contrary to what this very same organ 
makes possible in the spiritual economy’ (Stiegler 2013a: 13). 
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notes in L’autre cap, the thrust of Valéry’s analogic is premised on the claim that ‘spirit 
is one of the categories of the analogy and the incomparable condition, the transcendental, 
the transcategorical of the whole economy.’ (AC, 94n.8/123n.8)272 In a certain sense, 
then, by establishing the analogy as a manner by which spirit encounters itself (as a 
comparable value), spirit as the other of the analogy at the same time withdraws from its 
comparison. 
 Despite the withdrawal at work in the analogical relation, one attribute of the spirit 
that remains is that of λόγος. As we have underscored in the discussion above, at the 
origin of spirit Valéry finds the λόγος—a term which he translates as ‘calculation, reason, 
speech, discourse, and knowledge’ (HP, 194), as though such words gestures at something 
synonymous. As Derrida has suggested, this originary λόγος reflects a yearning for 
gathering the spirit into one whereby the spirit is that which ‘regulates all analogy and 
which itself is not analogical.’ (E, 19) In this respect, one may say that Valéry’s most 
characteristic employment of the term “spirit” is one by which he attempts to elicit it as a 
value whereby it enters into exchange with other values. But as soon as spirit enters into 
an economic circulation, it is evaluated in such a manner that the analogy manifests what 
it cannot describe precisely in that spirit as the archi-economy constitutes the source of 
all value. This clarification enables Derrida to argue that Valéry’s ‘original spiritualism 
indeed presents itself as a logocentrism,’ (AC, 96n.8/125n.8)—a logocentrism that under 
certain (Greco-European) conditions, privileges the structure of λόγος as reason, speech, 
calculation, etc. 
On this reading, the orientation of the analogy between the spiritual and the material 
is determined by a spiritual arche-telic schema that proceeds from and returns to the origin 
of spirit as λόγος. That is to say, its dynamic unfolds according to a logocentrism in terms 
of which the spirit presents itself so as to place itself in an “anteriority” in view of the 
similarity and dissimilarity whereto the analogy attests. A further consequence of such a 
logocentric presupposition is that if everything were to be measured on a scale where the 
spirit was afforded the highest value as that which is the ‘the universal analogical 
equivalent,’ (E, 18) the spirit would thereby become the “thing” that is ultimately 
responsible for bringing all values into exchange. In other words, spirit becomes the 
“thing” through which every-thing receives its value as exchangeable with any-thing. 
Succinctly put, spirit would be an absolute value or the value of the absolute. 
                                                          
272 Derrida continues: ‘It is an example and an exemplary example, the example par excellence.’ (AC, 
94n.8/123n.8) 
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However, the economy according to which spirit appears as the ἀρχή that becomes 
the fixed equivalent of exchange, such that spirit itself is accorded a presence precisely 
on account of a logocentric interpretation of λόγος, might turn out to be deceiving.273 In 
fact, if spirit presents itself as the λόγος, one could argue that it presents itself only as it 
withdraws as the idea of λόγος. Hence, instead of returning to itself as the ideality of 
reality, the idea of spirit effaces its ideality in order to be what it is; yet, that which spirit 
“is” is ultimately not, and cannot simply be itself in that it must redouble itself so as to be 
itself in the first place.274 
As I have been suggesting throughout this section, perhaps it is the very figure of 
the spirit, particularly the figure of the spirit as archi-economy that becomes disfigured 
by the spirit “itself” through the encounter with its other essence or, as Derrida says, with 
the ‘origin-heterogeneous’ (DE, 176/107). With this almost archi-origin of spirit as the 
origin of Europe (as the spirit of Europe)—a particular origin that we have argued is to 
be understood as that which is at once heterogeneous from the origin, heterogeneous to 
the origin, and ‘heterogeneous because it is and although it is at the origin’ (DE, 
177/108)—one may suggest that the spirit is rendered unrecognisable from within the 
economy of which it is supposed to be the origin. As such, the figure of spirit prefigures 
within itself not only another spirit but also an other than spirit, and in this manner it 
projects retrospectively towards an ἀρχή that appears always already to be broken.275 
In order to develop these critical questions of spirit in greater depth, I turn now to 
another aspect of Valéry’s analogy of spirit—namely, that the analogy withdraws what it 
seems to be giving, that is, a definition of spirit.  
 
  ALMOST NOTHING: THE SPIRIT GOING UP IN SMOKE  
The overall aim of this chapter has been to investigate Valéry’s understanding of spirit, 
and in carrying out this task we have discovered that there are indeed astonishing insights 
                                                          
273 Derrida’s parenthetical remark in the midst of a discussion on Mauss, the gift, and madness from Donner 
le temps seems to support this suggestion: ‘As Valéry says of spirit, the gift would be at once a value and 
the—priceless—origin of all value.’ (DT, 64/44) 
274 One may think here of the empty word with which Hegel begins his Wissenschaft der Logik II: ‘The 
logic exhibits the self-movement of the absolute Idea only as the original word, which is an utterance 
[Äußerung], but an utterance that inasmuch as it is immediately vanishes [verschwunden] again as 
something outer [Äußeres]’ (HW 6, 550). This reference is indebted to Nancy 2001b: 107. 
275 This is what Schürmann calls “anarchy,” designating an inner break that has already happened from the 
beginning so that the archic remains originally indistinguishable from the anarchic. That is to say, spirit as 
the first, as the ἀρχή, is anarchic—for if it had an ἀρχή, spirit would no longer be first (Schürmann 2003: 
529; 629). 
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to be gathered from a double reading of Valéry (cf. D, 10/4). Thus, even though one may 
have encountered the notion of spirit in various forms, such as the power of 
transformation, the absolute value, and the logocentric category, one is nevertheless at 
the same time also exposed to its crisis. For, in the midst of celebrating the achievements 
of spirit, Valéry hits upon the theme of crisis understood not as a destitution that leads to 
the subordination of spirit under the sway of materialism, but, rather, crisis as the 
instigation of a kind of disorder that forestalls any return to spirit’s ultimate authority. 
What is crucial to our double reading is therefore the constitutive value of spirit—or, more 
precisely, the absolute value of spirit—according to which spirit appears by detaching 
(absolutum) itself from every relation, even the relation to itself. As I would read it, then, 
there remains a kind of value or esteem to spirit that escapes from its presence precisely 
in that the spirit affirms its absolute value as the withdrawal of its own essence.276 
 Accordingly, the absolute value of spirit is no longer comparable or relative to a 
foundation or a substantial determination of spirit; rather, the absoluteness of the value of 
spirit designates a relation that is itself incommensurable—perhaps even a relation to the 
incommensurable. In Notre destin et les lettres, a lecture given at the Université des 
Annales in 1937, Valéry explains this relation in the following manner: 
 
But again, whether real or ideal, that value [of spirit] is incommensurable; it 
cannot be measured in society’s terms. A work of art is worth a diamond to 
some, a pebble to others. It cannot be assessed in man hours [remembering 
that Marx defines “values” by the labour required to produce the commodity]; 
it cannot, therefore, figure as a universally negotiable currency for every kind 
of exchange. The useful is that which satisfies men’s physiological needs, 
whose possession frees man from some sensation of pain or deficiency, some 
physically defined depreciation. (HP, 178)    
 
Accordingly, we see with clarity that within Valéry’s thought regarding the declining 
value of spirit a resuscitation of the question concerning the dignity of spirit is already at 
work. Precisely this is the basis of Valéry’s persistent interest in the question of spirit. In 
following a Kantian line of argument, Valéry seems to develop the idea that the dignity 
                                                          
276 Recognising Derrida’s specification of Valéry’s spiritualism that presents itself as logocentrism, one 
might suggest that Valéry’s definition of spirit cannot be oriented toward presence as such but rather to a 
showing itself. In this sense, Valéry’s “spirituology” transforms into a “monstrology” insofar as the 
determination of λόγος as discourse, calculation, rationality, etc., shifts into a showing (monstrare) whereby 
a moment of non-presence becomes interior to the presence of spirit. I owe this point to Sallis 2000: 42.     
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of spirit remains unappropriable due to the very fact that it resides beyond all value.277 To 
be sure, this consideration of the absolute dignity of spirit invites the question of what 
exactly this spiritual dignity might consist in. As we have seen, however, this question 
presupposes a knowledge that not only lends itself to a hypostatisation of spirit but also 
shrinks from being called into question in the question in such a manner that the question 
of spirit thereby runs the risk of being too vague, or simply “indecipherable” as such. 
 In order to remain consistent with what I have been suggesting throughout this 
chapter, we should note that articulating the question of dignity might serve to reissue the 
question of spirit as a way of looking further into the spirit’s ambiguous essence. 
Therefore, when Valéry, following in the footsteps of an immense, long, and highly 
complex philosophical and theological tradition concerned with the meaning of spirit, 
undertakes a discussion of the spirit, he raises doubt not only about whether the spirit is 
able to master what it has created, but also about whether the spirit is to be considered 
powerful or powerless with respect to the question of saving the world and thereby itself 
(HP, 138). Valéry underscores that the aim of his writing is not to justify spirit, that is, to 
develop a sort of pneumadicy that he remarks would be an attempt to determine the 
‘spirit’s current value and its future or probable value’ (HP, 138). Instead, Valéry 
attempts, as we have come to see in our double reading of his work and his reissuing of 
spirit, to think how the saving power of spirit takes place only where the crisis of spirit is 
at stake.278 Given this, one could suggest that one is not readily able to rescue the spirit 
from its crisis by transferring it to its absolute worth of dignity due to the fact that in 
turning its transformative power against itself the spirit incessantly inverts itself into its 
own opposite and thereby engenders an indignity of (un)spirit.279 In other words, spirit 
has interiorised what remains other than spirit—a movement that plays out not in the 
sense of an appropriation reducible to a moment in the overall formation of spirit, but 
rather in the sense of ex-appropriation according to which spirit “itself” is always already 
intimated by the exteriority of its other. 
                                                          
277 This is not the place to rehearse a complex history of dignity—from Pico to Kant, and beyond—but 
merely to note that for Kant the positing of law determining all values must have ‘eine Würde’ in the sense 
of an unconditional and incommensurable worth (unvergleichbaren Werth). Cf. KW 6, BA 79. 
278 I note that this indeed very Heideggerian question is considered by Heidegger himself as he ponders 
with respect to the Hölderlinian stanza “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächts / Das Rettende auch” whether or not 
art could expressly foster the growth of the saving power (GA 7, 35-36). Thus, towards the end of Die 
Frage nach der Technik, Heidegger defines τέχνη not merely as the origin of technology but rather as the 
production (ποίησις) of truth in the arts (schönen Künste) (GA 7, 35). 
279 See Stiegler 2013a: 149n.18. 
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 At this point, I would like to go one step further in the discussion of the valorisation 
of spirit in order to consider the radicality of its crisis. Towards this end, allow me to 
return to La liberté de l’esprit where Valéry, on the background of the rising and falling 
of the great stock markets of 1939, brings into relief ‘the price we are willing to pay for 
the value we call the spirit.’ (HP, 190) In the same fashion that all value is inscribed 
within the principle of general equivalence, spirit too has come to fluctuate in obedience 
to this same principle. Yet, as Valéry writes, ‘All these values, rising and falling, 
constitute the great stock market of human affairs. On that market, spirit is “weak”—it is 
nearly always falling.’ (HP, 190) This is a remarkable idea, and it should prompt us to 
ask how we are to understand this near perpetual fall of spirit. As I see it, it is the very 
inscription of spirit into the equating market of value that allows Valéry to imagine a 
spirit fallen from its height of supremacy. In order for something to be subjected to a fall, 
it must somehow or another be burdened with a weight—a weight that itself serves merely 
as the predisposition for something to fall. Regarding the spirit, it might appear as though 
its very evaluation is what allows the spirit to sink, in which case the spirit can no longer 
be distinguished from its own weight, that is, from the differing values that have been 
attached to it throughout its entire tradition.280 
On the one hand, then, spirit is weighed down by its inscription into the market of 
valorisation, while, on the other hand, the absolute value of spirit retains an attestation of 
its withdrawal from any relation in which it would be deemed measurable. However, on 
account of this duplicity pertaining to spirit it can no longer distinguish itself from what 
is not “itself.”281 In other words, the withdrawal of spirit from itself constitutes a “spirit 
without spirit,” as it were, that both touches upon the innermost core of spirit and remains 
an exteriority. It is for this reason I am stressing that the transformative power of spirit is 
at the same time a transformation of itself, which it does not master, whereby the power 
of spirit also becomes a testimony of its impotence and its weakness. For Valéry, the 
testimony of spirit is its creation, that is, a world that without an ἀρχή conceals nothing 
                                                          
280 Augustine states that God is measure (mensura), number (numerus), and weight (pondus). Accordingly, 
God “is” the weight without weight (pondus sine pondere est) because God in itself (esse ipsum) is the 
standard for what derives from it, while it does not itself derive from anything else (Augustine 1894: 
IV.8.4).  
281 On this last point, it is worth recalling how the transformation of spirit, as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra tells 
us, debouches into the spirit of weight (Geist der Schwere), which burdens us with its heavy words and 
values (KSA 4, 241-245). Meanwhile, we may ponder whether these heavy words and values are already 
exposed to their self-debasement in the madman’s question—‘What after all are these churches and now if 
they are not the graves and tombs of God?’ (KSA 3, 160)—to the extent that the transformative power of 
spirit is itself transformed. In short, one might ponder whether or not the spirit of weight becomes the weight 
of spirit that pulls not only its creations down but also itself. 
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but its very own unmasterable “nature.” Hence, if the world is always spiritual, as 
Heidegger also seems to claim, it is so only insofar as the spirit no longer reproduces itself 
in the form of a world; rather, it marks itself as an illimitation of its own unworlding in 
becoming-planetary.282 
 While such a reading of Valéry is no doubt highly speculative and inferential, it 
may also serve as a useful catalyst for inspiring further reflection on Valéry’s 
understanding of the spirit. This is the case precisely in that this reading considers the 
phrase spirit of spirit, here understood as a relation of spirit to itself, in such a manner 
that the presence of the absolute other of spirit exposes spirit to an absence of ground or 
to an abyss that is initially given to it. Although it may appear as if we have departed 
significantly from the writings of Valéry, one could argue that our reading has 
nevertheless remained as faithful as possible to Valéry in that is has brought to light why 
Valéry’s understanding of the spirit cannot be employed merely for the sake of recovering 
some lost ideality of spirit. Moreover, our reading also suggests that we have not yet 
arrived at the end of the end of spirit, even if the spirit perhaps does not name anything 
other than the inexhaustible exhaustion of the very power of spirit. 
 These last comments concerning the withdrawal and exhaustion of spirit indicate 
how spirit becomes almost nothing. Noting that the spirit has transformed the world, and 
that the world is repaying this transformation in kind, Valéry writes that ‘the spirit is 
unpredictable, nor can it predict itself […]. If then we impose on the human world the 
ways of the spirit, the world becomes just as unpredictable; it takes on the spirit’s 
disorder.’ (HP, 176) Furthermore, Valéry goes on to say that ‘we know nothing about the 
spirit itself’ (HP, 184). As Mallarmé puts it, some-thing weighs on spirit so that ‘its total 
equals spiritually nothing, almost [spirituellement à rien, presque],’ (Mallarmé 1945: 
398) and the transformative power of spirit results in a transformation of the sense of 
spirit. Hence, while Valéry defines spirit as the power of transformation, this power is 
transforming itself to such an extent that the very sense of spirit is transformed with the 
consequence that spirit is taken to its extreme where, in the words of Hölderlin, it enters 
into ‘the night of the present [die Nacht der Gegenwart]’ where it finds ‘no salvation 
[keine Rettung].’ In this situation of insolvency, as it were, spirit is ‘standing as a criminal 
                                                          
282 One can put this in a slightly different manner, as does Nancy, inasmuch as the spirit (of onto-theology) 
has produced itself as a subject of the world, that is, as a world-subject or world-spirit. In so doing, however, 
the spirit simultaneously subjugates itself as the supreme referent of the world and transforms itself in the 
existence for-itself of the world without an outside. See Nancy 2007a: 44.   
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[Verbrecher] before history’ (HCD, 307) exposed to an embarrassing sense of the 
remembrance of its vanished greatness.  
The withdrawal of spirit, by which the trace of spirit re-inscribes itself as that which 
is almost nothing, emphasises the duplicity that the spirit’s exhaustion of itself is at the 
same time that from which spirit also draws its power. Such duplicity is evidenced by the 
instability of the notion of spirit in Valéry’s writing since, as he remarks, ‘But that value 
[of spirit], the value produced by the poet’s hand, is complex, ambivalent, and, in both 
cases, essentially unstable. It is composed of one part reality (that is, it can sometimes be 
exchanged for money) and one part smoke indeed’ (HP, 178; my emphasis). Although 
Valéry adds that the value of spirit may one day solidify into some monumental work, the 
essence of spirit does not equivocally present itself as an idea, as the λόγος, or as the fire, 
flame, burning (Der Geist ist das Flammende, der Flamme), which Heidegger presents 
in his 1952 reading of Trakl. Or, if spirit would in fact present itself as any one of these 
things, such a presentation would be due to spirit’s affection of itself, which, as Derrida 
reminds us, means that spirit ‘gets affected by fire’ (DE, 133/84) in its own incineration 
of itself. But perhaps the spirit never was the flame in order for it to become affected by 
fire; rather, spirit was perhaps nothing but the effect, the vestige, or the smoke of an absent 
fire.283    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
283 I am indebted to Nancy’s account of the vestige, see Nancy 1996b: 96-98. 
216 
 
CLOSING REFLECTIONS 
Wer kann das heute sagen? 
Wir wissen, daß der Geist sich blamiert 
 (Jacob Taubes 1993: 62) 
 
In the preceding six chapters of this thesis we have been presented to two main strands in 
the tradition of the spiritual geography of Europe, namely, the two strands found in the 
writings of Heidegger and Valéry. To conclude this work I would like to draw out some 
closing reflections on its body: first by outlining the course of the thesis in a brief 
recapitulation of its essential themes; and second, by considering the spirit of Europe in 
light of the subtitle of the present dissertation, “the end of spirit,” so as to give some shape 
to the thought of “spirit” today. 
 Let me recall what was already stated in the introduction, namely, that the title of 
the thesis, “The Spirit of Europe,” signals towards a double movement taking place in the 
writings of both Heidegger and Valéry—a double movement concerning, on the one hand, 
the rise of the question of Europe and, on the other hand, the crisis of Europe’s spirit. In 
order to fully expound on this double movement, the two parts of the thesis were 
developed as a sort of thinking together with Derrida and his various readings of both 
Heidegger and Valéry. However, Derrida’s intermediary function in the thesis by no 
means serves to establish some dialectical resolution between the two thinkers, in such a 
manner that the works of Heidegger and Valéry could be viewed simply as two aspects 
of the same determinate object called “the spirit of Europe.” Rather, Derrida’s position 
in-between Heidegger and Valéry constantly engages the fragile opening that the notion 
Europe constitutes within their texts without it being able to gather itself in a unified sense 
determined by its spirit. Accordingly, we have sought to show how Europe, as Derrida 
writes, ‘opens itself, it has already begun to open itself, and it is necessary to take note 
of this, which means to affirm in recalling, and not simply to record or store up in the 
archives a necessity that is already at work anyway. It has begun to open itself onto the 
other shore of another heading’ (AC, 74/75-76). 
 Throughout the thesis, I have tried, on the one hand, not to infuse its voice too 
heavily with the (idiomatic) voices of Heidegger and Valéry, while, on the other hand, 
allowing their writings to speak for themselves, as it were. As outlined in the introduction, 
however, the thesis does approach the writings with which it engages with a certain 
interpretative strategy in that it aims at setting up an encounter between Heidegger and 
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Valéry through the ambiguous situation of Europe’s heading as it is traced out in 
Derrida’s L’autre cap. 
 Hence, although the many aspects of what “Europe” and “spirit” represent to 
Heidegger and Valéry are as different as their respective manner of thought, the thesis 
has sought to show that the two thinkers nevertheless both regard Europe as representing 
an essential feature of the world. This feature is determined precisely by the notion of 
spirit, which constitutes a sort of structure or logic of the world. As such, Heidegger 
argues that the world is always spiritual wherefore the roots of the darkness that he takes 
to be spreading across the world must be uncovered through a questioning of spirit. 
Valéry, for his part, seeks to describe and to understand the transformations taking place 
in and of the world in the aftermath of the Great War in terms of the spirit defined as a 
power of transformation that turns out also to be a power of disempowerment. 
Yet, despite of the possibility of setting up an encounter between Heidegger and 
Valéry through the spirit of Europe, significant differences remain. The thesis illustrated 
one such difference by showing how Valéry’s idea of Europe, as it is exemplified by the 
Greek spirit appropriated by the Mediterranean basin into a Greco-Roman strand, remains 
wholly foreign to Heidegger’s idea of Europe, which displays an unmistakable preference 
for the “Germans,” whom Heidegger claims are standing in an inner relationship with 
Greek language and thought. Another difference became evident by way of contrasting 
Heidegger’s frequent unflattering remarks about Europe with Valéry’s positioning of 
Europe at the very apex of the world, even if this privileged position is also said to be in 
the process of exhausting itself in a general equalisation. 
After this brief outlining of the Greco-Germanic and the Greco-Roman strands of 
Europe’s heading of which the two names Heidegger and Valéry are representatives, let 
us resume the overall path by which we have arrived at these closing reflections. 
 
 OUTLINE OF CENTRAL THEMES 
Part One of the dissertation introduced the overall aim of charting the development of the 
(to some extent) subdued question of Europe in Heidegger’s writings. Insofar as the motif 
of Europe does play a role in Heidegger’s thought, however, it is as a name for the 
“modern Evening-land,” which Heidegger regards as the end stage and completion of 
metaphysics. Chapters One to Three addressed Heidegger’s question of Europe in terms 
of the need to arrive at a deeper understanding of the question of Being than that of the 
fundamental question of metaphysics. Chapter One thus introduced Heidegger’s notion 
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of Europe in the 1930s in order to prepare the way for an in-depth analysis of his 1935 
lecture course Einführung in die Metaphysik. The reason for placing so great an emphasis 
on this course was that it not only establishes the groundwork for Heidegger’s question 
of Being, but also contains the most elaborate and detailed exposition of his reflections 
on the question of Europe. Chapter Two developed this point by suggesting that 
Heidegger by his return to the Greeks sought to uncover the question of Being from its 
oblivion throughout the history of metaphysics. In returning to the Greeks, however, 
Heidegger also discovers how deep-seated the affinity between the question of Being and 
that of Europe is, in that the destiny of Europe is said to depend on the translation and 
elision of the single Greek letter “ε”—an elision, moreover, that Heidegger regards as a 
spiritual matter. Chapter Three reissued the question of Being in Heidegger’s Einführung 
in die Metaphysik and its relation to the European nihilism that was indicated at the end 
of Chapter One. This relation was advanced through a consideration of the phenomenon 
of “world-darkening”—a phenomenon that Heidegger defines in terms of the 
disempowering of spirit. In light of this definition, we argued that the question of Europe 
in Heidegger is inextricably bound up with the question of spirit, in that the 
disempowering of spirit comes from Europe itself such that Europe’s dire situation 
becomes a matter of its spiritual condition. In 1935, however, Heidegger’s appeal to the 
dire situation of Europe was made with the particular intention of situating within Europe 
the people of its centre—the Germans—for whom the question of spirit was truly 
endangered (and therewith the question of their destiny). Finally, it was suggested that 
Heidegger’s notion of the spirit implies a sort of autoimmunitarian dynamics in that spirit 
defined as the empowering of the powers of Being harbours within itself the power of its 
own becoming disempowering. For Heidegger, this autoimmunity of spirit plays itself out 
most evidently in the manner by which modern technology has become hegemonic in the 
Europe of his day. 
 Part Two of the thesis was dedicated to Valéry’s understanding of Europe in the 
aftermath of the Great War. Chapters Four to Six demonstrated how Valéry’s conception 
of the crisis of Europe should also be understood as a crisis of spirit. Chapter Four offered 
a survey of Valéry’s notion of Europe in the aftermath of the Great War—a war by which 
Valéry discerns a radical dislocation of the question of the European civilisation, given 
that it brought Europe to the realisation that the mortality of its civilisation is no different 
from the mortality of every other civilisation ever to have emerged and vanished in the 
world. The fourth chapter concluded with a discussion of the European crisis as one in 
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which the significance of Europe is levelled out into the endless array of crises such that 
there is no longer any one crisis and therefore no longer any one critical moment in which 
the future of Europe could be decided. Chapter Five continued the discussion from 
Chapter Four in order to elucidate how the crisis of Europe has become a “crisis of crisis,” 
in terms of which Europe has reached what Valéry calls a “perfect state of disorder.” In 
this perfect state of disorder, Valéry recognised a sort of globalised general equality 
according to which the inequality on the basis of which Europe had hitherto held a 
privileged position over against other parts of the world has disappeared. As an 
implication of the disappearance of Europe’s privileged difference, Chapter Six finally 
highlighted how Valéry, with the spreading disorder of general equality, discerned a 
transformation by which the spirit came to entertain a profound distrust of itself. 
Following this summary of the trajectory taken by this thesis, we might ask what, 
besides the immediate purview of the question of Europe in Heidegger and Valéry, does 
this thesis offer? In closing, I will argue that the exposition of the spirit of Europe 
presented by this thesis helps to prepare the way for further research into the ongoing 
discussion of an alleged “end of the spirit.” In other words, we will close off these closing 
remarks with an opening of the question concerning an end of spirit that apparently has 
no end. 
 
 THE END OF SPIRIT AS THE SPIRIT OF TODAY? 
Why take up the question of the spirit of Europe? As I mentioned in the introduction, 
European philosophers, poets, and thinkers have not ceased to entertain the idea of Europe 
as a spirit. From Hegel to Heidegger, Novalis, Husserl, Valéry, and others, the question 
of spirit has been associated with Europe in the sense that Europe has been identified as 
the very body of the spirit. However, in the wake of the two World Wars this spiritual 
body appears to have been gravely wounded. In discussing the spiritual situation of 
Europe after the Second World War, Karl Jaspers, for example, reconsiders the 
widespread idea of Europe as constituting the spiritual pearl of the globe—an idea 
according to which Europe designated the colonising appropriation of the globe (den 
Erdball kolonisatorisch aneignete). According to Jaspers, the postwar world experiences 
a transformation of hitherto unprecedented velocity such that ‘one must live with the 
globe before one’s eyes,’ rather than behind one’s eyes as a conquered territory. One 
consequence of this rapid transformation is, so Jaspers claims, that Europe no longer 
represents the body of spirit but rather that ‘Europe has become a little thing’ (Jaspers 
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1947: 17). Echoing Valéry, Jaspers thus describes how Europe finally come to identify 
itself with what it really is, which is nothing more than a little peninsula stretching from 
the Eurasian continent of the earth around the Mediterranean to the furthermost coasts of 
the Atlantic Ocean (Jaspers 1947: 7).284 As Lacoue-Labarthe puts it, ‘the situation is 
global [mondiale], and the situation of Europe, if something like that still exists, is no 
longer in Europe. […] Europe does not exist. In fact, the situation of Europe today 
responds to the globalisation [mondialisation] of Europe’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1985: 65).   
 As we have seen throughout the thesis, the phenomenon of globalisation plays an 
important part in both Heidegger’s and Valéry’s notions of Europe in that the crisis of the 
European spirit, as Valéry notes towards the end of his second letter of La crise de l’esprit, 
has come about because of phenomena such as ‘democracy, the exploitation of the globe, 
and the general spread of technology, all of which presages a deminutio capitis for 
Europe’ (HP, 36). In his 1959 lecture on Hölderlin, Heidegger discusses Valéry’s 
question of whether Europe is to become what it is, that is, a mere cape, or whether Europe 
is to remain the brain of the entire terrestrial globe, that is, the power that manages the 
technological-industrial calculation. Heidegger’s manner of responding to this question 
is strikingly similar to Valéry’s own, in that both thinkers emphasise an essential 
ambiguity of power and powerlessness pertaining to the European spirit, which becomes 
especially evident in their considerations of the European ‘technological-industrial 
domination [Herrschaftsbezirk] already covering the entire earth’ (GA 4, 176). 
 Following the two World Wars, then, it seems that we have been witnessing 
something like a disengagement of Europe from the spirit, which does not, however, 
immediately follow the same form or logic of the beheading or decapitating of the 
spiritual head of Europe (AC, 21/15).285 In order to see what is at stake in such a 
disengagement of Europe from the spirit, it might be worth recalling Derrida’s logic of 
exemplarity in order to clarify the thought of Europe as the body of spirit. For Derrida, 
the logic of exemplarity serves the purpose of elucidating how Europe as an historical-
empirical accident is supplemented by a universal value whereby Europe seeks to 
overcome its geographical particularity. Taking his point of departure from Valéry’s 
                                                          
284 As Jaspers’ contemporary, Jean-Paul Sartre in Orphée noir from 1948 similarly notes how Europe has 
become ‘no more than a geographic accident, the peninsula that Asia shoves into the Atlantic’ (Sartre 1988: 
292). 
285 I note here that the question for Derrida is the heading of Europe toward the ‘other of heading,’ that is, 
of how Europe can ‘respond, and in a responsible way—responsible for itself, for the other, and before the 
other—to the double question of le capital, of capital, and of la capital, of the capital?’ (AC, 21/16) 
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claim that Europe as a particular region of the globe has specialised in the sense of the 
universal—understood both as a meaning or value of Europe and as the direction of 
Europe enveloping the whole world—Derrida discusses how Europe, in assuming a value 
of universality, thereby becomes ‘linked to the value of exemplarity that inscribes the 
universal in the proper body of a singularity, of an idiom or a culture, whether this 
singularity be individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal, or not.’ (AC, 71/72; 
partly my emphasis) 
 In the course of the present work, we have seen how the motif of spirit to a certain 
extent runs parallel in Heidegger and Valéry. As has hopefully been made clear from the 
analysis undertaken in each particular case, the definition of the spiritual feature that 
makes possible such drawing of a parallel owes much to Derrida’s brilliant interpretations 
of Heidegger and Valéry. As Derrida shows in De l’esprit, the question of spirit is for 
Heidegger not just another question. Indeed, the name Geist is the question of the question 
in such a manner that Geist is that which offers the ‘essence and dignity of thought’ (DE, 
24/9) to our very questioning of the question of spirit. As such, for Heidegger Geist 
becomes the ‘unquestioned possibility of the question.’ (DE, 26/10) In parallel, Derrida 
in a note to L’autre cap, demonstrates how Valéry’s notion of esprit is not only a value 
among others, but is also the ‘sublime surplus value of the priceless,’ which is to say that 
spirit is the ‘incomparable condition’ (AC, 94n.8/123n.8) of any analogy between spirit 
and value. It is, in other words, the exemplary example of the spirit of Europe that shows 
how the spirit inscribes its exemplarity, its universality in the body of Europe. 
 In order to illustrate Derrida’s point that the exemplary logic of spirit ends up in a 
universalism proclaimed by nationalism, let me turn for a moment to Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
reading of the Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg’s Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts 
(1930). In his reading, Lacoue-Labarthe refers to the myth of Nazism as a myth of self-
foundation of the German people in order to emphasise how the realisation of myth is a 
power to gather together the fundamental forces and orientations of the German people 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 137/93-94). On this understanding, Lacoue-Labarthe makes the 
provocative claim that in the collapse of abstract universality ‘Nazism is a humanism in 
so far as it rests upon a determination of humanitas which is, in its view, more powerful—
i.e. more effective—than any other.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 135/95) In other words, 
Nazism is “successful” to the extent that it succeeds in defining how universal humanity 
is based on the particular Aryan race wherefore the Jews no longer belong to the 
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humanitas and remains a “foreign body” for European culture (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 
144/100).   
 Hence, bearing in mind Husserl’s description of Europe as having its ‘spiritual 
birthplace in ancient Greece such that the embodiment of universal value came to be 
Europe’s trademark—a value reserved for European humanity vis-à-vis the philosophers 
who thus became the functionaries of humanity (Hua VI, 72), one might, in view of the 
atrocities of the Second World War, ask whether we can still believe in ‘the phantasm of 
a “proper body” of Europe’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1987: 145/101)? In other words, can we 
still believe that Europe has an identity of its own, as though the spiritual inscription of 
the universal onto the body of Europe would designate the homogenous singularity of 
Europe? In the introduction to his terrific work from 1996, Des hégémonies brisées, 
Reiner Schürmann proposes the following thesis about postwar Europe: 
 
All that European humanity has made of itself in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and all that it is in the progress of doing to itself on a planetary scale 
in the second half that makes darkness so familiar to us, must have distant and 
profound origins. These are good enough reasons to suspect philosophers of 
shady dealings. Have they perhaps always received a return on their 
“principles” from dealings carried out in the dead of night? (Schürmann 2003: 
3)   
 
Schürmann’s rich thesis about Europe exceeds the horizon of this conclusion, but it does 
indicate to us the doubly disastrous characteristic of twentieth century Europe: on the one 
hand, the extermination of the Jews that became the act of Europe’s suicide in that the 
“foreignness” which the Jews represented turned out to be constitutive of Europe’s very 
own body; on the other hand, the colonisation by which Europe exploited the entire globe 
and thereby ended up exhausting itself.286 This double catastrophe of Europe invites us to 
ponder whether or not the spirit of Europe can be said to have come to an end. Has the 
spirit of Europe exhausted and devalued itself to such an extent that, as Derrida notes, no 
one ‘wants anything to do with it [spirit] anymore’? Moreover, in focusing particularly 
on ‘the entire family of Heideggerians, be they the orthodox or the heretical,’ Derrida 
                                                          
286 In an article “Au nom de l’Europe” in Le Monde (Nov. 6, 1992), Lacoue-Labarthe raises the question 
how to think of the spirit of Europe “after Auschwitz.” However, Lyotard has pointed out that in speaking 
in such manner one runs the risk of surreptitiously reintroducing a “we” and thereby a “spirit” whenever 
speaking about “Auschwitz:” ‘There would not even be a spirit, a spirit of the people or of a spirit of the 
world, which are wes, to repossess [ressaisir] the name “Auschwitz,” to think it and to think itself inside 
it.’ (Lyotard 1981: 298) 
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further asks why no member of this family ‘ever speaks of spirit in Heidegger. […] Why 
this filtering out in the heritage, and this discrimination?’ (DE, 16/3-4) 
 However, as Derrida also points out, even in trying to avoid speaking of spirit, for 
example by calling attention to the question of its end, we are already working in the 
service of the spirit of Europe and its self-understanding insofar as the spirit of Europe 
only ever comes to see itself ‘on the horizon, that is to say, from its end’ (AC, 32/28). 
Europe, in short, reveals its taste for death including its own. Such European discourse 
concerning the end of Europe is, however, already a ‘traditional discourse of modernity’ 
(AC, 32/28) in that this discourse, if one may put it thus, is essentially an apocalyptic-
eschatological discourse in that it brings the end of the European spirit into connection 
with a teleologically informed orientation of history towards its completion (AT, 8; 21). 
One may therefore be tempted to dispose of the discourse of the “end of spirit” in order 
not to succumb to the European chorus of the apocalypse. However, putting an end to the 
“end of spirit” is still, argues Derrida, to participate in this apocalyptic chorus in that one 
would still venture to utter the end of Europe in an ‘eschatological language.’ (AT, 21) 
 Given these precursory considerations that portray how the end of spirit has perhaps 
not come to an end after all, one might expect a return of spirit. However, the manner in 
which this return of spirit is articulated, amounts, as Derrida says of Heidegger, to an 
anachronistic or even a ‘provocatively “retro”’ (DE, 15/3) mode of thought. Still, such an 
anachronistic provocation of spirit does not necessarily designate a nostalgic return to the 
spirit of Europe as the brain of its terrestrial body, nor to the spirit as the end-goal of 
history. Rather, it is as if the anachronistic character of the spirit motif in Heidegger, and 
I would argue also in Valéry, brings into view how this spiritual motif in fact never comes 
on time. The return of spirit, in other words, has the effect of displacing the position of 
the spirit beforehand, as it were, so that the mode of thinking spirit retro-jects spirit 
toward an unforeseeable future—a future in which spirit returns only to realise how its 
originary position is always already preceded by something other than itself, as well as it 
is always already anticipated by something yet to come.287 
 As this thesis has attempted to show, to entertain the idea of an end of spirit—even 
if this designates the end of the end of spirit—will always be determined by a sort of 
latter-day discourse about Europe. However, as Derrida remarks, such a latter-day 
discourse seems to have ‘exhausted [épuisé] all the possibilities of discourse and counter-
                                                          
287 For a discussion of the structural similarity between immemorial past and immemorial future, see 
Bennington 2010: 19-34; Lawlor 2014: 128-130.  
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discourse about [the spirit of Europe’s] own identification.’ (AC, 30/26)288 What does it 
mean, then, to say that the spirit of Europe is exhausted, or even better, that the spirit of 
Europe is exhausting itself within an exhausted discourse? 
 To be sure, an exhausted Europe seems to designate an immensely tired Europe, 
that is, a Europe whose spirit is barely able to breathe in that Europe suffers from a 
“historical emphysema” resulting from the caesura of its double disaster “after” which 
Europe is struggling to catch its breath again. In the fierce words of a heavily smoking 
Lacoue-Labarthe in the film The Ister (2004), Europe has “pulmonary difficulties.” 
Hence, if the spirit of Europe or, rather, the spiritual existence of Europe, aspires to life 
such as the long history of πνεῦμα, spiritus, anima, animus, or ruah suggests to us, it does 
so only insofar as this life, echoing the famous passage in the preface to Hegel’s 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, neither shrinks from death nor keeps itself untouched by 
disaster. Instead, already the Hegelian spirit designates the life that ‘endures and 
maintains’ (HW 3, 36) death within itself as an essential negativity albeit without scarring. 
However, what has been revealed in the history of the proper body of the spirit, is that 
Europe has been irreconcilably wounded by its own deeds. That is to say that the spirit of 
Europe comes to find itself incarnated in a wound where it seeks to regain a hold of its 
death. Yet, the difficulty is that this death has been altered by the two World Wars and is 
perhaps no longer a death that is essential to the life of spirit but rather, as Sarah Kofman 
remarks, a death that has become ‘scandalously indifferent’ (Kofman 1998: 52) in the 
multiple death camps inhabiting the European body. 
 Thus, if we return to the question of the exhaustion of Europe’s spirit, another 
discourse about Europe is implied, which, as we have seen in both Heidegger and Valéry, 
is the discourse of a “general equivalence” according to which the spiritual destination 
for Europe is exhausting itself through an absence of destination (Nancy 2001a: 12).289 
In a certain sense, then, the exhaustion of Europe is also other than a tired Europe seeing 
                                                          
288 Thus, there seems to be a connection between the statement that Europe is exhausted, and that the very 
discourse about Europe as exhausted. In what follows, then, when I shall discuss the exhaustion of the spirit 
of Europe, I do not intend to attribute to spirit its own reality, but rather to refer to the idea, which Europe 
is said to embody, but which is determined within a certain regime of significance that has exhausted itself. 
Cf. Nancy 1997: 4. 
289 In November 1959 in his work notes to Le visible et l’invisible, Merleau-Ponty reflects on Valéry’s 
expression ‘body of the spirit [corps de l’esprit]’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 270) by stating that ‘the spirit is 
neither here, nor here, nor here… And yet, it is “attached,” “bound [lié],” it is not without bonds’ (Merleau-
Ponty 1964: 271). Visker has suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s enigmatic thought could be connected with 
what he calls the “Western problem” in that the spirit has abandoned its body, its bond, so much so that the 
discourse on the West has become vacant or, rather has been replaced by a discourse of capital, of 
technology that is ‘without bonds altogether’ (Visker 1999: 208).    
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as a tired Europe may no longer dispose of the resources to realise any of its possibilities, 
but these possibilities nevertheless still remain. Put differently, a tired Europe has only 
exhausted the realisation of the possible, whereas an exhausted Europe that has lost its 
breath has exhausted the very modes of the possible. As Deleuze puts the difference, the 
tired ‘can no longer realize, but the exhausted […] can no longer possibilize.’ (Deleuze 
1998: 152) Accordingly, it would seem that the spirit of Europe today is still exhausting 
itself in the exhaustion of the possible, and is in this manner putting an end even to the 
possibility of ending. As such, to speak of the spirit today is also to speak of the heritage 
of the spirit, that is, the heritage of spirit from which one always selects one spirit from 
the evocation of the spirit in the plural. As Derrida puts it, ‘There is always more than one 
spirit.’ (NEG, 111) and with this multiplying of spirit, we are bereft of the right to decree: 
‘“Spirit ends here!”’ (Janicaud 1997: 138) The end, then, as Beckett remarks, seems to 
appear only in the form of the im-possibility ‘to end yet again’ (Beckett 1976: 60). 
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